It time or place other than that designated by | for all, for sailors and other aliens. the immigration officers, and punishes him hardly can be supposed that a master would if he lands or permits to land any alien be held justified under this section for alat any other time or place. The indictment lowing a leper to wander through the streets was for wilfully permitting an alien to land of New York on the ground that, as he exat another place. The evidence was that pected the passenger to return and his exthe defendant was master of the Cunard pectations had been fulfilled, he could not Steamship Slavonia, that the alien was an be said to have allowed the leper to land. Austrian sailor who shipped as a cook at The words must be taken in their literal Fiume, Hungary, for the round trip, not to sense. "Landing from such vessel" takes be paid off until he returned, and that on place and is complete the moment the vesthe evening of the day of arrival at New sel is left and the shore reached. But it is York, after he had reported his work fin- necessary to commerce, as all admit, that ished, he went ashore intending to come sailors should go ashore, and no one beback, but changed his mind. He did not lieves that the statute intended altogether formally ask leave to go, but leave habitu- to prohibit their doing so. The contrary alally was given and no additional precau- ways has been understood of the earlier acts, tions were taken when leave was asked. The in judicial decisions and executive practice. judge was requested to direct a verdict for If we reject the ambiguous interpretation the defendant and to instruct the jury that, of "to land," as we have, the necessary reif the sailor intended to return when he left sult can be reached only by saying that the the ship, they must acquit, etc.; but he section does not apply to sailors carried to left it to the jury to say whether the de- an American port with a bona fide intent fendant had used reasonable precautions, ad- to take them out again when the ship goes verting to the fact that there were other on, when not only there was no ground for desertions, and emphasizing the failure to supposing that they were making the voy. enforce a rule requiring the men to ask age a pretext to get here, desert, and get in, leave to go ashore. Exceptions were taken, but there is no evidence that they were dobut the circuit court of appeals sustained ing so in fact. Whether this result is the judgment, as we have said. 152 Fed. 1. reached by the interpretation of the words We assume for purposes of decision that "bringing an alien to the United States," one who makes it possible for an alien to that has been suggested, or on the ground land, by omitting due precautions to pre that the statute cannot have intended its vent it, permits him to land within the precautions to apply to the ordinary and meaning of the penal clause in § 18. But necessary landing of seamen, even if the we are of opinion that the section does not words of the section embrace it, as in Church apply to the ordinary case of a sailor de- of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 serting while on shore leave, and that there- U. S. 457, 36 L. ed. 226, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. fore the judgment must be reversed. We 511, does not matter for this case. are led to this opinion by what seems to us think it superfluous to go through all the the literal meaning of the section and also sections of the act for confirmation of our by the construction that would be almost opinion. It is enough to say that we feel necessary if the literal meaning seemed to no doubt when we read the act as a whole. us less plain. The reasoning is not long. The phrase which qualifies the whole section is, "bringing an alien to the United States." It is only "such" officers of "such" vessels that are punished. "Bringing to the United States," taken literally and nicely,*means, as a similar phrase in § 8 plainly means, transporting with intent to leave in the United States and for the sake of transport, -not transporting with intent to carry back, and merely as incident to employment on the instrument of transport. So again, literally, the later words "to land" mean to go ashore. To avoid certain inconveniences the government and the courts below say that sailors do not land unless they permanently leave the ship. But the single word is used for all cases and must mean the same thing We A reason for the construction adopted below was found in the omission of the word "immigrant" which had followed "alien" in the earlier acts. No doubt that may have been intended to widen the reach of the statute, but we see no reason to suppose that the omission meant to do more than to avoid the suggestion that no one was within the act who did not come here with intent to remain. It is not necessary to regard the change as a mere abbreviation, although the title of the statute is "An Act to Regulate the Immigration of Aliens into the United States." Upon our construction of the statute we need not go further into the particular circumstances. But we may add that even on a different reading the jury was permitted to establish a questionably high standard of conduct, if it be admitted, as it was, that shore leave might be granted. No practicable method of preventing sailors from occasionally yielding to the seductions of an unduly prolonged stay on land was suggested or occurs to our mind. (207 U. S. 113) JAMES E. KENT, Plff. in Err., V. PEOPLE OF PORTO RICO. Error to Porto Rico supreme courtfrivolousness of Federal question. 