tors. What was then done appears in an sons who were not parties or privies to affidavit of a witness, which was agreed by them. If they are binding upon such percounsel in the hearing before the New York sons, the state of New York may not levy surrogate to show the facts. The affidavit a tax upon property which has been transis in part as follows: "Said executors ac- ferred free from the burden, and impose counted as such in the orphans' court of a personal liability on the executors, who said Morris county, New Jersey, which court | have been declared forever exempt from all had jurisdiction under the laws of New demands against the estate. The enforceJersey to entertain such accounting and to ment of the claim for such a tax against the direct final distribution of the estate of property, against the distributees of the said testator thereon, and such proceedings property, and against those who have diswere thereupon had that on June 20, 1901, tributed it, under the direction of the court, a decree was made in said orphans' court and with its assurance that no claims by the judge presiding therein, finally set- against them shall longer exist, is plainly intling and allowing the accounts of said ex- consistent with the judicial proceedings of ecutors, and directing the distribution of which the property has been administered. the balance of the estate of said Albert Is, then, the nature of the proceedings such Tilt remaining in the hands of said executors that they are binding not only upon those according to the terms of said will. There- who were parties or privies to them, but upon and prior to August, 1901, such dis- upon all others as well? tribution was made by said executors pursuant to the terms of said will, in conformity with the direction of said decree, and thereafter there remained in the hands of said executors no money or personal property whatsoever of the estate of said Albert Tilt."

Thus, executors appointed by a court having, upon the face of the record, authority to make the appointment, had accounted for the property which had come into their hands to the court having jurisdiction, under the laws of the state, to pass on the accounts, and, without knowledge of any claim by the state of New York, had, by the direction of the court, acting within its jurisdiction, paid out the whole estate to those who were entitled to it by the will. All that was done by the executors, and all that was received by the beneficiaries in the disposition of the estate, was done and received by orders of court, duly entered in the course of judicial proceedings. For the purpose of enabling the executors to distribute the estate with safety to themselves, in accordance with a common practice in the settlement of the estate of deceased persons, and under authority conferred by the laws of the state, the court, prior to the distribution, had decreed that all those who had neglected to bring in their claims should be "forever barred from their action therefor against the executors of the deceased." Upon these facts, does the assessment of this *transfer tax by the state of New York, by whose laws the tax thus assessed is made a lien on the property transferred and a personal obligation of the transferee and the executors (Laws of 1896, chap. 908, § 222), give the full faith and credit to which these judicial proceedings are entitled? The answer to this question depends upon the nature of the proceedings and their effect upon the rights of those per

When the owners of property die, that property, under the conditions and restrictions of the law applicable, is transmitted to their successors named by their wills or by the laws regulating inheritance in cases of intestacy. For a suitable time it is essential that the property should remain under the control of the state, until all just charges against it can be discovered and paid, and those entitled to it as new owners can be ascertained. It is in the public interest that the property should come under the control of the new owners, after such delays only as will afford opportunity for investigation and hearing to guard against mistake, injustice, or fraud. It is the duty of the sovereign to provide a tribunal, under whose direction the just demands against the estate may be determined and paid, the succession decreed, and the estate devolved to those who are found to be entitled to it. Sometimes this duty is*performed by conferring jurisdiction upon a single court and sometimes by dividing the jurisdiction among two or three courts. The courts may be termed ecclesiastical, probate, orphans', surrogate, or equity courts. The jurisdiction may be exercised exclusively in one, or divided among two or more, as the sovereign shall determine. But somewhere the power must exist to decide finally, as against the world, all questions which arise in the settlement of the succession. Mistakes may occur and sometimes do occur, but it is better that they should be endured than that, in a vain search for infallibility, questions shall remain open indefinitely. As was said by Mr. Justice Bradley, speaking on this subject in Broderick's Will (Kieley v. McGlynn) 21 Wall. 503, p. 519, 22 L. ed. 599, p. 605: "The world must move on and those who claim an interest in persons and things must be charged with knowledge of their status and condi

