pected that by reason of the additions to the membership of the court its sitting time will be increased fully fifty per cent., and that it will be possible to practically clear the calendar in two years. There are at present 880 appeals pending argument before the court. Heretofore about three years has been required after notice of appeal to reach a decision in a given case, and this fact has frequently led to appeals being taken by parties who, without feeling at all confident of ultimate success, took this course in order to secure the two or three years' delay which must necessarily ensue before judgment could be entered. With prospect of much more speedy results, it is not improbable that there will be fewer appeals taken, and thus the work of the court will be lightened. The plan thus briefly outlined, while not perhaps the ideal one, gives promise of results quite satisfactory to lawyers and litigants by whom its operation will be watched with interest.

The retirement of Justice Hardin from the bench of the Fourth Appellate Division was marked by a notable gathering of judges and lawyers at Rochester, N. Y., on the 29th ult., assembled to testify their appreciation of the retiring jurist's services and their sincere regret that he could not longer serve the people in his capacity as a judge. The department includes the Fifth, Seventh and Eighth judicial districts, and on the occasion referred to every county in the three districts was represented. Former chief judge of the Court of Appeals, Charles Andrews, presided, and with others testified to the esteem in which Justice Hardin is held in words of warmest eulogy. Twenty-eight years ago Judge Hardin took his seat on the Supreme bench; he has completed two terms of fourteen years each, with a couple of years still to serve before reaching the age of retirement. He preferred not to accept a re-election for that time, but voluntarily retired while in the full possession of the faculties which have impressed his name imperishably upon the jurisprudence of the State. He carries with

and happiness.

and happiness. Another notable judicial record closed with the retirement of Justice Joseph F. Barnard, of Poughkeepsie, N. Y., after thirty-six years of continuous service on the bench of the Supreme Court. He was elected to the bench in 1863 for eight years, re-elected in 1871 for a term of fourteen years, and again re-elected in 1885 for a term of fourteen years. The age limit overtook him in 1893, and he has served since by appointment of the governor under a provision especially inserted in the last Constitution of the State to meet his case. The term for which he was last elected having expired, he will not be again eligible for assignment. Justice Barnard was born in Nantucket, Mass., in 1823. He was graduated from Yale college in 1841, and was admitted to the bar in 1844, after which he practiced law in Poughkeepsie until his elevation to the bench in 1863. In 1870 he was appointed by the governor presiding justice of the General Term. His last two elections were not opposed. It is estimated that Judge Barnard has tried more than 100,000 issues of law and fact.

A lawyer resuming the practice of his profession after passing his ninety-fourth year is an event so seldom witnessed that it calls for something more than passing comment. The gentleman who has achieved this rare distinction is Benjamin Douglas Silliman, LL. D., of New York. He may well be described as the " Grand Old Man" of the legal profession; a relic of a former generation. Born in Newport, R. I., September 24, 1805, his family removed to New York when he was a child, and since that time he has been a resident mainly of the city of Brooklyn. He is descended from Pilgrim stock, and on the side of his father's mother traces his lineage. to John Alden and Priscilla Mullins. General G. S. Silliman, of Connecticut, was his grandfather, and Gold S. Silliman his father; the latter died in Brooklyn, N. Y., in 1868, at the age of ninety-one. Benjamin D. Silliman was graduated from Yale in 1824, and is now the sole surviving member of that not

able class. Having studied law in the office of Chancellor Kent and his son, Judge William Kent, Mr. Silliman was admitted to the bar in 1829, and began practice in New York City. His success has been remarkable. It has been said of him that he never lost his temper in court, and that his successes were invariably won by methods dignified, manly and honorable. In early life a Whig, Mr. Silliman represented his party in the legislature from Brooklyn, as far back as 1838. He was frequently a delegate to local, State and National conventions. In 1854, as a Republican, he accepted the office of district attorney for the eastern district of New York, but resigned in 1866 because the duties of the office interefered with his practice. In 1872 he became a member of the commission to revise the Constitution of the State of New York, and in 1873 was defeated as a candidate for attorney-general of the State. In the same year Columbia College conferred upon Mr. Silliman the honorary degree of LL. D., and in 1874 Yale conferred a similar honor upon him. For twenty years he was president of the Brooklyn Club, has also been president of the Yale Alumni Association, and has been a director in numerous literary and benevolent associations. He was also one of the founders and vice-president of the Bar Association. If, as we are told by specialists, marriage is conducive to longevity, then Mr. Silliman, must be one of the exceptions, for he has avoided wedlock, together with stimulants of all kinds and all irregular habits. His remarkable success at the bar doubtless has been due to his prodigious industry, coupled with native ability. Something over ten years ago, at the time of his retirement from active practice, Mr. Silliman was tendered a public banquet at Delmonico's. Now, his health having greatly improved, he returns to active practice with mind as clear and brain almost as active as if he had not been engaged in the practice of the law for more than sixty years. A learned lawyer, a ripe scholar, a lover of his race, and withal modest to a fault as to his personal achievements, Mr. Silliman, as he approaches the century mark, enjoys remarkably good health, is wonderfully vigorous in mind and

body, and is able to look back upon a wellspent life, a life of toil and triumph. Those who enjoy the rare privilege of his personal acquaintance say that he possesses a rare fund of reminescence and anecdote of many of the great statesmen and lawyers of the past, including not a few former governors of New York with whom he was on terms of intimacy, and that when in the mood he is one of the most entertaining of men. Long may he live as a link connecting us with former generations.

