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his part.

may find himself unduly swerved, and will seek to time and who violates his contract and quits his gratify such public sentiment, to the detriment of employer's service, during the term of the contract, public justice. Such a proceeding is easily attri- be restrained by injunction from working elsewhere butable to any individual under the excitement of during the term of the contract? This is the legal the occasion, rather than to any lack of duty on proposition presented by the bill and demurrer filed

in this cause. Where the case involves the freedom or the life The salient allegations of the bill are as follows, of the accused it demands in the lawyer a far-seeing to wit: that “defendant is competent, skilled and discrimination and a strict inclusive view. “He well versed in the leather goods business, and commay be required to face the indignation of a frown- petent and able to take charge of and become sore, ing but unthinking community, and to maintain his man or superintendent of the leather goods deintegrity at the sacrifice of popularity or ambitions." | partment of complainant's business; ” that “his

On the other hand, his unfaithfulness to duty may knowledge and skill are peculiar and special to entail the most unfortunate results. In the follow- himself; that complainant cannot “find any other ing paragraph there is an example of this, and also person possessing the same peculiar skill and qualia probable cause of many riots, such as the public fications; that by reason of such qualifications has witnessed quite recently.

complainant employed him as foreman for $18 a A lawyer has, for defense, a client who has com- week, in consideration of which defendant agreed mitted a crime which justly outrages public senti- to give his whole time, skill and experience for a ment, and through questionable practice and certain period and to work for no one else; that methods the perpetrator goes unpunished; his exist pursuant to said contract, defendant entered comence causes the peace-loving portion of the com- plainant's employ, worked for it about two years, munity to be in constant fear; finally indignation became acquainted with the names of the persons bursts all bounds; the law delays and loopholes are from whom complainant purchased its raw materials made the excuse of defiance of all law, and property and the prices paid for the same and the cost of and life pay the penalty of this one man's vain work, production of the articles manufactured by comin behalf of a worthless client. This instance plainant; that defendant has left complainant's emclearly illustrates that the lawyer's first duty is to ploy and is engaging in business with others in the public, and his second to his client.

competition with complainant; that “ complainant A most fitting and appropriate conclusion to the is absolutely unable to replace the defendant and present article may be found in the language used' cannot at the present time procure any other person by the court in State v. Burr (19 Neb. 593): possessed with the requisite skill and ability to carry “ Instructed, as no other man is, in what is right on the services agreed to be performed and just, the lawyer who resorts to vicious methods defendant." will meet a retribution just as certain as the rising All these allegations are admitted by the demurrer. of the sun and the going down of the same. At the outset it will be conceded that specific perWithin himself is a judgment seat, and before it he formance of such a contract cannot be decreed. must stand to answer for his sin, and he can never No court in any country where the common law escape the judgment.”

prevails has ever attempted to compel one man to Detroit, Mich., August 30, 1900.

work for another, no matter how solemnly he has contracted so to do. It is to be hoped that many

years will yet elapse before such a decree will be MECHANIC UNDER CONTRACT, LEAVING,

entered. CAN NOT BE ENJOINED FROM WORK

Nevertheless, it is contended by counsel for comING ELSEWHERE.

plainant, that while courts of equity will not affirmCIRCUIT COURT, COOK COUNTY,

atively enforce the specific performance of such SEPTEMBER TERM, 1900.

contracts, they will negatively enforce the perDONKER & WILLIAMS Co. v. H. G. VANCE.

formance of the same by enjoining the person so

contracting from working elsewhere, and in supA mechanic who has contracted his services port of their contention they cite numerous authorito an employer for a definite period of time and ties (Hoyt v. Loie Fuller, 19 N. Y. 962; Duff v. who violates his contract and quits his employer's Lillian Russell

, 14 N. Y. 134; Canary v. Lillian Russervice during the term of the contract, cannot be sell, 30 N. Y. 122; Daly v. Fanny Smith, 49 How. restricted by injunction from working elsewhere. Prac. 150; Ilayes v. Willis, 11 Abbott’s Prac. U. S. during the term of the contract. It would be 167; McCaull v. Braham, 16 Fed. Rep. 43). against the spirit of the Thirteenth Amendment to

All of these cases on examination will be found hold that he could. - Chicago Legal News.

to be not cases between master and servant, or

employer and employe, providing for the renderMotion to dissolve injunction.

ing of services which would bring the contracting DUNNE, J. - Can a mechanic who has contracted parties in close personal contact from day to day his services to an employer for a definite period of i over a lapse of time, but pure theatrical contracts

by

I.

