whose name is forged and the one to whom the forged instrument is to be passed,
and the indictment may lay the intent to defraud either of them; and proof of
an intent to defraud either and to pass the instrument as good, though there be
shown no actual intent to defraud the particular person, will sustain the allega-
tion. State v. Cleavland, 181.
13. LEASE OF PREMISES AS EVIDENCE OF SALE OF GOODS. Where it became an issue
whether certain unbaled hay, which had been sold, had passed to the continued
possession of the vendee as claimed by him: Held, that a lease by the vendor
to the vendee of the premises in which the hay was kept was competent and
material testimony for the vendee, and that it was error to prevent him from
introducing it. Conway v. Edwards, 190.
14. LEASE NOT SIGNED BY TENANT AS EVIDENCE AGAINST HIM. In an action for
rent against a tenant, who holds under a lease signed only by the lessor, such
lease is admissible in evidence to show the conditions and reservations under
which the possession is held. Fitton v. Inhabitants of Hamilton City, 196.
15. DECLARATIONS OF VENDOR AFTER SALE. In a question as to the validity, un-
der the statute of frauds, of a sale of personal property, where the fact of the sale
and change of possession was established: Held, that the declarations of the
vendor made after such sale and change of possession were mere hearsay evi-
dence, and not admissible to impeach or defeat the sale. Lewis v. Wilcox, 215.
16. RELEVANCY OF EVIDENCE TENDING TO SUPPORT DEFENSE.
sureties on the official bond of a State treasurer, to recover for defalcation
claimed to have taken place within the period covered by the instrument, it is
competent for defendant to show that the defalcation occurred previous to the
giving of the bond, and any testimony tending to support such defense is rele-
vant and pertinent. State v. Rhoades, 352.
17. EXCLUSION OF RELEVANT TESTIMONY ERROR. Where in an action against the
sureties on the official bond of a State treasurer for defalcation, defendants'
counsel asked a witness as to the condition of the treasury at a time previous
to that covered by the bond; and upon objection, on the ground of irrelevancy,
counsel stated that he proposed to show that the defalcation complained of
took place before the bond was given, and that to show such fact it was neces-
sary to show the condition of the treasury as asked: Held, that the exclusion
of the question and proposed testimony was error. State v. Rhoades, 352.
18. TEST OF RELEVANCY OF EVIDENCE. To ascertain whether evidence be relevant
or not, it is only necessary to determine whether it has a tendency to establish
a legitimate case or defense relied on. State v. Rhoades, 352.
19. EVIDENCE-ORAL RESULT OF EXAMINATION OF LONG ACCOUNTS. Where it became
material and relevant to know the amount of money which should have been in
the State treasury on a certain day: Held, that it was competent, under Sec. 427
of the Practice Act, as well as under the law independent of it, for an expert,
who had made a full investigation of the accounts of the office, to state orally
the result of his examination. State v. Rhoades, 352.
20. EVIDENCE-BOOKS OF STATE TREASURER PUBLIC RECORDS. In a suit against the
sureties on the official bond of a State treasurer charged with defalcation:
Held, that the entries in the books of the treasurer's office were competent
evidence against the sureties without proof that they were made by or with the
knowledge of the treasurer personally; such books being official (Stats. 1866,
57) and coming under the head of public records. State v. Rhoades, 352.
21. OBJECTIONS TO ADMISSION OF EVIDENCE TOO LATE AFTER EVIDENCE ADMITTED.
Where a deed was admitted in evidence under insufficient objections to its val-
idity for alleged want of title in the grantor; and afterwards, on motion for
non-suit, further grounds of exception on account of its alleged want of proper
execution were made to it: Held, that the latter objections were too late and
therefore not available. Sharon v. Minnock, 377.
22. OBJECTIONS TO EVIDENCE TO BE MADE PROMPTLY. An objection to the admis-
sion of evidence should always be made at the earliest opportunity after the
objection becomes apparent; if apparent when offered, it should be made
then;
if the evidence, apparently admissible when offered, is shown by subse-
quent developments to be exceptionable, the objection should then be made in
the form of a motion to strike out. Sharon v. Minnock, 377.
