PAYMENT ON PURCHASE BY JUDGMENT CREDITOR. Where the judgment creditor
is the purchaser at execution sale, it does not follow that he need not pay any
money-the officer may require payment when fees are due, or to become due
to him, and in default of payment may re-sell. Sweeney v. Hawthorne, 129.
SHERIFF NOT INTERESTED IN REPLEVIN BOND. Though Sec. 104 of the Practice
Act requires the undertaking given on return of property replevied to be de-
livered to the sheriff, the officer has no interest in it, and is not a proper party
plaintiff in a suit on it. McBeth v. Van Sickle, 134.
SEIZURE BY SHERIFF OF GOODS ATTACHED BY CONSTABLE. Where a sheriff
seized and sold on execution out of a district court goods which were held by
a constable on attachment out of a justice's court: Held, that the sheriff,
though he was responsible to the constable, was not so to the creditor in the
attachment suit. Foulks v. Pegg, 136.
SPECIAL PROPERTY OF OFFICER IN PROPERTY ATTACHED-see ATTACHMENT, 1.
LIABILITY OF ATTACHING OFFICER TO ATTACHMENT CREDITOR
NO DOCKET FEE IN ACTION BY STATE-See Costs, 3.
ADVANCES TO STATE, WHAT-see DEFINITIONS, 1.
JURISDICTION OF STATE COURT AS TO PROPERTY SEIZED UNDER FEDERAL PRO-
CESS-see JURISDICTION, 5.
RENT OF PUBLIC BUILDINGS LEASED TO STATE-see LEASE, 3.
STATE APPROPRIATION FOR PROSECUTING INFRACTIONS OF REVENUE LAWS-see
TAXES, 3.
JUDGE'S CERTIFICATE TO STATEMENT ON APPEAL. The Practice Act (Secs. 197
and 335) does not contemplate that the judge shall certify that a statement on
appeal contains all the evidence, but simply that it has been allowed by him
and is correct. Caples v. Central Pacific R. R. Co., 265.
ADDITIONS TO JUDGE'S CERTIFICATE TO STATEMENT. A judge's certificate to
statement on motion for new trial and appeal that the record contains all the
evidence, will not be allowed to be added after the appeal has been perfected
and the transcript become a record of the appellate court. Caples v. Central
Pacific R. R. Co., 265.
WANT OF AUTHENTICATION OF STATEMENT ON NEW TRIAL-See APPEAL, 1.
ISSUES ON APPEAL ON NEW TRIAL STATEMENT-See APPEAL, 2.
ERROR IN JUDGMENT ROLL MAY BE CORRECTED WITHOUT STATEMENT-see AP-
STATEMENT ON APPEAL FROM NEW TRIAL ORDER-see APPEAL, 12.
AUTHENTICATION OF STATEMENT ON NEW TRIAL-see NEW TRIAL, 1.
NAMING PAPER "STATEMENT" NOT INDORSING IT AS CORRECTLY SUCH-see
STIPULATION, 1.
WAIVER AS TO TIME TO MAKE STATEMENT ON APPEAL-See WAIVER, 4.
1. TITLE OF STATUTE WHAT TO EXPRESS. It is only necessary, under the constitu-
tional provision as to the subject-matter and title of statutes, (Const., Art. IV,
Sec. 17) to express in the title the principal subject embodied in the law,
while the matters properly connected therewith are not required to be men-
tioned. Humboldt County v. Churchill County Commissioners, 30.
PRESUMPTION OF CONSTITUTIONALITY OF STATUTES. No statute will be annulled
by a court on the ground of unconstitutionality unless it be clearly in conflict
with the constitution. Humboldt County v. Churchill County Commissioners,
30.
JUDICIAL POWER AS TO STATUTES. No court has a right to annul or set aside a
statute except upon constitutional grounds, and no inquiry can be made as to
any alleged misunderstanding between legislators respecting its adoption, or
even fraud in procuring its passage. Humboldt County v. Churchill County
Commissioners, 30.
4. STATUTES THE EXPRESSION OF FREE LEGISLATIVE WILL.
taken by courts to be the expression of the free will and wish of the legisla-
ture, whatever may have been the means employed to secure its adoption,
and irrespective of any agreement or understanding had between members.
