It is contended that the equal protection of the laws, guaranteed by the 1st section of the 14th Amendment, is denied. The power of classification is conceded, but this will not uphold one that is purely arbi-a public character. It is true that no pentrary. There must be some substantial foundation and basis therefor. It is asserted that this is merely legislation to compel carriers to pay their debts within a given time, by an unreasonable penalty for any

unless there be a recovery of the full amount claimed.

was

the

not

(207 U. S. 93) SAMUEL H. LEATHE, Plff. in Err.,

V.

EDWARD L. THOMAS.

Error to state court-Federal question decision on non-Federal ground. No Federal question respecting due process of law or full faith and credit which will sustain a writ of error from the Federal Supreme Court to the highest court of state court, after reversing a judgment for a state is involved in a suit in which the defendant on the ground that a judgment of a Federal circuit court, set up as res judicata in a special replication to two of four pleas in set-off, is binding, decided on rehearing that, conceding the judgment of the Federal court to be binding as to the two pleas to which the replication of res judicata applies, judgment for defendant can be upheld upon the other two pleas referring to earlier stages of the same transaction; nor does it matter that the Federal Supreme Court may think the state court wrong in believing that there is evidence to support these pleas.

Further, the matter to be adjusted is one peculiarly within the knowledge of the carrier. It receives the goods and has them in its custody until the carriage is completed. It knows what it received and what it delivered. It knows what injury was done during the shipment, and how it was done. The consignee may not know what in fact delivered at the time of shipment, and the shipper may know what was delivered to the consignee at the close of the transportation. The carrier can determine the amount of the loss more accurately and promptly and with less delay and expense than anyone else, and for the adjust ment of loss or damage to shipments within the state forty days cannot be said to be an unreasonably short length of time. It may be stated as a general rule that an act which puts in one class all engaged in business of a special and public character, requires of them the performance of a duty which they can do better and more quickly Argued October 17, 1907. Decided November than others, and imposes a not exorbitant penalty for a failure to perform that duty within a reasonable time, cannot be adN ERROR to the Supreme Court of the judged unconstitutional as a purely arbi-State of Illinois to review a judgment trary classification.

[No. 21.]

11, 1907.

affirming, on rehearing, a judgment of the Appellate Court for the Fourth District of that state, which had in turn affirmed a judgment of the Circuit Court of St. Clair

See same case below, 218 Ill. 246, 75 N. E. 810.

The facts are stated in the opinion. Messrs. John Maynard Harlan, James S. Harlan, and Victor Koerner for plaintiff in error.

Mr. Edward L. Thomas in propria persona for defendant in error.

While in this case the penalty may be large as compared with the value of the shipment, yet it must be remembered that small shipments are the ones which especial-County in favor of defendant in an action ly need the protection of penal statutes like upon foreign judgments. Dismissed. this. If a large amount is in controversy, the claimant can afford to litigate. But he cannot well do so when there is but the trifle of a dollar or two in dispute, and yet justice requires that his claim be adjusted and raid with reasonable promptness. Further, it must be remembered that the purpose of this legislation is not primarily to enforce the collection of debts, but to compel the performance of duties which the carrier assumes when it enters upon the discharge of its public functions. We know there are limits beyond which penalties may not go even in cases where classification is legitimate; but we are not prepared to hold that the amount of penalty imposed is so great, or the length of time within which the adjustment and payment are to be made is so short, that the act imposing the penalty and fixing the time is beyond the power of the

state.

* Mr. Justice Holmes delivered the opinion of the court:

This is an action upon judgments obtained in Missouri by the plaintiff in error against the defendant in error, hereafter called respectively plaintiff and defendant. The defendant, not denying the judgments, pleaded four pleas in set-off. The first was for money had and received, interest, and upon an account stated. The second was upon an alleged contract of January 24, 1893. The third set up an alleged contract of March 25, 1893, to pay the debt of a railroad

The judgment of the Supreme Court of company to the defendant, a suit and judg South Carolina is affirmed.