NO REVERSAL WHERE EVIDENCE CONFLICTING-See APPEAL, 8.
ANY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE WILL SUPPORT A JUDGMENT-See APPEAL, 9.
REVERSAL WHERE EVIDENCE INSUFFICIENT-See APPEAL, 19.
EVIDENCE BEFORE INFERIOR TRIBUNAL NOT TO BE INQUIRED INTO ON CERTIO-
RARI-See CERTIORARI, 3.
EVIDENCE OF JURISDICTION TO REMOVE COUNTY SEAT-See COUNTY SEAT, 1.
INSUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE ON APPEAL-See CRIMINAL LAW, 1.
EVIDENCE OF GOOD CHARACTER IN CRIMINAL CASES-See CRIMINAL LAW, 2.
INDEPENDENT AND POSITIVE EVIDENCE AS TO CRIMINAL INTENT-see CRIMINAL
LAW, 3.
EVIDENCE OF LOADING TO MAKE PISTOL DEADLY WEAPON
LAW, 5.
EVIDENCE TO CORROBORATE ACCOMPLICE-See CRIMINAL LAW, 12.
CHARGING CIRCUMSTANTIAL to BE SUPERIOR TO DIRECT EVIDENCE, ERROR-
see CRIMINAL LAW, 15.
ESTOPPEL CANNOT BE PROVED IF NOT PLEADED-see ESTOPPEL, 5.
ADMISSION OF ADVERSE ALLEGATIONS AND DISPENSING WITH PROOF-See PRAC-
TICE, 3.
STATEMENT OF COUNSEL TO SHOW RELEVANCY OF TESTIMONY-see PRACTICE, 5.
INTIMATIONS OF COURT EXCLUDING EVIDENCE-see PRACTICE, 6.
DEVELOPMENT OF MINES-EVIDENCE-See PRACTICE ACT, 1.
SALE EVIDENCE OF CONTINUED CHANGE OF POSSESSION-See SALE, 1.
JUDGE'S CERTIFICATE TO STATEMENT AS TO EVIDENCE ADDUCED ON TRIAL-see
STATEMENT, 1, 2.
STATUTE OF FRAUDS-PROOF OF SALE-See STATUTE OF FRAuds, 1.
TRANSCRIPT NOT CONTAINING ALL THE EVIDENCE-See TRANSCRIPT, 1.
OBJECTION AS TO RIGHT TO EXECUTE DEED NOT OBJECTION AS TO EXECUTION.
Where the only specification of objection to the introduction in evidence of a
deed was that the alleged grantor, a corporation, had not been shown to have
title: Held, not broad enough to cover an objection that the corporate seal
had not been proved, nor any authority shown to affix it to the deed. Sharon
v. Minnock, 377.
PARTICULAR GROUND OF EXCEPTION TO BE STATED. The particular ground of
an objection or exception taken in the course of a trial is required to be stated,
(Practice Act, Sec. 191) so that the court may decide intelligently upon it, and
the opposite party be afforded on opportunity of obviating the objection if it
be in his power to do so. Sharon v. Minnock, 377.
IRREGULARITIES OF PRACTICE NOT EXCEPTED TO—see APPEAL, 4.
OBJECTION TO ADMISSION OF EVIDENCE TOO LATE AFTER EVIDENCE ADMITTED—
see EVIDENCE, 21, 22.
GROUNDS OF CHALLENGE OF JUROR TO BE SPECIFIED-see JURY, 2, 6.
EXCEPTIONS IN ACTION TO FORECLOSE MECHANICS' LIENS
SPECIFICATION OF GROUNDS OF MOTION FOR NONSUIT-See NoNsuit, 1.
EXECUTION SALE-BID BY JUDGMENT CREDITOR-SATISFACTION. Where property
of a judgment debtor was, on execution sale, struck off to the judgment credi-
tor, and upon his refusal to pay, the sheriff proceeded to re-sell, whereupon
the court, on motion, ordered the judgment creditor to enter satisfaction
of the judgment: Held, that the order was error and must be set aside. Swee-
ney v. Hawthorne, 129.
