Branch within hearing, and almost within sight, of the Federal troops fighting at Groveton, like a disinterested spectator. I hold no brief for Fitz-John Porter and recognize in him, as General Alexander states, "one among its officers of the very highest type," and even though he were clearly protected by his instructions or lack of instructions, I cannot commend him very highly for allowing the troops along the Warrenton turnpike to be defeated without giving assistance.

One of the best illustrations of cooperation on the battlefield occurred in the German army around Metz. The paucity of numbers and the lack of specific orders did not prevent Von Alvenslaben from pinning down the French army and the other corps commanders from rushing to his assistance. At Auerstadt, Bernadotte showed his first tangible symptoms of disaffection to Napoleon by not cooperating with Davout.

The spirit of cooperation on the part of subordinate commanders and the desire to help one another must not be carried to the point of jeopardizing their own particular mission, except in grave emergency.

more from the viewpoint of coordination than anything else, and all subordinates should be encouraged to act on their own initiative, to use their own judgment, but to stick to the mission that is assigned them, and cooperate with the others in executing theirs. If they do this, the unity of command feature will be there, and you will have the superlative of cooperation.

CONCLUSION

Human Factors.-In addition to the principles of war I have mentioned, there are certain human factors that must always be considered, as they are indispensable to success.

Discipline. The application of the above unchanging principles of war will not insure success without discipline, as evidenced by willing and cheerful obedience of orders, uncomplaining acceptance of necessary hardships, loyalty, and intelligent effort.

Morale. This factor is applicable to the individual as well as to the unit. The morale of the unit is directly influenced by and dependent upon the morale of the individual. High morale of a unit consists of confidence in its fitness and superiority through which it is rendered capable of developing itself to the accomplishment of the purpose for which designed.

To sum it up, we may say that in every unit there can be but one commander; that that commander is not compromising himself in the slightest by consulting with his staff, but that when the decision is made, it is not made by the staff, but made by the commander. The command conference, it must be understood, is not a council of war, for a council of war, is, generally speaking, a bad thing. Napoleon states that a council of war is a good thing for an excuse for not doing anything. Centralization should be considered conditions.

a

Leadership. The power of leadership developed in every individual, from the highest to the lowest, in the military organization constitutes factor essential to success in the application of the principles of war. This power, in its highest form, requires that for all situations as they arise, every group, large or small, and every effort of the group will be intelligently and properly directed regardless of

We should not study the art of war save to discover, if not the secret of victory, at any rate the causes that contribute to success or failure.

To best accomplish this we must study the campaigns of the great commanders. "Take them as your model, that is the only way of becoming a great captain, to obtain the secrets of the art of war," says Napoleon. At another place he says: "Your genius thus enlightened will cause you to do nothing in violation of the teaching of these men.' Napoleon recommended to his brother Joseph that he study in particular the history of his own country to obtain this knowledge, saying, "History that would make known . . . how our frontiers have been defended in different wars," meaning that a study of the military history of one's own country is of greatest benefit.

But all of our studies and researches would be in vain if they did not lead us to some conclusions. Merely memorizing is useless; it is necessary that one should know what was attempted, what was actually done, and what should have been done. But we must never imagine that we can deduce infallible rules nor reduce warfare to an exact science. An infinite variety of elements come into play in war; some are altogether material, while others are of a moral and intellectual order. Sometimes one element, sometimes another, gains the advantage, as the case may be.

But everything else being equal, with armies of the same standard of efficiency and commanded by competent leaders, numbers, the material element, will be the deciding factor. And it remains the deciding factor when numerical superiority is such that the genius of a Napoleon would not

suffice to reestablish that balance. We have many cases where brilliant leadership has offset disparity of numbers, as for example, Napoleon in 1814, and Lee during the Manassas campaign of 1862, but in the end numbers prevailed. "There is no hierarchy among the principles of war; one cannot pretend that one is more important than another." One day victory goes to the strongest battalions, next day "one man is everything." "Genius triumphed over numbers at Dresden and 2d Manassas and succumbed at Leipzig" and in the Wilderness of '64.

In spite of the contradictions resulting from fate, a study of the material causes of victory or reasons for defeat will not be sterile. Superiority of armament is unquestionably of importance, especially when it is very great.

great. When it is light, it gives small advantage. It was not the Dreyse rifle that carried the day at Koniggratz; it was the infantry that handled it-the same infantry that fought victoriously at Saint Privat and Gravelotte against the French chessepot. We must not be negligent about adopting the most perfect weapons but we must remember that to rely upon them solely will not bring victory. The Turks had a better rifle than the Russians in 1878, yet that fact did not bring them victory; the Russians at the outset of the war with Japan had superior artillery material, but failed to win, and in the World War superiority of wea pons could not offset lack of training. A plentiful supply of munitions, equipment and other reserves, especially transport matériel of various kinds, exercises so great an influence that its importance must not be ignored. Insufficient artillery, cavalry, aircraft, etc., may be a contributing cause of

failure or the only cause. "Superiority in numbers," says Clausewitz, "is the most usual means of victory." It is of the most importance when it is great enough to neutralize and make up for other shortcomings.

