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which it was declared that the President conceived that he had a right to demand that a war, conducted almost within sight of the United States and grievously affecting the interests of its citizens, should "at least be conducted according to the military codes of civilization." The Spanish government, in its reply, maintained that great progress had been made in subduing the insurrection, and, while denying the right of the United States to interfere in the matter, again complained of the support and encouragement which the insurgents received from American sources.

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President McKinley, in his annual message of December 6, 1897, reviewed the Cuban problem at much length. His attitude towards Spain was altogether friendly, but he stated that the existing conditions were such as to cause the gravest apprehension. The offer of the friendly offices of the United States, made by his predecessor in April 1896, had, he said, altogether failed, the answer of Spain in substance being that the pacification of the island must begin with the submission of the rebels to the mother country. He described the cruel policy of concentration" initiated in 1896 as a measure of "extermination," and adverted to the demand which he had made after his inauguration as President for the release or speedy trial of all American citizens who were under arrest in Cuba. This demand had resulted in the release of upwards of twenty prisoners who were citizens of the United States. The new Minister to Spain, General Woodford, had, said President McKinley, been instructed to assure Spain of the sincere wish of the United States to lend its aid toward the ending of the struggle by a solution which should be just and honorable alike to Spain and to the Cuban people. Between the departure of General Woodford from the United States and his arrival in Spain, Señor Canovas, the head of the Spanish cabinet, had fallen by the hands of an assassin and a new

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administration had been installed under the leadership of Señor Sagasta. It had fallen to the latter to answer General Woodford's representations, and the answer was, said President McKinley, in the direction of a better understanding. Señor Sagasta had stated that Spain had decided to put into effect the political reforms which he had previously advocated for the purpose of giving Cuba autonomy while guarding Spanish sovereignty. After thus rehearsing the negotiations, President McKinley stated that of the untried measures there remained only recognition of the insurgents as belligerents; recognition of the independence of Cuba; neutral intervention to end the war by imposing a rational compromise between the contestants, and intervention in favor of one or the other party. I speak not," declared President McKinley, "of forcible annexation, for that cannot be thought of. That, by our code of morality, would be criminal aggression." President McKinley then discussed the question of the recognition of belligerency and reached the conclusion that it was unwise and inadmissible. He also opposed intervention, especially in view of the hopeful change that had apparently taken place in the conduct of the Spanish government. Decrees looking to the application of the foreshadowed reforms had, he said, already been promulgated, although their full text had not been received. Moreover, under the appropriation made by Congress on April 4, 1897, effective relief had been given to distressed American citizens in Cuba and the new Spanish government had reversed the military policy which had so greatly shocked the sentiment of humanity, having recalled the commander under whose orders it was initiated, and had set on foot measures to relieve the horrors of starvation. No American citizen, so far as the government knew, was

would, said President McKinley, demonstrate whether the indispensable condition of a righteous peace was likely to be attained; and if it should later appear to be the duty of the United States to intervene by force, it should be "without fault on our part, and only because the necessity of such action will be so clear as to command the support and approval of the civilized world.”

The pursuit of the peaceful policy which President McKinley had sought to preserve was soon interrupted by certain extraordinary incidents which produced a crisis, and at last brought the United States to the point of forcible intervention. The first of these was the surreptitious publication of a letter which the Spanish minister at Washington had addressed to a personal correspondent in Havana. This letter, besides describing the negotiations then pending between the United States and Spain for a commercial arrangement in regard to Cuba, as a mere diplomatic expedient intended to gain time, contained an analysis of the political situation in the United States, in which opprobious epithets were applied to the President, who was represented as being a shifty politician, anxious to keep on good terms with those who advocated as well as with those who opposed intervention in Cuba. The fact that this letter was private detracted nothing from the painful effects produced by its publication. Its author manifested his appreciation of the circumstances by cabling his resignation to Madrid before a demand for his recall could be presented. The excitement caused by this incident had by no means died away when, on February 15, 1898, the sinking of the U. S. S. Maine, as the result of an explosion, ocurred in the harbor of Havana, with the loss of two of her officers and two hundred and sixty-four of the crew. The sinking of the ship was separately investigated by American and Spanish naval commissions, which rendered

opposite reports as to the cause of the explosion. While public feeling in the United States was deeply stirred by this incident, the impression that Spain was unable to restore order in Cuba was greatly strengthened by a notable speech made in the Senate by Senator Proctor of Vermont, who had lately visited the island. Hence, while negotiations to reach a peaceful solution were not wholly abandoned, there was little reason on either side to believe or to hope that they would prove to be successful.

General Woodford, at Madrid, continued earnestly to labor for a practicable basis of settlement. The Spanish Government offered to submit the affairs of the Maine to arbitration, to revoke all orders of concentration and accept assistance from the United States in feeding and extending succor to persons in need, and to confide the preparations for the pacification of the island to an insular parliament. But, as this parliament was not to meet until the 4th of May, the Spanish government intimated that it would not find it inconvenient to accept at once a suspension of hostilities if the insurgents should request it from the Spanish commander-in-chief, with whom it would rest to determine the duration and conditions of the suspension. On this basis the Spanish government sought to secure delay in the transmission by the President to Congress of a message which he had prepared on the Cuban situation. Great impatience had already been manifested in Congress and elsewhere at the delays that had taken place in the submission of the President's message. It was at length sent in on April 11, 1898.

In this message, President McKinley, after reviewing historically the relations of the United States with Spain in regard to Cuba, discussed the various expedients which had been suggested as a means of solving the problem

tion of recognizing the independence of the insurgent government in Cuba, he invoked as a precedent the message of President Jackson to Congress of December 21, 1836, on the question of recognizing the independence of Texas, and reached the conclusion that the recognition of the independence of the so-called Cuban Republic would be unjustified on grounds of law and would also be inexpedient. There remained for consideration, said President McKinley, the alternative forms of intervention to end the war, either by imposing a rational compromise between the contestants, or by becoming the active ally of the one party or the other. The latter alternative he rejected. Of the former, he stated that the grounds for such intervention might be summarized as follows:

First: In the cause of humanity and to put an end to the barbarities, bloodshed, starvation, and horrible miseries now existing there, and which the parties to the conflict are either unable or unwilling to stop or mitigate. It is no answer to say this is all in another country, belonging to another nation, and is therefore none of our business. It is specially our duty, for it is right at our door.

Second: We owe it to our citizens in Cuba to afford them that protection and indemnity for life and property which no government there can or will afford, and to that end to terminate the conditions that deprive them of legal protection.

Third: The right to intervene may be justified by the very serious injury to the commerce, trade, and business of our people, and by the wanton destruction of property and devastation of the island.

Fourth, and which is of the utmost importance: The present condition of affairs in Cuba is a constant menace to our

peace, and entails upon this government an enormous expense. With such a conflict waged for years in an island so near us and with which our people have such trade and business relations; when the lives and liberty of our citizens are in constant

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