tion and of the vicissitudes to which they | faith and credit aust be given to these judiare subject. This is the foundation of all judicial proceedings in rem." It is therefore within the power of the sovereign to give to its courts the authority, while settling the succession of estates in their possession, through their officers, the executors or administrators, to determine finally, as against the world, all questions which arise therein. Grignon v. Astor, 2 How. 319, 11 L. ed. 283, per Baldwin, J., p. 338; Beauregard v. New Orleans, 18 How. 497, 15 L. ed. 469; Foulke v. Zimmerman, 14 Wall. 113, 20 L. ed. 785; Board of Public Works v. Columbia College, 17 Wall. 521, 21 L. ed. 687; Broderick's Will (Kieley v. McGlynn) 21 Wall. 503, 22 L. ed. 599; Simmons v. Saul, 138 U. S. 439, 34 L. ed. 1054, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 369; Byers v. Mc-| Auley, 149 U. S. 608, 37 L. ed. 867, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 906; Goodrich v. Ferris, 145 Fed. 844; Loring v. Steineman, 1 Met. 204; Kellogg v. Johnson, 38 Conn. 269; State v. Blake, 69 Conn. 64, 36 Atl. 1019; Exton v. Zule, 14 N. J. Eq. 501; Search v. Search, 27 N. J. Eq. 137; Harlow v. Harlow, 65 Me. 448; Ladd v. Weiskopf, 62 Minn. 29, 69 L.R.A. 785, 64 N. W. 99.

In respect to the settlement of the successions to property on death the states of the Union are sovereign and may give to their judicial proceedings such conclusive effect, subject to the requirements of due process of law and to any other constitutional limitation which may be applicable. *But though a state may attach to the judicial proceedings of the courts through which the devolution of the estates of deceased persons is accomplished, the conclusive effect which has been described, it may not choose to do so, or may choose to do so only in respect of part of the adjudications made in the course of the settlement of the succession. It may, for instance, choose to regard the probate of a will or the grant of letters of administration as conclusive on all, and, on the other hand, to regard an order of distribution as open to attack in a collateral proceeding by those who were not parties to it. The extent to which such proceedings shall be held conclusive is a matter to be determined by each state according to its own views of public policy. The variation in practice in the different states is considerable and no good purpose would be served by considering them. It is enough to instance that in the states of Connecticut and Massachusetts, according to the cases just cited, a decree of distribution is binding upon all, while in the state of New York it appears not to be binding on one who was not a party to it. Re Killan, 172 N. Y. 547, 63 L.R.A. 95, 65 N. E. 561.

When, therefore, we come to consider what

4

cial proceedings of New Jersey, we must first ascertain what effect that state attaches to them. The statute enacted to carry into effect the constitutional provision provided that they should have, in any court within the United States, such faith and credit "as they have by law or usage in the courts of the state from which they are taken." Act May 26, 1790 [1 Stat. at L. 122, chap. 11], now 905, Rev. Stat. (U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 677). They can have no greater or less or other effect in other courts than in those of their own state. Cheever v. Wilson, 9 Wall. 108, 19 L. ed. 604; Board of Public Works v. Columbia College, 17 Wall. 521, 21 L. ed. 687; Robertson v. Pickrell, 109 U. S. 608, 27 L. ed. 1049, 3 Sup. Ct. Rep. 407; Hancock Nat. Bank v. Farnum, 176 U. S. 640, 44 L. ed. 619, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 506. In ascertaining, on a writ of error to a state court, what credit is given to these judicial proceedings by the laws and usages of the state of New Jersey, we are limited to the evidence on that subject before the court whose judgment we are reviewing. Hanley v. Donoghue, 116 U. S. 1, 29 L. ed. 535, 60 Sup. Ct. Rep. 242;*Chicago & A. R. Co. v. Wiggins Ferry Co. 119 U. S. 622, 30 L. ed. 522, 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 398. The only evidence upon this point was in an affidavit of an attorney and counselor at law of that state. The evidence is meagre and not entirely satisfactory and conclusive. It was, however, uncontradicted. It tended to show that the surrogate had jurisdiction to probate the will and issue letters testamentary, and that the probate and issue of letters could not be impeached in a collateral proceeding; that the surrogate had "under the laws of New Jersey full and competent jurisdiction" to make the order limiting the time for creditors of the estate to bring in their demands, and the subsequent order that all who had neglected to do so "should be forever barred from their action therefor against the executors of said deceased;" that the acts of the surrogate cannot be impeached collaterally, and that the orphans' court had jurisdiction under the laws of New Jersey "to direct final distribution of the estate of said testator," and it cited four cases from the New Jersey reports (Re Coursen, 4 N. J. Eq. 408; Quidort v. Pergeaux, 18 N. J. Eq. 472; Ryno v. Ryno, 27 N. J. Eq. 522; and Re Straub, 49 N. J. Eq. 264, 24 Atl. 569). In relying upon evidence of this kind we are quite aware that we may not ascertain with the precision which might be desired the credit which the state of New Jersey attaches to these judicial proceedings. But it is all that we can have. We think that we may safely infer from it that the order of the surrogate 'barring all creditors who had failed to bring

praiser's report it is said that the deceased had left a will "which was duly admitted tog probate in the surrogate's court of the county of Morris, state of New Jersey, and that letters testamentary were issued by said sur

disposition of the residue of the estate were then stated. The surrogate, in assessing the taxes, assessed them specifically on the beneficiaries, giving their respective names and the values of the property they respectively took under the will. Two life estates and several remainders, created by the will, were valued appropriately and the taxes assessed accordingly. All this is utterly inconsistent with an attack upon the jurisdiction, and we need not consider whether it could have been made with success.

