upon the impeachment. In the investigatian of the articles of impeachment, it appeared that the decision of Judge Peck in the case of James G. Soulard and others vs. the United States, was published in the Missouri Republican by his directions. Mr Lawless was counsel for the plaintiffs in this suit, who were land claimants, as well as for many other parties whose claims depended upon a similar state of facts. The question therefore decided by the Judge was one of great interest, and in the State of Missouri did actually produce an excitement, in which all individual feeling and interest was enlisted on the side of the claimants, the United States being the party defendant. Under these circumstances Mr Lawless published in the Missouri Advocate a comment upon the decision in respectful terms, in which he endeavored to show that the court was in error, and stated that error to consist in certain assumptions of facts and of doctrines. practice as an attorney and counsellor for publishing that comment. Mr Lawless appeared upon the return of the rule and insisted that the publication was no contempt, that it was a fair representation of the decision and within the limits of fair discussion. The court, however, held otherwise, and an attachment was issued. Mr Lawless was brought before the court, and was there asked whether he wished to purge himself of contempt by answering interrogatives, which he properly refused to do, but insisted on the truth of his publication. Judge Peck viewing this as an aggravation of the contempt, proceeded to sentence Mr Lawless to be imprisoned for twentyfour hours and to be suspended from prac tising in that court for eighteen months. For this arbitrary conduct he was impeached, but the Senate believing that Judge Peck proceeded upon a mistaken view of the powers of the court, and that he was governed by a strong conviction of what he deemed his official duty, refused to find him guilty upon the article of impeachment. The vote stood, guilty 21, not guilty 22. This impeachment, however, produced a strong conviction of the necessity of limiting and defining the power of the Judiciary in relation to the law of contempts. This statement, which was a concise recapitulation of the grounds for which the plaintiff contended, Judge Peck regarded as a contempt, because by suppressing certain distinctions and facts, insisted upon by the court, it placed his decision in an unfavorable light before the public, which was already excited by the conclusion which the court had It was universally conceded, adopted. He accordingly order- that the common law doctrine of ed Mr Lawless to shew cause the English courts was inconsiswhy an attachment should not be tent with free institutions, and awarded against him, and why entirely inapplicable to this he should not be suspended from country. It was derived from that undefinable notion concerning the prerogatives of high dignitaries, that prevailed in the early period of English history, and is so plainly to be perceived in the decisions and proceedings of the Star Chamber. Although modified by the greater freedom and intelligence of modern times, the doctrine as accepted in England, was deemed incompatible with a political system, whose distinguishing characteristic is the specific and well defined limitation of the prerogatives and powers of all its public officers. Scarcely, therefore, had the Senate determined upon the impeachment of Judge Peck, when a bill was introduced into the House, declaratory of the law concerning contempts of Court. This bill which was reported on the 10th of February, (the impeachment having been determined on the 31st of January,) was passed by both Houses, and became a law on the 2d of March, 1831. By it, the power of the Federal Courts to issue attachments and inflict summary punishment for contempt of Court, is limited to cases of misbehaviour in presence of the Court, or so near thereto as to obstruct the administration of justice; the misbehaviour of the officers of the Court in their official transactions; and the disobedience or resistance to any lawful writ, process, order, rule, decree or command, of the Court. It was also enacted, that any attempt by corruption, threats, or force, to influence, intimidate, or impede, any juror, witness, or officer, in the discharge of his duty, or to obstruct or impede the due administration of justice in the Federal Courts, should be punished upon conviction on an indictment, by fine not exceeding five hundred dollars, or imprisonment for three months, or both, at the discretion of the Court. While Congress thus evinced its determination to confine this power of the Courts within limits. consistent with the personal freedom of the citizen; it manifested equal zeal to maintain the authority of the Federal Judiciary, over those subjects assigned to that departinent by the Constitution of the United States. A jealousy had always been manifested of that department of the Government, by a certan class of politicians, especially by those, who contended for what they denominated a strict construction of the Constitution. The Speaker of the House of Representatives (Mr Stevenson) was an ardent advocate of that construction; and in the selection of the Judiciary committee, he appointed a majority from the class of members agreeing with him on that point, the chairman of the committee himself being an advocate of the right of a State, to nullify a law of Congress. Deeming the present a fit time to promote their views, that committee on the 24th of January, made a report accompanied by a bill, to repeal the twenty-fifth section of the act to establish the Judicial system of the United States,— passed shortly after the organisa tion of the Federal Government etition of such trespasses might be in 1789. In framing a scheme of Government for the United States, it was felt to be necessary to adopt some mode of carrying the laws of the general Government into effect through its own instruments, without being dependent upon the State Governments for their efficiency. Under the articles of confederation the decrees of Congress were only regarded as recommendations; or when it became necessary to execute them in opposition to a State Government, it was done by an armed force and as a hostile act against that State. A striking illustration of the mode in which the Continental Congress was obliged to maintain its rights against the pretensions of particular States, may be found in the manner in which that body vindicated its right to the northwest territory, against the claims of Virginia. Notwithstanding the earnest request of Congress, to abstain from granting warrants for unappropriated lands during the revolutionary war, that State in 1779, opened a land office for that purpose; and various inhabitants of Virginia crossed the Ohio and settled upon the banks of the Muskingum. An armed force stationed at Pittsburg, under Colonel Brodhead, to prevent intrusions upon that territory, was immediately put in motion against them, and after destroying their huts and apprehending them as trespassers, an account was sent on to Congress, where it was directed to be communicated to the Governor of Virginia, that a rep prevented. As this