which was the sovereign power, and gave expression to its sovereignty through the general will. Government, being only an administrative agent, could be changed at will by the sovereign power.

Instead of adopting one of the extremes, American statesmen took the middle ground as advocated by Locke. To admit that the sovereign only could maintain rights, that the sovereign was not bound by law, and that sovereignty once conferred, could not be alienated, would be to favor royalty and the consequences of dynastic quarrels. On the other hand, to conclude that the government could be changed at will without qualification was not satisfactory. Americans were satisfied to reason that certain rights could not be conferred; and if the government formed to secure these rights could not guarantee them, it could be overthrown. The right of revolution, then, was justified only on the grounds that a government failed to secure the natural rights of man. The Declaration of Independence is practically a statement of these principles. It was declared that when any form of government did not secure these ends, it was the right of the people to abolish it. But while the right was recognized, stress was laid upon the seriousness of the step. Prudence, indeed, will dictate that governments long established should not be changed for light and transient causes; and accordingly all experience hath shown, that mankind are more disposed to suffer, while evils are sufferable, than to right themselves by abolishing the forms to which they are accustomed." 1 The Declaration then goes into detail, enumerating the failures of the British government to secure these rights, thereby justifying political separation from England. It is well to point out the wisdom of the American course. To have adopted the view of Hobbes would have led either to colonial sub

66

1 Richardson, Messages and Papers of the Presidents, vol. i, p. 3.

Its effect was seen in

mission or to the establishment of an independent monarchy with all its dangers; while, to have followed the principles of Rousseau would have meant the carrying of the right of revolution to the straining point. France, when the effort was made to carry liberty to all oppressed peoples. The adoption of either of these extremes might have resulted in the virtual abandonment of the policy of non-intervention.

The Congressional view was strictly in favor of the nonintervention principle. The management of foreign affairs after the adoption of the Constitution was practically transferred from Congress to the President. Congress would favor no policy which would suggest direct interference in European affairs. Such an attitude had been manifested by the Congress under the Article of Confederation in the matter of the armed neutrality. On May 21, 1783, in connection with the Dana mission to Russia and the desirability of a commercial treaty with that country, it was on motion of Mr. Hamilton, seconded by Mr. Madison, resolved: "That though Congress approve the principles of the armed neutrality, founded on the liberal basis of the maintenance of the rights of neutral nations and of the privileges of commerce, yet they are unwilling, at this juncture, to become a party to a confederacy which may hereafter too far complicate the interests of the United States with the politics of Europe, and therefore if such a progress is not yet made in this business as may make it dishonorable to recede, it is their desire that no further measures may be taken at present towards the admission of the United States into that Confederacy." Congress had approved on October 5, 1780, the principles of the armed neutrality; 2 and

1Wharton, Diplomatic Correspondence of the American Revolution, vol. vi, p. 438.

the board of admiralty was instructed to prepare rules for the commanders of American ships conformable to those contained in the Russian declaration, while American ministers were authorized, if invited to do so, to accede to the principles. But on June 12, 1783, the Congress declared that the primary object of the resolution of October 5, 1780, and of the commission and instructions to Mr. Dana in reard to the accession of the United States to the neutral confederacy, could no longer operate, and that, as the true interests of the States required that they be as little as possible entangled in the politics and controversies of European nations, it was inexpedient to renew such powers to the American ministers abroad. And it was accordingly resolved :

That the ministers plenipotentiary of these United States for negotiating a peace be, and they are hereby, instructed, in case they should comprise in the definitive treaty any stipulations amounting to a recognition of the rights of neutral nations, to avoid accompanying them by any engagements which shall oblige the contracting parties to support those stipulations by arms.1

The most independent of American diplomatists was John Adams. From the first he was the spokesman and defender of the principle of non-intervention. On November 10, 1782, he disclosed in no mistakable terms to Mr. Oswald's secretary, his views on this question. He observed that there was something in the minds of the English and French which impelled them to war frequently, but if anything was done as regards peace which the Americans thought hard or unjust, "both the English and French would be continually blowing it up, and inflaming the American minds with it, in order to make them join one side or the other in a future

1 Wharton, op. cit., vol. vi, p. 483.

war. He was of the opinion that Oswald had good reason to think that America would be glad to join France in such a war, and he took pains to undeceive him on this point. He summarized his view in the following words:

2

For my own part, I thought America had been long enough involved in the wars of Europe. She had been a football between contending nations from the beginning, and it was easy to foresee that both France and England would endeavor to involve us in their future wars. I thought it our interest and duty to avoid them as much as possible and to be completely independent, and to have nothing to do but in commerce with either of them; that my thoughts had been from the beginning to arrange all our European connections to this end, and that they would be continued to be so employed.3

A few days later he told Oswald that he was afraid the United States would be made the tools of the European powers and of their manoeuvering to get the United States into their real or imaginary balances of power. It should be the rule of the United States not to interfere, and of the powers of Europe not to desire or even permit such interference. Later, President Adams, in referring to certain French indignities, stated that France and the world should be decisively convinced that the United States would not be made "the miserable instruments of foreign influence." 5 He recognized that the American form of government exposed the United States openly to the "insidious intrigues and pestilent influence" of foreign nations,

1 Wharton, op. cit., vol. v, p. 879.

$3 John Adams' Works, p. 307.

'Wharton, Diplomatic Correspondence of the American Revolution, vol. v, p. 880.

4

* Moore, J. B., Digest of International Law, vol. vi, p. 11.

which could only be averted by an "inflexible neutrality."

The views of President Washington are best set forth in his Farewell Address of September 17, 1796. He warned the American people against favoritism towards or hatred of any particular nation. Favoritism could easily lead to an imaginary common interest where no interest really existed; and would easily lead to concessions to the favored nations. which would be regarded as grounds for resentment by the others. He further pointed out how the favoritism of a small nation for a larger would result in the ultimate submission of the former to the rule of the latter, and how foreign influence was one of the most baneful foes of republican government. He stated his position in the following memorable words:

The great rule of conduct for us in regard to foreign relations is, in extending our commercial relations to have with them as little political connection as possible. So far as we have already formed engagements let them be fulfilled with perfect good faith. Here let us stop. Europe has a set of primary interests which to us have none or a very remote relation. Hence she must be engaged in frequent controversies, the causes of which are essentially foreign to our concerns. Hence, therefore, it must be unwise to us to implicate ourselves by artificial ties in the ordinary vicissitudes of her politics or the ordinary combinations and collisions of her friendships or enmities.

Our detached and distant situation invites and enables us to pursue a different course. If we remain one people, under an efficient government, the period is not far off when we may defy material injury from external annoyance; when we may take such an attitude as will cause the neutrality we may at any time resolve upon to be scrupulously respected; when

19 John Adams' Works, p. 277.