356 U.S. Opinion of the Court. HOOVER MOTOR EXPRESS CO., INC., v. CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT. No. 95. Argued January 29-30, 1958.-Decided March 17, 1958. Fines paid by a truck owner for inadvertent violations of state maximum weight laws are not deductible as "ordinary and necessary" business expenses under § 23 (a) (1) (A) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939. Pp. 38-40. (a) In this case, it does not appear that the truck owner took all reasonable precautions to avoid the fines. Pp. 39-40. (b) Even assuming all due care and no willful intent, allowance of the deduction would severely and directly frustrate state policy. P. 40. 241 F. 2d 459, affirmed. Judson Harwood argued the cause and filed a brief for petitioner. Solicitor General Rankin argued the cause for the United States. With him on the brief were Assistant Attorney General Rice, Joseph F. Goetten and Meyer Rothwacks. 1 MR. JUSTICE CLARK delivered the opinion of the Court. The sole issue here-the deductibility for tax purposes of fines paid by a trucker for inadvertent violations of state maximum weight laws-is identical to one of the 1"SEC. 23. DEDUCTIONS FROM GROSS INCOME. "In computing net income there shall be allowed as deductions: "(a) EXPENSES.— "(1) TRADE OR BUSINESS EXPENSES. "(A) In General. All the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any trade or business . . . ." 53 Stat. 12, as amended, 56 Stat. 819. 38 Opinion of the Court. issues decided today in No. 109, Tank Truck Rentals, Inc., v. Commissioner, ante, p. 30. Most of the overweight fines paid by petitioner during 1951-1953 inclusive, the tax years in question, were incurred in Tennessee and Kentucky, two of the nine States in which petitioner operated. During the relevant period, both Tennessee and Kentucky imposed maximum weight limitations of 42,000 pounds over-all and 18,000 pounds per axle, considerably less than those in the other seven States. Petitioner's fines resulted largely from violations of the axle-weight limits rather than violations of the over-all truck weight limits. The District Court found that such violations usually occurred because of a shifting of the freight load during transit. After paying the taxes imposed, petitioner sued in the District Court for a refund, claiming that no frustration of state policy would result from allowance of the deductions because (1) the violations had not been willful, and (2) all reasonable precautions had been taken to avoid the violations. The District Court held that even if petitioner had acted innocently and had taken all reasonable precautions, allowance of the deductions would frustrate clearly defined state policy. Judgment was entered for the Commissioner, 135 F. Supp. 818, and the Court of Appeals affirmed on the same reasoning. 241 F. 2d 459. We granted certiorari, 354 U. S. 920 (1957), in conjunction with the grant in Tank Truck Rentals, Inc., v. Commissioner, supra, and Commissioner v. Sullivan, ante, p. 27, both decided today. Wholly apart from possible frustration of state policy, it does not appear that payment of the fines in question was "necessary" to the operation of petitioner's business. This, of course, prevents any deduction. Deputy v. 2 Ky. Rev. Stat., 1953, § 189.222; Williams' Tenn. Code, 1934 (1952 Cum. Supp. to 1943 Repl. Vol.), § 1166.33. Opinion of the Court. 356 U.S. du Pont, 308 U. S. 488 (1940). The violations usually resulted from a shifting of the load during transit, but there is nothing in the record to indicate that the shifting could not have been controlled merely by tying down the load or compartmentalizing the trucks. Other violations occurred because petitioner relied on the weight stated in the bill of lading when picking up goods in small communities having no weighing facilities. It would seem that this situation could have been alleviated by carrying a scale in the truck. Even assuming that petitioner acted with all due care and without willful intent, it is clear that allowance of the deduction sought by petitioner would severely and directly frustrate state policy. Tank Truck Rentals, Inc., v. Commissioner, supra. As in Tank Truck, the statutes involved here do not differentiate between innocent and willful violators. Affirmed. FERGUSON v. ST. LOUIS-SAN FRANCISCO ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI. No. 799. Decided March 17, 1958. In this case arising under the Federal Employers' Liability Act, held: The proofs were sufficient to submit to the jury the question whether employer negligence played a part in producing petitioner's injury. Therefore, certiorari is granted, the judgment below is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings. Reported below: 307 S. W. 2d 385. Jo B. Gardner for petitioner. James L. Homire and Frank C. Mann for respondent. PER CURIAM. The petition for writ of certiorari is granted. We hold that the proofs were sufficient to submit to the jury the question whether employer negligence played a part in producing the petitioner's injury. Wilkerson v. McCarthy, 336 U. S. 53; Rogers v. Missouri Pacific R. Co., 352 U. S. 500; Webb v. Illinois Central R. Co., 352 U. S. 512; Shaw v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 353 U. S. 920; Futrelle v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 353 U. S. 920; Deen v. Gulf, C. & S. F. R. Co., 353 U. S. 925; Thomson v. Texas & Pacific R. Co., 353 U. S. 926; Arnold v. Panhandle & S. F. R. Co., 353 U. S. 360; Ringhiser v. Chesapeake & O. R. Co., 354 U. S. 901; McBride v. Toledo Terminal R. Co., 354 U. S. 517; Gibson v. Thompson, 355 U. S. 18; Honeycutt v. Wabash R. Co., 355 U. S. 424. The judgment of the Supreme Court of Missouri is 458778 0-58-7 reversed and the case is remanded for further proceedings in conformity with this opinion. MR. JUSTICE HARLAN concurs in the result for the reasons given in his memorandum in Gibson v. Thompson, 355 U. S. 18. For the reasons set forth in his opinion in Rogers v. Missouri Pacific R. Co., 352 U. S. 500, 524, MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER is of the view that the writ of certiorari is improvidently granted. MR. JUSTICE WHITTAKER dissents. HURLEY v. RAGEN, WARDEN. ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF WILL COUNTY, ILLINOIS. No. 225, Misc. Decided March 17, 1958. Certiorari denied without consideration of questions raised and without prejudice to institution of proceedings in an Illinois state court under the Illinois Post-Conviction Hearing Act of August 4, 1949. Petitioner pro se. Latham Castle, Attorney General of Illinois, for respondent. PER CURIAM. The petition for writ of certiorari is denied without consideration of the questions raised therein and without prejudice to the institution by petitioner of proceedings in any Illinois state court of competent jurisdiction under the Illinois Post-Conviction Hearing Act of August 4, 1949. Ill. Rev. Stat., 1957, c. 38, § 826. |