by the highest court of the state, whose decision, therefore, we may re-examine.

by its adjudication on the question of domicil. On the contrary, it is open to the courts of any state, in the trial of a collateral issue, to determine, upon the evidence produced, the true domicil of the deceased.

as an adjudication of the facts upon which it is grounded. On the contrary, those judg That re-examination, however, must be ments, such as sentences of prize courts, to confined to the single question whether, by which the greatest effect has been given in the assessment of the tax, full faith and collateral proceedings, are said to be conclucredit has been denied to the judicial pro- sive evidence of the facts upon which they ceedings of the state of New Jersey, in proceed only against parties who were enviolation of article 4, § 1, of the Constitu- titled to be heard before they were rendered. tion. In the consideration of this question, We may lay on one side, then, any the first inquiry which presents itself is argument based on the misleading expres. whether the adjudication of the New Jersey sion that all the world are parties to a procourt, that Tilt was, at the time of his ceeding in rem. This does not mean that all death, a resident of New Jersey, was conclu- the world are entitled to be heard; and, as sive upon the state of New York, a stran- strangers in interest are not entitled to be ger to the proceedings. If it was, that is heard, there is no reason why they should be the end of the case; because then New bound by the findings of fact, although York could not take the first step neces- bound to admit the title or status which sary to bring the estate within the provision the judgment establishes." We think that of the tax law of that state. But, upon this quotation expresses the correct rule and principle and authority, that adjudication, that it is sustained by the decisions of though essential to the assumption of juris- this court. Applying it here, it follows that diction to grant letters testamentary, was the full faith and credit due to the proceedneither conclusive on the question of domi-ings of the New Jersey court do not require cil, nor even evidence of it in a collateral | that the courts of New York shall be bound proceeding. Thormann v. Frame, 176 U. S. 350, 44 L. ed. 500, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 446; • Overby v. Gordon, 177 U. S. 214, 44 L. ed. 741, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 603; Dallinger v. Richardson, 176 Mass. 77, 57 N. E. 224, and see Mutual Ben. L. Ins. Co. v. Tisdale, 91 U. S. 238, 23 L. ed. 314; De Mora v. Concha, L. R. 29 Ch. Div. 268, Affirmed in L. R. 11 App. Cas. 541; Brigham v. Fayerweather, 140 Mass. 411, 5 N. E. 265. The difference in the effect of a judgment on the res before the court and of the adjudication of the facts on which the judgment is based is pointed out by Mr. Justice Holmes in the last case. In an opinion holding that a decree of a probate court admitting a will to probate was not, on an issue between parties, one of whom was not a party to the probate proceedings, competent evidence of the testator's mental capacity, he said: "A judgment in rem is an act of the sovereign power; and, as such, its effects cannot be disputed; at least, within the jurisdiction. If a competent court declares a vessel forfeited, or orders it sold free of all claims, or divorces a couple, or establishes a will, . a paramount title is passed, the couple is divorced, the will is established as against all the world, whether parties or not, because the sovereign has said that it shall be so. But the same is true when the judgment is that A recover a debt of B. The public force is pledged to collect the debt from B, and no one within the jurisdiction can oppose it. And it does not follow in the former case any more than in the latter, nor is it true, that the judgment, because conclusive on all the world in what we may call its legislative effect, is equally conclusive upon all

But assuming that the New York court had the right to determine, and determined rightly, the domicil of the deceased, what then? The grievance here is not the finding that Mr. Tilt died a resident of New York. It is the assessment, based upon that finding, of a transfer tax upon the legacies contained in his will. The real question in the case is whether the assessment of that tax by the state of New York is consistent with the full faith and credit required by the Constitution to be given to the judicial proceedings of another state. After the will had been allowed and letters testamentary had been issued by the New Jersey surrogate, the executors named in the will took possession of all the personal property of the testator (the real property not being concerned in this litigation) and began to administer it in accordance with the terms of the will and under the direction of the court. That property, appraised at about $1,000,000, consisted of bank deposits almost entirely in New Jersey banks, life insurance policies, a few small mortgages, notes, and accounts receivable, furniture, horses, and carriages, and (constituting more than eight tenths of the whole of the personal estate) stock in New Jersey corporations. A limit of time was fixed for the presentation of claims against the estate, at the expiration of which it was decreed that all creditors who had neglected to bring in their demands should be barred from any action thereon against the execu