Humboldt County v. Churchill County Commissioners, 30.
CONSTRUCTION OF Marriage StatuTE. The proviso in the marriage act to the
effect that the issue of a marriage of persons not of lawful age shall not be
illegitimate, (Stats. 1867, 88) refers to the issue of marriages of persons
under eighteen years in males and under sixteen in females. Fitzpatrick v.
Fitzpatrick, 63.
IMPRACTICABLE CONDITION PRESCRIBED BY STATUTE. Where a statute prescribed
that bonds should be issued to a railroad if it should pass a certain point:
Held, that to entitle the railroad to the bonds it must pass such point, not-
withstanding passing such point might prove to be impracticable. Virginia
and Truckee R. R. Co. v. Lyon County Commissioners, 68.
CONFLICT OF STATUTES. The statute relating to the removal of county seats
required an election to be held within fifty days after the order therefor (Stat-
utes of 1867, 78). On the other hand, the registry law of 1869 (Statutes of
1869, 140) allowed registration for forty days prior to closing the register,
which should close ten days prior to the day of election: Held, that though
the latter law might render it impossible to hold an election within fifty days,
still the former law was too clear and plain in its terms to mean that the fifty
day period could be extended. State ex rel. Hess v. Washoe County Commis-
sioners, 104.
8. STATUTE RELATING TO TenantS HOLDING OVER. Where a tenant under a lease
for a term less than a year holds over with the consent of his landlord, a new
tenancy for a like term is created by virtue of the statute. (Stats. 1864-5, 264.)
Fitton v. Inhabitants of Hamilton City, 196.
CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTE CONTAINING FORM OF INDICTMENT. The section of the
criminal statute giving the form of an indictment and omitting the venue there-
from (Stats. 1867, 126) is controlled by the next section, which requires a
statement of all essential facts. State v. Chamberlain, 257.
STATUTES AS TO DEPUTY ASSESSORS (STATS. 1864, 143; 1864-5, 345)—see
ASSESSOR, 2.
STATUTE MAKING LINCOLN COUNTY NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT (STATS. 1867,
129) CONSTITUTIONAL-see CONSTITUTION, 2.
STATUTE MAKING CHURCHILL PAY HUMBOLDT COUNTY $3,000 A YEAR FOR
FIVE YEARS (STATS. 1869, 88) CONSTRUED-see CoNSTRUCTION, 1.
SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE WITH CONDITION PRESCRIBED BY STATUTE-See CON-
STRUCTION, 3.
PRINCIPLES OF STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION-See CONSTRUCTION, 4, 5, 6, 7.
CREATION OF LINCOLN COUNTY (STATS. 1866, 131)-see COUNTIES, 1.
STATUTE TO REMOVE COUNTY SEAT (STATS. 1867, 78)-see COUNTY SEAT, 1, 2.
LEGISLATIVE POWER AS TO GIVING CERTAIN COUNTY CLAIMS PREFERENCE-See
LEGISLATURE, 1.
STATUTE AS TO DISTRICT JUDGE'S TERM IN LINCOLN COUNTY-See OFFICERS, 2.
STATUTE IN REGARD TO TOLL ROADS-See ROADS, 1.
STATUTE OF FRAUDS-PROOF OF SALE. To show a continued change of posses-
sion, such as is necessary to support a sale of personal property under the statute
of frauds, nothing generally can have a more direct tendency than the control
and management of the property, or acts of ownership exercised over it by the
vendee. Conway v. Edwards, 190.
DELIVERY AFTER SALE AND BEFORE ATTACHMENT. Where goods were sold and
the vendee took possession at a time subsequent to the sale but before the levy
of an attachment: Held, that the delivery before the attachment satisfied the
statute of frauds and validated the sale. Clute v. Steele, 335.
CHANGE OF POSSESSION, WHAT-see SALE, 2, 3, 4.
1. NAMING A PAPER NOT INDORSING ITS CORRECTNESS AS SUCH. A stipulation
reciting the papers by name which the transcript on appeal should contain, and
among others the "Statement on New Trial," is not a waiver of objections
that the paper purporting to be such statement is not properly authenticated,
and therefore not a statement. White v. White, 20.
