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Exercises

By Lt. Col. W. H. Waldron
Infantry, U. S. Army

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Enclosed find $2.50 for which please forward to the address below one copy of TERRAIN EXERCISES.

Address...

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Efficiency Reports

Col. Geo. B. Pritchard, U. S. A. Retired

Judge not that ye be not judged. For with what judgment ye judge ye shall be judged: and with what measure ye mete, it shall be measured to you again.

URING the late unpleasantness, the writer, whose entire duty was with troops, had occasion to see quite a varied assortment of Efficiency Reports pass through his hands from time to time, and has formed a few opinions on the subject as a result of this experience.

Two different cases illustrating opposite extremes of the same idea will suffice to give a clear notion of those others that fall between them. (It will be remembered that ratings at the beginning and for a long time afterwards were made on a percentage basis.) One report gave an officer nearly 100 per cent in everything. My first thought before the officer's arrival was that here indeed must be the Moses that is going to lead us out of the wilderness of this terrible conflict, and I was perhaps not guiltless of a lurking feeling that as the discoverer of the great leader I might receive some of his reflected glory due to my discovery.

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Upon the officer's arrival I was not discouraged to note that he seemed not at all conscious of transcendent qualities. I therefore adopted a policy of persistent "watchful waiting" to which was joined the keenest interest and curiosity. After about three months had elapsed I was left with but one firmly fixed idea-How in the world did this officer during the short period of time consumed in his travel from his former commanding officer to me manage to lose or be deprived of at least 40 per cent of the ratings given him? The other case was of an officer whose percentages were so low that the only idea suggested to anyone's mind was why he had not been shot at sunrise instead of being loaded onto some one else. How much simpler and more economical this would seem to have been for the Government as well as more humane for the man himself, his friends and his family! When the man subsequently reported it was at once apparent that, like the report of Mark Twain's death, his deficiencies had been greatly exaggerated. Mentally, I granted the fellow a reprieve until I could check up on this business. He

turned out to be at least a good officer.

Some reports really strongly suggested that the commanding officer's orderly had made them out, or at least that some wag had had a hand in them. Perhaps the reader can explain them better than I.

I was gradually forced to the conclusion concerning the successful operation of this system that there was something rotten and that it wasn't in Denmark. The opportunity for injustice seemed so great and the consequences seemed so appalling that the writer decided to personally take the matter in hand in his own office. A few sheets were ruled for tabulating on one line a retained copy of the percentages of each one and a concise memo in a column of remarks. Thus both the of ficer reported on as well as the one doing the reporting would be protected, and a basis was supplied for the correction of any injustice that might have been done should occasion arise. As the officers were very numerous and it was not thought practicable to put into practice my rapidly crystallizing conviction that officers ought to be able to see their own efficiency reports, I decided that as not all were to see them none should see them. There must also be no leakage. The adjutant was directed to keep all reports under lock and key except those of the field and staff, which I myself kept under lock and key. The adjutant was impressed that through him alone could any leakage take place. Efficiency Reports. were made out by myself. I did the final calculating and the weighing and final deciding. The training, drilling and disciplining of the regiment had to gc hand-in-hand with constant study of the characters, abilities, and develop

ments of the officers. Their efficiency in my mind was therefore constantly a live, fluid, and vital subject.

The whole system in the Army improved, as we all remember, but was still more or less defective when the war ended. Constant effort has been made since then to improve it, but its operation, in my opinion, will never reach that stage where it will not al ways be a most delicate subject constantly to be watched and jealously guarded. The critical point of the system will always be right under the hat of the immediate commanding officer. The delegation of this duty to subordi nates is a dangerous practice. The character and the ability of the commanding officer and his attention to this duty in person is the greatest guarantec of contentment and the best pillar of justice that the system can have. The running of this matter by the adjutant. except the paper work, would be a bad condition in any regiment. In other words, no matter how fine the system, it can never be any better in its effect than the average character, conscience, and carefulness of its immediate operators. Reports made out in haste are of doubtful value. The negative praetice of some commanders to neglect to keep their diagnoses of their officers up to the minute and then to give credit for everything for which no contrary evidence happens to be at hand is relatively unjust. It is the business of commanders constantly and actively to go after such evidence as will enable them correctly to estimate the efficiency of each officer and thereby to do relative justice to all. Good as well as bad is what he is after and a proper attitude will impress his officers with his

