power and all their decisions as to movement and strategy remained with the cabinet members concerned.

The Supreme War Council advocated as the plan of campaign for 1918:

To stand on the defensive on the Western Front until the Americans arrive.

To give the allied armies from the North Sea to the Adriatic a single organ of command.

To take the offensive in Palestine. The defensive plan of the Supreme War Council contained two important considerations:

(1) Extension of British Front.

(2) Unity of command by formation of general reserve controlled by an executive committee, with Foch in control.

LACK OF COOPERATION AS TO METHOD OF
CARRYING OUT THEIR PLANS, WITH
SPECIAL REFERENCE ΤΟ UNITY OF
COMMAND.

(1) Extension of British Front.Linked with the idea of Unity of Command was the extension of the British Front. After consideration of the subject, the Executive War Board, composed of Foch, Sir Henry Wilson, Bliss and Cadorna, decided that the British should take over as far as the Ailette (near Anizy le Chateau). The French desired this extension to go as far as Bar-le-Duc.

In spite of the above decision, Haig and Petain decided on Barisis as the point, and this compromise was finally accepted by the Supreme War Council.

(2) Unity of Command by Formation of General Reserve.-The General Reserve was to be formed by withdrawing a seventh of the total allied

force from the North Sea to the Adriatic and was fixed at 30 divisions, to be placed under control of a committee with Foch at its head, primarily to gain Unity of Command. The actual existence of a General Reserve failed because of Haig's refusal to contribute his pro rata share of divisions, and with it the proposed Unity of Command of the Allied forces on the Western Front.

WHAT THE ALLIED COMMANDERS DID TO
MEET THE COMING OFFENSIVE

(1) As early as December, 1917,
Foch and Sir Henry Wilson proposed
the formation of a General Reserve for
the allied forces on the Western Front.
This reserve was to be grouped into
what was to be called a Reserve Army
commanded by a committee with Foch
at its head. In support of the plan it
was argued that Haig and Petain
would never form such a Reserve and
that its existence would furnish the
necessary power to strike where needed.
The proposal was approved by the Su-
preme War Council and on February
6 the allied commanders-in-chief were
notified of the pro rata share each was
to furnish.

The French designated the III French Army then in line, the I French Army, and some troops from Italy.

The Italians signified their approval of the plan.

As pointed out, part of the plan in creating this reserve included the extension of the British Front; so the withdrawal of the III French Army entailed the V British Army taking over that front. Thus far the plan worked.

Foch expressed the following view to the Executive War Board:

Ludendorff must launch his mass of attack either westward or southward, either toward the British side of the angle in the Cambrai region or toward the French side of the angle, the Rheims region. But if he is successful and drives one or the other of these lines back he himself presents an unguarded and open flank, and the more successful he is-the more he enlarges the angle-the longer and therefore more open and unguarded his flank will be. (Pp. 81-83, Supreme War Council, by Wright.)

Foch, therefore, proposed to have a maneuver mass and to place his Reserve Army in the following places: The smallest near Dauphinee, close to the best crossing into Italy; the largest part to be concentrated in the vicinity of Paris; the remainder concentrated in the vicinity of Amiens. Foch stated that, "The Amiens portion stands behind the British Fifth Army, the weakest point in the line, and ready to support it." (Pp. 81-83, the Supreme War Council, by Wright.)

In placing a portion of his Reserve at Dauphinee Foch was influenced by the feeling that the Germans might attempt to violate the neutrality of Switzerland, and in accordance with his "Le Plan H" which he had previously studied and produced for the purpose of assisting the Swiss in this

event.

The Paris concentration was in position to go wherever the main German attack developed.

On February 6, the various C. in C. were notified of their quotas for the formation of the General Reserve.

On February 22 Haig and Petain (who had been present at the meeting of the Supreme War Council when the Executive War Board was created) was created)

met at the Grand Quartier-General and arranged for an entirely different and independent scheme of defense. The scheme of defense was based on an agreement that if one army (Haig or Petain) was attacked the other would assist by taking over part of the line, but only by extension. Under this arrangement each C. in C. (Haig or Petain) would decide for himself what assistance he would give. A stipulation which Petain placed in the agreement was, "that he was only bound to extend his extreme left if the British were attacked at a portion of their line other than the extreme right" (Su-· preme War Council, pp. 93, by Wright), which in effect nullified the agreement as the attack actually developed.

On March 3, Haig notified the Executive War Board that he refused to contribute any divisions to the General Reserve except the British division then in Italy, which in fact was not under his command. This killed the General Reserve scheme, for the Italians upon learning of Haig's action withdrew their approval and with it disappeared, for the time being, unity of command. Therefore, on March 21, when the Germans actually started their main offensive, the Allied High Command had done nothing in preparation for the coming offensive but extend and weaken the British front.1

Haig in his estimate in the fall of 1917 concluded that preparations must be made to meet a strong and sustained hostile attack. His interests were centered in taking over 28 additional miles of front from the French; to securing replacements and in their training; to providing necessary system

For location of Reserves just prior to the March 21 Drive, see map attached.

of defense and constructing new lines; and to reorganizing units so as to em ploy American units soon to be received. Nelson, in his history, states:

Haig had concluded that from Arras north no ground could be lost without great sacrifice. From Arras south a limited amount of ground could be given up without strategic danger. This required a discreet disposition of reserves between the two sectors.

