the present Lord Coleridge. The golden chain So that their life may be considered less ascetic than worn by Lord Russell of Killowen first belonged to frolicsome." Hockey for ladies attracted more Sir Alexander Cockburn, who entailed it upon his remark in 1850 than in 1900. Another gem is to successors in the office of Lord Chief Justice. Law be found in Walker v. Armstrong (8 De Gex, M. Journal. & G. 531), in which the plaintiff was an officer in the navy:

The judicial statistics of Ireland for the year 1899, relating to civil proceedings, show a decrease in chancery proceedings from 1,226 cases and motions to 986. In the Queen's Bench Division the number of jury cases tried declined from 315 to 261; and the writs of summons by upwards of 2,000. The amount of costs taxed in the year shows a decrease of 23.0411., or 8. per cent.

The lists of names of persons liable to serve as jurymen in England and Wales for the next year are now being exhibited for public inspection on the doors of the various churches and chapels over the country. Objection must be made during the present month by persons who are sixty years of age and upwards and others who are exempt, otherwise their names will be returned, and they will be liable to serve on special and common juries.

At the Journalists' Conference, says the Daily News, Sir Edward Clarke spoke in connection with a discussion on newspaper copyright of the case of Walter v. Lane as extremely interesting, especially as five highly-trained legal intellects were on one side and four on the other. If ever there was a case in which it was justifiable, on the part of a newspaper, to assert its rights, this was such a case. He did not, however, think that the decision would be so far-reaching as had been supposed. If Lord Rosebery wished to reproduce his speeches, and used the report of a newspaper, it would be doubtful whether any court would grant an injunction, and, if the worst happened, the damages against Lord Rosebery would be so small that even his limited means would cover them easily. Sir E. Clarke was of opinion that newspaper articles and reports should be better protected than at present. Jour nalists should not live upon one another, and he was glad to know that a bill had been prepared to further that view.

This litigation owes its origin to the manner in which a series of professional gentlemen in the north of England permitted themselves to transact, or in more accurate phrase, to entangle and perplex, some legal business intrusted to their care. These licensed pilots undertook to steer a post-captain through certain not very narrow straits of the law, and, with abundance of sea-room, ran him aground on every shoal that they could make. First, in 1824, then in 1825, and again some years afterwards, was the gallant officer incumbered with help of a description for which he could, perhaps, supply a better term than I can.

Or take the opening words of the judgment in. Barrow v. Barrow (5 De Gex, M. & G. 782):

These and two other suits are the fruit of an alliance between a solicitor and a widow, who, for the first sixty days of their married life, namely, from July 30 to September 28, 1850, lived, as well as quarreled, together, but at the end of that period parted, exchanging a though continual, was merely domestic, for the more conspicuous, more disciplined and more effectual warfare of Lincoln's Inn and Doctors' Commons.

state

of conflict, which,

Although the qualification of Sir Robert Finlay to occupy the position of Lord Chief Justice cannot We recently referred in these columns to the be doubted, the impression that he possesses, as pleasantries of the old law reports. A correspond- Attorney-General, a prescriptive right to the office ent reminds us that modern reports have their pleas-is erroneous. There have been eight occupants of antries, too. A generation has arisen that never knew Lord Justice Knight Bruce in the flesh; but his wit, as embalmed in his judgments, has been recorded for all generations by the pen of De Gex. The judgment in the Agapemone case (Thomas v. Roberts, 3 De Gex and Smale, 758) should be read in its entirety; one wonders how the court preserved any semblance of gravity as it heard for the first time of the "spiritual tea-party at Bridgwater," and listened to the description of the establishment, "placed not on the Euripus, but on the Bristol channel," whose inmates played "at lively and energetic games, such as hockey, ladies and all.

the office during the present century, viz., Lord Kenyon, Lord Ellenborough, Lord Tenterden, Lord Denman, Lord Campbell, Sir Alexander Cockburn, Lord Coleridge and Lord Russell, of Killowen; and of these only two- - Lord Ellenborough and Lord Denman — were promoted to the Lord Chief Justiceship direct from the position of law officer. The appointment of Lord Russell, of Killowen, should alone have prevented the erroneous impression becoming prevalent, for he had ceased to be Attorney-General and was a Lord of Appeal in Ordinary when he succeeded Lord Coleridge as Lord Chief Justice.- Law Journal.