can

providing for the production of certain plays or oi defendant, without means, is to say, “Work for exhibitions before the public; and in all of them it me or starve." Such a heartless edict should not would appear that large amounts of money had been go out of a court of equity. expended in providing theatres, advertising, etc., That there are cases in which courts of equity upon the faith of the contracts. Because of such have negatively enforced specific performance where expenditures and because the services contracted it was impossible to do so by positive decree, is not for were in their very nature unique and of an' denied; but have failed to find any arising between extraordinary character so that they could not be master and servant or employer and employe. replaced and consequently there could be no ade- Indeed, it is against the spirit of the Thirteenth quate remedy at law, the court of chancery has Amendment of the Constitution oi the United States, very properly intervened to prevent the contracting which prohibits “ slavery and involuntary servitude performers from exhibiting elsewhere.

within its borders. Involuntary servitude in juxtaThere is a plain distinction between such cases position to the word slavery has a significance. So and cases involving the relation of master and ser-, placed, it cannot mean the same as slavery, else it vant, or employer and employe. In the latter cases is a redundancy. It must mean servitude outside of constant every-day contact between the parties is slavery. Outside of slavery, servitude can originate common, if not absolutely essential. In the former only by contract.

No free man can become the it is uncommon and unnecessary. In the latter the servant of another except by consent, to wit, by servant is subject to the varying orders and direc- contract. Involuntary servitude can only arise, tions of the master. In the former the theatrical therefore, after the consenting party changes his performer is subject to no orders save such as are mind, and becomes an unwilling servant -- involens specified in the contract. In the latter the services servitor. are of a common every-day character, the loss of But whether or not the relief sought for in this which be supplemented by the services of cause comes within the inhibition of the Thirteenth others of a substantially similar character. In the Amendment, the court is of the opinion that to former the services contracted for are always of a grant the relief prayed for would be against sound unique and extraordinary character incapable of public policy. duplication.

It is claimed that the allegation that "the knowlCounsel for complainant has cited no case in edge and skill of defendant are peculiar and special which an employe has been enjoined at the instance to himself," and that “complainant cannot at the of his employer from working for another. On the present time procure any other person possessed contrary, as they admit, the issuance of an injunc of the requisite skill and ability to conduct the sertion has been denied as against an insurance agent vices agreed to be performed by defendant," places in Burney v. Ryle (Ga.), 17 S. E. 986.

the cause in the same category as the theatrical As against a baseball player in Metropolitan Ex. cases hereinbefore cited, and that it should be govCo. v. Ewing, 42 Fed. Rep. 198.

eined by the rule laid down in those cases. As against a lithographic designer in Strowbridge, The court is of a contrary opinion. These alleL. C. v. Craine, 20 Civ. Pro. 24.

gations are mere conclusions. No facts are set out And as against an acrobat in Cort Lassart to sustain them. It does not appear that defendant (Ore.), 6 L. R. A. 653.

is acquainted with any special or secret processes It is not to be wondered at that counsel has or gifted with any special or unusual dexterity. The not been able to cite cases enforcing even negatively facts alleged are that he is a skilful and expert by injunction the maintenance of the relation of leather worker, thoroughly competent to act as foremaster and servant where either party objects

and that he was employed at $18 a week. This thereto. In the judgment of this court it is against does not place him in the category of a prima donna, public policy to force an unwilling servant to work a tragedienne or a premier danseuse. for his master, or an unwilling master to keep a

The demurrer is sustained and the injunction servant after their relations to each other become

dissolved. strained and distasteful. To force them into daily contact with each other under such circumstances CONSTITUTIONAL LAW BEET SUGAR would be fraught with much more evil consequences

BOUNTY ACT VOID --- CLASS LEGISthan might flow from the breach of the contract of |

LATION MANUFACTURERS NOT EN

TITLED TO employment. Better far to leave them to their

BOUNTY UNDER ACT 263, remedies at law, even though inadequate, than to

P. A. 1899. force association and personal contact between hos

MICHIGAN SUPREME COURT. tile and unwilling parties. But it may be said that there is a difference be

MICHIGAN SUGAR COMPANY V, AUDITOR-GENERAL. tween enjoining a man from working for others and

Opinion filed October 3. 1900. compelling him to work for one man in particular. In effect there is none. To say to a man, “Work Act No. 48 of the Public Acts of 1897, entitled, for me or nobody," is that man be, as is alleged I" An act to provide for the encouragement of the

mian,

manufacture of beet sugar and to provide a com- weighman and inspector as hereinafter provided." pensation therefor and to make an appropriation Sections 4 and 5 provide that the commissioner of therefor," held to be unconstitutional and void as the State land office shall appoint a weighman and class legislation, in that it attempts to take the prop- inspector to keep an accurate account of the sugar erty of one citizen and turn it over to another; to manufactured and the kind and character of the compel one class to donate a part of its property beets furnished; and also provide that the firm or to another.

