Per Curiam. 356 U.S. MARSHALL v. BRUCKER, SECRETARY OF THE ARMY. ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT. No. 41, Misc. Decided March 10, 1958. Certiorari granted; judgment reversed; and case remanded to District Court for appropriate relief in the light of Harmon v. Brucker, 355 U. S. 579. Reported below: 100 U. S. App. D. C. 256, 243 F. 2d 834. Petitioner pro se. Solicitor General Rankin for respondent. PER CURIAM. The motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and the petition for writ of certiorari are granted. The judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit is reversed and the case is remanded to the District Court for appropriate relief in the light of Harmon v. Brucker and Abramowitz v. Brucker, 355 U. S. 579, decided March 3, 1958. MR. JUSTICE CLARK dissents from this disposition of the case for the reasons stated in his dissenting opinion in these cases. 356 U.S. Per Curiam. HOWARD v. UNITED STATES. ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT. No. 186, Misc. Decided March 10, 1958. On representations of the Solicitor General and examination of the record, certiorari granted, judgment of Court of Appeals vacated, and case remanded to District Court with directions to afford petitioner a hearing on his motion under 28 U. S. C. § 2255. Reported below: 101 U. S. App. D. C. 131, 247 F. 2d 537. Petitioner pro se. Solicitor General Rankin, Warren Olney, III, then Assistant Attorney General, Beatrice Rosenberg and Julia P. Cooper for the United States. PER CURIAM. The motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis is granted. Upon the representations made in the Solicitor General's memorandum, and an examination of the record, the petition for writ of certiorari is granted, the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit is vacated, and the cause is remanded to the District Court with directions to afford petitioner a hearing on his motion under 28 U. S. C. § 2255. 458778 0-58- -6 Per Curiam. 356 U.S. SHELTON v. UNITED STATES. ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT. No. 223, Misc. Decided March 10, 1958. Certiorari granted; on consideration of the record and confession of error by the Solicitor General that the plea of guilty may have been improperly obtained, judgment of the Court of Appeals reversed and case remanded to the District Court for further proceedings. Reported below: 246 F. 2d 571. Petitioner pro se. Solicitor General Rankin for the United States. PER CURIAM. The motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and the petition for writ of certiorari are granted. Upon consideration of the entire record and confession of error by the Solicitor General that the plea of guilty may have been improperly obtained, the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit is reversed and the case is remanded to the District Court for further proceedings. Opinion of the Court. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE v. SULLIVAN ET AL. CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT. No. 119. Argued January 30, 1958. Decided March 17, 1958. Amounts expended to lease premises and hire employees for the conduct of gambling enterprises, illegal under state law, are deductible as ordinary and necessary business expenses within the meaning of § 23 (a) (1) (A) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939. Pp. 27-29. 241 F. 2d 46, 242 F. 2d 558, affirmed. Solicitor General Rankin argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the brief were Assistant Attorney General Rice, Joseph F. Goetten and Meyer Rothwacks. Eugene Bernstein argued the cause for respondents. On the brief were Mr. Bernstein and E. J. Blair for Sullivan et al., and Howard R. Slater for Mesi, respondents. MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS delivered the opinion of the Court. The question is whether amounts expended to lease premises and hire employees for the conduct of alleged illegal gambling enterprises are deductible as ordinary and necessary business expenses within the meaning of § 23 (a)(1)(A) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939.1 1 Section 23 (a) (1) (A) provides: "In computing net income there shall be allowed as deductions: "All the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any trade or business, including a reasonable allowance for salaries or other compensation for personal services actually rendered; . . . and rentals or other payments Opinion of the Court. 2 356 U.S. The taxpayers received income from bookmaking establishments in Chicago, Ill. The Tax Court found that these enterprises were illegal under Illinois law, that the acts performed by the employees constituted violations of that law, and that the payment of rent for the use of the premises for the purpose of bookmaking was also illegal under that law. The Tax Court accordingly held that the amount paid for wages and for rent could not be deducted from gross income since those deductions were for expenditures made in connection with illegal acts. 15 CCH TC Mem. Dec. 23, 25 T. C. 513. The Court of Appeals reversed, 241 F. 2d 46, 242 F. 2d 558, on the basis of its prior decision in Commissioner v. Doyle, 231 F. 2d 635. The case is here on a petition for certiorari, 354 U. S. 920, for consideration in connection with the companion cases Hoover Motor Express Co. v. United States, post, p. 38, and Tank Truck Rentals, Inc., v. Commissioner, post, p. 30, decided this day. Deductions are a matter of grace and Congress can, of course, disallow them as it chooses. At times the policy to disallow expenses in connection with certain condemned activities is clear. It was made so by the Regulations in Textile Mills Corp. v. Commissioner, 314 U. S. 326. Any inference of disapproval of these expenses as deductions is absent here. The Regulations, indeed, point the other way, for they make the federal excise tax on wagers deductible as an ordinary and necessary business expense. This seems to us to be recognition of a 3 required to be made as a condition to the continued use or possession, for purposes of the trade or business, of property to which the taxpayer has not taken or is not taking title or in which he has no equity." 53 Stat. 12, as amended, 56 Stat. 819, 26 U. S. C. § 23 (a) (1) (A). 2 Ill. Rev. Stat., 1945, c. 38, § 336. 3 Treas. Reg. 118, § 39.23 (a)-1, Rev. Rul. 54-219, 1954-1 Cum. Bull. 51: "The Federal excise tax on wagers under section 3285 (d) of the |