prove that it ought to have chosen one to the left; if it has chosen a road to the left, his business is to prove that it ought to have chosen one to the right. This is the general description of the opposition problem. In the solution of its different cases, in the dextrous development of the principles which it involves, and in their adaptation to the varying aspects and circumstances of debate, lies the secret of opposition tactics. The opposition leader, who is always prepared with a happy application of this cardinal theorem, may consider himself, so far as his own craft is concerned, as being in possession of the philosopher's stone.

Starting from this datum, the wary oppositionist will perceive that his business is to assume the attitude, not of a member of a deliberative body, seeking to contribute his counsels for the common advantage, but of an observer, who watches the movements of an adversary. He will wait to see what course is taken by those whom he opposes; he will lie by, until their opinion is declared, their measure announced, and their course irrevocably fixed. Having secured his own freedom of choice by steady silence, he will then come forward, and condemn the adverse proposition, preferring to it any one of those which might have been made. A leading maxim, therefore, of the opposition leader is to propose nothing, and to commit himself to no opinion while the choice of the Government is free and open; to abstain from all suggestion, in the way of equal and friendly advice, for a common public good, but to maintain the attitude of a general who seeks to profit by the errors of his antagonist, and to drive in the enemy's lines, wherever he sees an opening for attack.

In all the great questions of the day, upon which a Government brings forward its propositions, or adopts its line of policy, there is always a choice of alternative courses. Moreover, this choice is often a choice between courses of which one is only preferable on certain grounds to another, and is in substance a mere choice of difficulties. Hence the experienced oppositionist can easily supply himself with reasons for preferring to the measure which he condemns some other which he recommends. For example, if the Minister has chosen war, the opposition leader will not hesitate to counsel peace. He may dwell upon the advantages of a pacific policy, the expensiveness of armaments, the uncertainty of the event of hostilities: he may say that true magnanimity consists in overlooking petty insults, and in not showing too great a readiness to vindicate supposed affronts to the national honour. He may insinuate that salaries, pensions, commissions, are multiplied in war; that patronage is

increased; and may intimate that pretexts of a regard for national honour and glory ought not to be suffered to be made a cloak for sordid and selfish views.

If, on the other hand, the Minister has chosen peace, the oppositionist will, with equal readiness, recommend war. He will dwell upon the necessity of avoiding penny wisdom and pound folly; he will show that national honour is more sacred than national credit; that if we once allow ourselves to be humbled among the nations, and insulted with impunity, we shall be subjected to a series of wrongs and affronts, which will entail upon us heavier losses, and a larger expenditure, than would result from a prompt resistance to aggression and injury.

The same mode of arguing may be extended to the whole circle of public questions. If a direct tax is proposed by the Government, this proposition may serve as a text for a copious dissertation upon the advantages of indirect taxation in one quarter; if an indirect tax is proposed, this may produce an eulogy on direct taxation in another.

There are indeed certain fundamental principles-such as economy of the public money-in which all parties are agreed. Every party, moreover, has certain opinions and principles of its own, and is committed to a certain course of policy, to which its leaders must adhere in criticising the measures of their adversaries. The field of alternatives is not, therefore, quite open to the oppositionist, in examining measures of general policy. He is restrained within certain limits fixed by the antecedents and previous history of his own party. He has moreover his own consistency to preserve, even if he should not be guided by higher principles of action. Hence it is often convenient to criticise the propositions of a Government on more special grounds; to narrow the objection to the person by whom, the time when, the manner in which, the extent to which, the proposition is made. The dextrous oppositionist should pursue the question through each of these categories. He should examine it under every head of the scholastic

verse:

'Quis, quid, ubi, quibus auxiliis, cur, quomodo, quando.' He may say that the measure is desirable in itself, but that the country will not accept it from the existing Government: that it is poisoned by the source from which it comes. He may likewise object to the degree: it is not enough; it is a miserable fragment, a pitiful abortion: or it is too much; it spoils a sound principle by carrying it too far. The category of time, however, affords to the accomplished objector a supply of argu

ments which may fairly be deemed inexhaustible. The reason is simple and obvious. In judicial proceedings a certain time is fixed within which an action may be brought, and if it is brought within that time, a defendant must defend himself, or judgment will go against him. Dilatory pleas, and postponements of trial, are only allowed on special grounds, which must be proved by clear evidence, and are admitted with jealousy by the Court. But in parliamentary proceedings it is otherwise. A person may choose his own time for bringing on a question; but its progress depends upon the will of the House; and it may, after it has once been proposed, be delayed or postponed indefinitely. Hence the facility of objections founded on considerations of time is obvious.

The

First, the measure may be condemned as too late. proper time is past. The favourable opportunity for legislation is gone. Public opinion, once inclined to the change, is now disinclined. The facilities which once existed for executing the law, no longer exist. There is no longer any demand for it in the country: no petitions in its favour have been lately presented. When it was wanted, it was not proposed; now it is proposed when it is not wanted. The public desire was met with inaction on the part of the Government; the public apathy is met with legislative activity in the same quarter.

