may find himself unduly swerved, and will seek to gratify such public sentiment, to the detriment of public justice. Such a proceeding is easily attributable to any individual under the excitement of the occasion, rather than to any lack of duty on his part. time and who violates his contract and quits his employer's service, during the term of the contract, be restrained by injunction from working elsewhere during the term of the contract? This is the legal proposition presented by the bill and demurrer filed in this cause. Where the case involves the freedom or the life The salient allegations of the bill are as follows, of the accused it demands in the lawyer a far-seeing to wit: that "defendant is competent, skilled and discrimination and a strict inclusive view. "He well versed in the leather goods business, and commay be required to face the indignation of a frown-petent and able to take charge of and become fore ing but unthinking community, and to maintain his man or superintendent of the leather goods deintegrity at the sacrifice of popularity or ambitions." partment of complainant's business;" that "his On the other hand, his unfaithfulness to duty may knowledge and skill are peculiar and special to entail the most unfortunate results. In the follow- himself; " that complainant cannot find any other ing paragraph there is an example of this, and also person possessing the same peculiar skill and qualia probable cause of many riots, such as the public fications; " that by reason of such qualifications has witnessed quite recently. complainant employed him as foreman for $18 a week, in consideration of which defendant agreed to give his whole time, skill and experience for a certain period and to work for no one else; that pursuant to said contract, defendant entered complainant's employ, worked for it about two years, became acquainted with the names of the persons from whom complainant purchased its raw materials and the prices paid for the same and the cost of production of the articles manufactured by complainant; that defendant has left complainant's employ and is engaging in business with others in competition with complainant; that "complainant is absolutely unable to replace the defendant and cannot at the present time procure any other person possessed with the requisite skill and ability to carry on the services agreed to be performed by defendant." A lawyer has, for defense, a client who has committed a crime which justly outrages public sentiment, and through questionable practice and methods the perpetrator goes unpunished; his existence causes the peace-loving portion of the community to be in constant fear; finally indignation bursts all bounds; the law delays and loopholes are made the excuse of defiance of all law, and property and life pay the penalty of this one man's vain work in behalf of a worthless client. This instance clearly illustrates that the lawyer's first duty is to the public, and his second to his client. A most fitting and appropriate conclusion to the present article may be found in the language used by the court in State v. Burr (19 Neb. 593): "Instructed, as no other man is, in what is right and just, the lawyer who resorts to vicious methods will meet a retribution just as certain as the rising of the sun and the going down of the same. Within himself is a judgment seat, and before it he must stand to answer for his sin, and he can never escape the judgment." Detroit, Mich., August 30, 1900. MECHANIC UNDER CONTRACT, LEAVING, CIRCUIT COURT, COOK COUNTY. SEPTEMBER TERM, 1900. I. A mechanic who has contracted his services to an employer for a definite period of time and who violates his contract and quits his employer's service during the term of the contract, cannot be restricted by injunction from working elsewhere during the term of the contract. It would be against the spirit of the Thirteenth Amendment to hold that he could.- Chicago Legal News. Motion to dissolve injunction. DUNNE, J.- Can a mechanic who has contracted his services to an employer for a definite period of All these allegations are admitted by the demurrer. At the outset it will be conceded that specific performance of such a contract cannot be decreed. No court in any country where the common law prevails has ever attempted to compel one man to work for another, no matter how solemnly he has contracted so to do. It is to be hoped that many years will yet elapse before such a decree will be entered. Nevertheless, it is contended by counsel for complainant, that while courts of equity will not affirmatively enforce the specific performance of such contracts, they will negatively enforce the performance of the same by enjoining the person so contracting from working elsewhere, and in support of their contention they cite numerous authorities (Hoyt v. Loie Fuller, 19 N. Y. 962; Duff v. Lillian Russell, 14 N. Y. 134; Canary v. Lillian Russell, 30 N. Y. 122; Daly v. Fanny Smith, 49 How. Prac. 150; Hayes v. Willis, II Abbott's Prac. U. S. 167; McCaull v. Braham, 16 Fed. Rep. 43). All of these cases on examination will be found to be not cases between master and servant, or employer and employe, providing for the rendering of services which would bring the contracting parties in close personal contact from day to day over a lapse of time, but pure theatrical contracts of defendant, without means, is to say, "Work for me or starve." Such a heartless edict should not go out of a