spayed heifer. Nor did some know that there should only be twenty-five pounds variation between the fore and hind quarters or that they were entitled to equal numbers of fore and hind quarters. Neither did they know that in case of potatoes the round varieties must be 17% and the long varieties 134. new. Knowing our need along these lines, we held a meeting in the local Armour plant. Colonel Matthews, a Regular officer on duty with the Reserves, who had made a specialty of the Army ration, addressed us. The entire plant was turned over to us and part of the evening Colonel Matthews lectured on fundamentals. The remainder of the The remainder of the evening was given over to practical demonstrations in the refrigeration plant. Not one of the seventy-five officers present left without learning something that he had never known before and all learned much that was Personally, the writer felt that each officer after that one lecture was worth a year's pay more to the Government in the event of war than he was before he attended that one meeting. It will be unnecessary to dwell at length on the other subjects covered; suffice it to say that they all were covered thoroughly and each time by the best man available. At times we would secure the services of an officer from Washington or Corps Headquarters here on an inspection tour. We called on the Commanding General at Camp Lewis and on the Commanding Officer at Fort Lawton or on the Military Department of the University of Washington for specialists. When we were covering the fundamentals we had our own officers prepare papers. We mobilized, entrained, encamped, and trained a Division. After five or six of our own officers had completed their papers we would conduct a critique of 15 or 20 minutes. Some of the other subjects covered have been Functions of the General Staff and the Working of the War College and Staff School; Gas Development Since the War; Trains; Operation of the Medical Department at the Front; Service of Supply; Marches and Outposts; Scouting and Patroling; Air Development Since the War; Eugineers at the Front; Artillery at the Front, etc. Our lectures are mimeographed and not only make a valuable library for future reference but also give the officer who has been unfortunate enough to be absent the opportunity to get a copy of the lecture. We in Seattle feel that we are worth a hundred times more to Uncle Sam as Reserve Officers because of our 18 months of intensive work along this line than we would otherwise have been. We have made it our business to make these meetings so interesting and instructive that our officers will not miss meetings if they can possibly avoid it. HERBERT W. MEYERS, Lieut. Col. 383d Enf., President Seattle Sector. Reserve Officers Records The Personnel Section of the Office of the Chief of Infantry is now engaged in securing the records of Reserve Officers of Infantry assigned to that Branch of the service. Blank forms (423a, A. G. O.) are being sent out to the officers concerned, and it is the desire that they be completed and returned at the earliest practicable date. Reserve officers will appreciate the necessity for having their records on file with the Adjutant General of the Army complete, and the only source from which the desired information may be obtained is the officer himself. This matter is being sent out under envelopes marked "Important," and when it is received it should be taken at its face value. Don't Give Up the Ship The following letter was written by a reserve officer assigned to the 81st Division, U. S. Army: Sometimes those of us who are in the reserves are prone to say: "Oh well, I don't see much to it; and, anyway, I have about done my share. Let someone else do it now. I haven't the time. And besides, it won't do me any good, because there won't be another war in my time." No, there won't be much to it, unless we make something of it, and if we don't there isn't much to us. Con gress and the War Department look with favor upon the Reserve, and hope that it will solve the great problem of national defense. If it fails, then this country will be in a serious condition. It will fail unless the members realize its potential value and build it up to assume its vital role. Do we realize how very, very much there is to the Reserve? Have we done our share if we fail to develop the only real military policy this country has ever advocated? Who else can do it but us? Who know how, except those who have been and are now soldiers? We can't let someone else do it, because there is no one else. And the very fact that perhaps we will not fight the next war is all the more reason why we should develop an organization that will conserve the benefits of our experience and pass it on to those who must eventually fight. If we think clearly, carefully and de liberately, common sense and conscience will show us that to evade the issue now will eventually mean the same disgrace and disaster that to evade service meant during the war. Realizing that fact, let us be men, deliberately face the issue, and do that which we know we should do-diligently, consistently and elaborately build our Reserve Corps. MURRAY JAMES, 1st Lieut., Hq. 161st Inf. Brigade. I Army Regulations The Infantry Association edition of the Army Regulations has been completed and is now ready for distribution. It is a book of 716 pages, handsomely bound in dark blue cloth and will make a valuable addition to the Reserve Officer's library. The book contains all of the new Regulations that are required by the individual officer and in addition all of the paragraphs of the old Regulations that cover the same category. These latter have been corrected up to date from the latest changes and circulars affecting them. A