An examination of the map shows the distribution and location of the 18 divisions he had in reserve. Note the weakness of the 5th British Army.

WHAT HAPPENED DURING MARCH DRIVE

The German plan was to separate the British and French, hold the French left, roll up the British right, throw the British back on the coast, and beat them in detail.

Early in March the Germans began a series of attacks or blows against the French from the Ailette to Verdun, certain sectors in Lorraine and the Vosges and in British Flanders.

The French High Command believed that the main German attack would be delivered against the British from the Scarpe to the Oise, with less serious attacks against the French between the Aisne and Suippe.

The British High Command agreed as to the zones, but believed that the main attack would be against the French, with minor efforts only on their front.

The main effort was directed against the British V and III Armies of 30 divisions, which held from Arras to the Oise, and was delivered by VII Army, Von Bulow; II Army, Marwitz; and XVII Army, Hutier, with 69 divisions.

Haig, in his report dated October 21, 1918, states:

Completion of arrangements for closest possible cooperation with the French was recognized to be a matter of great importance and urgency. Plans were drawn up in combination with the French military authorities and were worked out in detail to meet the different situations which might arise on the different parts of the allied front. Measures were taken to insure the smooth and rapid execution of these plans. Among the many problems studied by the allied staffs, those involved by a hostile offensive on the line of the Somme River and the passage of that river by the enemy had been worked out. The plans applicable to such a situation had been drawn up and were ready to be put into execution when required. (From Haig's report dated October 21, 1918. Nelson's History of the War, Vol. XXII, page 193, D 521, B 91.)

During the drive against the III and V British Armies, the following reenforcements were sent the V Army under Gough from March 21 to 28:

By Haig: On the 24th, the 8th British Division from St. Omer, 72 hours after the battle started.

By Petain: Night of 22/23, 125th French Division without Artillery and 50 rounds per Infantryman, and the 1st Cavalry Division.

Saturday, afternoon March 23, units of the 9th and 10th Divisions. March 24, 62d Division and units of 22d Division.

March 25, 133d Division (from Belgian front).

March 26, 35th Division.

March 27, 56th, 162d and 166th Divisions. (For location and movement of these divisions see map.) Note the 35th British was sent to Gough on Sunday, March 24, but went to Byng on the 25th.

Historians record that Haig had given no instructions to Gough before

or during the battle. Haig refused to send any troops south of the Somme

Petain agreed, on Saturday, the 23d, to send three divisions to Gough. On Saturday morning, the 125th French and 1st Cavalry Division. counter-attacked with the 18th British Division on Crozat Canal without success. Haig had to arrange with Petain to take over the front from south of Perrone, including passing the 3d, 18th, and 19th Corps to Foyolle. Haig urged Petain on Sunday, March 24, to send the 20th Division. Petain promised 12, but by Sunday 6 had arrived or were arriving and the 12 did not complete their arrival until Wednesday, the 27th.

On

On the same date, 24th, Haig wired Lloyd George to come over and arrange for a single supreme commander. On Sunday, the 24th, Petain thought it possible that connection between the two armies might be preserved. Monday, the 25th, Haig was considering a retreat on the sea, Petain to fall back on Paris. On Tuesday, the 26th, Clemenceau could not choose between Foch and Petain. At noon, at Doullens, in conference with Lord Milner, Clemenceau decided Foch was to coordinate the two armies; in effect, was put in command. That afternoon Foch directed Debeney to take out of line troops which were farther south and reenforce in front of Amiens.

CONCLUSIONS

(1) As to cause of defeat: Lack of cooperation in their plans and lack of unity of command.-Perhaps the weakness of their plan lies in the fact that they had not agreed on any definite plan other than to stand on the defensive. Haig determined not to give any ground north of Arras and

disposed of the greater part of his reserves to that end. He opposed any scheme which advocated unity of command or a general reserve army until his V Army had been beaten and thrown back 35 miles. Yet he consented to extend his front 28 miles. It is said this was forced on him by his Prime Minister's decision at the Supreme War Council, yet he agreed with Petain on a different point from that selected by that council.

Petain stood with his army between his government, the people of France. and the German Army. He appears to have taken a position to wait till the main blow developed. He agreed to turn over his pro rata share of divisions to the general reserve scheme. He afterwards entered into an agreement with Haig relative to the support to be given as shown herein. His 38 reserve divisions were in four main groups: La Fere-Rheims, Rheims-Verdun, St. Mihiel-Arracourt, and opposite Mulhausen on his extreme right flank. If Petain and Haig proposed to prevent the Germans from dividing their armies, the disposition of their reserves do not disclose this fact.

The Allied high commanders had all agreed that the Germans would take the offensive and that one of their objectives would be to divide the French and British Armies. To gain a better understanding of the situation in the event the German main effort was made with this object in view, a war game was played and the details closely observed. The weakness must have been appreciated, for the decision. gave Amiens to the Germans, the vital communication connection between the two armies.

Foch and Sir Henry Wilson planned