regiments themselves are broken up into detachments, each of which does the duty of police rather than of soldiers. Is it to be wondered at, if, at the commencement of every great European struggle, our expeditionary force, though composed of the best materials in the world, should prove inadequate to the strain that is put upon it?

There is but one mode of dealing with this evil: the army must receive such a permanent organisation as belongs to every other army in Europe, which shall keep it in time of peace effective, though numerically inconsiderable, and enable it in the event of war to expand itself without confusion or the destruction of its several parts.

Independently of the Household Brigade, which, were two batteries added, would be complete in itself, the Army List' gives us as available for general service 100 regiments of the line, including the Rifle Brigade, with eight local corps of unequal strength, of which, however, one is a mounted rifle regiment. Our cavalry of the line, including seven of Dragoon Guards, make up twenty-three regiments in all; and we have fourteen battalions of artillery. Taking the infantry by battalions, we have thus on our peace establishment a hundred and three of the line, and seven of local troops. The latter, as far as our present purpose is concerned, may be put out of view, because their peculiar composition ties them down to certain fixed localities. Distribute these one hundred and three battalions of the line, then, into brigades of three battalions each, and you will obtain thirtyfour brigades. Concentrate your brigades into divisions containing two brigades in each, and you will get seventeen divisions. But a division to be effective ought to consist of a portion of each of the three arms, namely, infantry, cavalry, and artillery. Now we never employ our cavalry in Colonial service, properly so called. India, indeed, makes a demand upon that branch of the service to the extent sometimes of six regiments; but we never send our troopers, except in the event of war, to Canada or the Cape, far less to stations of minor extent and consequence. Say then, that there are available eighteen out of our twenty-three regiments of horse. This will give us six brigades of three regiments each, to be attached respectively to six infantry divisions; as many, perhaps, as in time of peace may be considered sufficient for the protection of the United Kingdom. Or if it be preferred to keep seven divisions of infantry at home, then by a slight change in distribution, some cavalry brigades may be composed of only two regiments, so that no division shall absolutely lack this important arm of strength. And if, over and above, four batteries be taken as the complement of artillery

proper for a division, there will be placed under each general of division serving at home six or seven battalions of infantry, three regiments of cavalry, and twenty-four guns. Moreover, as such divisions are formed not for mere purposes of parade, but in order that each may be in a condition to act if suddenly called upon, there must be appended to them respectively, abroad as well as at home, a competent Staff, a commissariat, a medical department, an ambulance corps, a baggage train, a pontoon train, and a battalion of artificers.

And now comes the question how are we to distribute these divisions? Indeed, looking to the nature of our colonial empire, and to the necessity for relieving at stated intervals the troops employed in the colonies, how will it be possible to preserve this divisional organisation after it shall have been completed? We answer that accepting seven divisions, as sufficient for home service, the remaining ten may be disposed of thus. Gibraltar will require one division, without cavalry, to occupy the lines, as their importance demands. Malta will absorb another. The Ionian Islands may be held by a third, of which the head-quarters should be in Corfu. A fourth may suffice for the Cape, detaching a battalion or two to Mauritius. A fifth will suffice to garrison the whole of the Transatlantic possessions, keeping one brigade permanently together in Canada. To a sixth the care of Australia, China, and Ceylon may be committed. And there will remain four divisions, complete in every respect, because supported by cavalry, for India. The reliefs, moreover, may go on, for the nearer tour by brigades, for the more distant by single regiments, as is done now; or if it be esteemed more convenient by divisions, the Cape division passing on to India as soon as relieved, while one of the Indian divisions proceeds to Australia and Ceylon; thereby enabling the Ceylon and Australian division to return to England. Indeed, the divisional relief would, on many accounts, prove the more convenient of the two; for we should thus be accustomed, in peace, to embark and disembark troops as war requires, and have permanently at the disposal of the Minister of War at least the groundwork of a well-organised transport

service.

But it may be said, consider the expense involved in such a radical change of system. Instead of ten major-generals of districts, with their aides-de-camp, and adjutant, and quartermasters-general, we should be obliged to keep in active employment at home seven lieutenant-generals and twenty-one majorgenerals, with a staff fourfold more extensive than exists now; besides the ten lieutenant-generals, and the twenty major-gene

rals, to whom the Indian and Colonial divisions would give employment. And as to keeping these divisions together, and unless they be kept together the purpose of their creation would be defeated,-where throughout Great Britain and Ireland are you to find quarters of sufficient capacity to contain even one of them?

