The Court: Counsel for defendants asks the court to make a ruling upon the offer as presented as a whole; as a whole it is overruled, and exception noted for defendants. First assignment of error. its delivery; 3, that since the passage of the | instrument, is a matter of inference to be drawn Act of 1866, whereby the Acts of 1793 and the from the language of the paper by the court, Act of 1786, have been made perpetual, the and not to be testified to by witnesses. The evidence of lost deeds and their contents must offer, therefore, is not to prove contents, or the be obtained and given in accordance with those language, or the language as near as the witActs; and that this is exclusive of all other ness can recollect it, but to prove the legal ways, because it is the best evidence. effect and consequence of the paper; 3, it is proposed to prove that Robert Lewis and Lawrence Lewis executed the paper in question, by showing, by the witness, merely that the paper purported to be a paper signed by them, whose only knowledge as to the paper is, according to the statements in the offer itself, her having heard it read and having read it herself in July, 1882, after the decease of the parties who are said to have been designated therein, the relators, and in the absence of the plaintiffs in this case, and in the absence of all other persons whose acquiescence or consent might be held lawfully to be binding upon the plaintiffs; 4, there is no proof of the genuineness of the instrument which it is proposed to show that the witness saw; 5, the preliminary proof of loss and of search does not fulfill the requirements of the law and is not such as will warrant the court in ad the alleged paper in question, or pretended release; 6, that the testimony is generally incompetent, inadmissible and irrelevant. The Court: It is not pretended by the defendants that the witness on the stand saw the execution of this instrument, nor does she know of its delivery, nor is she acquainted with the handwriting of the releasors. Defendant's counsel: That is all true. The defendants offered to prove by Harriet Koons that she is the widow of Levi M. Koons, late of Boyertown, Berks County; that he died in September, 1882; that immediately before his death, and at the time of his death, he was the agent of the Hagy heirs, the defendants in this suit with the Phoenix Iron Company, for the collection of rent or royalty accruing upon a lease of the minerals or iron ore on the tract in dispute in this case, said lease having been made by Henry Boyer to Robert S. Buck, March 1, 1854, it being in proof in this case that the rights thereunder have devolved upon the Phoenix Iron Company as as-mitting secondary evidence of the contents of signee of the lessee, and the Hagys as assignees of the reversion; that the title papers of the Hagys to the mineral tract in dispute here were in the possession of her said husband as their said agent; that among the title papers was a release, old in appearance, and dated in 1847, and signed and sealed by Robert Lewis and Lawrence Lewis by which release the said Robert Lewis and Lawrence Lewis released and conveyed to Henry Boyer all their right, title and interest in the iron ore in the tract described in the writ in this case, and which right or interest to said iron ore had been reserved in a deed from Thomas Rutter and Samuel Potts to Henry Stauffer, in 1774; that the paper was without any erasure or alteration; that it was light blue in color; that it had the appearance of old age; that it was with the title papers of the Hagys; that she heard it read in the month of July, 1882, w en it was in the possession of her husband, ar that she personally read it, and from the rusal of it became acquainted with its c ents; to be followed with proof that in 7, Henry Boyer, the releasee, was the owne the land The Court: The defendants request the court described in the writ, and that f the time to give a ruling to their offer in the whole; as it of the execution of the release, enry Boyer stands, the offer is overruled, and exception and his assignees, up to this ti have been noted for defendants. Second assignment of in possession of the minerals in he tract de- error. scribed in the writ, and have leased the same, the same having been taken out and mined by their lessees, and they having paid the taxes on the same continually and exclusively during the entire period from the execution of the said release up to the present time. Objected to by the plaintiffs: 1, because the witness is incompetent to testify as to the purpose for which the parties came there to see her husband. If what was said and done there is pertinent to the issue now trying, she might testify as to what was said and done, but she cannot testify as to the purpose of the parties who participated in that transaction; 2, it is proposed to prove by this witness that one of these papers