BIBLIOGRAPHY BROWNE, L., This Believing World. A popular account of the religious beliefs of the world. COLUMBIA ASSOCIATES IN PHILOSOPHY, An Introduction to Reflective Thinking, chaps. VI, VII, VIII. Chapter six considers the general validity of a religious view of the world, chapters seven and eight the conflict between religion and science with respect to the theory of evolution and the higher criticism of the Bible. EDMAN, I., Richard Kane Looks at Life, chap. X. . A vivid portrayal of the form frequently taken today by the religious problem. JAMES, W., The Varieties of Religious Experience. A classic analysis of the extremer types of mystic experience, with respect to their psychological nature and the validity of the convictions about the world which they suggest. MILL, J. S., Three Essays on Theism. A fairly impartial study of the theistic view of the world in the light of the empirical evidence. MOORE, G. F., The Birth and Growth of Religion. An excellent elementary account of the history of religion. OTTO, M. C., Things and Ideals. A plea for the transfer of emotional enthusiasm from religious ob- RUSSELL, B., "The Free Man's Worship" (in Mysticism and Logic). THE CHAPTER TWENTY-ONE . A FINAL QUESTION support HE emphasis of the preceding chapters of the present section Does has been on problems rather than on principles of thinking. our outIn view of the obvious disagreements of intelligent people on the come really fundamental issues that arise in the extra-scientific fields discussed, and of the frankly coöperative purpose of the entire a sceptical volume, this was the only emphasis that could be permitted or conjustified. But the honest parading of the differences that con- clusion? stitute the problem of logic in these realms may have had an unduly sceptical outcome in the reader's convictions as to the possibilities and responsibilities of thinking on such matters. Do not such basically opposing beliefs, he may say to himself, imply that the effort to establish standards of thinking in these fields is entirely hopeless? The keener a thinker is, the more certain he will be to reach results here that are inconsistent with those reached by others; the simplest conclusion therefore to draw from the situation is that there is no such thing as objective truth on such subjects at all, and that we might just as well remain in what happen to be our present prejudices about them, since even when we have tried to think our way through the maze there will be plenty of equally intelligent people to contradict our conclusions. And, he might add, if the guiding thesis of the present section is sound, lack of objectivity is inherent in the process of valuation which is ineradicable from reflection on these problems. Where then lies the value of engaging in serious reflection here at all? Would it not be an equally or more justifiable policy to desist from any systematic attempt to guide ourselves intelligently in the judgments we pass on matters transcending scientific objectivity? This too a question of valu ation and will be answered variously Factors support Now since this question itself is one of comparative valuation, it is one on which different minds will differ, and the author does not propose to violate the atmosphere with which the discussion of these problems has been surrounded, despite the fact that philosophers are agreed on the supreme desirability of thinking on matters of valuation as vigorously and responsibly as we can. It will be fairer to put the question in this form: What are the factors that encourage such a sceptical feeling about the value of reflection here, and what can be said in support of the conviction that such reflection is most decidely valuable, quite irrespective of the divergent conclusions to which it leads? The answer to this question has really been given in the early chapters of the book, in which a general comparison of reflection with its possible alternatives was embarked upon, and again in the introductory chapter of the present section. But it will be pertinent to survey the problem again in the light of the ground traversed in the intervening chapters. Let us examine the alternative to careful and critical reflection on problems involving valuation, namely a complacent and undising sceptiturbed contentment with our present notions about them, except of reflec in so far as we are unavoidably and perhaps temporarily jostled tive evalu-out of these notions. The appeal of this policy, as will be realized cal distrust ation from the discussion in chapter three, lies mainly in the fact that it involves no intellectual effort, in the heightening of pleasurable emotions arising from the reaffirmation of loyalty to beliefs already become habitual, and in the avoidance of the natural unpleasantness which attends a period of doubt and uncertainty. These forces have some effect on all of us and a very strong effect on those whose minds have never been encouraged to develop habits of intellectual criticism; moreover, in the case of almost all there are certain beliefs that lie so close to our profounder emotions that it is practically impossible