There is some truth in these objections, but observe to what they amount. You acknowledge that your military system is defective, that it keeps you always in a state of military disorganisation, and that on a sudden alarm of war you are so helpless that millions are expended in the vain endeavour to bring about in a few weeks a state of things which no amount of mere money expenditure can accomplish at all. Is it sound economy to avoid a present outlay by persevering in the maintenance of an order of things which all experience has condemned, and which must, when the occasion arises, force on you more than the dreaded outlay, without producing the desired effect? In plain language, would it not be better to disband the army altogether in time of peace, and to trust, as the Americans do, to an enrolled militia and to the navy for protection, than to levy, year by year, nine or ten millions of taxes in order to keep on foot a regular force, which, when called upon to act, invariably disappoints you, till war and the pressure of circumstances compel you to adopt the organisation which you refused to give to it ere war began? Undoubtedly the pay of so many generals and such a staff will make considerable demands on the Exchequer. Probably it might add 100,000l. a year to the public expenditure. But will any body contend that 100,000l. a year, or twice that amount, is wasted, if we can provide ourselves out of it with generals accustomed to manage masses, and a staff practised in all the duties which staff-officers are expected to perform in a campaign? Nor can it be denied that the erection at seven different points of barrack accommodation equal to the wants of eight or ten thousand men will cost millions. But, besides that millions expended on domestic labour can hardly be said to be quite thrown away, there would be no occasion to rush, pell-mell, into the execution of so extensive a scheme all at once. It may suffice, at the outset, to redistribute the troops, so that each division shall be cantoned during winter within a reasonable distance of its head-quarters, while in summer its several parts are brought together, either under canvass or in hut-barracks, similar to those which are now in course of erection at Aldershot. The working of the scheme will thus be tested ere any serious expense is incurred, and possibly it may be found that, after all, our present barracks, incon

venient as in many respects they are, will tide us over that present, from which, when heavy payments are thought of, individuals as well as public bodies instinctively shrink.

Even this, however, important as it unquestionably is, will not suffice unless we go a step farther. During two or three months in every year two or more divisions must come together into the same camp, and practise there, from the general in command down to the private sentinel, all that soldiers are expected to perform when engaged in a campaign. The Chobham camp of 1853 did some good, but the good was restricted, first, because the commanders were all new to the work, and next, because public feeling had scarcely reached the point to which recent occurrences have carried it. Our future camps must in many respects be different. In these all ranks ought to be taught their duty,—the duties of outposts, of patrols, of reconnoissances, of entrenchment; of purveyance, of dressing food under difficulties; of pontooning in a hurry; of field hospitals, of commissariat arrangements. There must be frequent striking and pitching of tents,-marching with baggage packed and following the columns, sudden surprises- by night as well as by day; and all so managed that generals of brigade and commandants of battalions, if not captains and subalterns, may perfectly understand, after each evolution, the purposes which it was intended to serve. In these camps, also, there must be lecture-rooms, where from competent instructors, officers, and even non-commissioned officers, may learn the theory of the art of war; with this great advantage consequent upon each lecture, -that the general-in-chief shall take care to give the students every day a practical confirmation of the statements to which they may have listened over-night. Such a camp will be no mere raree show for Londoners to visit and admire. It will be a veritable school of war, in which men and horses when occasion requires shall bivouac, and all arms work together, as they do in the immediate presence of an enemy. Nor let us forget to urge a due attention to the great concerns of religion In nothing has the glory of our army shone more conspicuous than in the purely religious tone of its correspondence. Let no camp, no large military station, be without its commodious chapels, nor any corps be denied an adequate supply of chaplains to minister to the religious wants of men and officers.

IV. And this brings us to another of those defects in our system of which we have already spoken, namely, the gross abuse of patronage which prevails in our army, arising out of the indif ference heretofore exhibited by men in high places to the progress of professional education among the younger officers. In

deed it is not without a sense of something like mortification that we find ourselves compelled to repeat this charge. Six months ago we took the liberty of suggesting to Her Majesty's Government a plan by which the evil might have been effectually remedied. And the speech of Mr. Sidney Herbert in the House of Commons, as well as the grant of 2000l. for the education of officers, led us to believe that the blot was seen and would immediately be hit. But time has passed, and nothing, we believe, is done, whether through the pressure of more urgent business, or because of the resistance of some antagonistic power, we cannot say. All that can be said is this, that the 2000l. voted for so good a purpose are still unemployed, and that it remains for us again to urge upon our readers the reasonableness of a scheme which few among them, we have good ground for believing, would not gladly see effected

to-morrow.

There are three methods, all attainable, by which the education of officers may be promoted, and an effective staff corps created out of the entire body.

1. You may sweep away the existing military schools entirely, the junior department at Sandhurst, the school at Carshalton, and the Royal Academy at Woolwich. The parents and guardians of aspirants for commissions will in this case be left to find for their sons such means of acquiring the rudiments of a good education as may be most convenient to themselves; but all these youths ere they win the coveted prize must appear before commissioners duly qualified, and pass such an examination as shall be considered sufficient to vouch for the right application of time past, and the power and will to use it rightly in the future.

In this case the candidates for commissions in the line, on the one hand, and for employment in the ordnance corps on the other, will be kept apart as they are now, and the nature of the examination for the latter will, of course, be at once more severe, and far more scientific than for the former.

Seventeen may be taken as a convenient age for holding such examinations. The youths who pass for the line may be attached with temporary rank to regiments in which there shall happen to be vacancies, and at the end of half a year, or less, if favourably reported upon by commanding officers, the rank should be confirmed, and dated from the first day of joining. The youths who pass for the scientific corps should proceed, also with temporary rank, to Woolwich and Chatham respectively, there to undergo a course of practical training for the artillery and engineers, which training should in no case be