fairness and not lead him into the path of officious nagging over petty affairs. Admiral Sims has stated, and so say we all of us, that when a commanding officer finds that he cannot support a subordinate, he should relieve him from his position or at least take action that will bring about a change in the situation. The continual discrimination in mind and manner against a subordinate coupled with the lack of courage to correct him or remove him, is one of the worst possible traits in a commander, and leads ultimately to peevishness which finds an outlet in cumulatingly poor efficiency reports-a species of official murder born of moral cowardice. Every subordinate has the moral (more important than the legal) right to know reasonably promptly wherein his service or conduct is deficient, in order that he may have the chance to correct it promptly before he becomes confirmed in a bad habit through ignorance or through a lack of correction. A showdown with a subordinate is furtheremore constantly necessary (barring trivial matters) in order that he may be credited or debited according to the change or lack of change of attitude or conduct on his part. Failure to do one's duty by a subordinate as above outlined, the writer has not the slightest doubt, has in the last few years resulted in the expulsion in good faith but with great injustice from the service of some very worthy public servants. In Navy parlance we might designate the violation of Admiral Sims' dictum as the "Surreptitious Submarining of Subordinates."

Our Efficiency Reports give the subordinate an opportunity to answer unfavorable reports on questions of Fact, but he need never be appraised

But

of the most vicious attacks on his record if they are slipped in under the caption of. Opinion. But opinions are not without considerable weight in determining relative worth with the War Department. A slight concession in this direction has of late years been made by the suggestion from the War Department that subordinates should be verbally and informally informed of their defects which are matters of opinion at the time of their discovery by their commanding officers. there is still nothing explicitly mandatory in this regard or that thoroughly protects the subordinate from injury in this matter. Moreover, if the terms average, above average, and superior, corresponding to the old terms, good, very good, and excellent, respectively, are all considered not unfavorable, an officer may yet lose out relatively with a clean record of not below average, simply because on an absolute basis for the time being he was barred from showing that some or all of these terms should have been above average or superior. This is the method of damning by faint praise. Of what relative good is it to get 90 per cent at school if everybody else gets over 90? What relative harm is done when you get 76 per cent (just over proficient) if everybody else is deficient? Remember that the action of a board which places a man in Class B is a matter of opinion, based largely on the written opinions submitted to it. This suggests to us the necessity of some method of standardizing of the reports of the different commanders for justice when reports of different commanders on two different officers are considered. Referring again to the withholding of opinions from officers, it should not be forgotten

that after many years have passed, when time has dimmed the memory and the facilities for refutation (which were at hand at the time) have disintegrated, the officer's record is practically ruined by a silent, subtle and not impossibly villainous force against which he is now powerless.

Meanwhile, the records in the case are in perfect shape, the system has been carried out from above with good faith and with great uniformity and impartially-technically. The book

keeping is unassailable. To borrow a surgical expression, "The operation was successful, but the patient died," or, in the language of the poet: "Of all sad words of tongue or pen, the saddest are these-It might have been."

Other factors of importance in the matter of the justice of Efficiency Reports are the lack of uniformity in the

number, rank, age, experience, and relation to the subordinate of commanding officers who make out these reports; the periods of time which these reports cover, the qualifications for the job of rating officers, and in some cases (involved in the matter of qualification) the justly deserved defective ratings of the commanders themselves. It would be interesting to know what should be the true rating of an officer on his

moral character if the moral character of his commander is considered, say below average or poor. What should be the true rating, and how are we going to secure it, of an officer in professional zeal if his commander's professional zeal is fair or indifferent? Of what value is the opinion of a hard drinker on a young officer's record for sobriety? But, you say, the next higher commander has a chance to correct the re

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