The Doctrine has been useful, and such indeed was the real motive of its announcement, and it will remain of such use that it should never be abandoned, as a forewarning to European powers as to what this country would regard, in a restricted field, as inimical to its safety. It has been equally useful to the Americas as forecasting our attitude towards certain international problems and relations in which they might be involved.

But, recalling that the Doctrine is based upon the recognized right of self-preservation, it follows (it is submitted) that by the specification of a few matters in the Doctrine, the United States has not surrendered its right to deal, as it may be compelled, and under the rules and principles of international law, with the many others which are unspecified as these may arise, which others might, indeed, have been included in the declaration with as much propriety, legally, as those which were mentioned. By naming either one act or a series of acts which challenges our self-preservation, we do not estop ourselves from naming others as they may arise; otherwise the mention of one such act would foreclose all others. The custom of nations shows that invoking the right as to one menace does not foreclose a power from invoking it as to others.

Moreover, by specifying a few of the world powers which, if they performed the prohibited acts, would bring themselves within the inhibitions of the Doctrine, the United States has not estopped itself from asserting the same principles against other and unnamed powers making the same sort of aggression. That against these other powers, the United States might, in its intervention, speak of the right of self-preservation and not of the Monroe Doctrine, would neither enlarge nor diminish its rights under international law as to the Monroe Doctrine or otherwise.

It is evident from the foregoing that the Monroe Doctrine is not an equivalent for "self-preservation "; and therefore the Monroe Doctrine need not, indeed should not, be invoked in order to cover situations challenging our self-preservation but not within the terms defined by Monroe's declaration. These other situations may be handled, and more wisely so, as matters affecting the national security and self-preservation of the United States as a great power.

It has been sometimes contended (see particularly the speech in the Senate by Senator Calhoun in 1848 regarding the situation in Yucatan) that the Doctrine was announced merely to meet the threatened aggressions of the European Alliance in 1823, and that the Doctrine became obsolete with the passing of this immediate threat. But this view is not supported by the language of the declaration which as to action "by any European power" (both as to colonization and interposition) is unlimited in time; nor by that part of the declaration which specifically mentions the "allied

powers" for here the declaration is couched in such general terms as to be, with sound reason, applied to any power or powers whatsoever who should, at any time, commit the aggressions against which the announced policy was aimed.

During the period since the Doctrine was announced there have been assertions at various times as to situations which were not objectionable to the Doctrine or to the principles underlying the same. In few of these instances has it been categorically asserted that the Monroe Doctrine did not cover the specific matter in question, the ruling or declaration having usually come in the form of a statement to the effect that some particular situation was not inimical to the interests of the United States.

The statement of the Doctrine itself that "with the existing colonies or dependencies of any European power we have not interfered and shall not interfere," has been more than once reiterated.

It has also been announced that the Monroe Doctrine is not a pledge by the United States to other American states requiring the United States to protect such states, at their behest, against real or fancied wrongs inflicted by European powers, nor does it create an obligation running from the United States to any American state to intervene for its protection.

Mr. Clay in 1828 asserted that the Monroe Doctrine was not applicable to wars as between American states, and it was likewise very early declared by Mr. Clay (1825) "that whilst the war is confined to the parent country and its former colony, the United States remain neutral, extending their friendship and doing equal justice to both parties."

Beginning in the second half of the last century (1861) the United States took the position that it would consider that Spain was "manifesting an unfriendly spirit toward the United States " if it should undertake the resubjection of certain of her former colonies, and this position was reiterated at later dates.

Commencing with 1825 and running on down through the whole of the last century it was repeatedly asserted that the Monroe Doctrine did not require the United States to prevent Europe from waging war against Latin American countries, and from almost as early a period down to the close of the century the principle was followed (as announced by Secretary Sherman in 1898) that it was not the duty of the United States "to protect its American neighbors from the responsibilities which attend the exercise of independent sovereignty."

The United States has at times jointly intervened with European countries in internal situations existing in the Latin Americas; at other times it has declined to participate in such intervention.

A popular feeling exists that the Monroe Doctrine is hostile to monarchical government as such, but this is not the fact. Monarchies have been set up in Brazil, Haiti, and Mexico without objection by the United States, and for many years we dealt with the Brazilian monarchy on terms and in language of sincere friendship. Even the establishment of the Maximilian Empire in Mexico was objected to not so much from the point of view of its being a monarchy as from the point of view that this monarchy was established and maintained by European troops.

