would not adopt it voluntarily. Since Spain could not subdue them, the United States had adopted the policy of leaving them to themselves, which policy was commended to the rest of the world. The conditions of peace with Europe were, then: (a) non-intervention in European affairs as regards the United States, and (b) non-intervention in American affairs, as regards the powers of Europe.

European responsibility was characterized by President Monroe to be of two kinds, non-intervention in the affairs of the independent states of America, and non-colonization in any American territory. The latter was stated in the seventh paragraph of President Monroe's message of December 2, 1823, and has come to be known as the principle of non-colonization. This declaration was occasioned largely by Russian claims to the Northwest, the circumstances of which have already been related. At a Cabinet meeting on June 28, 1823, Adams had stated that the Russian claim could not be admitted as no settlement had been made upon the territory in dispute, except in California, and hence no territorial right could accrue.2 The Emperor's ukase of 1821 claimed territorial rights to the fifty-first degree of north latitude, and prohibited foreign navigation and fishing within one hundred Italian miles of the Coast. On July 17, Adams told Baron Tuyll that the United States "should contest the right of Russia to any territorial establishment on this continent, and that we should assume distinctly the principle that the American continents are no longer subjects for any new European colonial establishments. Adams addressed a communication to Rush, July 22, 1823, relating to the right of colonization. He

1 Richardson, op. cit., vol. iii, p. 219.

2 Adams, C. F., Memoirs of John Quincy Adams, vol. vi, p. 157.

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denied the claim that the occupation of an island gave a right to the adjoining mainland. He could not conceive of any European nation planting a colony on the northwest coast of America. The ultimate settlement of the country, including an absolute territorial right, was both natural and expected, and had been a subject of Congressional deliberations. He considered, then the following principles as the settled principles of colonization: the American continents were no longer subjects of colonization; American independent nations possessed rights incident to that condition; the Pacific Ocean was open to the navigation of all nations alike; the rights of interior navigation of their rivers would belong to each of the American nations within its own territories; the United States would not admit the colonial principle of exclusion as applying to any part of the Northwest coast of America, or regard any part of it as belonging to any European nation.

An incident of much significance was the Panama Congress. The governments of Colombia, Mexico and Central America had invited the United States to participate. The motive of American participation was "neither to contract alliances nor to engage in any undertaking or project imparting hostility to any other nation." President John Quincy Adams declared in a special message to Congress, December 26, 1825, that "an agreement between all the parties represented at the meeting that each will guard by its own means against the establishment of any future European colony within its border may be found advisable." 5 In his message of March 15, 1826, he stated that

1Am. State Papers, Foreign Relations, vol. v, p. 446.

'Ibid., vol. v, p. 447.

'Ibid., vol. v, p. 447.

'Richardson, Messages and Papers of the Presidents, vol. ii, p. 417.

Ibid., vol. ii, p. 417.

most of the new republics had assented to the principle of non-colonization, and that they were considering means of asserting that principle as well as of repelling interference in the affairs of American states.1 The American delegates to the Congress did not arrive in time to attend the sessions, and the adjourned session did not meet as planned. Doubts as to the aims of Bolivar threw a shadow over the Congress. On April 18, 1826, an important resolution passed the House of Representatives by a lean majority. It was resolved that the United States should be represented at the Panama Congress only in a diplomatic character. No alliance, offensive or defensive, nor any negotiations for such an engagement, should be undertaken with all or with any of the South American republics. No joint declaration should be made regarding interference of European powers with their independence or form of government, nor any compact formed for preventing colonization upon the continent of America. The United States should be left free to act when the crises might arise, as her friendship and interests might at the time demand. The Panama Congress failed in its immediate purpose, but it clarified the issue raised by Monroe and Adams. The republics to the South recognized the principle of non-intervention and its corollary, the principle of non-colonization. The United States, however, always true to its policy of non-intervention, held itself free from any alliance with the American states, in order to maintain a consistent policy, and in order to be better able to deal with any crisis unhampered by prior engagements.

In discussing the factors leading to and resulting in the extension of the policy of non-intervention, one is impressed by the fact that the extension of the policy was made as the

1 Richardson, op. cit., vol. ii, p. 334.

demands arose. The adoption of the policy in the earlier days of the Republic was largely the result of a given set of circumstances requiring definite action upon a policy as regards Europe. The early conception of non-intervention concerned relations exclusively American-European. The first form which the extension of the policy took was resistance to the territorial and commercial aims of the European powers. The independence of the Spanish provinces in South America raised quite another question. Before any further extension of the policy of non-intervention could take place, the United States must settle its own policy as regards the independence of the South American republics. They were ultimately recognized because they had successfully established and maintained their independence, the de facto government being recognized as the legitimate government. Neutrality was impartially observed, and there was no premature recognition. The United States declined to inquire either into the form of government or into the means by which the government had been established. This was later elaborated by Monroe by declaring de facto governments as legitimate as far as the United States was concerned, in contrast with the European intervention in Spain to put down revolution and to determine the form of government.

The United States, while avoiding intervention, endeavored to avoid occasion for it and to restore tranquillity to the western world by attempting in a conciliatory manner to induce Spain to make peace with Mexico and with the Central and South American governments. On January 20, 1826, Alexander H. Everett, United States. Minister to Spain, addressed a lengthy communication to the Duke de Infantado, Spanish Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, in which he reviewed the history of the Colonial struggle, the attitude of the United States, the

depleted condition of Spain, and pleaded for peace between the mother country and the colonies. From the first, it will be remembered that the United States maintained a strict neutrality as between Spain and the colonies. This policy was commended to Russia. Both Great Britain and the United States had taken the ground that they would not interfere with any reconciliation between Spain and her colonies, but both had indicated that they would oppose any interference by a third power to induce the colonies to submit. The efforts of Minister Everett to persuade Spain to recognize their independence were based solely on the fact that their independence was actually achieved, that Spain could not possibly subdue them, and that the continuation of the struggle must be altogether fruitless. As he pointed out, the United States did not depart from its neutral position, even so far as to express an opinion upon the merits of the quarrel; still less did it entertain a thought of active intervention in favor of either party. But the advantages of peace and commerce were urged upon Spain as adequate compensation for the recognition of the new states.

On different occasions the United States has opposed foreign intervention in Mexico. Henry Clay, as Secretary of State, in instructions to Joel R. Poinsett, Minister to Mexico, on March 25, 1825, declared that the purpose of Poinsett's mission was "to lay, for the first time, the foundations of an intercourse of amity, commerce, navigation, and neighborhood," helpful to both States. Poinsett was furnished with full powers to negotiate concerning commerce and navigation. But he was also instructed to

4

'Am. State papers, For. Rel., vol. vi, pp. 1006–1044.

2 Ibid., vol. vi, pp. 1006, 1008, 1009, 1010.

Ibid., vol. vi, p. 578.

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