corporation buying the beets and manufacturing the There is no power in the State to authorize a sugar shall, in order to obtain the bounty provided tax for private purposes.

by the act, pay to the seller of the beets at least A contention that Act No. 263, of the Public Acts four dollars per ton for beets containing twelve per of 1899, providing for a tax to meet the several cent of sugar and a sum proportionate to that appropriations for which a tax is not otherwise pro-amount for beets containing a greater or less per vided for the general expenses of the State, etc., cent of sugar. authorizes the payment of bounty earned by manu- Section 6 provides: “When any claim arising facturers under the provisions of the act of 1897, under this act is filed, verified and approved by the cannot be sustained, the act of 1899 making no commissioner of the State land office, as hereinafter specific appropriations by which sugar bounties provided, he shall verify the same to the auditorcould be paid, and the original act providing for general of the State, who shall draw a warrant upon the bounty being unconstitutional and void. – De- the State treasurer for the amount thereof, payable troit Legal News.

to the person, firm or corporation to whom said

sum or sums are due.” Application of the Michigan Sugar Company for

The act appropriated the sum of $10,000 for the Mandamus to compel the Auditor-General to

pay

years 1897 and 1898, and provided that if the bounty an account.-- Writ denied.

should exceed that amount, the deficit should be T. A. E. & J. C. Weadock, for relator (H. H. paid from the general fund. — Act No. 48, Public Hatch, of counsel); Horace M. Oren, Attorney- | Acts of 1897. General, for respondent (C. D. Joslyn, of counsel).

In 1899 the Legislature passed Act 263, entitled, LONG, J. - In 1897 the Legislature of this State · An act to provide a tax to meet the several appropassed an act entitled, “ An act to provide for the priations for which a tax is not otherwise provided encouragement of the manufacture of beet sugar and for the general expenses of the State government, to provide a compensation therefor, and to make salaries of the State officers, expenses of the State an appropriation therefor.”

department and expenses of the Legislature for the Section 2 provides: No money shall be paid years eighteen hundred and ninety-nine and ninefor sugar so manufactured unless such sugar shall teen hundred."--Act No. 263, Public Acts of 1899. have been so manufactured in this State, and from Section 2 of this act provides: “ The several sums beets grown in the State of Michigan, and unless appropriated by the provisions of any act to meet such sugar shall contain at least ninety per cent which this act provides a tax shall, so far as moneys crystalized sugar, and the manufacturer shall pro- are required to be paid to the boards or officers of duce good and sufficient receipts and vouchers to any institution or commission, be paid out of the show that at least four dollars per ton of twenty general fund in the State treasury to the proper hundred pounds has actually been paid for all beets | board, or officer, at such times and in such amounts purchased containing twelve per cent of sugar, said as the general accounting laws of the State pretwelve per cent being the basis for valuation of scribe, and the disbursing officer of such board or the purchase price of four dollars per ton.

The commission shall render his accounts to the auditorquantity and quality of sugar upon which all of said general thereunder.” beunty is claimed shall be determined by the com- It is claimed that while this last act does not in missioner of the State land office, with whom all terms provide for an appropriation of any moneys claimants shall from time to time file verified state- to pay the bounty on beet sugar manufactured, yet ments showing the quantity and quality of sugar so that it was the intent of the Legislature to provide manufactured by them, the price paid the producer by the act for such bounty, as a committee of the for the beets actually produced in this State upon house of representatives caused a statement to be which said bounty is claimed.”

made showing the different amounts necessary to Section 3 provides: “The persons, firms or cor- be raised; and it is claimed that this statement was porations so intending to engage in the manufac- an estimate of an excess of bounty over the tax ture of beet sugar in this State shall, before com- previously raised, amounting to $42,714.06, and a mencing the same, file a statement with the com- further estimate of the amounts needed for the years missioner of the State land office, setting forth their 1899 and 1900 of $50,000 and $150,000, respectively. proposed undertaking, the capacity of their manu- On the other hand, it is claimed by the respondent factory, the number of tons of beets they intend to that under date of December 2 and 29, 1898, the manufacture per annum, and request said commis- relator presented its claim for bounty earned, sioner of the State land office to appoint a suitable l amounting to $28,451.07, which presumably covered