court of equity. providing for the production of certain plays or exhibitions before the public; and in all of them it would appear that large amounts of money had been, expended in providing theatres, advertising, etc., That there are cases in which courts of equity upon the faith of the contracts. Because of such have negatively enforced specific performance where expenditures and because the services contracted it was impossible to do so by positive decree, is not for were in their very nature unique and of an denied; but I have failed to find any arising between extraordinary character so that they could not be master and servant or employer and employe. replaced and consequently there could be no adequate remedy at law, the court of chancery has very properly intervened to prevent the contracting performers from exhibiting elsewhere. There is a plain distinction between such cases and cases involving the relation of master and ser-, vant, or employer and employe. In the latter cases constant every-day contact between the parties is common, if not absolutely essential. In the former it is uncommon and unnecessary. In the latter the servant is subject to the varying orders and directions of the master. In the former the theatrical performer is subject to no orders save such as are specified in the contract. In the latter the services are of a common every-day character, the loss of which can be supplemented by the services of others of a substantially similar character. In the former the services contracted for are always of a unique and extraordinary character incapable of duplication. Counsel for complainant has cited no case in which an employe has been enjoined at the instance of his employer from working for another. On the contrary, as they admit, the issuance of an injunction has been denied as against an insurance agent in Burney v. Ryle (Ga.), 17 S. E. 986. Indeed, it is against the spirit of the Thirteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States, which prohibits "slavery and involuntary servitude within its borders. Involuntary servitude in juxtaposition to the word slavery has a significance. So placed, it cannot mean the same as slavery, else it is a redundancy. It must mean servitude outside of slavery. Outside of slavery, servitude can originate only by contract. No free man can become the servant of another except by consent, to wit, by contract. Involuntary servitude can only arise, therefore, after the consenting party changes his mind, and becomes an unwilling servant-involens servitor. But whether or not the relief sought for in this cause comes within the inhibition of the Thirteenth Amendment, the court is of the opinion that to grant the relief prayed for would be against sound public policy. It is claimed that the allegation that "the knowledge and skill of defendant are peculiar and special to himself," and that "complainant cannot at the present time procure any other person possessed of the requisite skill and ability to conduct the services agreed to be performed by defendant," places the cause in the same category as the theatrical As against a baseball player in Metropolitan Ex. cases hereinbefore cited, and that it should be govCo. v. Ewing, 42 Fed. Rep. 198. As against a lithographic designer in Strowbridge L. C. v. Craine, 20 Civ. Pro. 24. erned by the rule laid down in those cases. The court is of a contrary opinion. These allegations are mere conclusions. No facts are set out And as against an acrobat in Cort V. Lassart to sustain them. It does not appear that defendant (Ore.), 6 L. R. A. 653. is acquainted with any special or secret processes It is not to be wondered at that counsel has not been able to cite cases enforcing even negatively by injunction the maintenance of the relation of master and servant where either party objects thereto. In the judgment of this court it is against public policy to force an unwilling servant to work for his master, or an unwilling master to keep a servant after their relations to each other become strained and distasteful. To force them into daily contact with each other under such circumstances CONSTITUTIONAL would be fraught with much more evil consequences than might flow from the breach of the contract of employment. Better far to leave them to their remedies at law, even though inadequate, than to force association and personal contact between hostile and unwilling parties. But it may be said that there is a difference between enjoining a man from working for others and compelling him to work for one man in particular. In effect there is none. To say to a man, "Work for me or nobody," if that man be, as is alleged BOUNTY ACT VOID CLASS LEGISLATION MANUFACTURERS NOT ENTITLED TO BOUNTY UNDER ACT 263, P. A. 1899. MICHIGAN SUPREME COURT. MICHIGAN SUGAR COMPANY V. AUDITOR-GENERAL. 66 Act No. 48 of the Public Acts of 1897, entitled, 'An act to provide for the encouragement of the manufacture of beet sugar and to provide a com- weighman and inspector as hereinafter provided." pensation therefor and to make an appropriation Sections 4 and 5 provide that the commissioner of therefor," held to be unconstitutional and void as the State land office shall appoint a weighman and class legislation, in that it attempts to take the prop-inspector to keep an accurate account of the sugar erty of one citizen and turn it over to another; to manufactured and the kind and character of the compel one class to donate a part of its property to another. There is no power in the State to authorize a tax for private purposes. A contention that Act No. 263, of the Public Acts of 1899, providing for a tax to meet the several appropriations for which a tax is not otherwise provided for the general expenses of the State, etc., authorizes the payment of bounty earned by manufacturers under the provisions of the act of 1897, cannot be sustained, the act of 1899 making no specific appropriations by which sugar bounties could be paid, and the original act providing for the bounty being unconstitutional and void.