in the demand from any further claim against the executors was binding upon all. It was an order which he had "full and competent authority to make," and it was one of the acts which could not be impeached collaterally. We think, also, that the juris-rogate court." The specific legacies and the diction to direct a final distribution means a distribution which shall be final, so far, at least, as any person having a demand against the estate is concerned. If we have discerned correctly the effect which New Jersey gives to these judicial proceedings, it is obvious that the assessment of this tax denies them full faith and credit in two respects: First, in seeking a part of an estate which has been finally distributed to those who were entitled to it under the will; and, second, in fixing a personal responsibility for the tax upon the executors who had been conclusively exonerated from such a liability. Up to this point it has been assumed that the New Jersey court had jurisdiction to probate the will and administer the estate, and what has been said upon the effect of the judicial proceedings has been based upon that assumption. When, however, full faith and credit is demanded for a judgment in the courts of other states, an inquiry into the jurisdiction is always permitted, and if it be shown that the proceedings relied upon were without the jurisdiction of the court, they need not be respected. Thompson v. Whitman, 18 Wall. 457, 21 L. ed. 897; Thormann v. Frame, 176 U. S. 350, 44 L. ed. 500, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 446, and cases cited.

The defendant in error, acting upon this well-settled rule, might have attacked the

jurisdiction of the New Jersey courts, and

It is quite obvious that what was done here was the assessment by one state of taxes upon transfers of personal property, taking effect under the laws of another state, entirely regardless of the situs of the property transferred. This suggests grave constitutional questions, which we cannot consider because they were not properly and seasonably raised in the court below.

For the foregoing reasons we think that the judgment below denied to the New Jersey proceedings the full faith and credit to which they were entitled by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and accordingly it is reversed.

Mr. Justice Harlan dissents.

(207 U. S. 20)

SAMUEL B. RAYMOND, County Treasurer of Cook County, Illinois, and ex officio County Collector of Cook County, Illinois; John J. Hanberg, His Successor as Such County Treasurer and County Collector, et al. Appts.,

V.

CHICAGO UNION TRACTION COMPANY.

! Courts-jurisdiction of circuit courtFederal question.

1. The claim that the action of a state

thus brought forward for consideration many important questions which, in the view we take of the case, need not even be stated. But there was no attempt, except in argument here, to deny the right of the New Jersey court to act upon the paper writing purporting to dispose of the estate of Tilt, and, by admitting it to probate, to convert it into an operative will. It is true that, as a basis of assessing transfer taxes, it was proved that Tilt was a resident of New York board of equalization in making an assessat the time of his death, a fact which ment for a tax pursuant to the command would be relevant to the question of jurisdic- of a writ of mandamus was the action of tion. But that fact was not proved or used the state, and, if carried out, would violate for the purpose of invalidating the proceed-U. S. Const., 14th Amend., by taking propings taken in probating the will and admin-erty without due process of law and denying the equal protection of the laws, constitutes istering the estate. On the contrary, the a Federal question within the original juristaxes were based upon the provisions of the diction of a Federal circuit court. instrument, which derived all its authen- Constitutional law due process of law ticity as a will and all its capacity to trans- -equal protection of the laws. mit property from the judicial proceedings 2. The Illinois state board of equalization, in New Jersey. It appears conclusively from when making an assessment pursuant to the the action taken in the New York surrogate supposed command of a writ of mandamus, court that there was no attempt to declare od of reviewing its decision except by jurepresents the state,-there being no meththe New Jersey proceedings void because they dicial proceedings for relief from the assesswere taken without jurisdiction. In the ap-ment, and its action is therefore repug

nant to U. S. Const., 14th Amend., if it | lants from taking any further proceedings denies anyone the due process of law or the towards the collection of certain taxes asequal protection of the laws protected by sessed against the appellee upon an assessthat Amendment against impairment by the ment alleged to be in violation of the 14th