nent seat of the government of the United States. I. Stat. U. S. 130, sec. 1. "That a district of territory not exceeding ten miles square, to be located as hereafter directed, on the river Potomac, at some place between the mouths of the eastern branch and the Connogocheque, be and the same is hereby accepted for the permanent seat of the government of the United States, provided nevertheless, that the operation of the laws of the State [Md.] within such district shall not be affected by this acceptance until the time fixed for the removal of the government thereto, and until Congress shall otherwise by law provide." An amending act of 1791, I. St. U. S. 214, includes Alexandria town and county from Virginia in this act.' Retroceded in 1846.

1801.-An act concerning the District of Columbia, II. St. U. S. 103, sec. 1, that the laws of Virginia and Maryland respectively shall continue in force in the portions of the District ceded by them.. A supplementary act, II. St. U. S. 115, sec 6, "that in all cases where the constitution or laws of the United States provide that criminals and fugitives from justice or persons held to labor in any State escaping into another State shall be delivered up, the chief justice of the said district shall be and he is hereby empowered and required to

ture of the State in which the same shall be, for the erection of forts, magazines, arsenals, dockyards, and other needful buildings." But mere purchase of title for these purposes does not give jurisdiction to the United States. Story's Comm. § 1227 and citations. Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 424, and Story's Comm. §§ 12281235, is a leading case on the nature of the power of Congress. It is therein held that the legislation of Congress for the District is not like that of a territorial legislature, local in its extent, but is the act of the legislature of the Union; and, it would seem, has national extent while derived from national authority, or that Congress may give it that extent. The question might occur in connection with the subject of this treatise, if Congress should enact a law determining the status of persons within the District, whether such law had beyond the District any greater effect than a State law would have. It seems too that the status of persons within the District rests now on national authority; as much so as if it had been there established by an act of Congress. The doctrine of Cohens v. Virginia would also require the law of the District, the forts, &c., to be classed with municipal law, having national authority and national extent, in that distribution of the laws of the U. S. which was made ante, Vol. I. p. 455, or that it should be separately classed as a law having local or national extent, according to circumstances.

Congress has entire control over the District for every purpose of government. There is no division of powers, as between the general and a State government, Kendall v. the U. S. 12 Peters, 524.

The cession of the Maryland part of the District was made Dec. 23, 1788; of the Virginia portion, Dec. 3, 1789.

cause to be apprehended and delivered up such criminal fugitive from justice or person fleeing from service as the case may be, who shall be found within the District, in the same manner and under the same regulations as the executive authority of the several States are required to do the same; and executive and judicial officers are hereby required to obey all lawful precepts or other process issued for that purpose, and to be aiding and assisting in such delivery."

1802. An amending act, II. Stat. U. S. 193, sec. 7, that no part of the laws of Virginia and Maryland to be in force in the District "shall ever be construed so as to prohibit the owners of slaves to hire them within, or remove them to the said district in the same way as was practised prior to the passage of the last act." An act incorporating the inhabitants of Washington City, II. Stat. 195, sec. 2, confines the ballot to free whites. (1804, a supplementary act.) There is no mention made of slaves. Sec. 6. Among the powers of the corporation" to restrain and prohibit the night and other disorderly meetings of slaves, free negroes, and mulattoes, and to punish such slaves by whipping not exceeding forty stripes, or by imprisonment not exceeding six calendar months for any one offence, and to punish such free negroes and mulattoes for such offences by fixed penalties, not exceeding twenty dollars for any one offence; and in case of inability of any such free negro or mulatto to pay and satisfy any such penalty and costs thereon, to cause such free negro or mulatto to be confined to labor for such reasonable time, not exceeding six calendar months, as may be deemed equivalent to such penalty and costs."

1812.--An act to amend, &c. II. Stat. U. S. 755, sec. 9. "That hereafter it shall be lawful for any inhabitant or inhabitants in either of the said counties, [of Washington and Alexandria,] owning and possessing any slave or slaves therein, to remove the same from one county into another and to exercise freely and fully all the rights of property in and over the said slave or slaves therein which would be exercised over him, her or them, in the county from whence the removal was made,

1 But see Butler v. Duvall, 4 Cranch, 167. Lee v. Lee, 8 Peters, 44.

anything in the legislative acts in force at this time in either of the said counties to the contrary notwithstanding.""

