to be indifpenfably neceffary, that every single being, who attains the perfection of an angel or archangel, must have gradually rifen to that height through all the intermediate steps, from the lowest ftation of rational existence. General rules may always admit of exceptions. But if we exclude all notion of progreffion and retribution from the universe, we shall exclude one of its greatest beauties, we fhall exclude what is ef fential to it as a regular system; and must therefore conclude, that in an universe planned by perfect Wisdom, retribution is, because it ought to be, and in fact cannot but be an essential and fundamental part; fince a multitude of detached, unconnected beings, endowed with consciousness, merely for the fake of their enjoying happiness, and raised at random and without reafon or rule, to a great degree of happiness, would not be an universe, but an effect of mere capricious and unguided power.

WE can form no idea of a fupreme first Cause, without afcribing to Him a certain moral character or nature. Whatever He is, he must be to an infinite degree. His moral character must therefore be infinitely good, because infinite evil is a felf-contradictory idea. And if he be infinitely, or perfectly good, he must love goodness. If therefore He creates moral agents (which, as fhewn above, pag. 9, it is better he fhould do, than not, as giving rife to various beauties, which otherwife could have had no place in the univerfe) it is to be depended upon, that

He

He will conftitute his univerfe in fuch a manner, that the fate or condition of his moral creatures fhould be different, according to their moral character and conduct; that those of them, who cultivate a godlike difpofition, who fuccefsfully endeavour at an imitation of his own moral character, fhould be honoured and favoured by God, and fhould of course, in confequence of the laws of the divine conftitution, rife to perfection, happiness, and glory; and that those of them, who act a contrary part, have a contrary retribution. Every common understanding that is not biaffed by the erroneous notion of Neceffitarianifm, fees the propriety of virtue's being happy rather than miferable, as clearly as it does the most obvious proportions in numbers. Every rational agent, who regulates his conduct, and forms his character, according to the Divine moral character, acts a wifer and better part, a part more fuitable to the fyftem, of which himfelf is a member, than if he regulates himself by any other pattern, either contrary to, or even different from the fupreme ftandard of moral excellence. And, if the univerfe were to be conceived of, as conftituted upon any plan, which did not bring happiness to virtue, it must be conceived of in a manner unworthy of a wife and good Author, because, upon fuch a plan, it must want the great and indifpenfable advantage, without which all other advantages would be of no confequence, for the want of which nothing could compenfate, and without which it would not have been worth while to have created an

uni

universe. To speak properly, fuch a scheme is not conceivable, as the production of perfect Wif dom...

THE Divine intention, accordingly, appears, from what we know to be the ftate of things to have been, first, that all confcious beings below the rational pitch, be put in the way of being upon the whole gainers by coming into existence, because it is not proper that a confcious being fhould be made use of to contribute to the good of the universe, without fharing in that which himself has contributed to. Secondly, That beings of the rational rank have it in their own power to promote their own and the general improvement in virtue, the nobleft end of their exiftence; in confequence of which fervice performed by them, to the advantage of themselves and the univerfe, and the accomplishment of the grand intention of crea-. tion, they will, of course attain very high degrees of happiness. So that there will be a direct reafon for their attaining thofe high degrees of happiness, without which direct reafon and adequate means, they could not have attained them. Because the principal object propofed by the Divine wifdom was not, the conferring of a great overbalance of happinefs, merely for the fake of the fingle point of conferring happiness, exclufive of its being earned, or deferved by the beings on whom it is confered, but the improvement of rational and moral natures in rectitude, the natural confequence of C which

which is, and ought to be their attaining those degrees of happiness, which there comes then to be a direct reafon and adequate means for their attaining and enjoying. In all which there is fomewhat intrinfecally good, and worthy of God to propose, as being fuitable to eternal and unchangeable rectitude; and rectitude is his own

nature.

PROCEEDING in this manner, we cannot but be fecure from all fatally erroneous conclusions concerning the Divine plan of the moral oeconomy, fo far as it is His plan, un-defaced and unaffected by the agency of created beings. For we are fure that the fupreme Wisdom, will always do that which there are the most reasons: for doing. Now, there are, generally and univerfally speaking, more reafons for giving happinefs to beings, who, by their industrious virtue, have earned it, than there would have been, if they had not earned it. We may therefore fafely conclude, that in general, the higher degrees of attainment, to which moral agents. rife in the universe, are the effect of their own virtue, and that in general, thofe beings, who now poffefs ftations of very high elevation, have some time been in lower places in the scale of being, and have raised themselves.

SECT.

TH

SECT. III.

HE common, or rather univerfal error, that happiness at any rate, the highest in degree, and attained in the speedieft manner, is rightest and propereft, and the grand scope in creation and government, has led reasoners into endless labyrinths. The grand end of creation, and moral government is, to exhibit the greatest and most extenfive display of rectitude, to produce the most that can be produced, of what is, upon the whole, rightest and beft, whatever that be. But it will not always, and in every fingle individual cafe happen, that the greatest and fooneft attained happiness shall be, upon the whole, the rightest and beft. Therefore, if, with moft reafoners, we make the production of happiness the mark to which we steer, we shall run the hazard of holding a wrong course, and not be fo fure of arriving at truth, as if we keep our eye fixed upon rectitude. An order of moral agents, who come into existence in the most advantageous state for virtue, that is, with comprehenfive minds, and enlarged capacities for apprehending truth, for feeing the beauty of virtue and deformity of vice, and with inclinations the most equally balanced, fo as they may run the least hazard of being hurried into any kind of excess; fuch an order of moral agents would feem to be upon the best foot for improvement in virtue, C 2 and