10. Where a mortgage is given by a part owner during prooeedings in partition to which he is a party, and at the sale in such proceedings the land is purchased by and conveyed to trustees for the beneficial owners of the property, held, that the legal title of the mortgagor was extinguished and the mortgage attached, but in equity only, to the equitable interest of the mortgagor in the property, and that when on the II. VALIDITY; USURY; AFTER ACQUIRED division thereof, such part owner obtained title to the part allotted to him, such mortgage cannot be maintained beyond the extent of the mortgagor's interest in the property, and that a lien for purchase money of such part owing by him was paramount to the mortgage. Id. III. PARTIES; ASSUMPTION; REDEMPTION. 11. Unless the mortgage lien is complete at debtor's death, priority cannot be claimed over other judgment creditors. Authorities cited. Heft's Appeal (Pa.) 593 19. It is not necessary in such case that plaintiff should have offered to redeem; a willingness stated in the bill, to allow all that is actually and fairly due, is all that is re quired. Id. 20. Letters from the lender's agent to borrower's agent, found among the papers of the latter after his decease, their envelopes showing the dates of their passage through the postoffice, in connection with letter press copies in the letter book of the writer are admissible as part of the res gesta. Id. 21. In a suit to foreclose a mortgage, held, the alleged defenses of an agreement to extend time of payment of mortgage, and an agreement to assign the same, are not maintained. Eastwood v. Worrall (N. J.) 363 34. Where by the mortgage, mortgagor is entitled to possession until default, the chattels do not, before default, belong to mortgagee, within section 60 of Act for Trial of Small Causes, Rev. 550. Id. 35. In replevin for chattels claimed under a mortgage which had not been accompanied with an immediate change of possession, it is incumbent on plaintiff to show that the mortgage was made in good faith and without any intent to defraud. Mfrs. & Traders Bank v. Koch (N. Y.) 672 of the mortgaged chattels by the mortgagor 36. Where notice to the mortgagee of sales and of the appropriation of the proceeds by the mortgagor on his own account is only evidence from which a previous agreement to permit such sales and appropriation may be inferred, it is not ground for an absolute direction to the jury to find for the defendant in such case. BRIEFS AND NOTES. ld. Deed absolute as. (Md.) 440; (Pa.) 186, 494 Where grantee has power to sell, transaction cannot be mortgage. (Pa.) 495 88 Bona fide purchasers. (N. Y.) Acknowledgment necessary. (Pa.) 186 Estoppel by. (Pa.) 186 Validity of unrecorded mortgage. (Pa.) Usury. (N. Y.) Defense of. (Md.) 186 752 439 439 | of Baltimore by the Act of 1833, chap. 180, is not taken away by the Act of 1854, chap. 9, nor by Ordinance No. 36 of 1874. Bryan, J., dissents. 403 Junior mortgagees may set up. (Md.) After acquired property. (N. Y.) 319 Rights of mortgagee. (N. Y.) 319 Payment to be in reasonable time where no particular time specified. (Md.) 440 Agreement to extend time of payment is valid contract; such agreement may be by parol. (N. J.) 363 Garrett v. Janes (Md.) 5. An ordinance of Baltimore allowing steps, etc., to extend nine feet into Mount Vernon Place is a valid exercise of the power derived from the Act of 1854. Id. 6. A municipal Legislature may, by a single ordinance, declare any compilation of ordinances to be in force, unless prohibited 363 by statute. Id. Satisfaction of judgment on bonds accompanying mortgage does not impair same debt secured by the mortgage. (Pa.) 910 Assignment. (Md.) 444; (N. J.) Subrogation. (N. Y.) Foreclosure; jurisdiction. (Md.) Parties. (N. Y.) 752 440 Rights claimed in priority of, or hostility to mortgage cannot be litigated in. (N. Y.) 745 Decree; conclusiveness. (N. Y.) Chattel; retention of goods by mortgagor; evidence of intent. (N. Y.) 672, 673 MOTIONS. See TRIAL, II. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS. I. DIVISION. 319 II. POWERS; REGULATIONS: ORDINANCES. III. OFFICERS. III. OFFICERS. 7. Under Laws 1871, chap. 323, the comptroller of the City of New York in the creation and issuing of "consolidated stock of the County of New York," was impliedly authorized to contract for assistance in negotiating the loan, and to pay for such services a reasonable commission out of the premium realized on the bonds. Andrews and Finch, JJ., dissent. Mayor of New York v. Sands (N. Y.) 268 8. It was competent for a city officer to render services to the county and receive compensation therefor. Id. 9. Defendant having received, by indorsement from the comptroller, a check in IV. PUBLIC PROPERTY; WORKS; CON- payment of services is not liable to the county for the amount thereof. Id. 10. The board of supervisors fixed the salaries of the district attorney, his chief clerk and other subordinates, at certain sums, but thereafter, by resolution, included in the budget a sum less than the aggregate of amounts fixed by the first resolution. Held, that a and who accepted payment at such reduced chief clerk appointed under such arrangement rate had, after the termination of his employment, no claim for the larger salary fixed by the first resolution. 273 People v. Supers. of Kings Co. (N. Y.) See HEALTH; LANDLORD AND TENANT, 8-11. member of the fire department cannot be ar 3. If a grant is made to a municipal corporation, charged with a trust in favor of an individual, private corporation or charity, the interest which the cestui que trust or beneficiary has under the grant may sustain it against legislative revocation. Stockton v. City of Newark (N. J.) 458 15. If the Act of 1886 gives the city the power to destroy the trust, such Act is unconstitutional. Id. 16. The fact that the place in question has 4. The power to regulate porches, etc., become a nuisance from the neglect by the in Mount Vernon Place, given to the City | city to take proper care of it is no reason why b. Assessments. the city should be permitted to go still further 458 17. In an action by a town to recover port duties it is not necessary to show that it did Authorities actually keep the port in repair. cited. 