tion and of the vicissitudes to which they | faith and credit aust be given to these judiare subject. This is the foundation of all judicial proceedings in rem." It is therefore within the power of the sovereign to give to its courts the authority, while settling the succession of estates in their possession, through their officers, the executors or administrators, to determine finally, as against the world, all questions which arise therein. Grignon v. Astor, 2 How. 319, 11 L. ed. 283, per Baldwin, J., p. 338; Beauregard v. New Orleans, 18 How. 497, 15 L. ed. 469; Foulke v. Zimmerman, 14 Wall. 113, 20 L. ed. 785; Board of Public Works v. Columbia College, 17 Wall. 521, 21 L. ed. 687; Broderick's Will (Kieley v. McGlynn) 21 Wall. 503, 22 L. ed. | 599; Simmons v. Saul, 138 U. S. 439, 34 L. ed. 1054, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 369; Byers v. McAuley, 149 U. S. 608, 37 L. ed. 867, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 906; Goodrich v. Ferris, 145 Fed. 844; Loring v. Steineman, 1 Met. 204; Kellogg v. Johnson, 38 Conn. 269; State v. Blake, 69 Conn. 64, 36 Atl. 1019; Exton v. Zule, 14 N. J. Eq. 501; Search v. Search, 27 N. J. Eq. 137; Harlow v. Harlow, 65 Me. 448; Ladd v. Weiskopf, 62 Minn. 29, 69 L.R.A. 785, 64 N. W. 99.

In respect to the settlement of the successions to property on death the states of the Union are sovereign and may give to their judicial proceedings such conclusive effect, subject to the requirements of due process of law and to any other constitutional limitation which may be applicable.

"But though a state may attach to the judicial proceedings of the courts through which the devolution of the estates of deceased persons is accomplished, the conclusive effect which has been described, it may not choose to do so, or may choose to do so only in respect of part of the adjudications made in the course of the settlement of the succession. It may, for instance, choose to regard the probate of a will or the grant of letters of administration as conclusive on all, and, on the other hand, to regard an order of distribution as open to attack in a collateral proceeding by those who were not parties to it. The extent to which such proceedings shall be held conclusive is a matter to be determined by each state according to its own views of public policy. The variation in practice in the different states is considerable and no good purpose would be served by considering them. It is enough to instance that in the states of Connecticut and Massachusetts, according to the cases just cited, a decree of distribution is binding upon all, while in the state of New York it appears not to be binding on one who was not a party to it. Re Killan, 172 N. Y. 547, 63 L.R.A. 95, 65 N. E. 561.

When, therefore, we come to consider what

cial proceedings of New Jersey, we must first
ascertain what effect that state attaches to
them. The statute enacted to carry into
effect the constitutional provision provided
that they should have, in any court within
the United States, such faith and credit "as
they have by law or usage in the courts of
the state from which they are taken." Act
May 26, 1790 [1 Stat. at L. 122, chap. 11],
now 905, Rev. Stat. (U. S. Comp. Stat.
1901, p. 677). They can have no greater or
less or other effect in other courts than in
those of their own state. Cheever v. Wilson,
9 Wall. 108, 19 L. ed. 604; Board of Public
Works v. Columbia College, 17 Wall. 521,
21 L. ed. 687; Robertson v. Pickrell, 109
U. S. 608, 27 L. ed. 1049, 3 Sup. Ct. Rep. 407;
Hancock Nat. Bank v. Farnum, 176 U. S.
640, 44 L. ed. 619, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 506.
In ascertaining, on a writ of error to a state
court, what credit is given to these judicial
proceedings by the laws and usages of the
state of New Jersey, we are limited to the
evidence on that subject before the court
whose judgment we are reviewing. Hanley
v. Donoghue, 116 U. S. 1, 29 L. ed. 535, 600
Sup. Ct. Rep. 242; *Chicago & A. R. Co. v.
Wiggins Ferry Co. 119 U. S. 622, 30 L. ed.
522, 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 398. The only evidence
upon this point was in an affidavit of an
attorney and counselor at law of that state.
The evidence is meagre and not entirely sat-
isfactory and conclusive. It was, however,
uncontradicted. It tended to show that the
surrogate had jurisdiction to probate the
will and issue letters testamentary, and that
the probate and issue of letters could not be
impeached in a collateral proceeding; that
the surrogate had "under the laws of New
Jersey full and competent jurisdiction" to
make the order limiting the time for cred-
itors of the estate to bring in their demands,
and the subsequent order that all who had
neglected to do so "should be forever barred
from their action therefor against the exec-
utors of said deceased;" that the acts of the
surrogate cannot be impeached collaterally,
and that the orphans' court had jurisdiction
under the laws of New Jersey "to direct
final distribution of the estate of said testa-
tor," and it cited four cases from the New
Jersey reports (Re Coursen, 4 N. J. Eq. 408;
Quidort v. Pergeaux, 18 N. J. Eq. 472; Ryno
v. Ryno, 27 N. J. Eq. 522; and Re Straub, 49
N. J. Eq. 264, 24 Atl. 569). In relying upon
evidence of this kind we are quite aware
that we may not ascertain with the preci-
sion which might be desired the credit which
the state of New Jersey attaches to these
judicial proceedings. But it is all that we
can have. We think that we may safely in-
fer from it that the order of the surrogate
barring all creditors who had failed to bring