The Albany Law Journal. transaction and formed a sufficient compliance

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with the statute. The court said:

"It has been held almost universally that an attestation in the same room with the testator is good, without regard to intervening objects which might or did intercept the view; and also that an attestation outside the room or place where the testator sat or lay is valid if actually within his range of vision. And no court seems to have doubted that a

man unable to see at all could properly make a will under the statute, if the witnesses attested within his conscious presence, whatever that means. Ex

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temporarily or permanently blind can be injected into this statute has not been attempted by any court or writer, so far as we know. Nor has there been any success in the effort to show why one kind of an intervening object — a partition wall for instance - is better calculated to afford an opportunity for

difficult to see what sound distinction could be made

when applying the rule, between the case where the testator can see the witnesses attest, if he chooses to lean his body forward a few inches, and the case where the act could not be seen if he steps forward the same distance. Or, take a case where a testator has been injured, and is compelled to lie on his

back with his eyes fixed on the ceiling. Must the witnesses affix their signatures from an elevation in order to sign in his presence? No case has gone that far, and yet what difference would it make with such a testator in fact or in sound reason if the will was attested ten feet distant, on a table in an adjoin

ing room, or on a table the same distance from the bed, but in the same room."

HE tendency of the courts to construe the perpetration of a fraud upon the testator than is statutes liberally, according to their another kind, say the closed curtains of an oldspirit, which maketh alive, rather than accord-fashioned bed, or the head or footboard of a beding to the letter which killeth, is again illus- stead, or any other article of furniture which haptrated in the case of Cunningham v. Cunning-pens to be an obstruction to the sight. Again, it is ham, decided by the Supreme Court of Minnesota, wherein the question whether the statute requiring that a will shall be subscribed "in the presence of the testator," had been complied with. It appears that the testator, who was sitting on the side of the bed, signed his will in the presence of two physicians who were to be the witnesses. After he had signed the paper it was taken into an adjoining room and signed at a table about ten feet from the testator. The door was open, and he could have seen the table had he stepped forward two or three feet, but he did not do so. The will was immediately taken back to the testa- The recent decision of the New York Court tor, the signatures of the witnesses were of Appeals, in the matter of the O'Brien and pointed out to him, and he looked over the Clark aqueduct claims, makes very interestpaper and pronounced it correct. The Su-ing reading; besides, it seems to be an emipreme Court, in holding that there had been nently just and righteous decision, notwithsubstantial and satisfactory compliance with standing it does not uphold the majority of the statute, took occasion to say that the the court below. The Court of Appeals suscourts have often placed themselves in absurd tains the contention of Comptroller Coler that and inconsistent positions in construing the Mr. Scott, as corporation counsel of the city of words referred to; that in the case at bar the New York, had not the power to take the sum signing took place within the sound of the of $700,000, or any other sum, out of the city testator's voice; that he knew what was being treasury without the consent and against the done, and that when the signatures of the at- protest of the comptroller, and the city can testing witnesses were pointed out to him he now sue for the recovery of the amount. The took the instrument in his own hands, looked story of the so-called $700,000 compromise is over it and pronounced it satisfactory, which thus told by the New York Commercial made the whole proceeding a single and entire Advertiser:

VOL. 62.- No. 15.

"When the new aqueduct was finished there was vent hostile legislation or to "purchase peace" by left over a claim by O'Brien and Clark, contractors, preventing the prosecution of claims which have no of $7,000,000 against the city for repairs. These legal existence. No more dangerous precedent ' repairs' consisted of work done under compulsion could be conceived, as it practically puts the dispoby the contractors to conform to the specifications sition of the property of the city in the hands of the of their contracts. They had been caught scamp- corporation counsel. ing their work, and had been compelled by the aqueduct commissioners, of whom Mr. Scott was one, to make their work good before receiving their money. There was never any doubt on this point. All the contracts for the work had been drawn by E. Henry Lacombe, at present on the United States Circuit Court bench, when he was corporation counsel, and had been of such ironclad character that escape for a scamping' contractor under their requirements had been found to be impossible. O'Brien and Clark found they had to make their work what they agreed to make it before they could get a penny of pay from the city.

