Spithead the powerful squadron which was reviewed on that day by the Queen. The Russian Princesses were also present on that occasion, and one of the royal yachts was placed at their disposal; but the Grand Duchess Marie declined the invitation, adding, with some spirit aud candour, that she had no desire to visit a fleet prepared to destroy her father's armaments. The Camp at Chobham, in the same year, though not caused by any especial reference to political events, was an important experiment in the preparation of an army soon destined to hold against a powerful enemy far less pacific encampments. The artillery, which had been reduced to an incredible degree, soon began, under Lord Hardinge's administration at the Horse Guards, to present a more imposing force; but these were the rudiments from which the Government of this country was in less than twelve months to equip two of the most powerful squadrons that ever left our shores, and to send upwards of 50,000 men into the field.

Such was the state of our military and naval establishments when the cloud no bigger than a man's hand first rose above the Eastern horizon. The eye of more than one experienced politician had already discerned a probability that the affairs of the East would ere long reach some catastrophe; the decay of the Turkish Empire was becoming more and more obvious; the diplomacy of France had injudiciously raised questions which could not be touched without danger; the designs of Russia were carefully disguised, but enough was known to cause uncertainty, and to excite suspicion. As Prince Menschikoff's mission advanced to its consummation, and the relations of Russia and the Porte were interrupted, the fleets of the Western Powers drew nearer to the Dardanelles, though rather for the purpose of a political demonstration than of an immediate intervention by force of arms. The passage of the Pruth, and the occupation of the Principalities, took place early in July, 1853; these encroachments were not followed by an immediate declaration of war, partly because hopes were still entertained of terminating the contest by negotiation, but far more because the Turkish frontiers, and even the capital, were not considered safe from the possibility of a rapid advance of the Russian divisions, which had already appeared at Jassy and Bucharest. The next three months were vigorously used by the Turkish Government, and when war was declared on the 4th of October, Omar Pasha at the head of a considerable army occupied the line of the Danube, and placed the Balkan in a state of defence. The declaration of hostilities first opened the Dardanelles to the passage of ships of war, and before the close of the month the Allied squadron

entered the Straits, and soon afterwards anchored in the Bosphorus.

Up to this time it may be doubted, whether the probability of a great military expedition to Turkey had been anticipated by the Allied Governments, although it had not escaped the bold and sagacious mind of Lord Stratford de Redcliffe. The Emperor of the French was known to be extremely averse, at that time, to send any troops to' the East, hoping that the naval superiority of the Allies would suffice for the protection of Constantinople, and foreseeing that if any army was sent at all, it must be a force capable of meeting on equal terms the legions of Russia. The Turkish forces held their position on the line of the Danube with gallantry and success. The occupation and entrenchment of Kalafat was conceived and executed with equal judgment and courage, and this position effectually prevented the Russians from turning the left of the Turkish army, or operating on the Balkan by the route through Sofia. Prince Gortschakoff, on the contrary, committed the error of extending his line of operations beyond his strength, commanded as he was in his flank and rear by the Austrian territories, and successfully opposed by the Turks in his front. Considerable reliance was placed on the fortified passes of the Balkan; but, on the other hand, it was known, that if Omar Pasha's army were once defeated, the Porte had nothing in reserve, and that all Bulgaria and Roumelia would then be open to the enemy.

Under these circumstances the position of the allied fleets, which had entered the Black Sea on the 5th of January, might have become critical. It was felt that, although they could embarrass the operations of Russia by blockading the coast, they could not oppose any decisive obstacle to the advance of a powerful army; and that in the event of a signal defeat of the Turks, it was even possible that the Balkans might be crossed, and that the advance of Diebitsch repeated. If by any adverse contingency of war the Russians should have been able to renew that movement which brought them to Saros and Rodosto in 1829, they might have seized the European castles of the Dardanelles from the rear, and obtained the command of that important passage whilst the allied fleets were operating within the straits. In short, the first necessary point was, to protect the approach of the seat of war, and to cover the future line of operations from the possibility of attack.

This subject had forcibly attracted the attention of more than one traveller who visited the East in 1853; and General Macintosh especially pointed out the measures to obviate this danger

in some communications which he has annexed to the work before us.

I venture to submit a few reflections which occurred to me when formerly in this country, connected with its defence on the side towards Russia.

'In the first place, the line of the Danube is so extended, and the nature of the country in its immediate vicinity so favourable for a large manoeuvring army, if opposed to one in such an imperfect state of training as that of Turkey*, that it seems almost hopeless that they should meet their opponents successfully in such a locality, unless powerfully supported.

'It may therefore be submitted that the best plan of operations would be only to garrison the fortresses on the Danube, and, as soon as possible, duly to strengthen the line of the Balkan, as the best situation in which the Turkish army could receive its assailants.

'With this view every thing should be done to put Shumla and Varna in as complete a state of preparation to receive their garrisons as possible; and, moreover, all the passes leading through the mountains in their rear should be artificially strengthened with fieldworks, looking towards those fortresses. It would be impossible to prepare such works at a period when active operations might be going on in the field; and the expense would be greatly diminished by employing the troops already in that neighbourhood in their construction, before their dispersion renders this impossible. There is a range of mountains called the Lesser Balkan, behind the great range looking towards the sea, the passes through which near Faki should also be strengthened with a view to their occupation, as a force landing behind the passes through the Balkan, which lie in rear of Varna, might otherwise turn the main position, and penetrate from thence into the country.†

Should the enemy succeed, as before, in reaching Adrianople, it is believed that Constantinople might still be defended by occupying positions which extend from the creeks or lakes called Buyuk Chekimagee and Kutchuk Chegmagee, on the Sea of Marmora, towards the Black Sea. These positions, however, ought also to be artificially strengthened.

