Opinion of the Court. 356 U.S. provides such close budgetary, auditing and fiscal controls that little more than a corporate name remains to distinguish it from the ordinary government agency." In brief, Commodity is simply an administrative device established by Congress for the purpose of carrying out federal farm programs with public funds. In our judgment Commodity is a part of "the Government of the United States" for purposes of the False Claims Act. That Act was originally passed in 1863 after disclosure of widespread fraud against the Government during the War Between the States. It seems quite clear that the objective of Congress was broadly to protect the funds and property of the Government from fraudulent claims, regardless of the particular form, or function, of the government instrumentality upon which such claims were made. Cf. United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U. S. 537, 544-545. By any ordinary standard the language of the Act is certainly comprehensive enough to achieve this purpose. In reaching our conclusion, we are aware that the civil portion of the Act incorporates, as a test of liability, the provisions of the criminal section as they were set out in § 5438 of the Revised Statutes of 1878,8 and that according to 559 Stat. 597, as amended, 31 U. S. C. § 841 et seq. Cf. Cherry Cotton Mills, Inc., v. United States, 327 U. S. 536; Inland Waterways Corp. v. Young, 309 U. S. 517; Emergency Fleet Corp. v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 275 U. S. 415. 7 See Cong. Globe, 37th Cong., 3d Sess. 952-958. Cf. H. R. Rep. No. 2, Part 2, 37th Cong., 2d Sess. Originally Congress provided both criminal and civil sanctions in the same statute. 12 Stat. 696. By the Revised Statutes of 1878 the civil sanctions were codified as § 3490, while the criminal provisions were separately enacted as § 5438. Section 3490 permitted the Government to recover forfeitures and damages for those acts prohibited by § 5438, e. g., submission of false or fraudulent claims "against the Government of the United States, or any department or officer thereof." See note 1, supra. The civil provisions as enacted in § 3490 have never been altered. 590 Opinion of the Court. familiar principles the scope of these provisions should be confined to their literal terms. Yet even penal provisions must be "given their fair meaning in accord with the evident intent of Congress." United States v. Raynor, 302 U. S. 540, 552. In 1918 Congress amended the criminal provisions of the False Claims Act so that they explicitly prohibited false claims against "any corporation in which the United States of America is a stockholder." Petitioners contend that this amendment shows that the criminal provisions had not previously covered government corporations. From this they argue-relying on the rule that incorporation of a statute by reference generally does not include subsequent amendments to that statute that the civil provisions, which have never been amended, also do not cover false claims against such corporations. Despite its surface plausibility this argument cannot withstand analysis. At most, the 1918 amendment is merely an expression of how the 1918 Congress interpreted a statute passed by another Congress more than a half century before. Under these circumstances such interpretation has very little, if any, significance. Cf. Higgins v. Smith, 308 U. S. 473, 479-480; United States v. Stafoff, 260 U. S. 477, 480. Aside from this, the language of the 1918 amendment as well as its background indicates that Congress was primarily concerned with protecting certain government corporations, like the United States Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corporation, chartered under local laws and organized so that private parties could share stock ownership with the United States. See 39 Stat. 731; United States v. Bowman, 260 U. S. 94, 101-102. Any expression of congressional opinion regarding that type of corporation is of little value in deciding the applicability of the False Claims Act to a 940 Stat. 1015. Opinion of the Court. 356 U.S. wholly owned and closely controlled government instrumentality like Commodity. None of the cases relied on by petitioner call for a result different from the one we reach. Pierce v. United States, 314 U. S. 306, where the Court refused to apply a statute making criminal the impersonation of an officer of the United States to a person posing as an officer of the Tennessee Valley Authority, concerned another statute enacted for other purposes.10 Moreover, it rested in substantial part on the fact that the TVA Act specifically listed a number of federal criminal statutes as applicable to TVA operations but omitted the false impersonation statute. The cases presenting questions of governmental immunity, e. g., Keifer & Keifer v. Reconstruction Finance Corp., 306 U. S. 381, or intragovernmental organization, e. g., United States ex rel. Skinner & Eddy Corp. v. McCarl, 275 U. S. 1, involved nothing more than a search for congressional purpose with respect to the problems then before the Court. Affirmed. 10 Also see United States v. Strang, 254 U. S. 491. Compare United States v. Walter, 263 U. S. 15, 18, and Emergency Fleet Corp. v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 275 U. S. 415. Opinion of the Court. UNITED STATES v. McNINCH, DOING BUSINESS AS HOME COMFORT CO., ET AL. CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT. No. 146. Argued April 1, 1958.-Decided May 26, 1958. 1. A claim against the Commodity Credit Corporation is a claim "against the Government of the United States, or any department or officer thereof" within the meaning of the civil provisions of the False Claims Act. Rainwater v. United States, ante, p. 590. Pp. 595-596. 2. The Federal Housing Administration, an unincorporated agency in the Executive Department created by the President pursuant to congressional authority to administer a number of federal housing programs and operating with funds originally appropriated by Congress, is a part of the "Government of the United States" within the meaning of the civil provisions of the False Claims Act. Pp. 596-598. 3. A lending institution's application to the Federal Housing Administration for credit insurance is not a "claim" as that term is used in the False Claims Act. Pp. 598–600. 242 F.2d 359, affirmed in part, reversed in part, and cause remanded. Assistant Attorney General Doub argued the cause for the United States. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Rankin and Samuel D. Slade. A. C. Epps and Edwin P. Gardner argued the cause for respondents. On the briefs were Mr. Epps and Charles W. Laughlin for Cato Bros., Inc., et al., and Mr. Gardner and Edward W. Mullins for McNinch et al., respondents. MR. JUSTICE BLACK delivered the opinion of the Court. This case was argued with Rainwater v. United States, ante, p. 590, also decided today. It involves three separate actions by the Government to recover damages and Opinion of the Court. 356 U.S. forfeitures under the False Claims Act.1 These actionswhich will be referred to, after the principal defendant in each instance, as Cato, Toepleman and McNinch—were initially brought in different Federal District Courts but on appeal were disposed of by the Court of Appeals in a single opinion. 242 F. 2d 359.2 In Cato and Toepleman the District Court found the defendants had submitted false claims for crop support loans to the Commodity Credit Corporation, and entered judgment in favor of the Government for the forfeitures. provided by the False Claims Act. The Court of Appeals reversed on the ground that a false claim against Commodity was not a claim "against the Government of the United States, or any department or officer thereof" within the meaning of that Act. The sole question before us, so far as these two actions are concerned, is whether the Court of Appeals erred in so deciding. For the reasons set forth in Rainwater we hold that it did. McNinch raises different questions concerning alleged false claims against the Federal Housing Administration. By statute the FHA is authorized to insure qualified banks and other private lending institutions against a substantial portion of any losses sustained by them in 1 R. S. §§ 3490, 5438 (1878), which are set out in note 1, Rainwater v. United States, ante, p. 590. 2 In Cato the suit was filed in the Eastern District of Virginia. The defendants were Cato Brothers, Inc., a Virginia corporation, and Wilfred Cato, William Cato and Magie Stone, all directors and officers of the corporation. Toepleman was brought in the Eastern District of North Carolina. Named as defendants were Frederick Toepleman and Garland Greenway, as individuals and partners. After trial, the District Court exonerated Greenway and he is no longer involved. In McNinch the action was instituted in the Eastern District of South Carolina. The defendants were Howard McNinch, Rosalie McNinch and Garis Zeigler. |