complete index makes the subject matter readily available. This is the one book that the Reserve Officer must have in order to keep abreast of the times. The price is $3.00 per copy. May we have your order? I Training Regulations In order to get the material into the hands of Reserve Officers so that it may be gotten over before the summer training camps, the War Department has authorized the U. S. Infantry Association to get out an edition of the new Infantry Training Regulations covering the Combat Principles of the Rifle squad, section and platoon. This is real up-to-the-minute stuff-the material that you will need at the Training Camps this summer. The book is now ready for distribution. The price is 75 cents per copy, postpaid. Allied Reaction to German Drive of March 21, 1918 In discussing the allied action from just prior to and during the German Drive of March, 1918, from the standpoint of the Allied High Command, it seems fitting to present the subject in the following order: I. A brief statement of the II. The German plans for the III. The Allies' plans for the IV. Lack of cooperation as to V. What the Allied High Everything pointed to an offensive by the Germans in the spring of 1918. The Allies felt that France could do nothing to add to her strength. British recruiting had not been sufficient to replace the losses from the Third Ypres and Cambrai. The Italians were unable to add anything and the Americans could not be counted on arriving in sufficient numbers until the summer. Whatever was to be done would have to be done with the forces then available. (2) Comparative statement of forces on various fronts: Allies 61 Divisions ITALIAN FRONT Central Powers 4611⁄2 Divisions German 4312 Austrian1 3 6 French VI. What happened during the 5 British 50 Italian Battalions (1) As to cause of defeat -lack of cooperation 633,000 Rifles 439,000 3,400 in their plans and 3,000 Heavy Guns 1,500 (2) As to violation or BALKANS 1 Austria had 34 Divisions on the East Front, part of which could be sent to Italy. Greek mobilization not complete, but later in the spring their contingent should be doubled or trebled, giving advantage to allies. Allies Central Powers 23 Divisions 27 Divisions 8 French 23 Bulgarian 412 British 2 German 112 Italian 2 Austrian 3 Greek2 6 Serbian 294 271 219.000 Bns. Rifles 228,000 3,000 Field Guns 972 353 With Russians and Roumanians out, Germany could bring at the rate of 10 divisions per month from east to west, in four months a total of 40. ORDER OF BATTLE Allies, March 15 I and IV British From Arras to South of Gon- III British Army (16 Div.) 10 Div. Line-6 Reserve South of the Oise reserve Germany, March 21 IV Flanders From Arras south ward XVII Army Otto von Below, Hero of Caporetto (5 corps and 23 divisions) From Cambrai to just north of St. Quentin (Picardy) II Army -Von der Marwitz (5 corps, 23 divisions) South to the Oise, XVIII Army. Oskar von Hutier (4 corps, 23-24 divisions) South of the Oise, VII Army-Von Boehns Rheims, I Army and 5 other di- Champagne, III visions in serve re Army *March 20, allies had 168 Divisions; 59 Divisions on reserve, 8,956 field and 7,168 heavy guns, 3,870 airplanes. *March 21, Germany had 192 Divisions; 85 in reserve, 11,200 field and 7,920 heavy guns, 2,730-2,890 airplanes. Of the 70 divisions in reserve, 33 were in close reserve, 37 in general reserve believed to be in four masses: MauburgeFournac, ChimayFourmies, Champagne, Arton GERMAN PLAN FOR SPRING OF 1918 With the opportunity to strengthen her forces on the Western Front by the transfer of divisions from the east, thereby overcoming the allied superiority, Germany planned a vigorous offensive with the object of breaking through and dividing the French and British, rolling up the British right and then beating them in detail. She had the opportunity of bringing superior forces against selected points of the allied front. She had the advantage of interior lines, of adequate rail road nets for prompt movement of troops and supplies, and of placing her reserves so that she could strike either against the French or British Front. Her plan was to threaten the Allies at one or more points and conceal, if pos sible, the main attack. She began with a series of blows from Laon to Verdun, a powerful attack opposite Amiens, followed by an attack against the British near Ypres, and two attacks against the French between Rheims and Montdidier toward Chateau-Thierry. She drove the Allies back 35 miles at Amiens, 10 miles at Ypres and 30 miles at Chateau-Thierry. She failed to break through. She failed to defeat them in detail. She threatened, but did not destroy communication between the British and French. She threatened but did not capture Amiens or Paris. ALLIED PLAN FOR SPRING OF 1918 While it is true that the various Allied High Commanders calculated that the German High Command not only saw but fully appreciated their advantage in the situation, and had resigned themselves to the defensive until the Americans could offset the inevitable German superiority, it is equally true that there was a division ing out these plans and as to unity of of opinion as to the method of carry. command. Lloyd George determined in November, 1917, as a result of Caparetto, on the formation of the Supreme War Council to guide the Allies in their future policies. The Supreme War Council at Versailles consisted of the Prime Ministers and one other minister of cabinet rank from each of the tional policies. The military interests Allies. Its duty was to coordinate na military delegates from France, Britwere represented by four permanent ain, Italy, and the United States. They were to attend but were not members and had no votes. The military members were, therefore, without executive |