'Lastly, the peninsula on the European side of the Dardanelles, ought to be strengthened against a land attack by works raised across the narrowest part of the isthmus north-east of Gallipoli, as most of the batteries on that side of the strait could easily be carried from the heights behind them, if left as they now are. It would also be very desirable that the Gulf of Saros, behind that peninsula, should be accurately surveyed, and the soundings near the isthmus correctly laid down, a favourable opportunity for doing which is, I presume, afforded by the presence of the fleet. I say this in

At the period at which this communication was written, not above 40,000 Turkish troops had been collected towards the frontier. †The allied fleets were at this time still in Besika Bay.

the belief that no such survey at present exists. In the event of our ships having at any period to act there, and possibly to land troops, this would be found of great utility. Works are to a certain extent in progress in rear of the batteries on the Bosphorus, which was a precaution much called for. The other localities I have adverted to would require the careful examination of scientific officers of engineers, who might afterwards lay down the works and superintend their execution, and I fear that the Turkish military establishment does not afford a sufficient number for this undertaking, and it is indeed the impression on my mind that the whole staff arrangements in this country are still very deficient, which has led me to point out, though in a manner which may perhaps be considered very crude and imperfect, the expediency of these measures. (Appendix I. vol. ii. p. 269-73.)

And again the General observes:

'When I was at Constantinople in summer, apprehensions existed that the advance of the Russians would not stop at the Danube, which caused me to make some suggestions upon that subject of a professional nature.

Having formerly passed a considerable time in the provinces and capital of Turkey, I am enabled to speak of the country from personal observation; and as there is again apparently a renewal of agitation in the East, I would observe, that I think that even though the Russians were to be the conquerors in case of hostilities with the Turks, and even though they were to effect the occupation of Constantinople, the Dardanelles might still be held by a power having the command of a fleet, even though that fleet might not be on the very spot at the moment; but this could only be done if that position were to be augmented in strength on the land side. On the Asiatic side of these straits, forts were erected about the time of Mehemet Ali's defection, from a fear of his advancing and seizing on that important channel; but when I last passed through it, no new work had been even commenced on the European side, which is a peninsula connected by a narrow neck with the mainland. In case of a land attack, it could not be defended by the old Turkish castles or batteries, chiefly on the water's edge; and if the peninsula were once occupied, they must themselves very soon fall into the hands of the assailants.

To prevent such an occupation by a force passing over the neck or isthmus, I would propose that a strong line of defensive works should be erected across its narrowest part, which is only a few miles broad, and at which point the slope of the land is favourable for the purpose. It lies some miles above (that is, north-east of) Gallipoli.

As the fortification of the isthmus would require time, and as the winter there is usually not so severe as to prevent such works from being proceeded with, it might be worthy of consideration whether

* At this time the formation of an Allied Expeditionary Force had not been publicly discussed.

they should not be commenceéd as soon as the risk of hostilities in spring may appear to be imminent.

If the Russians were enabled to advance on Constantinople, there is no doubt they would make a simultaneous movement on the Dardanelles, and would easily carry the batteries on the European side of the gorge-I say, the gorge, as the works have only thin walls on the land side.

'Constantinople itself is so extensive, that an army might occupy its inland portions without fear of being dislodged by a fleet, though it might bombard and batter the districts near the water. A struggle of this kind would cause the entire destruction of the city, but mere operations from the sea would have little other result.' (Appendix II. vol. ii. p. 274-6.)

In the course of the winter, the ground being still covered with snow, the Thracian Chersonesus, to which these observations principally relate, was surveyed by Sir John Burgoyne, and certain works were designed above Gallipoli to effect the first object of the expedition, which was to protect against all hazards the entrance of the Dardanelles. Such we take to have been the first step in the military expedition which has since grown to such gigantic dimensions. The first division of the British army left London on the 28th of February, and sailed from Malta for Gallipoli on the 31st of March, where they landed on the 8th of April. The first division of the French army left Marseilles on the 19th of March, and arrived a short time before our troops. It was not, however, until the 29th of April that Lord Raglan joined the army, part of which had in the meantime gone on to Scutari.

In the meantime there was every reason to believe, that, after immense preparations, and on the arrival of further reinforcements, the Russians considered themselves in a condition to pursue the objects of the campaign. Their main army, which had considerably contracted its line of operations, by the orders of Prince Paskievitsch, crossed the Danube on the 23rd of March, in front of Brailow and Galatz, the Turkish fortresses of Isáktcha and Matchin fell with little resistance, the Dobrudscha was invaded, and the enemy appeared disposed to follow the same line of operations as in 1828. These successes, however, were by no means followed up with the rapidity which such a campaign required, for more than seven weeks clapsed from the passage of the Danube to the regular attack on Silistria, although the Russians had every inducement to anticipate that interference of the European Powers which soon afterwards barred their progress. During this time the forces of the Allies began to arrive, but their policy and their operations were strictly defensive. The neck of the Thracian Chersonesus was fortified,