Ist.

all claims to the end of the year 1898; and that no It is void whether it comes within any of the express specific appropriations were made by the act of provisions of the Constitution or not. It is not a 1899, nor any taxes levied for such bounty.

law, but an act which attempts to take the property Relator claims that there is due it, for such boun- of one citizen and turn it over to another; to comties, the sum of $24,262. The accounts were pre- pel one class to donate a part of its property to sented to the auditor-general by the relator for such another. Under the express terms of the Constituamount, and payment was refused.

tion private property cannot be taken for private use, It appears that the relator is a corporation organ- even with compensation, without the owner's conized under the laws of the State, with a capital' stock sent; nor can it be taken for public use without just of $200,000; and that it has fully complied with all compensation. There is no claim here, nor can any the provisions of the act of 1897 to be entitled to be made, that these taxes thus imposed under the the bounty provided by that act.

act are for any public use; nor could the State itself But two questions are raised:

carry on such a business. It is claimed that there is no money in the Counsel for relator seek to uphold this legislation State treasury with which to pay the bounty claimed, by several cases cited in their briefs. Attention is as the act of 1899 made no appropriation for it, and, called to Taylor v. Ypsilanti (105 U. S. 60), in which therefore, the respondent properly refused to draw it was said: “In 1829 the legislature of Michigan the warrant for the same; while, on the other hand, i passed an act providing for the payment from the it is claimed by relator that an appropriation was ' State treasury of a certain sum, by way of bounty. made and that though the act of 1897 be found un- for every bushel of salt manufactured by an indiconstitutional and void, the relator is entitled to vidual, company or corporation, from water obhave the bounty paid, as the legislature has recog- tained by boring in Michigan, and exempting from nized by the act of 1899 the right of the relator to taxation property used for such purposes (Laws have the bounties earned under the act of 1897. of Michigan, 1859, page 531). That law was subse

2d. It is claimed by respondent that the act of quently amended; and in People v. State Auditors 1897 is unconstitutional.

(9 Mich. 327), decided in 1861, it was held that the We will discuss the last proposition first. This relator, a manufacturing company, acquired a vested taxation is for no such public purpose that it can right to the amount offered by the original act, for be upheld. There is no power in the State to all salt manufactured prior to the amendatory statute authorize a tax for private purposes. Taxes can be reducing the bounty. And the doctrines of that levied only for public purposes to accomplish some i case were reaffirmed in East Saginaw Manufacturing government end. The legislature is the mere Company v. East Saginaw, etc. (19 Mich. 259), decreature of an organic law deriving all its power cided in 1869, after the passage of the act of March from the Constitution. Its limits within that power 22, 1869. The diligence of counsel, aided by our must be admitted to be plenary, except so far as

own researches, has not disclosed any adjudication otherwise specifically limited; but outside those of the Supreme Court of Michigan prior to May 26, limits it is as powerless as if specifically prohibited. 1870, in which the doctrine of these It cannot take the property of A and give it to B; recalled.” nor can it tax it for the benefit of B. Here is a From an examination of the cases referred to in private corporation now calling upon the State for the above opinion in this court, it is evident that the a sum of money to aid it in carrying on a private constitutionality of the salt bounty act business, most of which money, is paid, must come raised or passed upon. In the first case, a manout of the pockets of people who are not engaged damus was asked to compel the board of State in that business and who have no interest in it. auditors to allow a claim under the original act, as

It is claimed by the relator that this is not a gift the board had refused payment on the ground that to the relator, but that it would not have engaged a subsequent act repealed the former one. In the in the business but for this act of the legislature; second case a bill had been filed to restrain the colthat in reliance upon the act it built a plant at large lection of the taxes levied upon the property of comexpense and that it complied with the provisions plainant (the Salt Mfg. Co.), invested in the busiof the act requiring it to pay to the producers of ness of manufacturing salt. The ground for filing beets at the rate of four dollars per ton; and that, the bill was that the statute in force when the comtherefore, the honor and integrity of the State are plainant commenced its manufacture exempted from involved.