1. The Federal question presented by the contention that the changes made by the Porto Rico legislature in the boundaries of judicial districts and in the number of judges deprived the courts affected of their validity under the act of April 12, 1900 (31 Stat. at L. 85, chap. 191), § 33, legalizing existing tribunals, must be deemed too frivolous to sustain a writ of error to the supreme court of Porto Rico under § 35 of that act, when the whole of § 33 is considered together with the context of the act, and especially with § 15, giving the local legislature the power of amendment, alteramodification, or repeal. Error to Porto Rico supreme courtFederal question. In the second case the district judge declined to follow the decision in Taylor v. The United States, 152 Fed. 1, which we have been considering, and quashed an indictment which disclosed that the alien alleged to have been permitted unlawfully to land was a seaman. The United States brings a writ of error under the act of March 2, 1907, chap. 2564, 34 Stat. at L. 1246, U. S. Comp. Stat. Supp. 1907, p. 209, on the ground, it must be presumed, that the judgment was based upon the construction, tion of the statute. There are other technical questions apparent on the record, but, if they are open, the government very properly has not pressed them, but has confined itself to the question of law with which we have dealt. There is an allegation in the indictment that the alien was a stowaway under order of deportation, and there is a suggestion that this raises a doubt if he was a bona fide seaman. This is the only additional point raised. But we perceive nothing in the fact that an alien has been refused leave to land from 2. Errors assigned with respect to the action of the trial court with reference to an alleged confession of guilt furnish no basis for the exercise by the Supreme Court of the United States of its appellate jurisdiction over the Porto Rican supreme court, under the act of April 12, 1900, § 35, where the record does not show even the semblance of the assertion or denial of right under the Federal Constitution. * [No. 31.] Decided November 18, 1907. a British ship and has been ordered to be Argued and submitted October 30, 31, 1907. deported, to make it impossible, as matter of law, for the British master subsequently to accept him as a sailor on the high seas, N ERROR to the Supreme Court of Porto even if bound for an American port. If I Rico to review a judgment affirming a the government had wished to try the good faith of this particular transaction, and not simply to get a construction of the act, there was no need to rely on the allegation mentioned alone. Of course it is possible for a master unlawfully to permit an alien to land, even if the alien is a sailor, and it was alleged that the master did so. But we take the government at its word. The defendant argues that the United States cannot be allowed a writ of error in a criminal case like this. We do not perceive the difficulty. No doubt of the power of Congress is intimated in United States v. Sanges, 144 U. S. 310, 36 L. ed. 445, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 609. If the 5th Amendment has any bearing, the act of 1907 is directed to judgments rendered before the moment of jeopardy is reached. Kepner v. United States, 195 U. S. 100, 128, 49 L. ed. 114, 124, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 797. We think it unnecessary to discuss the question at length. Judgment in No. 238 reversed. Judgment in No. 404 affirmed. conviction of embezzlement in the District The facts are stated in the opinion. Mr. Frank Feuille for defendant in er ror. Mr. Justice White delivered the opinion of the court: Whether the supreme court of Porto Rico erred in affirming the conviction and sentence of the plaintiff in error of a crime held to constitute embezzlement is the question presented by this record. Twenty-seven errors are assigned. At the threshold we are concerned with our right to consider them. Our jurisdiction arises from the 35th section of the act of April 12, 1900 (31 Stat. at L. 85, chap. 191). For the purposes of this case it suffices to say that by the section in question our power to review extends, first, to "the same cases as from the supreme courts of the territories of the United "Ed. Note.-For cases in point, see vol. 13, Cent. Dig. Courts, § 1032. 