- Detroit Legal News. Application of the Michigan Sugar Company for Mandamus to compel the Auditor-General to pay an account.- Writ denied. beets furnished; and also provide that the firm or corporation buying the beets and manufacturing the sugar shall, in order to obtain the bounty provided by the act, pay to the seller of the beets at least four dollars per ton for beets containing twelve per cent of sugar and a sum proportionate to that amount for beets containing a greater or less per cent of sugar. Section 6 provides: "When any claim arising under this act is filed, verified and approved by the commissioner of the State land office, as hereinafter provided, he shall verify the same to the auditorgeneral of the State, who shall draw a warrant upon the State treasurer for the amount thereof, payable to the person, firm or corporation to whom said sum or sums are due." The act appropriated the sum of $10,000 for the years 1897 and 1898, and provided that if the bounty should exceed that amount, the deficit should be paid from the general fund.- Act No. 48, Public Acts of 1897. T. A. E. & J. C. Weadock, for relator (H. H. Hatch, of counsel); Horace M. Oren, AttorneyGeneral, for respondent (C. D. Joslyn, of counsel). In 1899 the Legislature passed Act 263, entitled, LONG, J. In 1897 the Legislature of this State" An act to provide a tax to meet the several appropassed an act entitled, "An act to provide for the encouragement of the manufacture of beet sugar and to provide a compensation therefor, and to make an appropriation therefor." Section 2 provides: "No money shall be paid for sugar so manufactured unless such sugar shall have been so manufactured in this State, and from beets grown in the State of Michigan, and unless such sugar shall contain at least ninety per cent crystalized sugar, and the manufacturer shall produce good and sufficient receipts and vouchers to show that at least four dollars per ton of twenty hundred pounds has actually been paid for all beets purchased containing twelve per cent of sugar, said twelve per cent being the basis for valuation of the purchase price of four dollars per ton. The quantity and quality of sugar upon which all of said bounty is claimed shall be determined by the commissioner of the State land office, with whom all claimants shall from time to time file verified statements showing the quantity and quality of sugar so manufactured by them, the price paid the producer for the beets actually produced in this State upon which said bounty is claimed." priations for which a tax is not otherwise provided for the general expenses of the State government, salaries of the State officers, expenses of the State department and expenses of the Legislature for the years eighteen hundred and ninety-nine and nineteen hundred."-Act No. 263, Public Acts of 1899. Section 2 of this act provides: "The several sums appropriated by the provisions of any act to meet which this act provides a tax shall, so far as moneys are required to be paid to the boards or officers of any institution or commission, be paid out of the general fund in the State treasury to the proper board, or officer, at such times and in such amounts as the general accounting laws of the State prescribe, and the disbursing officer of such board or commission shall render his accounts to the auditorgeneral thereunder." It is claimed that while this last act does not in terms provide for an appropriation of any moneys to pay the bounty on beet sugar manufactured, yet that it was the intent of the Legislature to provide by the act for such bounty, as a committee of the house of representatives caused a statement to be made showing the different amounts necessary to Section 3 provides: "The persons, firms or cor- be raised; and it is claimed that this statement was porations so intending to engage in the manufac- an estimate of an excess of bounty over the tax ture of beet sugar in this State shall, before com- | previously raised, amounting to $42,714.06, and a mencing the same, file a statement with the com- further estimate of the amounts needed for the years missioner of the State land office, setting forth their 1899 and 1900 of $50,000 and $150,000, respectively. proposed undertaking, the capacity of their manu- On the other hand, it is claimed by the respondent factory, the number of tons of beets they intend to that under date of December 2 and 29, 1898, the manufacture per annum, and request said commis-relator presented its claim for bounty earned, sioner of the State land office to appoint a suitable amounting to $28.451.07, which presumably covered all claims to the end of the year 1898; and that no specific appropriations were made by the act of 1899, nor any taxes levied for such bounty. Relator claims that there is due it, for such bounties, the sum of $24,262. The accounts were presented to