was a release. Now, as to whether an instrument is a release, a bond or other legal The Court: We will permit you to show by the witness what paper she saw there in July, 1882, of which you propose to prove the contents. Defendant's counsel: The defendants desire to add to the offer that the release, the contents of which are now offered to be proved, is the same release testified to by Mrs. Koons as having been in the possession of her husband Levi M. Koons, together with a deed and a lease, and letters testamentary and a will, as the agent of the heirs of Charles Hagy, deceased; and we also propose to prove by her that she, having read the said release, as stated in our offer, recollects its contents. The defendants offered in evidence a lease, dated the first day of July, 1852, between Robert M. Lewis and Lawrence Lewis, lessors, and David Reeves, Robert S. Buck, Samuel J. Reeves and R. C. Nicholls, recorded, etc., which lease refers to a plan or plot of lots embraced in the lease; and the lease itself states that it grants the right of the lessors to the minerals in the mines in Colebrookdale, Berks County, and the plot shows the lots in which they claim to have a mineral right in Colebrookdale. Objected to by the plaintiffs: 1, because the evidence of a lease by the Messrs. Lewis, of mineral rights other than those which constitute the subject matter of this action, does not legally or logically prove or conduce to prove that they had no title in the ore which forms | his heirs have been in possession by tenants and the subject matter of this action; 2, because it paid the taxes." is generally irrelevant and incompetent. Offer overruled; exception for defendants. Third assignment of error. Defendants offered to prove that for the last thirty years and upwards the reputed ownership of the minerals in the lot described in the writ was in Henry Boyer and those claiming under him (that is, Charles Hagy and Daniel Boyer, and later Charles Hagy, and since his death his heirs) for the purpose of proving an element of adverse possession. Plaintiffs objected: 1, because the offer does not prove an element of adverse possession; 2, because a reputation which may have been created by Henry Boyer as against the real owners of the minerals, who reside at a distance from the neighborhood, and may have been so created by design, cannot be used in a court of justice for the purpose of assailing the title of the rightful owner; 3, because the evidence of reputation of ownership is not competent testimony in this case as against the plaintiffs; 4, because it is generally irrelevant and incompe tent. Objection sustained; exception for defendants. Fourth assignment of error. Defendants proposed to prove that the tract described in the writ was sold by the executors of Henry Boyer; and the announcement was made at the sale that it was clear of everything, that it was without any reservation of any kind, and that the whole thing, including the mineral, was sold. Objected to by plaintiffs: 1, because the title which passed by executors' sale must be measured by the title which Henry Boyer owned at the time of his disease, and cannot be enlarged by anything that the executors of Henry Boyer may have said or done at the time of the sale of the property; 2, no declarations made by the executors, or their agent, or by any other person at the time of the sale of the said property, and in the absence of the ancestors of the plaintiffs, who then owned the mineral right, can be given in evidence as against the title of the plaintiffs; 3, the testimony is generally incompetent and irrelevant. Offer overruled, and exception noted for defendants. Fifth assignment of error. Defendants offered in evidence the deposition of Charles K. Hagy, taken on the 21st day of April, 1885, at the office of Charles Van Wert, in the City of Minneapolis, and State of Minnesota, by a virtue of a commission issued from the Court of Common Pleas, of the County of Berks, to Charles Van Wert, and on file in this case; offered for the purpose of showing that his father, Charles Hagy, and Daniel Boyer, and the heirs of Charles Hagy, were the owners of the minerals described in the writ, from 1858 up to this time, and that they have been in actual possession of the said minerals during that time-for the purpose of proving adverse possession. The portion of the deposition relied on is the following: "The tract adjoins what is known as the old mine hole, in Boyertown, and from 1888 up to the time of my father's death, was in his possession, the mines being operated by his tenants during that period; he paid the taxes during that period; and since his death That part of the deposition offered was objected to by the plaintiffs: 1, because the testimony of the witness was not responsive to the questions which he was answering; the question did not indicate to the plaintiffs or give them any notice that