Secondly, the measure may be condemned as premature. There has not been sufficient time for consideration. There has been no inquiry. The facts are not ascertained. The papers are not printed. The Committee have not reported. Members have not had time to communicate with their constituents. The country is taken by surprise. It is too late in the session for the proper consideration of the measure. It ought to be considered in connexion with another measure which is not yet introduced.

A similar see-saw of alternative topics is presented by the fertile subject of Committees. If a measure is proposed by a Government nakedly, on its own responsibility, then the necessity of preliminary inquiry is dwelt on. The Government is accused of rashness and precipitation, and of acting upon imperfect information. The importance of mature consideration, and of consulting men of practical knowledge on the subject, is placed in a prominent light. If, on the other hand, the Government propose a Committee, then it is said that they delegate their duties; that they shift their responsibility upon private members; that they send everything to a Committee upstairs. The objector is perhaps reminded that inquiry had, at some previous period, been recommended by his own friends. Nothing

daunted by this reminiscence, he falls back upon the neverfailing argument of time. Inquiry was good then, but it is bad now. His friends proposed it, when it would have been useful, and it was refused. It is granted, when it is useless.

Another copious source of alternative criticism is the examination of the past with the light of subsequent experience. In order to criticise past conduct with fairness, the critic ought to put himself in the place of the agent at the time of action, and suppose himself to be limited to the information which the agent then had, or with due diligence might have had. It would be unreasonable to blame a person for acting in ignorance of a plot, the secret of which had been faithfully kept by the conspirators; or to accuse a physician of unskilfulness, in not detecting a disease, of which there were no sufficient external indications, and which was only revealed by a post mortem examination.. Yet it is scarcely more reasonable, in taking a retrospect of the conduct of a Government, or of any of its officers, to censure it with the aid of all the information, which subsequent inquiries and disclosures have produced, and with the knowledge of the event and the practical consequences of the course adopted, which the lapse of time has afforded. Such is, however, the line of criticism usually followed by the oppositionist. The agent himself is necessarily confined to a dim prospective view of the future: the critic can take a clear retrospective view of the past; and by means of this retrospect, he can, without any remarkable exercise of ingenuity, discover some alternative course which may with plausibility, and perhaps with truth, be represented as preferable to that actually chosen. Nevertheless, it may not follow that in the position in which the agent was placed, and with the information at his command, he did not form the best judgment of which the circumstances admitted.

If a Government changes its policy, and adopts the alternative course recommended by its opponents, it may, perchance, hope to obtain from them some support or commendation, or at least to mitigate the strength of their opposition. A Government. which is so weak as to form any such expectation will, however, in general find itself wofully disappointed. It will be told that the concession comes too late; that the policy, though sound in principle, is marred in the execution. If the Opposition during a war have recommended peace, and the Government makes peace, the conditions of the peace will be condemned. It will be said that the honour or interest of the country have been sacrificed, that sufficient securities for the future have not been taken; that a territory has been ceded, which was one of

the brightest gems of the Crown. If the Opposition during peace have recommended war, and the Government makes war, the time and manner of making the war will be censured; the generals will be denounced as incapable; the points of attack will be described as ill chosen: if a land expedition is sent, it will be alleged that the proper course was to operate by sea; if a sea expedition is sent, it will be affirmed that the proper course was to operate by land. Exceptions conceived in the same spirit may be taken on other subjects; an opposition leader must be very unskilful or very candid who allows himself to be seduced into an approbation of the Government by the mere adoption of a policy which he has previously recommended. Some specious ad captandum objection to the means selected for carrying the policy into effect may always be found; it would be very strange if he cannot (with Sheridan) say of the Government, that they have treated his measure as gypsies do stolen children; disfigured it, in order to make it pass for their own.

Whatever course the Government may take, the oppositionist must be able to find some ground, general or special, for censure. His business with respect to the Government is, in fine, to sustain the part of an Advocatus Diaboli; his office is to state the case against the Administration; to say everything which can be said with plausibility against every measure, every act, and every word of every Minister, and of every person in the service and under the control of the Ministry. It is clear that such an office, accompanied with a strong personal interest in misrepresenting, defaming, and undermining the Ministers, is liable to serious abuse. Nevertheless it has great and real advantages. It is of paramount importance that there should be a standing censorship of the Government, and that all its acts and measures should be subjected to a close and jealous scrutiny. Unless the Opposition assumes something of an official character, unless it has strong interests and passions which keep it in perpetual activity, there is a danger that its vigilance may slumber, or that its constancy may yield to some of the strong countervailing forces which a Government can in general set in motion. In times of insecurity and violence, indeed, opposition to a Government implies personal courage; the Government can intimidate its opponents. In the interval which elapsed between the assassination of Julius Cæsar, and the consolidation of the power of the young Augustus, the Roman Government was substantially in the hands of Mark Antony, and the opposition to it was led by Cicero. Of this bold but ineffectual opposition his fourteen Philippic orations are an imperishable monument.

Its