in the demand from any further claim against the executors was binding upon all. It was an order which he had "full and competent authority to make," and it was one of the acts which could not be impeached collaterally. We think, also, that the jurisdiction to direct a final distribution means a distribution which shall be final, so far, at least, as any person having a demand against the estate is concerned. If we have discerned correctly the effect which New Jersey gives to these judicial proceedings, it is obvious that the assessment of this tax denies them full faith and credit in two respects: First, in seeking a part of an estate which has been finally distributed to those who were entitled to it under the will; and, second, in fixing a personal responsibility for the tax upon the executors who had been conclusively exonerated from such a liability. Up to this point it has been assumed that the New Jersey court had jurisdiction to probate the will and administer the estate, and what has been said upon the effect of the judicial proceedings has been based upon that assumption. When, however, full faith and credit is demanded for a judgment in the courts of other states, an inquiry into the jurisdiction is always permitted, and if it be shown that the proceedings relied upon were without the jurisdiction of the court, they need not be respected. Thompson v. Whitman, 18 Wall. 457, 21 L. ed. 897; Thormann v. Frame, 176 U. S. 350, 44 L. ed. 500, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 446, and cases cited.

praiser's report it is said that the deceased had left a will "which was duly admitted tog probate in the surrogate's court of the county of Morris, state of New Jersey, and that letters testamentary were issued by said surrogate court." The specific legacies and the disposition of the residue of the estate were then stated. The surrogate, in assessing the taxes, assessed them specifically on the beneficiaries, giving their respective names and the values of the property they respectively took under the will. Two life estates and several remainders, created by the will, were valued appropriately and the taxes assessed accordingly. All this is utterly inconsistent with an attack upon the jurisdiction, and we need not consider whether it could have been made with success.

It is quite obvious that what was done here was the assessment by one state of taxes upon transfers of personal property, taking effect under the laws of another state, entirely regardless of the situs of the property transferred. This suggests grave constitutional questions, which we cannot consider because they were not properly and seasonably raised in the court below.

For the foregoing reasons we think that the judgment below denied to the New Jersey proceedings the full faith and credit to which they were entitled by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and accordingly it is reversed.

Mr. Justice Harlan dissents.

(207 U. S. 20)

SAMUEL B. RAYMOND, County Treasurer of Cook County, Illinois, and ex officio County Collector of Cook County, Illinois; John J. Hanberg, His Successor as Such County Treasurer and County Collector, et al. Appts.,

V.

CHICAGO UNION TRACTION COMPANY.
Courts - jurisdiction of circuit court-
Federal question.

1. The claim that the action of a state

The defendant in error, acting upon this well-settled rule, might have attacked the jurisdiction of the New Jersey courts, and thus brought forward for consideration many important questions which, in the view we take of the case, need not even be stated. But there was no attempt, except in argument here, to deny the right of the New Jersey court to act upon the paper writing purporting to dispose of the estate of Tilt, and, by admitting it to probate, to convert it into an operative will. It is true that, as a basis of assessing transfer taxes, it was proved that Tilt was a resident of New York board of equalization in making an assessat the time of his death, a fact which ment for a tax pursuant to the command would be relevant to the question of jurisdic- of a writ of mandamus was the action of tion. But that fact was not proved or used the state, and, if carried out, would violate for the purpose of invalidating the proceed-U. S. Const., 14th Amend., by taking propings taken in probating the will and admin-erty without due process of law and denying the equal protection of the laws, constitutes istering the estate. On the contrary, the a Federal question within the original juristaxes were based upon the provisions of the diction of a Federal circuit court. instrument, which derived all its authen- Constitutional law - due process of law ticity as a will and all its capacity to trans- -equal protection of the laws. mit property from the judicial proceedings 2. The Illinois state board of equalization, in New Jersey. It appears conclusively from when making an assessment pursuant to the the action taken in the New York surrogate supposed command of a writ of mandamus, court that there was no attempt to declare represents the state, there being no method of reviewing its decision except by juthe New Jersey proceedings void because they dicial proceedings for relief from the assesswere taken without jurisdiction. In the ap-ment, and its action is therefore repug

nant to U. S. Const., 14th Amend., if it | lants from taking any further proceedings denies anyone the due process of law or the towards the collection of certain taxes asequal protection of the laws protected by sessed against the appellee upon an assessthat Amendment against impairment by the ment alleged to be in violation of the 14th