such an answer would be made; and therefore it was impossible for the plaintiffs to frame a cross interrogatory in order to elicit the extent of the witness' knowledge of the matter concerning which he was testifying; 2, the testimony in itself indicates that the witness was not speaking from actual knowledge of the matter concerning which he was testifying; 3, it appearing that the witness had for a number of years been residing in a remote State, many hundreds of miles removed from the locality of the subject matter of this action, it is manifest that he can have no personal, actual knowledge concerning the matter to which he testifies; but that he must be testifying from hearsay, if his testimony has any foundation whatever; 4, the testimony is also objected to on the ground that the witness is an interested witness, and a party to the record, and therefore is incompetent to give the testimony in question; 5, the matter is generally irrelevant and incompetent. Offer overruled; exception noted for defendants. Sixth assignment of error. The defendants offered in evidence a deed, dated the 15th day of October, 1847, from Henry Boyer, of Boyertown, to Robert M. Lewis and Lawrence Lewis, both of the City of Philadelphia, recorded in deed book 54, p. 91, for 145 perches of land; consideration, $400. To be followed with proof that this 154 perches is part of the tract which in 1801 was acquired by Henry Boyer. The purpose of the offer is that the deed, from Henry Boyer to Robert Lewis and Lawrence Lewis, making no reference to any reservation of ore or mere surface right of Henry Boyer, but purporting to convey a fee simple to the lot and everything that it contains, is evidence tending to negative the claim of the plaintiffs that in 1847, Robert and Lawrence Lewis were the owners of a right to the ore in the tract contained in the deed, which is part of the Henry Boyer tract, the remainder being the land described in the writ. Plaintiffs objected: 1, because the offer is irrelevant; 2, because under the terms of the deed of Stauffer to Rutter and Potts, September 24, 1774, Rutter and Potts and their heirs and assigns covenanted to pay and make good any damages to Stauffer, his heirs and assigns, which might at any time be caused by digging, searching for, or breaking the ground, or hauling away ore, should any be discovered, and the purchase from an assignee of the Stauffer title of the strip of ground referred to was not and could not be an admission of want of title in the purchasers to the iron ore, and is not inconsistent with the title shown by the plaintiffs, to wit: the title to the iron ore and minerals under the tract. Offer overruled; exception noted for defendants. Seventh assignment of error. Defendants, inter alia, presented the following point: 1. If the jury believe that in 1854, and from Bowser v. Cravener, 56 Pa. 132. If a deed is thirty years old, it may be admitted in evidence without any further proof of its execution. 1 Phil. Ev. p. 404. Ancient writings which are proved to have been found among deeds of evidences of land may be given in evidence, although the execution cannot be proved. that time up to the bringing of this suit, Henry | session, proves itself, and is regarded as an anBoyer and those claiming under him, including cient deed. the heirs and devisees of Charles Hagy, de ceased, the defendants here, were the owners of the tract of land on which the ore in suit here is situated, and claimed to own not only the surface but the ore likewise; that they leased the ore to Robert S. Buck, March 1, 1854, in good faith, claiming to be the owners thereof, and that the lease was recorded; that the claim of ownership by Henry Boyer, the lessor, and his successors in title, was a matter of general reputation in the neighborhood of Some account ought to be given of the place the tract during all that time; and that the said where the deed was found; and the finding of lessee and his assignees entered into the posses-it among deeds of evidence of land is a presion of said tract in pursuance of said lease, and held exclusive, peaceable, hostile, notorious, visible and continuous possession from 1854 to the present time, the defendants have shown a good title by adverse possession, and the verdict should be in favor of the defend ants. The court in the charge to the jury answered the above point of defendants as follows: "We then proceed to consider the second ground upon which a defense can be set up. Have the defendants shown a right by adverse possession? The court says to you that there is no evidence in this cause to show that there has been an adverse possession taken by any one for a period of twenty-one years, from 1774 down to the bringing of this suit. The lease given in evidence made by Henry Boyer to Robert S. Buck in 1854, and entered of record, is not such adverse and hostile possession as will devest the rights