Mr. Justice Peckham dissents.

ment for the defendant against the railroad company, a bill in equity brought by the plaintiff to enjoin the proceedings in that

sought to establish a right to be reimbursed for his advances to the road. Later, on March 25 of the same year, there was a conveyance of its property by the railway company to the plaintiff and a conveyance by him to another company. The former deed was for $1 and "other valuable considerations to it from him moving," and the defendant alleged that the other considerations embraced a promise of the plaintiff to reimburse him. The referee's report refers to the dealings of January, but seemingly discovers no contract of reimbursement in them. It shows that the plaintiff insisted that all that he did was under the agreement of that month, but says that the evidence does not prove it *conclusively. It says that matters culminated in the agreement of March 25, and finds that as part of the consideration of that deed the plaintiff promised to pay.

suit, upon which one of the issues was the, and subsequent transactions, the defendant liability under the contract, and that after a hearing the bill was dismissed. The fourth plea was on the contract of March 25, without more. There was a general replication denying the pleas, and also a special replication to the third and fourth, to the effect that a suit upon the alleged contract was brought against the plaintiff for the use of the defendant and removed to the United States circuit court and there determined in favor of the present plaintiff, the proceedings set up in the third plea being held not conclusive. The suit referred to is Belleville & St. L. R. Co. v. Leathe, 28 C. C. A. 279, 53 U. S. App. 718, 84 Fed. 103. The case was sent to a referee to report his conclusions of law and fact. The referee reported in favor of the defendant and also reported the evidence. The trial court ordered judgment on the referee's report. This judgment was affirmed by an intermediate court and then was taken by writ of error to the supreme court of the state. That court held that the judgment of the United States circuit court made the matter of the third and fourth pleas in set-off res judicata, and reversed the judgment of the court below. But, upon a rehearing, the court, while adhering to its judgment upon the third and fourth pleas, stated that it had overlooked the first and second, that the judgment could be sustained upon them, that there was evidence to support them both, or at least the first, and that the referee's finding might be supported under the first. On these grounds the judgment was affirmed. 218 Ill. 246,

75 N. E. 810.

The case now is here on a writ of error, the errors alleged being that full faith and credit was not given to the judgment of the United States court, and that the present judgment was rendered without due process of law. It is true that the judgment of the United States court was held binding against the pleas to which it applies, but it is said that it is emptied of all real effect if a judgment can be entered upon the first and second pleas, referring to earlier stages of the same transaction, because it is said that there was no evidence to support those pleas and no finding upon them, so that to support the judgment by their presence on the record is a mere pretense, and either is a denial of due credit to the former judgment or deprives the plaintiff of his property without due process of law.

In order to dispose of the case it is not necessary to state the dealings in detail; the following outline is enough: The defendant wanted money from the plaintiff to start a railway company. An agreement with regard to it was made on January 24, 1893, out of which, with the accompanying

The judgment purported to be based upon the referee's report, and it may be that, if it were our concern to deal with it, we should find it hard to discover sufficient warrant for a judgment on the first or second pleas. The general line of thought which the report follows seems to lead to the third and fourth. The conclusion is that the defendant is entitled to recover the amount of the judgment mentioned in the third plea, and this follows immediately after the finding of the plaintiff's promise. The plaintiff excepted to the referee's failure to find that everything was done under the January contract. And further reasons might be given for thinking that the court below was wrong. Even if the words of the judg ment, "renders judgment on said referee's report," should be held to include the evidence as well as the referee's findings, and if it should be presumed that one of the courts below the supreme court of the state had reconsidered the evidence before enter ing or affirming the judgment, still, although there was evidence enough of the defendant's advances to the railway company, we might assume, for purposes of argument, that there was nothing sufficient to make out a promise on the plaintiff's part before March. But on the most favorable statement that we can make on the side of the plaintiff in error we can see no ground for coming to this court.

It is admitted that the general and wellsettled rule is that in a case coming from a state court this court can consider only Federal questions, and that it cannot entertain the case unless the decision was against the plaintiff in error upon those questions. Murdock v. Memphis, 20 Wall. 590, 22 L. ed. 429; Sauer v. New York, 206 U. S. 536, 546, 51 L. ed. 1176, 1181, 27 Sup. Ct. Rep.

whatever ground he could. He had his hearing, even if it should be thought that he might have insisted on a ruling that there was no evidence to support those pleas. However it is put, the claim of a right to resort to this court after the only Federal question has been decided in the plaintiff's favor must fail.