to consider fairly an opposing belief-we cannot imagine ourselves deprived of such convictions. But is it not evident from the entire course of our discussion that it is quite impossible for us to insulate ourselves from the likelihood of falling into difficulties on account of the inadequacies avoiding about values of these present notions in which we propose to remain? If we The adopt the Utilitarian ethics, and there are really certain human impossisituations in which following the Utilitarian principle will lead us bility of to commit acts which we shall subsequently rue, how shall we problems guard ourselves from the possibility of tumbling into these situa- that tions? If we believe that God performs miracles, and it so force happen that the universe is such that miracles are impossible, thought how can we avoid the tragic disappointment of the vain expectancy of miracles occurring in our behalf, in situations which we might have learned to control had we been convinced of the universality of natural law? If we commit ourselves dogmatically to a sentimental idealism in the field of art, are we not preparing for ourselves inevitable æsthetic disappointments in a world characterized more and more by realistic and experimental tendencies in the work of artists? It is hardly necessary to repeat the same theme in reference to the other realms in which the same considerations apply. In short, to attempt to follow this way out of the difficulty is to place ourselves in an inherently unstable equilibrium, to pursue the impossible goal of dictating in the present the nature of all our future problems and insisting that they must be confined within the limits that will permit satisfactory solution in terms of our present opinions. And when we face this fact frankly how can we rest complacently in our traditional notions no matter how strongly we may desire to do so? We must come to hold our beliefs tentatively and flexibly, for we see that something might happen at any time to force us to enlarge or replace them in the interest of solving satisfactorily a real difficulty we had met. We see, in other words, that being what we are, and living in the kind of world we do, the only cure for inadequate thinking is more earnest and persistent thinking. But in what direction would a stable equilibrium lie? For in some vital sense we all seek it and feel insecure without it. Is not this the answer toward which the entire argument points: It lies in the firm adoption of the readiness to commit ourselves confidently to action on the basis of the best judgments which experience to date permits us to form, coupled with the readiness actively to correct them to whatever extent the most careful Y accept ance reflection on experience shows to be desirable. It involves acceptance of the inevitability of change, and of free, disciplined thinking as the only way of adopting our own process of growth to the responsi-changing world. The value, in short, of practical readiness, combility of of the construc tive thinking the only attitude that can be consist ently maintained bined with forwardlooking intellectual tentativeness, is that it may be dependably counted upon to deal as adequately as possible with all other values; and if this be the case, the unreserved adoption of this attitude is the only way to achieve such mental equilibrium as is possible in a dynamic world. It means the gradual transfer of emotional appeal from the specific beliefs which have at present come to entwine themselves about our affections, to the process of continual reconstruction of our beliefs so that we shall prize the attitude of tentativeness more than any notion which might conflict with it. This transfer of feeling is difficult and arouses resistance from all the conservative sides of human nature, but it is not impossible. If we have come to see it as ultimately necessary and desirable we shall find that the forces working toward its attainment have the advantage of constancy while the opposing forces, though more intense, are fickle and transitory. The realm in which this reconstruction is most difficult is probably that of religion, for the emotional supports of beliefs consecrated by sacred tradition and ritual are most intense. To the deeply pious soul it seems quite impossible that the fervid attachment characterizing his attitude toward the objects of his faith could ever be secured by competing goods; the eternal salvation of himself and of others appears dependent on the maintenance of unquestioning loyalty toward these objects of devotion. But the remarkable rise of liberalism in almost all religious groups in the world today, and the extent of the transformation that has already been brought about within a few decades, shows that even in religion the transfer of devotion from objects that cannot approve themselves to intelligence to those that offer a better title to allegiance, is not only possible but can take place far more rapidly than the most optimistic champions of tentativeness in thinking would have dared to prophesy. In religion, too, the mind that is most apt to win deep satisfaction in a dy |