of the plaintiffs in the iron ore contained in this tract of land. One person may be the owner of the surface of the land, and another may be the owner of the mineral right; and the fact that the person who is entitled to the surface is in possession for any length of time, without interfering and taking possession of the mineral right, does not give him a right by adverse possession. The possession of the owner of the surface may run with his land; and until he has in some way taken possession of the mineral, and he can only take possession of it by mining, or doing some act in the way of mining, that will interfere with the owner of the mineral right, he cannot be said to be in possession adversely to the owner of the mineral right. There being, therefore, no right shown by the defendants under a grant, nor any evidence in the case which would justify the court in submitting to you the question of adverse use or occupation of the iron ore right, the verdict of the jury will have to be for the plaintiffs; and this is a full answer to defendants' first point." Eighth assignment of error. The court directed a verdict for plaintiffs, and defendants took this writ assigning errors as above noted. Messrs. J. H. Jacobs, B. Frank Dettra and H. Willis Bland, for plaintiffs in error: I. The release was an ancient document, and its due execution was not necessary to be proved. When ancient instruments are more than thirty years old, they prove themselves. 1 Greenl. Ev. § 21. 1 Phil. Ev. p. 404. sumption that they were fairly and honestly Where proof of execution would have been dispensed with, in case the original had been produced, proof of execution is unnecessary. Goodier v. Lake, 1 Atk. 246; 1 Stark. Ev. 392. In McReynolds v. Longenberger, 57 Pa. 13, the proposition was to prove ancient receipts appearing to be more than thirty years old, accompanying the muniments of title, to the land, and found with them by the witness when he received the title papers, and which were retained by him until his house was burned; the court below held this not sufficient proof of execution to admit secondary evidence, and the supreme court in reversing, through Judge Thompson, says: "They would have been evidence without preliminary proof of execution, had they been produced and offered as such in court, and for the reason that they were ancient receipts." If the instrument is lost, the party is required to give some evidence that such a paper once existed, although slight evidence is sufficient for this purpose, and that a bona fide and diligent search has been unsuccessfully made in the place where it was likely to be found. 1 Greenl. Ev. § 558. It must appear that the instrument comes from such custody as to afford a reasonable presumption in favor of its genuineness. 1 Greenl. Ev. §§ 21, 142; 1 Phil. Ev. p. 404. If a document has been placed in the hands of a custodian, he must be required to make due search; and the fruitlessness of such search must be shown, before secondary evidence can be let in; and where such person is dead inquiry must be made of his legal representatives. 1 Whart. Ev. § 144; Krise v. Ñeason, 66 Pa. 253. It is plain that the proof of loss of a document necessarily involves some descriptive proof of the document itself, although not to the degree of precision subsequently necessary in order to establish a title under it; and a strong probability of its loss has been held sufficient to let in secondary evidence of its contents. Bouldin v. Massie, 7 Wheat. 122, 154, 155 (20 U. S. bk. 5, L. ed. 414, 422 and editorial note). If the ground for admitting the secondary evidence is that the original has been lost, it ought to be shown that every reasonable inA deed thirty years old, accompanied by pos- quiry has been made; and the last person in whose possession it is traced should be called to give some account of the instrument. 1 Phil. Ev. p. 399; Caufman v. Presbyterian Cong. 6 Binn. 59. It is sufficient if the party has done all that could reasonably be expected of him under the circumstances of the case, in searching for the instrument. Kelsey v. Hanner, 18 Conn. 311. The degree of diligence in the search depends much upon its peculiar circumstances; and it is a question for the court as to whether the loss of the instrument has been sufficiently proved to admit secondary evidence. 1 Greenl. Ev. § 558. The party is expected to show that he has in good faith exhausted, in a reasonable degree, all the sources of information and means of discovery which the nature of the case would naturally suggest and which were accessible to him. But the object of the proof is merely to establish a reasonable presumption of the loss of the instrument. 1 Greenl. Ev. § 558, p. 645. It is sufficient if the party offering parol proof show such diligence as is usual with good business men under the circumstances. 