the auditor-general by the relator for such amount, and payment was refused. It appears that the relator is a corporation organized under the laws of the State, with a capital stock of $200,000; and that it has fully complied with all the provisions of the act of 1897 to be entitled to the bounty provided by that act. But two questions are raised: It is void whether it comes within any of the express provisions of the Constitution or not. It is not a law, but an act which attempts to take the property of one citizen and turn it over to another; to compel one class to donate a part of its property to another. Under the express terms of the Constitution private property cannot be taken for private use, even with compensation, without the owner's consent; nor can it be taken for public use without just compensation. There is no claim here, nor can any be made, that these taxes thus imposed under the act are for any public use; nor could the State itself carry on such a business. Counsel for relator seek to uphold this legislation by several cases cited in their briefs. Attention is called to Taylor v. Ypsilanti (105 U. S. 60), in which it was said: "In 1829 the legislature of Michigan passed an act providing for the payment from the State treasury of a certain sum, by way of bounty, for every bushel of salt manufactured by an individual, company or corporation, from water obtained by boring in Michigan, and exempting from taxation property used for such purposes (Laws of Michigan, 1859, page 531). That law was subse Ist. It is claimed that there is no money in the State treasury with which to pay the bounty claimed, as the act of 1899 made no appropriation for it, and, therefore, the respondent properly refused to draw the warrant for the same; while, on the other hand, it is claimed by relator that an appropriation was made and that though the act of 1897 be found unconstitutional and void, the relator is entitled to have the bounty paid, as the legislature has recognized by the act of 1899 the right of the relator to have the bounties earned under the act of 1897. 2d. It is claimed by respondent that the act of quently amended; and in People v. State Auditors 1897 is unconstitutional. We will discuss the last proposition first. This taxation is for no such public purpose that it can be upheld. There is no power in the State to authorize a tax for private purposes. Taxes can be levied only for public purposes to accomplish some government end. The legislature is the mere creature of an organic law deriving all its power from the Constitution. Its limits within that power must be admitted to be plenary, except so far as otherwise specifically limited; but outside those limits it is as powerless as if specifically prohibited. It cannot take the property of A and give it to B; nor can it tax it for the benefit of B. Here is a private corporation now calling upon the State for a sum of money to aid it in carrying on a private business, most of which money, if paid, must come out of the pockets of people who are not engaged in that business and who have no interest in it. It is claimed by the relator that this is not a gift to the relator, but that it would not have engaged in the business but for this act of the legislature; that in reliance upon the act it built a plant at large expense and that it complied with the provisions of the act requiring it to pay to the producers of beets at the rate of four dollars per ton; and that, therefore, the honor and integrity of the State are involved. So the honor and integrity of the State might become involved under any other act, however unconstitutional, which the legislature might see fit to pass. What may have brought about the passage of the act of 1897 we need not discuss; the only question being whether it is within the legislative power. We need not point out specifically any particular provision of the Constitution which it violates. (9 Mich. 327), decided in 1861, it was held that the cases was From an examination of the cases referred to in the above opinion in this court, it is evident that the constitutionality of the salt bounty act was not raised or passed upon. In the first case, a mandamus was asked to compel the board of State auditors to allow a claim under the original act, as the board had refused payment on the ground that a subsequent act repealed the former one. In the second case a bill had been filed to restrain the collection of the taxes levied upon the property of complainant (the Salt Mfg. Co.), invested in the business of manufacturing salt. The ground for filing the bill was that the statute in force when the complainant commenced its manufacture exempted from taxation the property employed for that purpose; and complainant insisted that this statute was a contract between itself and the State and was irrepealable. The court held, however, that the statute was nothing but a bounty law and as such might be repealed at any time. On error, this was affirmed by the Supreme Court of the United States (13 Wall. 373). We think the present case comes squarely within any less that he has companions in misery. Taxation for private purposes is no more legal than robbery for private purposes. And where an enterprise is conducted by private persons for their own benefit, the public authorities have no control over the expenditure and no share in the profits, it is a private enterprise and not a public one, whether large or small, and