4 *115 teers, August sixteenth, eighteen hundred and ninety-nine, and including also the police courts, established by general orders numbered one hundred and ninety-five, promulgated November twenty-ninth, eighteen hundred and ninety-nine, by Brigadier General Davis, United States Volunteers, and the laws and ordinances of Porto Rico and the municipalities thereof in force, so far as the same are not in conflict herewith, all which courts and tribunals are hereby continued." States;" and, second, to "all cases where the, dred and eighteen, as promulgated by Brig. Constitution of the United States, or a adier General Davis, United States Voluntreaty thereof, or an act of Congress is brought in question and the right claimed thereunder is denied." As we have no authority to review the action of the supreme court of a territory of the United States in a criminal case like this (Amado v. United States, 195 U. S. 175, 49 L. ed. 146, 25 Sup. Ct. Rep. 13), the first of the above clauses may be put out of view. A few only of the errors assigned are relied upon at bar as presenting Federal questions within the scope of the second clause, yet it is urged that all the assigned errors are open. This rests upon the proposition that, in a case coming from Porto Rico, where jurisdiction arises from the presence of a Federal question, the duty devolves of passing upon all the errors relied upon, irrespective of their Federal character. Passing for the moment a consideration of the deduction involved in the proposition, we come to consider the premise, that is, the alleged existence of Federal contentions embraced by the second clause of § 35. We do this because, if it be that there are no such questions, it will become unnecessary further to notice the ar-trict courts, and especially in so far as it gument. In determining whether the assignments of error present Federal questions it is to be borne in mind that the mere fact that some of the assignments relied on assert Federal rights is not determinative, since, even although the assignments formally involve such rights, we are neverthe-going into effect of the Porto Rican act, in less without jurisdiction "where it indubitably appears that the Federal right asserted is frivolous; that is, without color of merit." American R. Co. v. Castro, 204 U. S. 453, 51 L. ed. 564, 27 Sup. Ct. Rep. 466. In March, 1904, a law was enacted by the legislature of Porto Rico, modifying the judicial system as established by the military orders referred to in the act of Congress. For the purposes of the contention now under consideration it suffices to say that by this local law the boundaries of the judicial districts were changed, caused by the creation of additional districts, and it was provided that such courts, instead of being composed of three, should consist of one, judge in each district. The argument is that this local law, in so far as it changed the dis provided for one instead of three judges to preside over each court, was void, because in conflict with the provision of the 33d section of the act of Congress. The contention amounts to this: that there were no district courts in Porto Rico from the time of the 1904, up to the present time. Whilst the proposition presents a formal Federal question, we think it is clear that it is so frivolous as to bring it within the rule announced in American R. Co. v. Castro, supra. The first error assigned alleged to embody We say this because we think that no other a Federal right is that the trial below was conclusion is reasonably possible from a conabsolutely void because the district courtsideration of the whole of § 33 of the act of in which the information was filed and trial had was not a legal tribunal within the intendment of the act of Congress of April 12, 1900, the organic act of Porto Rico. To test the merit of the contention it is neces sary to briefly state the organization of the judicial system of Porto Rico under the American domination and the legislation of Congress relating to the same. By an order promulgated during the control of Porto Rico by the military authorities the judicial system was made to consist, generally speaking, of district courts composed of three judges, and of a supreme court. By § 33 of the act of Congress above referred to, it was, in part, provided: "That the judicial power shall be vested in the courts and tribunals of Porto Rico as already established and now in operation, including municipal courts, under and by virtue of general orders, numbered one hun Congress and the context of that act, particularly § 15 thereof, both of which are reproduced in the margin.t †Sec. 15. That the legislative authority due enactment to amend, alter, modify, or hereinafter provided shall have power by repeal any law or ordinance, civil or criminal, continued in force by this act, as it may from time to time see fit. Sec. 33. That the judicial power shall be vested in the courts and tribunals of Porto Rico as already established and now in operation, including municipal courts, under and by virtue of general orders numbered one hundred and eighteen, as promulgated by Brigadier General Davis, United States Volunteers, August sixteenth, eighteen hundred and ninety-nine, and including