Vol. XXII I MARCH, 1923 Four Years After Col. M. B. Stewart, U. S. Army we T is an inalienable right of every American citizen to tell any brother citizen just what he thinks of the rest of the fraternity. Accordingly, were discussing ourselves one hot August afternoon in the smoke-room of a transcontinental Pullman, and what with strikes and connections that failed to connect and the heat and so forth, the ears of the rest of the fraternity had every reason in the world to burn with a fierce glow. When the discussion had dwindled to the usual inconclusive finish, a slowspoken party who had been confining himself to the part of heavy listener leaned in and spoke for the absentees. He said: No. 3 known eastern magazine, and quite naturally our talk turned to the war just ended. In due course, I expressed the hope that the country would take some of the more fundamental lessons of our experience to heart and would profit by them. "For example, what?" my friend asked. "Well, for one thing," I told him, "that war is always a possibility; for another, that it is not always a matter of our own choosing; and for still another, that it is always well to be prepared for war before going to war." "If by all that, you are trying to say that you hope to see this country embark upon anything savoring of a general preparedness campaign, I can tell you right now that you are going to be disappointed," he replied emphatically. "The people of this country are in no mood for anything of that sort. Their chief aim at present is to forget about war as quickly as possible." "But," I protested, "it's the business of you editorial fellows to keep them from forgetting it. Now is the time for you to get busy and hammer a few cold facts home to them." "Perhaps," he admitted, then added, "but there is no profit in trying to argue with people who won't listen. You spirit and the keen realization of the war period had disappeared so quickly. must understand that public feeling There was no doubt as to my friend's sincerity, nor was there any doubt as to how he felt in regard to defense. I knew that he had always been a firm believer in preparedness and that he had done all he could to that end before the war. I also knew that he generally knew what he was talking about, and I was convinced that he believed what he was telling me. On the other hand, I could not help thinking that he must be mistaken in his estimate of public sentiment. Just to prove to myself that one of us was wrong, I wrote to other editors, telling them what I had in mind and asking them what, in their opinion, was the prospect of bringing defensive measures to the attention of the public. Without exception, they replied courteously and at length. They realized the importance of doing something and of doing it while the experience of the war was fresh in the minds of the people, but-invariably but-their readers did not appear interested; they feared that it would be some time, years perhaps, before such matters would have any appeal for the general reading public. It began to look as though somebody had guessed wrong and it was gradually forced upon me that I was the guilty party, still I could hardly bring myself to believe that splendid One after another I ran across old friends of the National Guard, old warhorses with ten, fifteen, twenty-five years of pre-war service to their credit. When I broached the subject of defense to them and inquired what they thought about it, they eyed me almost "That's all right for you, old man," was the general tenor of their replies. "You do that sort of thing for a living, but never again for me. I'm through!" My National Army friends were equally discouraging. When I inquired if they were coming back into the Reserve Corps, they shook their heads emphatically. "Not me," they replied almost to a man. "I did my little part in the big push and I'm glad of it. I wouldn't have missed it for anything-but no more!" Many of these were men who, before the war, had devoted all of their spare time, and a lot they couldn't afford to spare, to working for preparedness. When I reminded them of this and expressed surprise at their change of heart, they told me something like this: "Well, war is one thing and peace is quite another, you know." "But war is always a possibility," I persisted. "You know that as well as I do. We need to be prepared to day as much as we did in 1916 and 1917." "Yeah, I know all that," they would reply, "but I'm going to let somebody else do the job next time." In the light of evidence such as this, it was apparent that my editor friends had not had their ears to the ground for nothing, and for a time I felt constrained to believe with them-but not for long. From a most surprising source, rumblings of defense began to make themselves heard above the general hue and cry of the jobless and the H. C. L. essayists. Congress shook itself partly free from the war wreckage with which it had been all but submerged, took a deep breath and announced in loud, firm tones that it was ready to do something about this matter of national defense. Surprising enough of itself. The wiseacres turned their heads aside to smile-the idea! But there was more to come. Congress, of its own accord, actually got down to business and started something. The military committees of the Senate and House cleared their desks, rolled up their sleeves and settled down to a deadly grind of hearings. Every body who had anything to say about the late war or about future wars was cordially invited to come before the committees and have his say. The war and all that related to it was reviewed, analyzed and scrutinized from one end to the other, inside and out, from every conceivable point of view, and any little lesson that was not haled forth and subjected to cold and critical consideration was hardly