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sessed as follows: bridge, six cents, and county, ninety-six cents, total, $1.02.

On March 6, 1878, George M. Miller, receiver of taxes for the City of Wilkesbarre, made his return to the county commissioners of Luzerne County on the exoneration claimed by him for the year 1876, and the only return concerning said Thomas Hughes or his property was as follows:

"Hughes, Thomas-vacant lot-sold three years ago-Bridge, twenty four cents, county, $3.84.

The county commissioners thereupon exonerated said receiver of taxes from the aforesaid taxes.

The county commissioners, influenced no doubt by the fact that the amount of said taxes thus exonerated was exactly equal to the amount of taxes assessed against said two properties, disregarded the return of the receiver of taxes, and in the year 1880 certified to the county treasurer both of the said lots delinquent, as follows: "Vacant lot, Hughes, Thomas, Parrish Street, six cents bridge, 96 cents county." Also, "House and lot, Hughes, Thomas, Hazel Street, bridge tax eighteen cents, county tax $2.88."

The county treasurer, after duly advertising the two properties, September 14, 1880, sold the property in controversy to the county commissioners and made a deed to them in which the only description was, "house and lot, Thomas Hughes, Hazel Street, fourteenth ward, Wilkesbarre, for taxes of 1876."

At the expiration of five years the commissioners duly made and passed a resolution to sell all lands which had been held by them for five years or more, in pursuance of which, after due and legal notice, they, November 5, 1885, sold said lot on Hazel Street to William H. Vandermark, plaintiff, who received a deed December 14, 1885, containing a description as last above given, under which he claimed title in this action.

The defendant moved for nonsuit on the ground that under the Act of April 21, 1856, the county treasurer had no authority to sell the lands in question, they having been returned and the taxes exonerated, March 6, 1878, and that the return was otherwise defective.

therefrom the exact property which is delinquent and liable to sale, and that such uncertainty would vitiate the sale; whereupon, the referee granted the nonsuit and subsequently refused to strike the same off. Exceptions filed by the plaintiff to his report were overruled in the court below by WOODWARD, J., and the report confirmed; and the plaintiff took this writ, assigning such action of the court as error.

Mr. Michael Cannon, for plaintiff in er

ror:

Any negligence by the assessors or collectors in that respect for failing to make their return in a given time cannot defeat the deed or sale made by the county treasurer, all irregularities of that character being cured by the Act of 1815.

Heft v. Gephart, 65 Pa. 510; Hubley v. Keyser, 2 Penr. & W. 501; Devinney v. Reynolds, 1 Watts & S. 333; Crue v. Burke, 25 Pa. 377.

It was the assessment of the land and the levy of taxes thereon that made the charge against the land, and not the collector's return, the return being only evidence of its nonpayment or collectibility.

Cohn's App. 10 W. N. C. 230, is a case directly in point. The collector's return was not made for two years after assessment and levy of the taxes, and it was held right.

Messrs. Allan H. Dickson and Q. A. Gates, for defendants in error:

The return is a condition precedent to sale of seated land. The Act of 1844 does not extend the unseated land laws to seated lands in general,

Potter's Dwar. Stat. 257; East Union Township v. Ryan, 86 Pa. 459; Bennett v. Birmingham, 31 Pa. 15.

In this case a house and lot on Hazel Street and a vacant lot on Parrish_Street were assessed to Thomas Hughes. The collector returned a vacant lot of the size of the Parrish Street lot. The treasurer sold to the commissioners a house and lot on Hazel Street; hence, the lot returned was never sold, and the lot sold was never returned. It seems beyond dispute, then, that this land on Hazel Street, which is the subject of this ejectment, never came within the operation of the unseated land laws; and the treasurer had no more right to sell it than any other land not returned.

The return was not made in time.

Act of April 21, 1856, § 3, P. L. 477, Purd. Dig. 1674, pl. 13, as amended by Act of February 23, 1858, P. L. 45.

In the case of Hess v. Herrington, 73 Pa. 445, it does not appear that any duplicate was ever issued to a collector for the unseated land tax, and no question was raised as to the time of return.