Chief of Infantry on Inspection

Tour

MAJOR GENERAL CHARLES S.

FARNSWORTH, the Chief of Infantry, accompanied by Major Leonard T. Gerow, Infantry, recently left this city on a tour of inspection of Infantry commands in Porto Rico and Panama. The party will arrive at San Juan, Porto Rico, on March 15. They will leave for Cristobal on March 26 and arrive on March 30. Leaving Cristobal on April 9, they are due to arrive in New York on April 16.

Before his return to Washington, the Chief of Infantry will visit Infantry commands at Miller Field, and Forts Wadsworth, Jay, Slocum, Hamilton, and Schuyler, N. Y.; Fort Hancock, N. J., and West Point, N. Y. He also expects to visit various R O. T. C.

equipment to the detriment of individual and organizational training, which were rated from "unsatisfactory" to "very good."

The following remarks are quoted from those of the General of the

Armies, which are contained in General Orders No. 2, War Department, January 20, 1923:

As a result of my personal observations and a study of reports during the past year, I take this occasion to bring to the attention of the Army many important matters requiring systematic and energetic efforts for their improvement. Inspections make it evident that commands which excel in discipline, military appearance, and administration too frequently are deficient in field training, and that in other commands the exact reverse is often the case. The efficiency of an organization or garrison is the measure of the value of its commander. It is his re

units in the Second and Third Corps sponsibility that the training and de

Areas.

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Infantry Ideals

RECENT inspection of approximately six regiments of Infantry revealed the interesting fact that in all of the inspections the items relating to material, such as arms, vehicles, animals, harness, and individual equipment were rated from "good" to "excellent," except that in one instance the rating of the individual equipment was only "fair." This is in accord with observations made by inspectors from the office of the Chief of Infantry last year, and indicates that possibly commanding officers are stressing the care of individual and organizational

velopment of his unit shall follow wellbalanced plans.

Cordial relations are to be maintained with the neighboring community and local military organizations; the post or camp well kept; individuals must be smart in appearance, uniformly clad, precise in their salutes and self-respecting; absolute perfection of minutiæ is to be sought in paradeground drills and ceremonies; and tactical training for battle must be constantly put forward as the ultimate object of all routine military endeavor.

A variety of reasons are given for deficiencies in some phase or particular. but these seldom can be accepted as satisfactory. Almost invariably difficulties can be overcome by an energetic and resourceful commander. The most successful performances during the World War were usually given by of

ficers where their predecessors had failed, claiming lack of men, material, or other means. Similar comparisons are evident today.

The above remarks are significant. The amount of time and effort devoted to one subject must not operate to the detriment of others.

Graduates of the Infantry School should not be placed with undue rcflection, but should be placed where all concerned will receive the benefit of their training. Difficult conditions for training should be studied from every angle, with a view of providing a means where every man may receive his share of that training.

Garrison training is made more important by the reduction in number and scope of courses in General and Special Service Schools.

Competition should be established in both military and athletic events, and where possible a suitable trophy should be awarded to the organization found superior in general efficiency. trophy should be held until the next similar competition.

This

the coming session of 1923-1924. Only field officers will be detailed to the Advanced Course, and only captains will be detailed to take the Company Officers' Course. There will be a total of approximately 200 students. The above is made necessary by a reduction. in school projects.

Rifle Fire

N one Infantry regiment a great bat

Rifle Marksmanship. It is battling to better the 1922 record. Other regiments are also waging the same battle.

But in addition to "beating last year's record," we have another point to keep in mind-the importance of rifle fire. The following incidents illustrate this importance.

An officer of the 38th Infantry relates the following as a part of his experiences in the Champagne-Marne

defensive:

1. We expected a German attack at this point and my battalion had standing verbal orders to hold our positions in that event until relieved. My platoon was entrenched along the bank of the Marne at position on the map marked

2. The enemy dropped a heavy barrage all along this area at 12.05 a. m. We prepared to receive the Infantry attack which was evidently to follow the artillery preparation.

3. As soon as it became light enough to see as far as the wood on the enemy side of the river (about 700 yards), I could see the enemy Infantry advancing in assault formation through the wheat fields. My platoon opened a brisk fire with rifles and two supporting machine guns in my rear commenced firing over my head. The enemy advance continued until he had