1 Whart. Ev. § 142. See cases cited, note 1. Where a document is lost or destroyed without any suspicion of spoliation attaching to the party offering to prove it by parol evidence, then such parol evidence is admissible to prove its contents, it appearing that due but fruitless efforts have been made to produce it in court. Enders v. Sternbergh, 2 Abb. App. Cas. 31; McReynolds v. Longenberger, 57 Pa. 13; Kaul v. Lawrence, 73 Pa. 410; 1 Whart. Ev. § 129. It is not necessary that the witness should testify to the provisions of the lost instrument; it is presumed to have been in the usual form. Emig v. Diehl, 76 Pa. 359; Brown v. Day, 78 Pa. 141. If an ancient deed, is found in the proper custody and is corroborated by evidence of ancient or modern corresponding enjoyment, or other equivalent acts, it is to be presumed that the deed constituted part of the actual transfer of property therein mentioned. 1 Greenl. Ev. p. 144; McReynolds v. Longenberger, 57 Pa. 13; Bertie v. Beaumont, 2 Price, 303. II. A party to a suit is a competent witness, at common law, to prove to the court that an instrument which it is necessary to produce at the trial is destroyed or lost, so as to let in secondary evidence; and there in no distinction in this respect between cases where the action is upon the instrument, and those where the question arises indirectly; and it is of no importance in the order of exhibiting the evidence, which fact is first proved, whether that of the existence and contents of the instrument, or the fact of destruction or loss. Fitch v. Bogue, 19 Conn. 285; 1 Greenl. Ev. 14th ed. 1883, § 349; Robinson v. Freeman, 13 W. N. C. 565. III. The offer covered by the fourth assignment of error, to prove the reputation in the neighborhood, of the ownership in the mines, was clearly competent. When a party sets up a title to ownership by adverse possession, he must prove such a state of things as would be likely to give notice to any other person whose title is to be affected by his adverse holding. As an element of this kind of proof, reputed ownership in the adverse holder is admissible. Earl of Sussex v. Temple, 1 Ld. Raym. 311; 1 Greenl. Ev. § 101; Davis v. Butterbach, 2 Yeates, 211; Sampson v. Sampson, 4 Serg. & R. 330. Adverse possession may be held of minerals. Arnold v. Stevens, 24 Pick. 106; Caldwell v. Copeland, 37 Pa. 427; Armstrong v. Caldwell, 53 Pa. 287; Barnes v. Mawson, 1 Maule & S. 77; Caldwell v. Fulton, 31 Pa. 475. Occupation by tenant is sufficient. Pipher v. Lodge, 16 Serg. & R. 214, 233-236; S. C. 4 Serg. & R. 310; Watson v. Gregg, 10 Watts, 289; Union Canal Co. v. Young, 1 Whart, 410; Jones v. Porter, 3 Penr. & W. 132; Neel v. McElhenny, 69 Pa. 300. The possession of succeeding occupiers in privity is sufficient. Overfield v. Christie, 7 Serg. & R. 177; Schrack v. Zubler, 34 Pa. 38; Doswell v. De La Lanzo, 20 How. 32 (61 U.S. bk. 15, L. ed. 824); Brandt v. Ogden, 1 Johns. 159; Doe v. Campbell, 10 Johns. 477. Certainty, publicity and notoriety are the essential elements of adverse possession. Tyler, Ejectment, 890 and cases cited; Ewing v. Burnet, 11 Pet. 41, 52 (and see note Bk. 9, L. ed. 624, 629); Ellicott v. Pearl, 10 Pet. 412 (35 U. S. bk. 9, L. ed. 475); Johnston v. Irwin, 3 Serg. & R. 291. Payment of taxes is evidence of a claim, and of the extent of such claim. Sorber v. Willing, 10 Watts, 142; Naglee v. Albright, 4 Whart. 291; Hockenbury v. Snyder, 2 Watts & S. 240; Boyer v. Benlow, 10 Serg. & R. 303. To give color of title does not require the aid of a written conveyance, or other evidence in writing; but it is only necessary that the entry be made under a bona fide, and not a pretended claim of title, existing in another. La Frombois v. Jackson, 8 Cow. 589; M' Call v. Neely, 3 Watts, 72; Green v. Kellum, 23 Pa. 254-258; Tyler, Ejectment, 863-865. The law designs that the owner shall have ample knowledge on the subject, and a full opportunity to assert his claim; but if he sleeps upon his right for the period prescribed by the Statute of Limitations, he is presumed to have acquiesced in the claim of another. Thompson School Dist. v. Lynch. 33 Conn. 330; Pray v. Pierce, 7 Mass. 383; Tyler, Ejectment, 909. The possession need only be according to the nature of the thing. Robison v Swcett, 3 Greenl. (Me.) 316. Messrs. Cyrus G. Derr and George F. Baer, for defendants in error: The authorities are clear that it is absolutely essential, before undertaking by parol to prove the contents of a lost deed, that the loss should be unequivocally established. Parks v. Dunkle, 3 Watts & S. 291; Parke v. Bird, 3 Pa. 360; Graff v. Pittsburgh etc. R. R. Co. 31 Pa. 489. Proof of the genuineness and of the actual execution and delivery of a lost instrument must precede parol evidence of its contents. Whart. Ev. 141; M'Reynolds v. M'Cord, 6 leged he had said D would assign the tax deeds at any time the purchase money was paid; or 4, that before and after his purchase A declared that the sale was for the joint benefit of the parties to perfect their joint title. (Argued Feb. 17, Decided March 14, 1887.) Watts, 288; M Credy v. Schuylkill Nav. Co. 8 JY Term, 1886, No.105, E. D., before Mer Whart. 