When they had made their work good and

No doubt this was a proper characterization of the transaction; at all events, the Court of Appeals has now sustained the view of Justices Patterson and McLaughlin. As our contemporary well says: "Whatever else may be said of the argument that an unjust claim of $700,000 should be paid by a public officer in order to prevent another unjust claim of $7,000,000 being paid by a Legislature, it obviously has no legal status and hence has no standing in a court of law.”

received their pay they turned about and brought claims against the city for all the money they had The Supreme Court of Georgia, in the respent in making it good, between $7.000,000 and cent case of Bowar v. Equitable Mortgage $10,000,000, alleging that it had been spent in Company, held that the payee of a note, in repairs. Special counsel were retained by the city to fight these claims, and the courts in every instance possession of the same, is presumed to own it, decided that the contractors had no case. As one although his indorsement thereon may stand of the special counsel said in his argument, the uncancelled; he may sue upon the note, and courts held that the claims were without any his title thereto cannot be inquired into, unless foundation whatever, either in law, or justice, or it be necessary for the protection of the deequity." After failing in the courts the claimants went to the State legislature and had a bill passed fendant or to let in the defense which he seeks appointing a commission to investigate the matter. to make. The court said: The commission reported in favor of a compromise. The corporation counsel, Mr. Scott, who had, from the outset, maintained that there was not the slightest basis for a dollar of the claims, arranged a compromise of $700,000, and confessed judgment against the city for that amount. When Mr. Coler became comptroller he refused to pay the money, on the ground that the corporation counsel had not the power to do what he had done. The lower courts decided against him and directed him to pay the money. He paid it under protest, and, through a taxpayer, had suit brought restraining him from the payment. The lower courts decided against him on this, but the Court of Appeals now reverses them and opens the way for the protesting taxpayer to bring suit for recovery of the money."

"The note was in possession of the payee, and the presumption was that it was the owner, notwithstanding its indorsement upon the note stood uncanceled, and it had a right to sue thereon in its own name. In Dugan v. United States (3 Wheat. 172; 4 L. Ed. 362), it was held that if any person who indorses a bill of exchange to another, whether for value or for the purpose of collection, shall come to the possession thereof again, he shall be regarded, unless the contrary appear in evidence, as the bona fide holder and proprietor of such bill, and shall be entitled to recover, notwithstanding there may be on it one or more indorsements in full, subsequent to the one to him, without producing any receipt or indorsement back from either of such indorsees, whose names he may strike from the bill, or not, as he may think proper.' In Daniel, Neg. Inst. (sec. 1198), the rule is stated to be that where there appears on the paper the plaintiff's own indorsement, it will be presumed either that he had not perfected his indorsement by delivery, or that the paper has been returned to him as his own property, and in either case he has the right to sue upon it.' In 2 Rand. Com. Paper (sec. 717). the author says: The payee's possession of a bill or note is prima facie evidence of title in him, notwithstanding his own indorsement is erased, and, The property of the city cannot be used to pre- even, it has been held, notwithstanding his own

Throughout all the litigation on the $700,000 compromise, there has been no attempt to defend it upon legal grounds. The argument made in defense of it has been that if the city did not pay this sum, the claimants would continue to appeal to the legislature and would ultimately recover the entire amount of their claims. This argument was made before the Appellate Division and was met by Justices McLaughlin and Patterson as follows, in an opinion dissenting from that of a majority of the

court:

*

train upon the trestle. As to the matter of poor MUCH has been said and written upon this

subject in contemporary legal periodicals, leged negligence therein, we cannot see how and still more remains to be said. It is a subject such " 'poor lights" could be the proximate cause upon which hinges closely that most serious and

important of all qualities — reputation. And to the ing his client innocent.