31. It is for the jury to determine whether the land is urban, suburban, or rural. Id. 32. Municipal assessments for permanent improvements upon land are apportionable between the life tenant and the remainderman; ordinary taxes of government are properly chargeable to the life tenant alone. Authorities cited. 804 Thomas v. Evans (N. Y.) 33. Assessments for water rates, against vacant lots in Brooklyn, under Laws 1859, chap. 396, § 24, held illegal and void, the statute failing to provide for notice to the lot owners or opportunity to be heard. Finch and Andrews, JJ., dissent. Remsen v. Wheeler (N. Y.) 691 22. Individuals who furnished materials to such contractor are entitled to the lien provided in Act of 1878, on moneys in 34. Where vacant lots, belonging to the city treasury due or to grow due under minors, had been sold to enforce such illethe contract. Id. gal assessments, and a proceeding was had 23. Filing the notice of the lien with the to enable the owners to sell a part of the land clerk of the board of education and with the to pay off the incumbrances, and the purchas city comptroller was a fulfillment of the Acter paid to the city the amount of the outstandof 1878, § 2. Id. 25. In an action to recover damages by the owner of land against a municipality, for the taking of land for a street, a reference to the street as a boundary in deed to private parties, held, not to operate as a dedication, so as to prevent the recovery of damages. Easton Borough v. Rinek (Pa.) ing illegal tax sale certificates on account of the purchase money, held, that while the money remained in possession of the city an action was maintainable by the lot owners to compel the delivery thereof to them. Id. damages to property owners, occasioned by 36. Act of May 24, 1878, providing for the change of grade of streets in boroughs, is not retroactive so as to give damages for injuries prior to the Constitution of 1874. Folkenson v. Easton Borough (Pa.) 211 192 26. The right to damages did not ac37. The measure of damages is the difcrue until the street was opened. Id. ference in the market value of the property 27. The acceptance by the City of Cumber- before the change in the immediately adjoinland of its amended Charter of 1848 did not ing property and the market value after the change of grade in front of the property, with operate as an acceptance of streets pre-interest on the principal sum to date. viously laid out within the city limits and dedicated to the public by the owners. Kennedy v. Cumberland (Md.) 409 accrues at time of physical change of grade | where he had authority to call upon the trus of street. tees for the same. 40. An assent to a change of grade of street by plaintiff when he was not the owner of the property will not bind him after he becomes such owner. Id. 41. Where excavations made in the street and adjacent lots by the State changed the direction of the drainage, if a village by turnpiking the street and improving the highway did not increase the flow of surface water on the plaintiff's lot beyond what it was prior to the excavations, it committed no wrong to plaintiff. Rutherford v. Holley (N. Y.) 677 44. Under the method in force for laying out and building public roads in the County of Kings, the officers of the town are not chargeable for a defect in the road or omission to provide safeguards, which arises from an error in its plan. Id. 45. A village which is constituted a separate road district, and the trustees of which are commissioners of highways, is bound to keep its streets and sidewalks in a reasonably safe and proper condition. Pomfrey v. Saratoga Springs (N. Y.) 44 46. There must be an acceptance of a dedication of a street before the duty of the county or municipality in improving or keeping it in repair can arise. Authorities cited. Kennedy v. Cumberland (Md.) 412 Id. 53. A township is not chargeable with damages resulting from extraordinary accidents which may happen on its public roads, and which reasonable skill and care would not be required to guard against. Id. 54. The running away of a horse is not a contingency against which the township is bound to provide. Id. 55. When two causes combine to produce an injury to a traveler upon a highway, both of which are in their nature proximate, the one being a culpable defect in the highway and the other some occurrence for which neither party is responsible, the municipality is liable, provided the injury would not have been sustained but for such defect. thorities cited. Taylor v. Yonkers (N. Y.) Au. 231 57. A municipal corporation may require each of its citizens to clean the snow from the walks adjacent to his own premises, and when this is not done within a reasonable time the corporation may compel them to act or do the work itself; and if it suffers the obstruction to remain thereafter with notice of its existence, it may become liable for injuries resulting. Taylor v. Yonkers (N. Y.) 230 58. It should require householders to sprinkle ashes or sand, or the like, upon the surface, but it is not responsible for their omission. Id. 48. It is in the discretion of the commissioners to apply the funds in their hands in making such repairs as in their judgment are most needed; and they are not responsible for an error of judgment in doing so where 59. When for two years the action of rain they have not the funds to repair all the de- and frost had thrown upon the sidewalk sand, fective places. Id. gravel and stones from an adjoining bank, un49. Where, by the village charter, the walks til the flagging was entirely covered by it, and are placed under the care of the trustees and a new and sloping grade substituted for the superintendent is bound to repair them, the one adopted, which when winter came was held, that money raised for the repair of the covered with snow which was never removed streets is applicable also to the repair of but had been trampled down by travel, and by the sidewalks. freezing and thawing converted into ice, held, that these facts established negligence on the part of the city. Pomfrey v. Saratoga Springs (N. Y.) 44 50. It is not sufficient to exonerate the village that the superintendent had 110 money in his hands to repair walks, Id. 60. Where there were no facts beyond the existence of the slope that permitted the infer |