energetic act was stigmatised as an encroachment upon State rights, Congress found it necessary on the 18th of April 1780, to resolve, that Colonel Brodhead should be supported by Congress in any acts or orders, which the nature of the service and the discharge of his duty as commanding officer at Fort Pitt, had made or should make necessary. In this manner when the case was too urgent to tolerate a violation of the resolution of Congress, that body was at once brought into hostile collision with some of the States; and where it was not of paramount importance, execution was entrusted to the State legislatures, which were governed in their decisions by too close a regard to their local interests. Warned by experience of the inefficacy of a central government upon this basis, the framers of the Constitution determined to give to the federal government a direct action upon the citizens as individuals, rather than indirectly upon them as communities through the State governments. With that view they provided that 'the Federal Consitution, the laws of the United States, made in pursuance thereof, and all treaties made, or which shall be made under the authority of the United States, should be the supreme law of the land.' A supreme Court of the United States was then established, and the judicial power, which was vested in that and other inferior courts to be ' established by Congress, was extended to all cases arising under the Constitution, the laws of the United States, and treaties made under their authority; to all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls; to all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction; to controversies to which the United States shall be a party; to controversies between two or more States; between a State and the citizens of another State; between citizens of different States; between citizens of the same State claiming lands under grants of different States; and between a State or the citizens thereof, and foreign states, citizens or subjects. In all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls, and those in which a State shall be a party, the Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction. In all other cases before mentioned, the Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction, both as to law and fact, with such exceptions and under such regulations, as the Congress shall make.' Shortly after the organisation of the Government upon this basis, the States of Georgia, New York, and South Carolina were sued in the Supreme Court by various citizens of other States for debts due to them from the governments of those States. In February term, 1793, the case of Chisholm vs. the State of Georgia came up for judgment and the Court decided in favor of the plaintiff, and held the States to be liable to respond in the Supreme Court of the United States . to the actions of private citizens of other States. Although this was the express language of the Consitution, it was not convenient at that time to carry that provision into practice. The States had just emerged from a ruinous war; and it was found easier to postpone and to adjust claims with petitioners in the legislature of the State, than with suitors whose demands were backed with legal authority. Great dissatisfaction was accordingly expressed at this decision, and the legislature of Georgia at that as at a later period openly defied the judicial authority. To quiet this feeling of discontent, Congress proposed, in 1794, the following amendment, which was adopted and became part of the Constitution. The judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States, or by citizens of another State, or by citizens or subjects of any foreign state.' By this amendment therefore the States were rendered no longer liable to be arraigned as defendants at the suit of private persons, citizens of another State. The Supreme Court, however, by this amendment, was not deprived of jurisdiction over all cases arising under the Constitution, laws, and treaties of the United States. This was a branch of its powers, that was conferred in order to preserve uniformity in the construction of the Constitution, laws, and treaties of the United States; to ensure the peaceable execu- Constitution; or of a treaty or tion of the constitutional powers of the federal government; to protect them from the encroachments of the States; to vindicate the rights of individuals from the local excitements which temporarily affect states and communities; and to prevent any quarrels with foreign nations, by a disregard or misconstruction by the State Courts, of the treaties between them and the United States. With the view of giving effect to this branch of its jurisdiction, the first Congress, which met after the adoption of the Constitution, (composed of members, many of whom had belonged to the convention which framed that instrument,) inserted in the judiciary act, the section commonly known as the 25th section, which is as follows, 'A final judgment or decree in any suit, in the highest court of law or equity of a State in which a decision in a suit could be had, where is drawn in question the validity of a treaty, or statute of, or an authority exercised under, the United States, and the decision is against their validity; or where is drawn in question the validity of a statute of, or an authority exercised under the United States, and the decision is against their validity; or where is drawn in question the validity of a statute of, or an authority exercised under, any State, on the ground of their being repugnant to the Constitution, treaties, or laws of the United States, and the decision is in favor of such their validity; or where is drawn in question the construction of any clause of the statute of, or commission held under the United States, and the decision is against the title, right, privilege, or exemption, specially set up or claimed by either party under such clause of the said Constitution, treaty, statute, or commission, may be re-examined, and reversed or affirmed in the Supreme Court of the United States, upon a writ of error, the citation being signed by the chief justice, or judge, or chancellor of the court rendering or passing the judgment or decree complained of, or by a justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, in the same manner and under the same regulations, and the writ shall have the same effect as if the judgment or decree complained of had been rendered or passed in a circuit court; and the proceeding upon the revisal shall, also be the same, except that the Supreme Court, instead of remanding the cause for a final decision, as before provided, may at their discretion, if the cause shall have been once remanded before, proceed to a final decision of the same, and award execution. In this section are embraced three classes of cases, 1st, where a State court decides against the validity of a law or treaty of the United States,-a power conferred to prevent any violation of the laws or treaties of the United States on the part of a State: 2d, where the validity of a State law is questioned on the ground of its being repugnant to the federal Constitution or laws,— a power essential to preserve the |