TRANSFER OF ACTION BY STIPULATION-See VENUE, 6.
LIABILITY OF VIRGINIA CITY AS TO CARE OF STREETS-see CORPORATIONS, 3.
VIRGINIA CITY CHARTER AS TO OPENING AND REPAIRING STREETS-
SERVICE OF SUMMONS UPON CALIFORNIA COMPANY. Service of summons upon
a California corporation, made in accordance with Sec. 29 of the Practice Act,
is valid. Caples v. Central Pacific R. R. Co., 265.
SERVICE OF SUMMONS AFTER INSUFFICIENT ATTEMPTED SERVICE.
attempted service of summons upon a California corporation was made in this
State, and a subsequent service in California, under the provisions of Sec. 29
of the Practice Act: Held, that it made no difference whether an order
refusing to quash the first service was correct or not, it appearing that the
second service was good, and no prejudice done. Caples v. Central Pacific
R. R. Co., 265.
LIABILITY OF SURETIES ON BOND OF DE FACTO OFFICER. Where a State treas-
urer, reëlected in 1866, accepted a new commission and took a new oath, and
continued to discharge the duties of the office, but failed to file a new official
bond within the time prescribed by law: Held, that he was an officer de facto
and holding as of the new term; and that the sureties on the new bond after-
wards filed were estopped from denying that he was holding as of the new
term de jure. State v. Rhoades, 352.
LIABILITY OF SURETIES OF DEPUTY ASSESSOR-see ASSESSOR, 1.
TERM OF LIABILITY ON BOND OF DEPUTY ASSESSOR-see BONDS, 1.
SUBSEQUENT TAX ASSESSMENT OF VIRGINIA & TRUCKEE RAILROAD COMPANY.
Where, under the provisions of the supplemental revenue act of 1867, (Stats.
1867, 111) the Virginia and Truckee Railroad Company applied to the county
commissioners of Ormsby County to have the "subsequent assessment roll"
for 1869, as to its property, equalized; and the commissioners thereupon
ordered the entire subsequent assessment roll to be stricken out and remitted:
Held, that they acted beyond their powers, and that their order was void.
State ex rel. Swift v. Ormsby County Commissioners, 95.
EXTENT OF RELIEF AS AGAINST SUBSEQUENT ASSESSMENTS.
mental revenue act of 1867, (Stats. 1867, 111) allowing every person feeling
aggrieved by a supplemental assessment roll to appear before the county com-
missioners and apply to have such assessment equalized, modified or dis-
charged, and authorizing the commissioners to hold a meeting to hear and
finally determine the matter: Held, that the commissioners had no power to
interfere with the subsequent assessment roll, except upon application of some
person feeling aggrieved, and even then, in granting relief, not to go beyond
the application made. State ex rel. Swift v. Ormsby County Commissioners, 95.
FEES FOR PROSECUTING DELINQUENT STATE TREASURER. Where a sheriff had
a bill for fees in a suit by the State against the estate of a delinquent State
treasurer and the sureties on his official bond: Held, that he could not claim
payment out of a State appropriation "for prosecuting delinquents for infrac-
tion of the revenue laws," and that the controller properly refused to issue his
warrant therefor. Swift v. Doron, 125.
TAX SALES OF PERSONAL PROPERTY - INJUNCTION.
restrain a county assessor from selling certain personal property for taxes al-
leged that he would sell unless restrained, and thereby damage plaintiff in a
certain amount of money: Held, that as the amount of damages was exactly
stated and there was no showing that a judgment therefor could not be col-
lected, there was no case for a restraining order, injunction or other equitable
relief. Conley v. Chedic, 222.
STOCK BROKERAGE-WAIVER OF TENDER-see BROKER, 1.
TERM OF DEPUTY COUNTY ASSESSOR-see ASSESSOR, 1.
TERMS OF DISTRICT JUDGES-see ELECTIONS, 1.
TERM OF LEASE CREATED BY HOLDING OVER-see LEASE, 2.
SURRENDER OF FIRST TERM BY OFFICER RE-ELECTED-See OFFICERS, 3.
|