He has seen the crime lawyer reputation signifies and means more, with- committed, we will suppose, and, therefore, knows, out doubt, than to any other professional calling, to a moral certainty, of the client's guilt. What is because of the general low opinion of him existing his duty under such circumstances? It has been among the laity. asked: “ May he rightfully, in such a case, make use In defending a guilty client it is a most perplex- ¦ of all his eloquence to convince the jury and public ing and unsettled question as to just where to draw that the deceased, having spent his money in the line. In no treatise on legal ethics, in no con- debauchery, fell down and was thereby killed in constitution or statute, in no general work or paper sequence of his drunkenness?" To this query all on the subject-nowhere has been laid down any right-minded, faithful and conscientious attorneys definite rule as to just where to draw the line of answer readily "no!" duty in such a case.

I shall not attempt, therefore, in a paper of this kind to do more than others have done, but merely to discuss generally the subject.

Under these circumstances it is the first sworn duty of the attorney to remember and comprehend that the court is the impartial judge of the right and the law in the case, and that he was the friend, assistant and officer of the court before he was the attorney of his client, and that, as such officer, it is his duty to honestly and earnestly labor to render aid to the court to arrive at a correct conclusion upon the facts and the law, and that he do this speedily and without delay, and also that he thereby performs his full duty to and best serves his client. We have here, in a general way, a summary of his duty.

Usually the lawyer who defends a guilty client, that is, one whom he knows to be guilty, as far as such a thing is possible, is looked upon by the profession and especially the community as being guilty of a criminal offense himself. This naturally leads us to the question, "is," as has often been said, "an attorney bound to take every case that comes into his office?" This seems to have been the theory once upon a time, but the latest conclusions of prominent members of the profession are to the More, in detail, we have to consider the advocate's contrary; that "there are human demands which position in preparing and presenting evidence of are above professional, and I do not mean to sur- facts so as to favor his client's cause. It has been render the lawyer's privilege of choosing what he repeatedly said, and very truly, that it is the duty will be a party to, even among cases which involve of an attornev to present all evidence in such a law alone, without dispute of facts, and of choosing manner as to aid the court in arriving speedily at on any grounds which his moral or mental comfort the correct conclusions, and, further, that in premay demand." This seems to be the best and most senting the evidence he shall favor his client's cause, logical manner of disposing of this decidedly as far as possible. But, unfortunately, some lawyers important problem. The Alabama Bar Association have construed, or, rather, misconstrued, the phrase Code of Ethics says upon this subject: An attor-" as far as possible" so as to signify that it has no ney cannot reject the defense of a person accused bounds whatever, which, no doubt, has led Judge of a criminal offense because he knows or believes Waterman to ask: "May he call to the stand withim guilty." This section of the Code, commenting nesses to prove an alibi when he has the best of on his duty in such a case, says: "It is his duty, reasons for believing, and does believe, they testify by all fair and lawful means, to present such defenses to a falsehood?" Some attorneys may have gone as the law of the land permits, to the end that no to this extreme measure, no doubt, but they cannot, man be deprived of life or liberty but by due process within the bounds of legal ethics, have justified of law." But what does the law of the land permit? their actions by any process of reasoning. In PeoSurely, it does not permit of deceiving the court ple v. Beattie (137 Ill. 553) the court reached the by falsifying evidence. Nor does it sanction the conclusion that the oath or duty of an attorney does intimidation of a timid witness upon cross- not bind him to suffer false and perjured testimony examination, whom he knows to have told the sim- to be presented, with the possible result of inducing ple truth. the court to take jurisdiction where there would be otherwise no power to act, and to grant a judgment or decree which the law would prohibit, were the real character of the testimony known.

It is a well-known fact that every accused person is entitled, by constitutional right, to be tried by a jury. But when a lawyer takes it upon himself to say to his client "I believe you to be guilty, therefore, I decline to defend you," he deprives the client of this constitutional right and usurps the functions of both the judge and the jury by trying the accused person himself.

Suppose, however, as the case sometimes is, that a lawyer knows his client to have knocked down, robbed and killed a workingman on his way home with his week's earning. Here we have a different situation. Here the lawyer has no chance of believ

An attempt by an attorney-at-law to impose upon and deceive the court by the introduction in evidence of testimony known by him to be false and perjured, whereby he obtains a fraudulent decree, is professional misconduct.

The course which the prosecution pursues necessarily and materially affects the lines upon which the defense conducts its case.

If the public shows its appreciation of the cause by clamoring in favor of the defense, the advocate