also the police courts established by general orders numbered one hundred and ninety-five, promulgated November twenty-ninth, eighteen hundred and ninety. When the document was offered in evidence the record recites that "the defendant objected on the ground that its competency➡ had not been established in accordance with the custom in law, inasmuch as it had not been shown to have been free and voluntary and given without promise of reward or without promise of freedom from prosecution." It is next stated that "the accused re We do not deem it necessary to analyze, here made was not raised below, is a mere the text of the act of Congress to point out afterthought, and is established by the recthe inevitable result just stated, since the ord to be without color of merit. obvious meaning of the act is established by a decision heretofore rendered. Dones v. Urrutia, 202 U. S. 614, 50 L. ed. 1172, 26 Sup. Ct. Rep. 767. In that case Dones, who had been convicted and sentenced to death for murder, unsuccessfully sought release by habeas corpus at the hands of the supreme court of Porto Rico upon the identical ground presented in the assignment of error which we are considering, and upon an additional ground relating to an alleged per-quested that the jury withdraw while the sonal disqualification of the judge who presided at his trial. On appeal to this court the questions raised were fully argued in printed briefs, but were deemed to be of such a frivolous character as not to require an opinion, and were hence disposed per curiam, referring to the provisions of the statute and pertinent authorities. True it is that in the Dones Case, in conformity to the practice in cases of habeas corpus, the formal order was to affirm, but this would not justify us in assuming jurisdiction on this record when the necessary result of the action of the court in the Dones Case is to establish the frivolous nature of the contention here relied upon as the basis of jurisdiction. Equitable Life Assur. Soc. v. Brown, 187 U. S. 308, 311, 314, 47 L. ed. 190, 192, 193, 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 123. question of the competency of the evidence should be decided by the court." The request was acceded to and evidence was introduced on the subject of the voluntary nature of the alleged confession. The court decided to admit the document and overruled "an extensive oral argument, requesting the court to reconsider its decision to admit the document in evidence." After such admission in evidence it is stated merely that "the defendant duly excepted to the admission." Again, after the close of all the evidence, the record recites: "Counsel for the defense asked that that part of the record in which appeared the testimony of the witnesses Dix, Kent, and Dexter concerning the so-called confession which the fiscal had offered in evidence be transcribed by the stenographer and given to the jury so that the jury might have full knowledge of all of the circumstances connected with the so-called confession, which motion was denied by the court, in accordance with the law and especially § 274 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and the accused duly excepted. court, and the witnesses testified." The second of the asserted Federal questions relates to the action of the courts below in respect to a certain letter claimed to constitute a confession of guilt and written by the accused to a private person before this prosecution was commenced. It is insisted that by the actions of the trial court on the subject the plaintiff in error was de- "Whereupon, the defendant moved through prived of rights guaranteed by the 5th his attorneys, that Messrs. Dexter and Kent Amendment to the Constitution of the Unit- be allowed to testify as to the circumstances ed States. Conceding, arguendo, the appli- surrounding the alleged confession before cability of the constitutional provision re-the jury, which motion was granted by the lied upon to the subject and that it was operative in the island of Porto Rico, we Further, after thus, at the request of the think the record demonstrates that the claim counsel for the accused, allowing testimony nine, by Brigadier General Davis, United, shal thereof shall be appointed by the PresStates Volunteers, and the laws and ordi- ident, by and with the advice and consent of nances of Porto Rico and the municipalities the Senate, and the judges of the district thereof in force, so far as the same are not courts shall be appointed by the governor, in conflict herewith, all which courts and by and with the advice and consent of the tribunals are hereby continued. The juris- executive council, and all other officials and diction of said courts and the form of pro- attachés of all the other courts shall be cedure in them, and the various officials and chosen as may be directed by the legislaattachés thereof, respectively, shall be the tive assembly, which shall have authority same as defined and prescribed in and by to legislate from time to time as it may see said laws and ordinances, and