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one who could attempt the bold maneuvres on the field of battle, or the hazardous strategic marches, which have illumined the name of Jackson to all posterity.
It is not improbable that had Jackson lived, and risen to larger commands, he would have been found equal to the full exigencies of the situation. Whatever he was called upon to do, under limited but independent scope, seems to testify to the fact that he was far from having reached his limit. Whatever he did was thoroughly done ; and he never appears to have been taxed to the term of his powers, in any operation which he undertook.
Honesty, singleness of purpose, true courage, rare ability, suffice to account for Jackson's military success. But those alone who have served under his eye know to what depths that rarer, stranger power of his has sounded them : they only can testify to the full measure of the strength of Stonewall Jackson.
THE POSITION AT FAIRVIEW.
EN. HOOKER'S testimony before the Committee
on the Conduct of the War comprises almost every thing which has been officially put forth by him with reference to this campaign. It therefore stands in lieu of a report of operations, and it may be profitable to continue to quote from it to some extent. His alleged intention of withdrawing from Chancellorsville is thus explained. After setting forth that on the demolition of the Eleventh Corps, the previous evening, he threw Berry into the gap to arrest Jackson, “and if possible to seize, and at all hazards hold, the high ground abandoned by that corps," he says:
“Gen. Berry, after going perhaps three-quarters of a mile, reported that the enemy was already in possession of the ground commanding my position, and that he had been compelled to establish his line in the valley on the Chancellorsville side of that high ground. As soon as this was communicated to me, I directed Gens. Warren and Comstock to trace out a new line which I pointed out to them on the map, and to do it that night, as I would
not be able to hold the one I then occupied after the enemy should renew the attack the next morning.”
“ The position” at Dowdall's “was the most commanding one in the vicinity. In the possession of the enemy it would enable him with his artillery to enfilade the lines held by the Twelfth and Second Corps.” “To wrest this position from the enemy after his batteries were established upon it, would have required slender columns of infantry, which he could destroy as fast as they were thrown upon it.” Slender columns of infantry were at this time among Hooker's pet ideas.
slintwadangan “Every disposition was made of our forces to hold our line as long as practicable, for the purpose of being in readiness to co-operate with the movement which had been ordered to be made on our left.”
* The attack was renewed by the enemy about seven o'clock in the morning, and was bravely resisted by the limited number of troops I could bring into action until eleven o'clock, when orders were given for the army to establish itself on the new line. This it did in good order. The position I abandoned was one that I had held at a disadvantage ; and I kept the troops on it as long as I did, only for the purpose of enabling me to hear of the approach of the force under Gen. Sedgwick.” Thus much Hooker.
The position of both armies shortly after daybreak was substantially that to which the operation of Saturday had led.
The crest at Fairview was crowned by eight batteries of the Third and Twelfth Corps, snpported by Whipple's
Second brigade (Bowman's), in front to the left, forming, as it were, a third line of infantry.,
In advance of the artillery some five hundred yards, (a good half-mile from the Chancellor House,) lay the Federal line of battle, on a crest less high than Fairview, but still commanding the tangled woods in its front to a limited distance, and with lower ground in its rear, deepening to a ravine on the south of the plank road. Berry's division held this line north of the plank road, occupying the ground it had fought over since dusk of the evening before. Supporting it somewhat later was Whipple's First brigade (Franklin's). Berdan's sharpshooters formed a movable skirmish-line; while another, and heavier, was thrown out by Berry from his own troops.
A section of Dimick's battery was trained down the road.
Williams's division of the Twelfth Corps was to the south of the plank road, both he and Berry substantially in one line, and perpendicular to it; while Mott's brigade was massed in rear of Williams's right.
Near Williams's left flank, but almost at right angles to it, came Geary's division, in the same intrenched line he had defended the day before ; and on his left again, the Second Corps, which had not materially changed its position since Friday.
The angle thus formed by Geary and Williams, looked out towards cleared fields, and rising ground, surmounted by some farm-buildings on a high crest, about six hundred yards from Fairview.
At this farm, called Hazel Grove, during the night,
and until just before daybreak, holding a position which could have been utilized as an almost impregnable point d'appui, and which, so long as it was held, practically prevented, in the approaching battle, a junction of Lee's severed wings, had lain Birney's and Whipple's divisions. This point they had occupied, (as already described,) late the evening before, after Sickles and Pleasonton had finished their brush with Jackson's right brigades. But Hooker was blind to the fact that the possession of this height would enable either himself or his enemy to enfilade the other's lines; and before daybreak the entire force was ordered to move back to Chancellorsville. In order to do this, the intervening swamp had to be bridged, and the troops handled with extreme care. When all but Graham had been withdrawn, a smart attack was made upon his brigade by Archer of Hill's command, who charged up and captured the Hazel Grove height; but it was with no serious Federal loss, except a gun and caisson stalled in the swamp. Sickles drew in his line by the right, and was directed to place his two divisions so as to strengthen the new line at Fairview.
Reynolds's corps had arrived the evening before, and, after somewhat blind instructions, had been placed along the east of Hunting Run, from the Rapidan to the junction of Ely's and United States Ford roads, in a location where the least advantage could be gained from his fresh and eager troops, and where, in fact, the corps was not called into action at all, restless however Reynolds may have been under his enforced inactivity.
The Eleventh Corps had gone to the extreme left, where