MERE STRIKING OFF TO Judgment CredITOR NOT SATISFACTION OF EXECUTION.
Where, on an execution sale, the judgment creditor bid in the property but
refused to pay, and the property had to be offered again: Held, that the
execution was not satisfied. Sweeney v. Hawthorne, 129.
REQUISITES OF EXECUTION IN REPLEVIN-See REPLEVIN, 2.
ERRONEOUS INDIVISIBLE PART OF FINDING. If a finding contains erroneous mat-
ter, which cannot be divided from the remainder, the whole must fall. Clark
v. Nevada Land and M. Co., 203.
FIXTURES-WHAT CANNOT BE. A thing which is neither attached to the realty,
nor placed upon the land with a view to making it permanent, nor essential to
the full and complete enjoyment of the freehold, cannot become a fixture in
any sense of the word. Brown v. Lillie, 244.
A FIXTURE MUST BE CONNECTED WITH THE FREEHOLD. Connection with or annex-
ation to the freehold in some way is indispensable, as a general rule, to con-
stitute a fixture. Brown v. Lillie, 244.
INTENTION OF BUILDER as to FIXTURE. The cases holding that the intention of
the person making the annexation to real estate must determine whether the
thing annexed be a fixture or not, are overborne by the great weight of au-
thority the other way. Brown v. Lillie, 244.
CHATTELS NOT FIXTURES HAVE NO CHARACTER OF REALTY. A personal chattel
cannot be converted into real estate or given the character of realty, except by
making it a fixture; and if not so attached to real estate as to become a
fixture, it retains its character of personalty, entirely unmodified and unaf-
fected by its situation. Brown v. Lillie, 244.
SAW MILL-WHEN NOT A FIXTURE. A saw mill built upon timbers lying upon
the surface of the ground and constructed with the object and purpose, after
sawing the timber within a convenient distance, to be removed to another local-
ity, is a mere personal chattel, and will not pass by a conveyance or patent of
the land. Brown v. Lillie, 244.
FORFEITURE OF TOLL ROAD FRANCHISE-See ROADS, 2.
FORGERY OF CHECK PAYABLE TO "SAPPHIRE MILL OR BEARER "-see CRIMI-
NAL LAW, 9.
PROOF OF EXISTENCE OF CORPORATION INJURED BY FORGERY-See EVIDENCE,
11, 12.
INDICTMENT FOR FORGERY-See INDICTMENT, 1.
FORGERY OF CHECK ON "AGENCY OF BANK OF CALIFORNIA "-see PROMISSORY
NOTES, 2.
EFFECT OF FORFEITURE ON TOLL ROAD FRANCHISE-See ROADS, 2.
INSURANCE-FRAUD-QUESTIONS OF LAW AND FACT. Where a contract of in-
surance provided that fraud in a claim made under it for a loss, or a false
declaration or affirmation in support thereof, should forfeit all benefit under the
policy: Held, that whether there was such fraud, or false declaration or af
firmation, was a matter for the jury to decide under proper instructions of
the court. Gerhauser v. North British and M. Ins. Co., 15.
DECLARATIONS OF POSSESSOR TO CONTRADICT ALLEGED GIFT OF CHATTELS—
see EVIDENCE, 8.
HAMILTON CITY PAROL CONTRACTS. The charter of Hamilton City providing
that "all scrip and bonds issued and contracts and agreements made shall be
signed by the president and countersigned by the clerk," (Stats. 1869, 165, Sec.
14) does not prohibit parol contracts by the city, but only designates the man-
ner in which written contracts shall be executed. Fitton v. Inhabitants of
Hamilton City, 196.
CHOSES IN ACTION BELONGING TO HUSBAND AND WIFE.
of the statute relating to husband and wife, (Stats. 1864-5, 240) the husband,
for the purpose of bringing suits upon choses in action which are common
property and so far as the disposition of such property is concerned, is the sole
owner, and he alone is the proper party to bring actions upon them. Crow v.
Van Sickle, 146.
COMPLAINT BY HUSBAND ON NOTE GIVEN TO WIFE-See PROMISSORY NOTES, 1.
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