686. It is admitted further, that a decision | tice that the defendant meant to prevail on upon those questions must have been necessary to the decision of the case, so that, if the judgment complained of is supported also upon other and independent grounds, the judgment must be affirmed or the writ * of error dismissed, as the case may be. *Murdock v. Memphis, supra. But Murdock v. Memphis does not stop there. It further establishes that when the record discloses such other and completely adequate grounds this court commonly does not inquire whether the decision upon them was or was not correct, or reach a Federal question by determining that they ought not to have been held to warrant the result. 20 Wall. 590,

635, 22 L. ed. 429, 444; Eustis v. Bolles, 150 U. S. 361, 369, 37 L. ed. 1111, 1113, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 131; Castillo v. McConnico, 168 U. S. 674, 679, 42 L. ed. 622, 624, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 229.

Of course, there might be cases where, although the decision put forward other reasons, it would be apparent that a Federal question was involved, whether mentioned or not. It may be imagined, for the sake of argument, that it might appear that a state court, even if ostensibly deciding the Federal question in favor of the plaintiff in error, really must have been against him up on it, and was seeking to evade the jurisdiction of this court. If the ground of decision did not appear and that which did not involve a Federal question was so palpably unfounded that it could not be presumed to have been entertained, it may be that this court would take jurisdiction. Johnson v. Risk, 137 U. S. 300, 307, 34 L. ed. 683, But there is 686, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 111. nothing of that sort in this case. At first, having in mind only the third and fourth pleas, to which alone the judgment of the United States court was a bar, the supreme court decided in favor of the plaintiff. It affirmed the judgment below only upon a rehearing, and after its attention had been called to the first and second pleas. It did not recede from or qualify its former decision so far as that went, but simply pointed out that there were other pleas to which the replication of res judicata did not apply, and on which the judgment might be upheld. Suppose that it was mistaken as to the evidence, the mistake was upon a matter admitting of hesitation, for which it would seem from the opinion that there were special reasons in the state of the record and the admission of counsel. The question is one with which, by the general rule, we have nothing to do, and we see no reason why the general rule should not be applied.

The first and second pleas were on the record and at issue. The plaintiff had no

Writ of error dismissed.

Mr. Justice Harlan and Mr. Justice Day dissent.

(207 U. S. 89)

JAMES H. CHAPMAN, as Trustee in
Bankruptcy of the Estate of Alfred Mo-
Coy, Appt.,

V.

ABNER T. BOWEN.

Appeal - from circuit court of appeals -in bankruptcy case — findings of fact.

1. Failure of the circuit court of appeals to make and file findings of facts and conclusions of law, as required by general order in bankruptcy 36, clause 3, when an appeal to the Federal Supreme Court is desired, cannot be supplied by reference to the opinion of the circuit court of appeals. Appeal-from circuit court of appeals

Federal

ques

case - bankruptcy tion. 2. A decision of a circuit court of appeals that a creditor is entitled to have his claim allowed against the bankrupt estate of an individual partner as well as against the estate of the bankrupt partnership, which proceeds upon a well-settled principle of general law, broad enough to sustain it without reference to the provisions of the bankruptcy act of July 1, 1898 (30 Stat. at L. 544, chap. 541, U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 3418), is not reviewable in the Federal Supreme Court under § 25b of that act, as involving a question which would sustain a writ of error to a state

court.

Appeal-from circuit court of appeals bankruptcy case- - Federal

tion.

ques

3. The bare denial by a trustee in bankruptcy of a claim of a creditor asserted under the bankruptcy act of July 1, 1898 (30 Stat. at L. 544, chap. 541, U. Š. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 3418), is not the assertion by the trustee of a right under such statute, so as to give him the right to appeal to the Federal Supreme Court from a decision of a circuit court of appeals in favor of the creditor, under § 25b of that act, which gives such appeal when the question involved is one which would sustain a writ of error to a state court.

[No. 168.]

Submitted October 14, 1907. Decided No- | bankruptcy 36; (2) that the case was not appealable to this court.

PPEAL from the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit to review a judgment which, re-entitled by the act to take an appeal to the versing a judgment of the District Court for the District of Indiana, remanded the cause with instructions to allow the claim of a creditor against the bankrupt estate of an individual partner as well as against the estate of the bankrupt partnership. On motion to dismiss or affirm, dismissed.

As to paragraph 2, there was no such certificate here; and as to paragraph 1, we are not able to perceive that a writ of error from the highest court of a state to this court could be maintained. No validity of a treaty or statute of, or an authority ex*Mr. Chief Justice Fuller delivered the ercised under, the United States, was drawn opinion of the court:

06.

16.