said general fit with respect to said courts, and any orders numbered one hundred and eighteen others they may deem it advisable to esand one hundred and ninety-five, until oth-tablish, their organization, the number of erwise provided by law: Provided, however, that the chief justice and associate justices of the supreme court and the mar judges and officials and attachés for each, their jurisdiction, their procedure, and all other matters affecting them. *119 as to the voluntary nature of the confession, dispose of all the alleged Federal questions to go to the jury, the court, in instructing asserted to come within the second clause of them, after calling their attention to the § 35 of the act of April 12, 1900, the conproceedings had at the trial in respect to clusion follows that we are without jurisdicthe circumstances surrounding the making tion, and the writ of error is therefore disof the confession which had been given be missed for want of jurisdiction. fore the jury, submitted the matter to the jury and no exception was noted. That this action of the court was proper, if there was conflict of testimony, is not open to controversy. Wilson v. United States, 162 U. S. 613, 40 L. ed. 1090, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 895, Nor does the record disclose that the errors assigned in the supreme court of Porto Rico involved any contention that rights (207 U. S. 100) PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS EX REL. JOHN MCNICHOLS, Plffs, in Err., V. JAMES PEASE, Sheriff of Cook County, Habeas corpus-to review extradition buttal. person against whom the crime is alleged to have been committed testify in another habeas corpus proceeding that such crime was committed at 2 o'clock in the afternoon of the day named. [No. 19.] Argued and submitted October 16, 17, 1907. under the Constitution of the United States had been denied. The supreme court, in approaching the consideration of an assigned The prima facie case arising on habeas error which complained of the action of the corpus from an extradition warrant, regutrial court in admitting the confession in lar on its face, and the requisition papers evidence, made an elaborate statement of on which it was issued, charging a larceny what it deemed to be the rules applicable from the person, committed at Kenosha, to the admissibility of confessions, and in so Wisconsin, on a specified day, is not rebutdoing referred to the 5th Amendment and ted by affidavits which import nothing more than that the accused was to a multitude of cases in this and other Illinois, at 1 o'clock and during the whole in Chicago, courts concerning the principle to be applied of the afternoon of that day, although the in determining such admissibility. It is a petition for habeas corpus contains an almatter of no concern, however, in ascer-legation that the accused had heard the taining whether rights under the Federal Constitution were asserted and denied, to consider the accuracy of all the statements made by the appellate court in its elaborate review of the subject, since the conclusion which it reached was that, as a general principle of law, confessions, in order to be admissible, "must have been made without compulsion or undue promise or inducement, and be entirely voluntary." Besides, the ultimate and decisive ruling of the supreme court of Porto Rico was that the trial court had not erred in acceding to the request of the accused in allowing the evidence concerning the voluntary nature of the confession to be heard by the jury, and leaving that subject to its determination. True it is that the opinion indicates that the court deemed that the proof as to the voluntary nature of the confession was of such a preponderating character that the court would have been authorized in not submitting it to the jury. But the correctness of that conclusion is not a matter of concern in view of the fact that the question of the voluntary nature of the confession was submitted to the jury at the request of the ac-viding that "a person charged in any state cused. As from no possible view of the action of the courts below concerning the confession can we discover even the semblance of the assertion or denial of a right under the Constitution, it follows that the errors assigned on that subject furnish no basis for the exercise of our jurisdiction. As the matters which we have considered I Messrs. E. C. Lindley, John J. Healy, and F. L. Barnett for defendant in error. *Mr. Justice Harlan delivered the opin ion of the court: This writ of error brings up for review a final judgment of the supreme court of Illinois in a case of habeas corpus arising under that clause of the Constitution pro with treason, felony, or other crime, who shall flee from justice and be found in another state, shall, on demand of the executive authority of the state from which he fled, be delivered up, to be removed to the state having jurisdiction of the crime" [art. 4, § 2]; also, under § 5278 of the Revised Statutes (U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 3597), |