1. Section 3 of the Act of April 21, 1856, Purd, 1674, pl. 13, as amended by the Act of February 23, 1858, provides as follows: "It shall be the duty of *** all collectors of any taxes whatsoever, to make return to the county commissioners of any exonerations claimed by them, on or before the first day of February in each year; and it shall not be lawful for the said county commissioners to grant any exonerations after that time, nor for the county treasurer to sell any lands which shall have been returned and taxes exonerated after time.” The referee held that the Act of April 21, 1856, had not been repealed prior to the time these taxes were returned and exonerated; that the provisions therein are mandatory on the officers, and their observance a condition precedent of their right to sell the land; that a sale of land not thus returned, as in the pres- The præcept from commissioners to tre sent case, is void, and the purchaser takes no ti-urer of unseated land must describe the land tle; that the return of the collectors was not ordered to be sold; otherwise, it confers no ausufficiently definite to enable the owner, the thority on treasurer to sell. officer and the public to identify and determine

The return here is too indefinite and misleading to authorize a sale.

Dunn v. Ralyea, 6 Watts & S. 479; Philadelphia v. Miller, 49 Pa. 449; Lyman v. Philadelphia, 56 Pa. 501; Strauch v. Shoemaker, 1 Watts & S. 177; Hess v. Herrington, 73 På 447; Brotherline v. Hammond, 69 Pa. 134.

Stewart v. Graffies, 8 Serg. & R. 344.

This was a sale of a lot for a joint tax on two | said claim is hereto annexed as part hereof lots, and it is therefore void. marked exhibit “A.”

Stark v. Shupp, 3 Cent. Rep. 146.

Per Curiam :

There is no error in this judgment. The return of taxes was made too late in time, and too defective in form, to constitute a valid basis for a sale of the land in question. Judgment affirmed.

City of PHILADELHPIA, Plff. in Err.,

V.

William R. MATCHETT.

Satisfaction of a municipal claim for water pipe, entered of record in accordance with an ordinance of the councils of Philadelphia, not only discharges the lien but operates as an estoppel to prevent the City from denying payment when a subsequent purchaser of the land, against which the claim was filed, applies for a permit to introduce water from the pipe to the premises.

(Argued March 29, Decided April 11, 1887.)

JANU

ANUARY Term, 1887, No. 137, E. D., be fore Mercur, Ch. J., Trunkey, Sterrett, Green and Clark, JJ.

Error to Common Pleas No. 3 of Philadelphia County, to review a judgment for the defendant in a case stated in an action of trespass on the case. Affirmed.

Reported below, 2 Pa. C. C. R. 272.
The case stated was as follows:

It is hereby agreed that an amicable action be entered in the above entitled suit, and that a case stated therein be agreed to, as follows, to wit:

That in and prior to the year 1872 the German Hospital, a charitable corporation, was, inter alia, the owner of a lot of ground in the City of Philadelphia, situate on the east side of Twentieth Street, extending from Norris Street to Park Avenue (now called Diamond Street), containing in front on said Twentieth Street, 500 feet, and extending in depth eastward of that width along Norris Street and Park Avenue or Diamond Street 150 feet, on which were erected the buildings of said hospital, and the said lot and buildings were occupied by it for the purposes of a charitable hospital until the month of October, 1872, at which time the said hospital was removed to the new buildings of the corporation situate at Twentieth Street and Girard Avenue in said City, but that the said lot continued in the ownership of said corporation until the time hereafter mentioned, but after the last mentioned date was no longer used for the purpose of a hospital. That some time in the year 1873 the City of Philadelphia laid a water pipe in the said Twentieth Street along the whole front of said lot.

That on the 11th day of March, 1874, the said City, through its solicitor filed in the district court, as of March Term, 1874, No. 12, a claim for $400 for said water pipe laid in front of said lot. A copy of the docket entries of

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That on the 12th day of December, 1874, an ordinance of the select and common councils of the said City was duly approved by the mayor thereof, ordaining that "The said solicitor be authorized and directed to enter satisfaction on the claims of the City against the German Hospital for water pipe laid in front of their property on Twentieth Street from Diamond to Norris Street, D. C. M. T. 1874, No. 12, C. C. D." A copy of which said ordinance is hereto annexed, as part hereof, marked exhibit "B."