Apropos of Mr. Silliman's resumption of practice, it is interesting to observe that the English legal journals are endeavoring to ascertain who is the oldest practitioner in England. Mr. George Hensman, who was admitted in 1831, two years after Mr. Silliman, seems to be entitled to the honor; but two other solicitors are stated in the Law List to have been admitted in 1831, viz.: Mr. John Shaw and Mr. W. D. H. Oehme, of Upper Norwood.

We begin the publication in this issue of a somewhat elaborate biographical sketch of Lucien Brock Proctor, the well-known historian and legal biographer which, if properly written, cannot, we think, fail to interest and instruct our readers. Although he has been before the public for many years, owing to his own peculiar modesty in this regard, very little has ever been written about Mr. Proctor's life and career. The article, which will be continued through several numbers of the ALBANY LAW JOURNAL, will, we believe, appeal not only to Albanians, but to readers in all parts of the country who have been interested and instructed by his many productions on historical and legal topics, but who know little or nothing of the writer personally, or of his long and remarkably successful career at the bar, which has been set forth in some detail.

The North Carolina Bar Association, although mere fledgling among similar organizations, having begun its existence on the 10th of February, 1899, appears to be in a very healthy and flourishing condition.

condition. For this reason the legal effect of the judgment after the death of the husband was not expressly decided. This decision was modified upon appeal. (Id., 116 N. Y. 635, 22 N. E. 1114.)

ing condition is a matter for general congratulation.

Divorce

Notes of Cases.

Effect. Judgment for Alimony. In Johns v. Johns, decided by the New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department, in November, 1899, it appeared that a judgment for divorce directed the payment of alimony to the wife during her lifetime, and also required the husband to pay the premiums on insurance policies issued on his life, which were payable to the wife, and only became due and payable on his death. It was held that in view of the fact that the judgment made provision, in the matter of the insurance policies, for plaintiff on defendant's death, the provision directing payment of alimony to plaintiff during her lifetime meant during the lives of both parties, and hence had no binding force after defendant's death. The court said in part:

In Field v. Field (15 Abb. N. C. 434). Mr. Justice Van Brunt reached the conclusion, in construing the provision of a judgment directing the payment of alimony to the plaintiff during her life, that it did not have the effect of extending its operation beyond the lifetime of either of the parties. Upon appeal the General Term affirmed the decision of Mr. Justice Van Brunt, and for the reasons stated in his opinion (Id. 437, 438). In Galusha v. Galusha (43 Hun, 181) the subject was again under consideration, and it was therein held (Mr. Justice Bradley writing the opinion) that, in order to render effectual payment of alimony after the death of the party charged, some direction was required to be made in the judgment to effectuate such purpose; and it is evident. from the discussion therein had, that the mere expression directing payment during the life of the party entitled was not sufficient to charge the estate of the deceased party, as no method was provided for its enforcement. In that case the judgment provided for alimony during the life of the plaintiff, to be secured by a mortgage, with the reservation of right in either party to apply for a change of the

But it was upon other grounds, and in nowise affected the question which we are now considering. The same rule obtains in Massachusetts as was announced in the Field case, supra. (Knapp v. Knapp, 134 Mass. 353.) It is to be borne in mind that, under the provisions of law as existing in this State, the innocent wife who obtains a divorce does not lose her right of dower in the estate of her husband, existing at the time. Her

quently acquired real property. This consideration, among others, led Mr. Justice Van Brunt and the General Term of the First Department to the conclusion which they reached; and in 2 Nels. Div. & Sep. (sec. 932), the learned author reaches the conclusion that, in those States where the divorce does not terminate the right of dower, the effect of a decree awarding alimony during life terminates with the death of the party charged. (Id., p. 879.) The plaintiff, however, challenges this view of the law, and insists that it is in contravention of the decision in Burr v. Burr (10 Paige. 20). It seems clear that the opinion in that case went to the extent of holding that the court was possessed of authority to continue the payment of alimony beyond the life of the husband charged; but this case, and others which follow it, are clearly distinguishable from the judgment in the case at bar, as therein the defendant was decreed to pay an annuity, and was also required to give security for its payment, so that it became a charge upon his estate, to be enforced by virtue of the terms of the judgment entered in the action. The rights. of the parties thereunder became clearly fixed in this regard, and the right was regarded as secured by the express terms of the power as exercised by the

courts.

And this is apparent in the decision rendered in the Court of Errors, as reported in Burr v. Burr (7 Hill, 207). The same power was also exercised in Peckford v. Peckford (1 Paige, 274) and in Forest v. Forest (3 Abb. Prac. 144-166). We may assume, therefore, without deciding, as it is not necessary to a disposition of the present case, that such power still remains in the court: but it is also well settled, by the decisions already cited, that such power must be clearly expressed in the judgment or it will not pass. In Craig v. Craig (163 Ill. 176, 45 N. E. 153) it was held that a judgment decreeing the payment of permanent alimony 'until the further order of this court," and making the same a specific lien upon land, only continued during the lifetime of both parties - the rule therein announced being that it must unequivocally appear in the judgment that the intention was to bind the heir by the decree or it terminated upon the death of the defendant; and such is the