taxation the property employed for that purpose; So the honor and integrity of the State might and complainant insisted that this statute was a conbecome involved under any other act, however un- tract between itself and the State and was irrepealconstitutional, which the legislature might see fit able. The court held, however, that the statute was to pass. What may have brought about the passage nothing but a bounty law and as such might be oi the act of 1897 we need not discuss; the only repealed at any time. On error, this was aftirmed question being whether it is within the legislative by the Supreme Court of the United States (13 power. We need not point out specifically any par- Wall. 373). ticular provision of the Constitution which it violates. We think the present case comes squarely within

cases

was

was not

the reasoning of this court in People v. Salem (20 any less that he has companions in misery. TaxaMich. 452). In that case the question was the con- tion for private purposes is no more legal than robstitutionality of an act permitting townships to issue bery for private purposes. And where an enterprise bonds in aid of the construction of railroads. It is conducted by private persons for their own benefit, was said by Mr. Justice Cooley, beginning at page the public authorities have no control over the ex486: “But it is not in the power of the State, in penditure and no share in the profits, it is a private my opinion, under the name of bounty or any other enterprise and not a public one, whether large or cover or subteríuge, to furnish capital to set private small, and whether profitable or unprofitable. No parties up in any kind of business, or to subsidize enterprise can properly be regarded as a public their business after they have entered upon it. A enterprise in which the public has no voice. For bounty law, of which this is the real nature, is void, the expenditure of public money the Constitution whatever may be the pretense on which it may be and laws provide public officers and put them under enacted. The right to hold out pecuniary induce- adequate control and security. The money of the ments to the faithful performance of public duty in people belongs in the custody of the agents of the dangerous or responsible positions stands upon a people. Governments cannot delegate public redifferent footing altogether; nor have I any occasion sponsibilities to private and irresponsible hands." to question the right to pay rewards for the destruc- These views have been affirmed and reaffirmed tion of wild beasts and other public pests; a pro- by this court. vision of this character being a mere police regula- The first contention of counsel for relator has no tion. But the discrimination by the State between more substantial foundation than the other. The different classes of occupations, and the favoring of act of 1897 is unconstitutional and void, and yet one at the expense of the rest, whether that one be ccunsel contend that though this be found, under farming or banking, merchandising or milling, the act of 1899 it is entitled to the bounty there printing or railroading, is not legitimate legislation, appropriated. Counsel cite in support of this proand is an invasion of that equality of right and position, the case of United States v. Realty Co. (163 privilege which is a maxim in State government. U. S. 427). When the door is once opened to it, there is no line The question there raised was entirely different at which we can stop and say with confidence that from the question here. Here no specific approprithus far we may go with safety and propriety, but ations were made by the act of 1899, by which the no further. Every honest employment is honor- sugar bounties could be paid, and the legislature able! it is beneficial to the public; it deserves en- has not recognized the relator's claim. But it has couragement: the more successiul we can make it, been held several times in this State that an unconthe more does it generally subserve the public good. stitutional statute is a statute only in form and lacks But it is not the business of the State to make dis- the force of law, and is of no more saving effect to criminations in favor of one class against another, i justify action under it than as though it had never or in favor of one employment against another. The been enacted (Mason v. Perkins, 73 Mich. 303; Adsit State can have no favorites. Its business is to pro- ! v. Osman, 84 Mich.). tect the industry of all, and to give all the benefit The writ of mandamus must be denied. The other of equal laws. It cannot compel an unwilling mi-justices concurred. rority to submit to taxation in order that it may keep upon its feet any business that cannot stand alone. Moreover, it is not a weak interest only that RATIFICATION OF AN AGENT'S CONTRACT. can give plausible reasons for public aid; whien the State once enters upon the business of subsidies,

N THE recent case of Durant v. Roberts and we shall not fail to discover that the strong and Keighley, Maxsted & Co. (82 L. T. Rep. 217; powerful interests are those most likely to control [1900] 1 Q. B. 629), it was decided that a contract legislation and that the weaker will be taxed to en- made by a person in his own name not purporting hance the profits of the stronger. I shall not ques to make it on behalf of a principal, but intending to tion the right of the people, by their Constitution, act for another in making it, though without authorto open the door to such discriminations, but in this ity from him, can be ratified by that other person, State they have not adopted that policy, and they even though the intending agent did not disclose to have not authorized any department of the govern- the other party at the time of making the contract ment to adopt it for them."

that he was acting for someone else. The case is On page 495 of the case, it was said by Justice of interest from more than one point of view. In Campbell: “ It has been said to be too clear to need the first place, the reported arguments of counsel argument, that it would be usurpation and not legis- ; and considered judgments of the members of the lation to take the property of A and give it to B. Court of Appeals contain references to nearly all It must be on the same ground equally illegal to the authorities upon the question, while the lords tax A for the benefit of B; for the amount of prop- justices to whom the responsibility for the decision erty taxed against his will cannot make any differ-, of the case must be attributed, unable, as they said, ence in the principle, neither can it make the wrong i to find any recent authority deciding the question,

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