That the said city solicitor on the 22d day of December, 1874, entered satisfaction of record of the said claim for water pipe against said lot, as appears by the docket entries, a copy of which is hereto annexed.

That the said German Hospital, by indenture dated the first day of December, 1879, duly recorded in Deed Book L. W. No. 66, page 29, etc., granted and conveyed the said lot of ground, inter alia, to George Sergeant in fee.

That the said George Sergeant, by indenture dated the second day of December, 1879, and recorded in Deed Book L. W., No. 71, page 12, etc., granted and conveyed the said lot, inter alia, to John D. Lankenau in fee.

That the said John D. Lankenau, by indenture dated the 12th day of May, 1885, and recorded in Deed Book G. G. P., No. 40, page 298, etc., granted and conveyed the said lot, inter alia, to the said William R. Matchett in fee.

That, prior to the delivery of the last mentioned deed, the said William R. Matchett caused certificates of search to be procured from the office of the court of common pleas (which since the adoption of the Constitution of 1874 includes searches in the late district court) and also from the city solicitor's office, which said certificates are dated the 21st day of May, 1885, and show no municipal claim for water pipe, or any other claims, against said lot. A copy of said searches is hereto annexed as part hereof, and marked exhibit "C."

That, prior to the payment of the purchase money of said lot, the said William R. Matchett knew that the said water pipe had been laid in front of the same, that the said claim had been filed therefor, and that the said claim had been satisfied of record by the then city solicitor, and relying on these facts, neither he nor anyone on his behalf, before paying said purchase money made any inquiry at the water department, to ascertain there if the said pipe had been paid for.

That, by inquiry at the said office of the water department, he would have ascertained that said pipe had not been paid for. That there is connected with said water department a search office, and that for a fee of twenty-five cents, as provided by a resolution of councils, dated the 4th day of March, 1884, searches are now, and have been since the last mentioned date, issued by the chief engineer of the water department. That no such search was ordered or requested in this case. A copy of the form of such search is hereto annexed as part hereof, marked exhibit "D."

That since the passage of the Ordinance of January 29, 1855, it has always been within the power of a purchaser to ascertain by inquiry at

the water department whether pipe has been paid for. It has been customary for some years past for attorneys and conveyancers in Philadelphia to make inquiry at the water department to ascertain as to the payment of pipe. That, as a matter of fact, the water pipe in question has not been paid for, but that the said William R. Matchett was not aware of said fact at the time of the payment of the purchase money of said lot. The admission of the fact that said pipe has not been paid for is not to prejudice the right of the defendant to argue that the plaintiff is estopped from alleging such fact as against him.

That the said William R. Matchett has caused a row of dwelling houses to be erected

judgment, with right in either party to take a writ of error to the supreme court.

It is further agreed that either party shall have the right to refer to all statutes of the State and ordinances of councils bearing on the creation and organization of the water department for the furnishing of water to citizens, the laying of water pipes, and the remedies for the collection of the charges therefor, with the same force and effect as though the same were incorporated herein at length.

The exhibits referred to in the case stated
were as follows:
Exhibit "A."
Copy of Municipal Claim.
C. C. Dkt. March T. 1874.

phia

on said lot, which are now nearly completed, The City of Philadel
and it became necessary to connect the water
pipes of said houses with the said water pipe
in the street for the purpose of introducing The German Hospital.

water into the said houses.

V.

Dec. 22, 1874. By

That on the 23d day of November, 1885, the said William R. Matchett applied to Charles order of City Solicitor, H. Russell, the officer at the water department filed, this claim is satisof the said City, duly authorized to issue per-fied. mits for the introduction of water into buildings, who was duly appointed by William Ludlow, chief engineer of said water department, and that said application was refused, unless the said William R. Matchett would first pay into said department the cost of laying said water pipe in front of said lot, in pursuance of an Ordinance of councils of the 29th day of January, 1855, a copy of which is hereto annexed as part hereof marked exhibit "E."