whether profitable or unprofitable. No enterprise can properly be regarded as a public enterprise in which the public has no voice. For the expenditure of public money the Constitution and laws provide public officers and put them under adequate control and security. The money of the people belongs in the custody of the agents of the people. Governments cannot delegate public responsibilities to private and irresponsible hands." These views have been affirmed and reaffirmed by this court. The first contention of counsel for relator has no more substantial foundation than the other. The act of 1897 is unconstitutional and void, and yet counsel contend that though this be found, under the act of 1899 it is entitled to the bounty there appropriated. Counsel cite in support of this proposition, the case of United States v. Realty Co. (163 U. S. 427). the reasoning of this court in People v. Salem (20 Mich. 452). In that case the question was the constitutionality of an act permitting townships to issue bonds in aid of the construction of railroads. It was said by Mr. Justice Cooley, beginning at page 486: "But it is not in the power of the State, in my opinion, under the name of bounty or any other cover or subterfuge, to furnish capital to set private parties up in any kind of business, or to subsidize their business after they have entered upon it. A bounty law, of which this is the real nature, is void, whatever may be the pretense on which it may be enacted. The right to hold out pecuniary inducements to the faithful performance of public duty in dangerous or responsible positions stands upon a different footing altogether; nor have I any occasion to question the right to pay rewards for the destruction of wild beasts and other public pests; a provision of this character being a mere police regulation. But the discrimination by the State between different classes of occupations, and the favoring of one at the expense of the rest, whether that one be farming or banking, merchandising or milling, printing or railroading, is not legitimate legislation, and is an invasion of that equality of right and privilege which is a maxim in State government. When the door is once opened to it, there is no line at which we can stop and say with confidence that thus far we may go with safety and propriety, but no further. Every honest employment is honorable! it is beneficial to the public; it deserves encouragement; the more successful we can make it, the more does it generally subserve the public good. But it is not the business of the State to make discriminations in favor of one class against another, or in favor of one employment against another. The State can have no favorites. Its business is to protect the industry of all, and to give all the benefit! of equal laws. It cannot compel an unwilling mirority to submit to taxation in order that it may keep upon its feet any business that cannot stand alone. Moreover, it is not a weak interest only that RATIFICATION OF AN AGENT'S CONTRACT. can give plausible reasons for public aid; when the State once enters upon the business of subsidies, I we shall not fail to discover that the strong and powerful interests are those most likely to control legislation and that the weaker will be taxed to enhance the profits of the stronger. I shall not question the right of the people, by their Constitution, to open the door to such discriminations, but in this State they have not adopted that policy, and they have not authorized any department of the government to adopt it for them." On page 495 of the case, it was said by Justice Campbell: "It has been said to be too clear to need argument, that it would be usurpation and not legislation to take the property of A and give it to B. It must be on the same ground equally illegal to tax A for the benefit of B; for the amount of property taxed against his will cannot, make any difference in the principle, neither can it make the wrong The question there raised was entirely different from the question here. Here no specific appropriations were made by the act of 1899, by which the sugar bounties could be paid, and the legislature has not recognized the relator's claim. But it has been held several times in this State that an unconstitutional statute is a statute only in form and lacks the force of law, and is of no more saving effect to justify action under it than as though it had never been enacted (Mason v. Perkins, 73 Mich. 303; Adsit v. Osman, 84 Mich.). The writ of mandamus must be denied. The other justices concurred. N THE recent case of Durant v. Roberts and Keighley, Maxsted & Co. (82 L. T. Rep. 217; [1900] 1 Q. B. 629), it was decided that a contract made by a person in his own name not purporting to make it on behalf of a principal, but intending to act for another in making it, though without authority from him, can be ratified by that other person, even though the intending agent did not disclose to the other party at the time of making the contract that he was acting for someone else. The case is of interest from more than one point of view. In the first place, the reported arguments of counsel and considered judgments of the members of the Court of Appeals contain references to nearly all the authorities upon the question, while the lords justices to whom the responsibility for the decision of the case must be attributed, unable, as they said, to find any recent authority deciding the question, |