One of the interesting suggestions that have been made by European powers is that the possession of colonies by that power upon this hemisphere makes of that possessing power an American state. This suggestion has, of course, not been acceptable to the United States.

The Monroe Doctrine has always been considered as covering a possession either "temporary or permanent" (Forsyth, 1840)—— of American territory by European powers, and in line with that principle, we have declared that the Monroe Doctrine forbade the occupation of American territory by such powers. President Roosevelt in his message of February 15, 1905, in relation to the situation in Santo Domingo, declared:

An aggrieved nation can without interfering with the Monroe Doctrine take what action it sees fit in adjustment of its disputes with American States, provided that action does not take the shape of interference with their form of government or of the despoilment of their territory under any disguise.

At various times proposals have been made that the United States should join with Europe in neutralizing certain areas (notably Cuba) on this continent, but the United States has steadily declined to join in such an action. One of the classic notes that have been written regarding the relationship between the United States and the other Americas was penned by Secretary Everett on December 1, 1852, regarding a proposal to neutralize Cuba.

The so-called "Roosevelt corollary" was to the effect, as generally understood, that in case of financial or other difficulties in weak Latin American countries, the United States should attempt an adjustment thereof lest European Governments should intervene, and intervening should occupy territory-an act which would be contrary to the principles of the Monroe Doctrine. This view seems to have had its inception in some observations of President Buchanan in his message to Congress of December 3, 1860, and was somewhat amplified by Lord Salisbury in his note to Mr. Olney of November 6, 1895, regarding the Venezuelan boundary dispute.

As has already been indicated above, it is not believed that this corollary is justified by the terms of the Monroe Doctrine, however

much it may be justified by the application of the doctrine of selfpreservation.

These various expressions and statements, as made in connection with the situations which gave rise to them, detract not a little from the scope popularly attached to the Monroe Doctrine, and they relieve that Doctrine of many of the criticisms which have been aimed against it.

Finally, it should not be overlooked that the United States declined the overtures of Great Britain in 1823 to make a joint declaration regarding the principles covered by the Monroe Doctrine, or to enter into a conventional arrangement regarding them. Instead this Government determined to make the declaration of high national policy on its own responsibility and in its own behalf. The Doctrine is thus purely unilateral. The United States determines when and if the principles of the Doctrine are violated, and when and if violation is threatened. We alone determine what measures if any, shall be taken to vindicate the principles of the Doctrine, and we of necessity determine when the principles have been vindicated. No other power of the world has any relationship to, or voice in, the implementing of the principles which the Doctrine contains. It is our Doctrine, to be by us invoked and sustained, held in abeyance, or abandoned as our high international policy or vital national interests shall seem to us, and to us alone, to demand.

It may, in conclusion, be repeated: The Doctrine does not concern itself with purely inter-American relations; it has nothing to do with the relationship between the United States and other American nations, except where other American nations shall become involved with European governments in arrangements which threaten the security of the United States, and even in such cases, the Doctrine runs against the European country, not the American nation, and the United States would primarily deal thereunder with the European country and not with the American nation concerned. The Doctrine states a case of the United States vs. Europe, and not of the United States vs. Latin America. Furthermore, the fact should never be lost to view that in applying this Doctrine during the period of one hundred years since it was announced, our Government has over and over again driven it in as a shield between Europe and the Americas to protect Latin America from the political and territorial thrusts of Europe; and this was done at times when the American nations were weak and struggling for the establishment of stable, permanent governments; when the political morality of Europe sanctioned, indeed encouraged, the acquisition of territory by force; and when many of the great powers of Europe looked with eager, covetous eyes to the rich, undeveloped areas of the American hemi

sphere. Nor should another equally vital fact be lost sight of, that the United States has only been able to give this protection against designing European powers because of its known willingness and determination, if and whenever necessary, to expend its treasure and to sacrifice American life to maintain the principles of the Doctrine. So far as Latin America is concerned, the Doctrine is now, and always has been, not an instrument of violence and oppression, but an unbought, freely bestowed, and wholly effective guaranty of their freedom, independence, and territorial integrity against the imperialistic designs of Europe.

December 17, 1928.

J. REUBEN CLARK