That the said William R. Matchett on the 28th day of November, 1885, presented his petition to this honorable Court for a writ of mandamus to the said William Ludlow, chief engineer, and Charles H. Russell, permit clerk of said water department, commanding them to issue to him a permit to introduce water from said pipe into said houses; whereupon, a writ of alternative mandamus was awarded to which the said William Ludlow, chief engineer, made return and an issue was joined thereon and the case argued before this honorable court and held under consideration; and thereupon at the suggestion of said court an agreement between the said plaintiff and the said defendant was entered into, providing that the said plaintiff should grant the said permit, upon the said defendant entering into a covenent to pay the cost of laying said water pipe, if upon a case stated reciting the foregoing facts, the court should be of opinion that the plaintiff was not estopped from alleging that the said pipe had not been paid for, and that defendant was not entitled to use said water pipe without paying the cost of laying the same, which said Covenant has been duly signed and delivered to the city solicitor, and thereupon the said permit was duly issued to the said defendant. If upon the foregoing facts the court should be of opinion that the plaintiff is not estopped as to the defendant from alleging that said water pipe has not been paid for, and that the said defendant is not entitled to introduce water into his said houses from said water pipe, without first paying the cost of laying the same, then judgment to be entered for the plaintiff in the sum of $500; otherwise, judgment to be entered for the defendant, costs to follow the

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Exhibit "B."

11,

Copy of Ordinances 1874, P. G. 389. Section 1. The Select and Common Councils of the City of Philadelphia do ordain "That the city solicitor be authorized and directed to enter satisfaction on the claims of the City against the German Hospital for water pipe laid in front of their property on Twentieth Street, from Diamond to Norris Street. (D. C., M. T. 1874, No. 12 C. C. D.)

A. Wilson Henszey,

President Common Council.

Attest:-John Eckstien,

Clerk of Common Council.
R. W. Downing,

President Select Council.

Approved this twelfth day December, A. D.

1874.

Wm. S. Stokley,

Mayor of Philadelphia.

Exhibit "C."

Copy of Searches.

All that square of ground bounded on the north by Park Avenue (formerly Diamond Street), on the south by Norris Street, on the east by Nineteenth Street, and on the west by Twentieth Street. Page Fontain.

On searching the Indices of Claims in the
City Solicitor's office, I find nothing against
the premises as above described.
F. F. Sorver,

May 21, 1885.

Assistant Solicitor. On examining the Locality Indices of the Courts of Common Pleas, I find nothing against the above described premises since May 21, 1880.

May 21, 1885.

[SEAL.]

S. B. Van Dusen,

Pro. Phy.

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court and sustained in the case of Philadelphia v. Cooke, 30 Pa. 56.

In the case of Girard Life Ins. Co. v. Philadelphia, above quoted, a mortgagee of a property purchased at a sheriff's sale. There was nothde-ing upon the court record to show that the water rent was in arrears, yet the court compelled him to pay all arrears at time of sale; otherwise, to submit to the cutting off of water under the Ordinance of March 22, 1862.

charges against

Chief Engineer.

No.

I hereby certify that there is

City Water pipe laid in

and that there are

William Ludlow,

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Clerk.

Copy of Ordinance of Councils. Section 2. "That no permit for the use of water shall be issued, unless at the time of the application the person or persons shall exhibit the receipt of the proper officer for the amount of assessment, or other satisfactory evidence of payment thereof, for the expense of laying the water pipe on the premises for which the permit is requested."

Judgment was entered for defendant on the case stated, and this was assigned as error.

Messrs. Frank M. Riter and Robert Alexander, Assistant City Solicitors, and Charles F. Warwick, City Solicitor, for plaintiff in error:

It is admitted that the pipe has not been paid for.

The Ordinance of January 29, 1855, provides that "No permit for the use of water shall be issued unless, at the time of the application, the person or persons shall exhibit the receipt of the proper officer for the amount of assessment or other satisfactory evidence of the payment thereof for the expense of laying the pipe on the premises for which the permit is granted. This ordinance, if valid, must be complied with by the chief of the department.