1831. An act for the punishment of crimes in the District of Columbia. IV. St. U. S. 448, sec. 15-18, speak of slaves being punishable as therein provided, though concluding with, 'provided that this act shall not be construed to extend to slaves." 17. Declares the offence of carrying off free negroes with intent to keep or sell as a slave, punishable with fine and imprisonment.

1846.-An act to retrocede Alexandria county to Virginia. IX. St. U. S. 35. Sec. 3. That the existing jurisdiction and laws shall continue until Virginia shall provide by law for the extension of her "jurisdiction and judicial system." 4. Requires the assent of the inhabitants to the retrocession.

1850, Sep. 20. An act to suppress the slave trade in the District of Columbia.' IX. St. U. S. 467. Be it, &c., " that from and after the first day of January, eighteen hundred and fiftyone, it shall not be lawful to bring into the District of Columbia any slave whatever for the purpose of being sold, or for the purpose of being placed in depot, to be subsequently transferred to any other State or place to be sold as merchandise; and if any slave shall be brought into the said District by its owner or by the authority or consent of its owner contrary to the provisions of this act, such slave shall thereupon become liberated and free. 2. And be it, &c., that it shall and may be lawful for each of the corporations of the cities of Washington and Georgetown, from time to time and as often as may be necessary, to abate, break up, and abolish any depot or place of confinement of slaves brought into this District as merchandise, contrary to the provisions of this act, by such appropriate

1 See the act of Congress of 1801, and the Maryland law of 1796, against importation. Also, Lee v. Lee, 8 Peters, 44.

One of the so-called Compromise Acts of 1850. See vol. I., 563.

So far as I am aware, this is the only act of legislation where this pronoun is thus used, where "his or her" is employed in the State laws.

A compilation by W. G. Snethen, 1848, is entitled The Black Code of the District. There is no general Code for the District. A code prepared by Judge Cranch, under authority of Congress, April 29, 1816, was published 1819, though never adopted. Another was rejected in 1855 by popular vote. A compilation was made, in 1831, by A. Davis. Another, by Mr. Thrift, is understood to be in course of publica tion.

means as may appear to either of the said corporations expedient and proper. And the same power is hereby vested in the Levy Court of Washington county, if any attempt shall be made, within its jurisdictional limits, to establish a depot or place of confinement for slaves brought into the said District as merchandise for sale contrary to this act."

545. LEGISLATION OF THE STATE OF MASSACHUSETTS.' 1780. First Constitution of the State. The preamble declares the enjoyment of "natural rights" to be one of the ends of government. Declaration of Rights, Art. 1, declares that "all men are born free and equal, and have certain natural, essential and inalienable rights, among which may be reckoned the right of enjoying and defending their lives and liberties; that of acquiring, possessing and protecting property, and in fine of seeking and obtaining their safety and happiness.'

'See Vol. I. p. 265. 3 Hildreth's Hist. p. 391. "In 1777, a prize ship from Jamaica, with several slaves on board, was brought into Salem by a privateer. The slaves were advertised for sale, but the General Court interfered and they were set at liberty."

In Bradford's Hist. of Mass. p. 277, and appendix, it is said that in 1778, a Constitution was rejected by the people, and that "the greatest objection to it was that there was no bill of rights, or that the natural and inalienable rights of the people were not expressly reserved and secured."