424; Slone v. Thomas, 12 Pa. 209; Porter v. Wilson, 13 Pa. 641. See Leazure v. Hillegas, 7 Serg, & R. 323; Pipher v. Lodge, 16 Serg. & R. 214; Parks v. Dunkle, 3 Watts & S. 291; Jack v. Woods, 29 Pa. 375; Emig v. Diehl, 76 Pa. 359. Per Curiam: cur, Ch. J., Gordon, Paxson, Trunkey, Sterrett, Green and Clark, JJ. Error to the Common Pleas of Elk County, to review a judgment of compulsory nonsuit in an action of ejectment. Affirmed. This was an action by W. B. Brickell and P. Y. Hite, against C. R. Earley, for an undivided two thirds of forty-one lots of land in the Townships of Benzinger and Fox and the County of Elk. At the trial the following facts appeared: By deed dated October 18, 1859, Jesse Lan The plaintiffs below proved a good paper title to the land in question. We have carefully examined and considered all the assignments of error. The evidence was properly re-dis conveyed to H. G. O. Ramberger, Edwin jected, and the points were correctly answered. Judgment affirmed. Jefferies and Richard J. Byrnes, a large number of tracts of land, situate in Elk County. The several tracts were described by metes and bounds, and included within the boundaries and number of acres given a large number of William B. BRICKELL et al., Plffs. in farm lots which had before that time been Err., v. C. R. EARLEY. 1. A constructive or a resulting trust can arise only when title has been obtained by fraud or purchased with the money of another. 2. No part of a parol trust can be left to inference, the proof to establish it must in all particulars be clear and specific. 3. A, B and C, by conveyances which excepted certain lots, became the tenants in common of a large tract of land which, for the purpose of clearing up the title, A afterwards, by agreement with B and C, permitted to be sold for taxes, and bought in in his own name for the benefit of all. Still later both this tract and the excepted lots were again sold for taxes, and were bought by D. The excepted lots were not redeemed, and D conveyed them to A. B and C thereon brought ejectment against A for an undivided two thirds of the lots. Held, that in the absence of fraud or the use of their money in purchasing the lots by A, they could not recover. Held also, that evidence on the part of B & C was inadmissible to prove: 1, that A had employed, to survey the tract owned in common, a surveyor who had included the lots within the tract; or 2, that A represented to them that there were a number of tracts the title to which was in doubt which he could perfect by purchasing at tax sale, to be followed by A's letters showing he was pursuing a policy as to obtaining tracts at such sales which he had told them could be accomplished when they made the purchase; or 3, that A had written to them a letter by which as they al surveyed and offered for sale; a considerable number, among which were some of the lots in controversy in this suit, had been sold. For the years 1858 and 1859, these lands, which were all unseated, were assessed with the usual taxes, and on the 11th of June, 1860, were sold None of the farm lots were then assessed septo one Sarah A. Byrnes for taxes and costs. arately, but a few of the purchasers paid taxes or redeemed from the sale. Ramberger, Jefferies and Byrnes continued to make sales and conveyances of the farm lots until April 1, 1861, when they sold the remaining lands to one William C. Black. In this conveyance the lands were again fully described, and included within the bounds all the farm lots which had been so conveyed; and the grantors excepted, by the names of purchasers and the numbers of the lots, with the number of acres, the lands sold by them. Among the lots so excepted were Nos. 3, 5, 6, 7, 15, 16, 17, 18, 20, 34 and 37, in the precipe. On the same first of April, 1861, Black bought from Mrs. Byrnes and her husband, Timothy Byrnes, all the rights that Mrs. Byrnes had acquired by the treasurer's sale. This purchase was evidenced, not by assignments of the treasurer's deed, but by a conveyance, complete in itself, and which is of record, and was given in evidence at the trial. Black sold and conveyed some more lots, among others Nos. 35, 38, 39, 40 and 41, in precipe, and on the 12th of August, 1862, conveyed to S. B. Coughlin. This deed does not describe the lands in full, but refers to deed from Ramberger et al., and recites that deed and its exceptions, and after thus describing the land, excepts about 1,170 acres sold by grantor. The taxes of 1860 and 1861, on all the lands, were paid in full by Coughlin, as were the taxes of 1862 and 1863. For 1860 and 1861, lots were assessed to William Shanahan and M. Shanahan (29 and 30, Chestnut Road, Nos. 17 and 18, in precipe), |