The supplying of water and gas to a city is not a municipal duty; hence, when the city undertakes to do so it acts not by virtue of any rights of sovereignty, but exercises merely the functions of a private corporation.

Western Saving Fund Society v. City of Phila. 31 Pa. 175; Wheeler v. City of Phila. 77 Pa. 338. The introduction of water by the city into private houses is not on the footing of a contract but of a license which is paid for.

Smith v. City of Phila. 81 Pa. 38.

It may very well be that when a license has been given by the city to the owner of a house to use the water, such license may not be withdrawn arbitrarily or from mere caprice. But it is equally clear that the city may adopt such rules in regard to the use of the water, and the payment therefor, as the municipal authorities shall deem expedient.

Girard Life Ins. Co. v. Phila, 88 Pa. 393. This very ordinance was before the supreme

In the present case the defendant could have easily ascertained the fact that the pipe was not paid for. To inquire and take searches at the office of the water department is now the settled practice with conveyancers and lawyers in passing titles.

There are miles of unpaid pipe in the City, for which no lien exists. Liens have in some cases expired by limitation and in others been discharged. Every man is bound to know the law. The law is that the City can make its own rules in selling water; and one rule, made and enforced for thirty years past, is that it will not furnish water before the pipe through which the water runs is paid for. Concerning this it is the business of a purchaser of land to inquire. To inquire whether a lien has been discharged, has expired, or has been satisfied, is not sufficient. The regulation of the business being that the pipe must be paid for to the satisfaction of the chief of the department, the inquiry of the purchaser must be: Has the pipe been paid for? And this inquiry must be made at the water department.

The relator, having failed to make this inquiry, has no legal right to say he was misled. For what reason councils directed the lien to be satisfied is not known to the City.

To make a gift to the hospital was beyond the power of councils. There is no charter right to do it.

Dechert v. Commonwealth, 4 Cent. Rep. 754; Hodges v. Buffalo*, 2 Denio, 110; Bergner v. Harrisburg, 1 Pearson, 291.

The property in front of which the water pipe is laid is a vacant lot not used by the German Hospital, and consequently the lot is not exempt from frontage charges or taxes under the Act of May 12, 1874, exempting hospitals, etc.

If the ground were exempt, the owner must comply with the ordinance. The lien is by force of statute. The collection by lien under the statute is considered by the court as an exercise of the taxing power of the State, and in that way a lien for frontage becomes a tax. The Ordinance of January 29, 1855, is not an exercise of any taxing power of the State, it is simply a business regulation of a corporation.

If extinguishment of lien by judicial sale and payment to sheriff is neither actual nor constructive payment, certainly the satisfaction of claim without payment is no payment of the debt. Hundreds of verdicts have been rendered in the courts against the City on pipe claims, because the property liened was rural; yet it has never been supposed the City could be compelled to furnish water until the pipe was paid for, as required by the ordinance. If such be the case, the City will lose at least $100,000 of pipe debts where liens have been

*See note, Lawyers' edition. [Ed.]

lost by adverse decisions on rural property de | Sharswood's Orig. MS. Vol. 10, p. 137; Tathfenses.

There is no equity in the position of the defendant. He has not paid for the pipe, and seeks to throw on his fellow citizens a burden of $500 which he should bear. He was not deceived. He could have ascertained in a minute whether the pipe had been paid for by inquiring at the proper office. The fact that he got no receipted bill from his vendor should have put him on inquiry. The fact that an ordinance directed the satisfaction was evidence that no money had been paid. When money is paid the city solicitor has full authority to satisfy without an ordinance.

am v. Phila. 2 W. N. C. 564.

This ordinance, declaring that the City was satisfied as to this claim, emanates from the same body; it is of as high authority as, and later in date than the Ordinance of 1855, which provides that a permit shall not be granted unless satisfactory evidences of payment be exhibited.

The City as against the defendant, who is an innocent purchaser, is estopped by its solemn declaration of record from now alleging that said pipe has not been paid for.