In Betty & al. v. Horton (1833), Court of Appeals of Virginia. 5 Leigh's Rep. 622. H. St. Geo. Tucker, President." The jury has found the Constitution of Massachusetts, containing a provision, like our own bill of rights, declaring “all men born free and equal." This it would seem is the only provision in the laws or Constitution of that State, upon this interesting subject. Looking to the actual state of that Commonwealth, and knowing, as we all know, that its slaves were few in number at the time of the adoption of its Constitution, we should be disposed to take this declaration less as an abstraction than we must regard that which is contained in our own bill of rights. We should readily extend it to mean at least as much as the common law, which does not recognize slavery as reconcilable with a residence upon British soil. I am inclined to think, however, it may go farther. The common law, I take it, is to be considered rather as declaring, the mere status of the party, while in Great Britain, than in annulling the bond by which he is fettered, unless he asserts his right and establishes it by the adjudication of a competent tribunal. Then, indeed, it passes in rem adjudicatum; and upon well received principles of national [i. e. international] law this decision upon the right by a tribunal having complete jurisdiction over the subject, is conclusive everywhere. But, unless the right of the slave is so asserted and established, the common law has not the effect of knocking off his shackles; nor can it be invoked as his protector, upon his return to that country where he had formerly been a slave. Such, I incline to think, is the substance of the cases of Williams . Brown, 3 Bos. and Pull. 69, and of "the mongrel woman Grace," decided by Lord Stowell, and mentioned by counsel and by Judge Green in Hunter v. Fulcher, 1 Leigh, 179, 181. In Massachusetts, however, it seems that the Constitution of the State must have been interpreted to have a more extensive operation, as it

1786, June 22, c. 3. Act for the orderly solemnization of marriage. Sec. 7. "No person authorized to marry shall join in marriage any white person with any negro, Indian, or mulatto, under penalty of fifty pounds; and all such marriages shall be absolutely null and void."

1788, Mar. 25, c. 11. An act to prevent the slave-trade, and for granting relief to the families of such unhappy persons as may be kidnapped or decoyed away from this Commonwealth. Enacts that "No citizen of this Commonwealth, or other person residing within the same," shall import, transport, buy, or sell, any of the inhabitants of Africa as slaves." And

appears to have been decided, that the issue of a female slave, though born prior to the Constitution, was free; 2 Kent's Comm. 205. If this be so the Constitution has received an interpretation which goes to divest the title of the master to break the bonds of the slave and to annul the condition of servitude. It emancipates and sets free by its own force and efficacy, and does not wait the enforcement of its principles by judicial decision. It is more operative than the common law and more resembles the effect of our statute, declaring free all slaves imported contrary to law. But this depends upon the construction of the Constitution of Massachusetts by its courts, which we would of course respect and follow, if we were sufficiently advised of them. But, without their reports here, we should perhaps venture too far to rest our decision upon the Massachusetts Constitution. It is not deemed necessary," &c. In this case the question was of the freedom of slaves who had been brought back to Virginia after being taken to Massachusetts. They were held free.

1 Mention has already been made (Vol. I. 264, n.) of suits brought, before the Revolution, in Massachusetts, for freedom by negroes held in slavery, in some of which it was urged that no person born in the colony could be a slave. In the case of Inhabitants of Winchendon v. Inhabitants of Hatfield, 4 Mass. 128, decided in 1808, Parsons, Ch. J., said "In an action by the Inhabitants of Littleton, brought to recover the expenses of maintaining a negro against Tuttle, his former reputed master, tried in Middlesex, October term, 1796, the Chief Justice, in charging the jury, stated, as the unanimous opinion of the court, that a negro born in the State before the present Constitution (1780) was born free, although born of a female slave." But Judge Parsons added, “It is, however, very certain that the general practice and common usage had been opposed to this opinion." And his decision of the case, which regarded the settlement of a negro pauper, is based upon the fact that he was a slave in 1776; but it does not appear whether he was or was not a native of the colony.

It seems that within a year or two after the adoption of this Constitution, the general question of the legality of slavery in Massachusetts was brought before the courts, but no contemporaneous report of the decisions appears to be extant. 3 Hildr. 391. In Winchendon v. Hatfield, Parsons, Ch. J., said "Slavery was introduced into this country soon after its first settlement, and was tolerated until the ratification of the present Constitution. The slave was the property of his master, subject to his orders and to reasonable correction for misbehavior, was transferable, like a chattel, by gift or sale, and was assets in the hands of his executor or administrator. If the master was guilty of cruel or unreasonable castigation of his slave, he was liable to be punished for the breach of the peace; and I believe the slave was allowed to demand sureties of the peace against a violent and barbarous master, which generally caused a sale to another master. And the issue of the female slave, according to the maxim of the civil law, was the property