Sect. IX. punishment might have come upon the apostle, without the leaft derogation from the Divine goodness. For no one can conceive of the Divine goodness in fuch a manner, as to affirm, that it muft exclude all punishment, even the most just and adequate. We have feen page 35, that adequate punishment for vice is as effential a part of the fyftem, of every poffible system, as reward. If then the adequate punishment might have come upon the apostle for his offence in perfecuting the Chriftians, and yet, if this punishment did not in fact, as we know it did not, come upon him; we must look for the caufe that prevented it, fomewhere else, than in the general conftitution of the moral world. For that alone might be expected to bring it, not to keep it off.

PERHAPS it may be faid, that because it is proper, all due encouragement be given to repentance and reformation, as being most for the intereft of virtue, therefore it was right and fit, that provifion fhould be made in the original plan of the moral oeconomy, that (without deliverance by means of interpofition, or created agency, which is always contingent, and may occafionally fail) penitence fhould of itself na→ turally keep off punishment, and restore to a state of fafety, and to every advantage for virtue and happiness, as if the offender had been obedient From the beginning; if this fhould be alledged, and that it was accordingly the apostle's repentance, that of itself alone faved him from the

punish

punishment otherwife to be expected to come upon him; it is to be remembred, that, as above observed, it is not possible, (because not agreeable to the nature of things, nor to rectitude) to constitute a moral fyftem of government on fuch a plan, that penitence fhould of course bring total oblivion and high reward. For innocence itself, and a high degree of industrious virtue, can at most only claim a retribution of unmixed, and high happiness. Therefore penitence cannot be naturally connected with the fame retribution as pure innocence. For penitence is at best inferior to innocence. The apostle's character would have been much more laudable and rewardable, had he died poffeffed of the fame attainments in virtue and piety, which he did reach, and had never fullied his character by perfecution. Even then, he would, at most, but have deferved an incorruptible crown of righteousness. How then came he to expect it, guilty and defective as he was? Not in confequence of the general conftitution of the world; but by grace, or favour, which grace comes by Jefus Chrift. And we know, that the interpofition of Chrift is a peculiarity, not univerfal. For we are told in fcripture, that Chrift did not lay hold on the angels * [to fave, or recover thofe of them, who offended] and that those of them who kept not their first eftate, are [not to be faved, as mankind]

*Heb. ii. 16.

+ Jude vi.

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but

but are referved to punishment, according to the primary conftitution of the universe.

We know that in many particulars, it is, and could not but have been, in all parts of the univerfe, the natural confequence of vice, whether repented of, or not, to cut off the of fender from a variety of advantages for virtue and happiness. Which is a fact directly contrary to the prefumption of a natural connexion between penitence and pardon. The practice of vice tends naturally to harden the offender, and unfit him for virtue and happiness. There is not, nor could have been, in the original plan of the moral world any thing naturally tending to delay punishment, till the offender fhall refolve to repent. On the contrary, the natural and unbiaffed courfe of things is, that punishment follow vice at the heels. That a fpecies fhould go on for fome thousands of years, and receive no regular retribution till the time. of a general judgment (as is our cafe) is a peculiarity; not the natural and general course of the moral world. The notion of a connexion, exclufive of fecondary interpofition, between penitence and abfolute amnesty with unabated happinefs, is equally irrational, and implies the fame impoffibility, as, after granting a natural connexion between great industry and great profperity; and between total neglect of oeconomy and extreme poverty; to contend for a natural connexion between a mixed conduct, partly prudent and partly the contrary, and great profperity;

which would be affirming, that the natural consequence of a very confiderable degree of folly is the fame as that of the most confummate wisdom, which is a contradiction in terms. It might as well be alledged, that, in order to give all poffible encouragement to prudence, there ought to have been a provision made in the original plan of the world, for making it altogether the fame for a perfon to waste a third part, for example, of his life in idleness, and of his paternal fortune, by profufion; and then take to frugality and industry, with the remainder; as to apply the whole of his life to the practice of thofe gainful virtues, and to make the best improvement, from the beginning, of his whole patrimony. But this is abfurd and impoffible.

WE

SECT. X.

HAT has led men into endless error and confufion in their conceptions of the Divine moral government, is the natural tendency we have to deviate into anthropomorphitifm. We know of no way of carrying on government, but by retribution conferred upon individuals fingly, in confequence of their refpective behaviour, after regular trial had fingly, which is to be followed by paffing of fentence, and that by the execution of the fentence upon each individual fingly; and contrariwife of rewards.

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wards. We are therefore apt to think of the univerfal governing Mind, as of a judge trying and deciding of the characters and fates of his creatures by fingle individuals. But this is a conception altogether unworthy of a fcheme planned by a wisdom which reaches at one view backward and forward through an infinite extent of duration, and which must be thought of as having originally connected in a fyftematic and conftitutional manner, the proper retributions with the characters for which they are refpectively proper, in fuch a manner, that his government will of courfe execute itself, as the machine of the world carries on its own motions in virtue of one fimple and uniform agency prevailing through the whole. We may con-ceive of an empowered fecondary agent as oca fionally rewarding and punishing a particular being, or a fpecies, by fingle individuals; but we must not think of the univerfal Governor, as having originally conftituted the moral world (more than the natural) upon any other foundation than that of a regular fyftem, going on more uniformly, than the most perfect machine of human conftruction, and not as accommodating itself to fingle individual cafes in a detached and incoherent manner.

NOR are we to conclude, that there is no other plan of retribution throughout the moral world, than that inferior orders of moral agents, are by fuperior created beings, empowered for that purpofe, judged, and allotted to states

of