worth mentioning. When everyone of any importance in our military and other circles-and they were aplenty-had had his say, the committees undertook the task of boiling it all down for legislative consumption. Just what their conclusions were as to the lessons of the war has never been stated in so many words, but a study of the legislation they finally produced leads to the belief that they got a working grasp of most of the outstanding features of our experience, and if we may judge from what they did, they must have inter "All Set" for the Great Athletic Classic of Hawaii, the Army-Navy Championship Football Game at Schofield Barracks, December 22, 1922. Score: Navy, 14; Army, 3 preted these about as follows: War is something you must always count on; if you are not prepared to defend yourself, you are taking a big chance of being licked; therefore, let's get ready -and do it right. Moreover, the legislation they finally wrote indicated conclusively that they not only knew how to get ready but how to do it right, without unnecessary expense, frills or hullabaloo. The result of their efforts was the National Defense Act, amended up to date in every respect, passed and enacted into law June 4, 1920-less than nineteen months after the signing of the armistice! Now, on the theory that Congress voices the sentiment of the people-and when it does not, it invariably hears from them-it was too hard to believe that the people of the country were wholly fed up on war, at least not to the point where they took the trouble to interfere with their representatives in considering and providing for its possibilities. Accordingly, those interested in defense began to take courage. And what about this defensive measure Congress had passed-was everybody happy over it? Everybody was not, emphatically not, and in no measured terms. In spite of the general feeling that Congress had rather done. itself proud in producing a most comprehensive, sensible and practical piece of military legislation, there was no lack of fault finding voices. Because the act did not provide for a Regular Army of half a million or so, many unhesitatingly pronounced it merely a bit of clever camouflage. Because it did not include provision for compulsory and universal military training, others declared that it was without teeth and invited the world to compare it with the militia provisions of a century and more ago. Because it did provide for this and did not provide for that, still others found fault. They compared it with similar measures in other countries and pointed out at length wherein it was lacking. What they failed to see was that Congress had enacted a military policy for the United States and that, in doing so, it had been guided by the fundamental principles of our Government and the traditions of our people. Consciously or unconsciously, it had harked back to the counsels of Washington and had based its policy on the principle that the defense of a nation is a task for the people as a whole, not for a few hirelings. What it actually had done was to provide the people with the means of preparing themselves for this task. Nothing more appropriate for a country accustomed to government of, for and by the people, could be imagined. In effect, Congress had said to the people: "It's your country; you are responsible for its defense; here is your chance to get ready." Specifically what Congress did was to authorize the organizing of the Army of the United States, made up of three components, the Regular Army, the National Guard and the Organized Reserves. With due regard for economy and because the Regular Army is the most expensive component to maintain, its size was limited to that required for essential needs, such as overseas garrisons, coast defense, minor disturbances within the country and the task of keeping the whole military machine in operation. The National Guard, the next component in order of expense, was limited to a strength which combined with that of the Regular Army would suffice for any but a national emergency. The Organized Reserves, least expensive of all, was practically unlimited as to strength. Together, these three components as organized by the War Department form the framework upon which a force of from two and a half to three millions of men may be quickly raised and made ready for defense. All of this is, of course, on a voluntary basis. and its effectiveness for defense depends upon the number of men who offer their services in one or another of the three components. "Yes," the unbelievers jeered. "It looks fine on paper, but you just hold your breath until the men of this country come surging up for all of this voluntary organizing and training. You just wait and see." Well, we have waited and we are seeing--what? In the first place, we are seeing that it is never wise to predict what the people of these United States will or will not do until it has been put squarely up to them and they have had a chance to think it over. Even our rankest unbelievers should have conceded that much, and doubtless would have had they stopped to think. They had only to recall what happened in 1917 after they had stood around telling the world in general what the American people were going to do when the selective draft was actually sprung on them, but they overlooked that and they also overlooked the fact that the American people occasionally The Department Commander, Major General C. P. Summerall, and Staff Escort the Governor General, the Honorable Wallace R. Farrington, and Family to the Center of the Field, where he is taken over to the Navy Side between Halves at the Army-Navy Football Championship Game, Schofield Barracks, Honolulu, December 22, 1922. The Naval Officer in the Center, Facing the Camera, is Admiral E. Simpson, commanding 14th Naval District, Pearl Harbor |