By these declarations in the ordinance and on the court record that her claims for water If the City had said to the defendant, This pipe were satisfied, of which facts the defendpipe is paid for, and the defendant had acted ant had knowledge before he bought, as found upon that assertion, of course the City would be by the case stated, the plaintiff misled the deestopped from asserting the contrary. All that fendant from making that inquiry which he Matchett alleges is that the City said "This otherwise might have made, and thus he was municipal claim is satisfied." The City con- induced to pay over his purchase money, betends that a satisfaction of a claim is not neces-lieving the pipe to be paid for, without retainsarily a payment of the debt. The City has two remedies, entirely distinct, by which to compel the payment of a claim for pipe, one given by statute, and the other by ordinance. There is nothing which makes it compulsory upon the City to file a claim. The claim when filed will expire in five years, unless revived. It may be discharged by a sheriff's sale, and in other ways the remedy given by statute may fail; but the remedy provided by ordinance is good until actual payment.

A purchaser of real estate has no right to rely solely upon the lien records. In buying real estate if a man desires to know upon what terms he can get the use of water, he must go to the office of the water department, and there inquire.

It has been decided in the case of Norris v. Brady, 5 Whart. 541, that the satisfaction of a judgment on a bond accompanying a mortgage does not impair the same debt secured by the mortgage; and it has also been decided in Fleming v. Parry, 24 Pa. 47, that the satisfaction of a mortgage does not in conclusion of law discharge the bond secured by it. And it is said in the last named case" That there is no magic in an entry of satisfaction, either on a judgment or a mortgage, which can prevail against the truth and equity of the transaction."

See also Jones v. Johnson, 3 Watts & S. 276.
Mr. William C. Hannis, for defendant in

error:

While it is now admitted that an inquiry at the water department would have developed the fact that said pipe had not been paid for in the ordinary way in cash to that department, yet it does not follow that the City satisfied said claim without receiving a consideration therefor. It is admitted that the consideration did not pass through the water department; but here is a hospital whose wards are always open to citizens or persons hurt in the employ of the City, and the consideration of this fact doubtless induced the select and common council and the mayor to order the city solicitor to enter satisfaction of record on the claims of the City against the German Hospital for water pipes laid in front of its property; and this the councils had undoubted power to do.

Tagg v. City, 18 W. N. C. 79; Lewis v. Lutz,

ing any part of the purchase money from his vendor, and against whom he has no claim to recover it back; for clearly, the claim being satisfied, there was no liability of either his grantor or of his property for this alleged claim of the City, and even the liability of the hospítal was barred more than six years by the Statute of Limitations.

Webster defines satisfaction: "Payment of a legal debt or demand, the discharging or canceling of a judgment or a mortgage by paying the amount of it." Satisfy is defined: "To make payment."

When the councils, the mayor and the city solicitor publicly declared that this claim for water pipe was satisfied, and thus used a word which invariably means payment, what duty was there imposed on the defendant to go further? This word "satisfied" is the common word applied whenever mortgages, judgments and all other claims of record have been paid; and the defendant was justified in believing, from the use of this common word, that the claim had been paid.

The argument that if, after learning of this declaration that the claim had been satisfied. the defendant, instead of relying on it, had inquired of the clerk at the water department he would have found that the declaration was not true, was strongly pressed on this court in Brooke v. New York etc. R. Co. 16 W. N. C. 514, ` which was a case of a false bill of lading fraudulently issued by defendant's shipping clerk, for goods which had never been received; and it was urged that if plaintiff had not relied on the declaration contained in bill of lading, but before advancing money on it, had applied to defendants, they would have at once learned that the bill was fraudulent, and that the statement in it, that the goods had been received, was false. The court disregarded this argument and upheld the plaintiff's claim that the defendants were estopped from showing that the statements contained in the bill of lading were false.

So in Bank v. Bank, 50 N.Y. 575, which was a false certificate of a check, and was pronounced genuine by the teller whose certificate it purported to be, the defendant bank claimed that the plaintiff had ample time and oppor

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