a town are to be exercised by ordinances to be passed by the town council, an order or resolution adopted by the council and entered on its records, will be, in point of form, a valid exercise of a power. (2) A town charter authorized the town council to require the citizens to work on the streets in such manner as the council might prescribe by ordinance, not exceeding ten days in each year. Held, that it was not necessary for the ordinance to fix the precise number of days that each man should be required to work; this might be left to the overseer of streets, without infringing the rule against the delegation of legislative power. (3) The power to require work to be done upon the streets as by ordinance the council may prescribe, implies the power of imposing penalties for a failure to work. Citing 2 Dillon Mun. Corp., §§ 604, 622; Thompson v. City of Boonville, 61 Mo. 282; First Municipality v. Cutting, 4 La. Ann. 335; 1 Dillon Mun. Corp., § 244. Town of Tipton v. Norman. Opinion by Henry, J. WISCONSIN SUPREME COURT ABSTRACT.* DEED-WITH UNCERTAIN DESCRIPTION - EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE held that "where there has been a body corporate de facto for a considerable period of time, claiming at least to be such, and holding and enjoying property as a corporation, it will be presumed that every mere formal requisite to the due creation of the corporation has been complied with." It was further, in effect, held in that case that one contracting with such church in its corporate name thereby admits the existence of the corporation, and cannot thereafter deny it; and where suit is brought by the trustees of such church colore officii, the defendant cannot object upon the ground that they are not trustees, without showing that the proceedings have been instituted against them by the government, and carried on to a judgment of ouster. Whitney v. Robinson. Opinion by Cassoday, J. REPLEVIN -OF SEWING MACHINE SOLD ON INSTALLMENT PLAN-WHEN DEMAND NECESSARY. - A. delivers to B. a sewing machine under a contract for the sale thereof, by which title is not to pass to B. until full payment is made in specified installments, and on default of any payment A. is to be at liberty to take the machine away at his option. Held, (1) that A., on default in a payment, could not replevy the machine from B.'s possession without demand or notice of his when it had been suffered to remain in B.'s possession for several months after the default, plaintiff claiming meanwhile that the payment was due. (2) That the possession of the machine by B.'s wife, living with him as such, was B.'s possession. (3) That in the absence of any proof that B. was keeping out of the way to avoid notice and demand, a demand upon his wife, and her refusal to surrender the machine, and claim that it belonged to B., were not a demand upon and refusal and claim by B., unless she was especially authorized to act for him in that behalf, and the mere fact that she had made all the previous payments is not sufficient to establish such agency. Smith v. Newland9 Hun, 553; Johnston v. Whittemore, 27 Mich. 463; Giddey v. Altman, id. 209; Deyal v. Jamison, 33 id. 94; Cushman v. Jewell, 7 Hun, 525-530; Hutchings v. Munger, 41 N. Y. 155-158. Wheeler & Wilson Manufacturing Co. v. Teetzlaff. Opinion by Taylor, J. GRANTOR ESTOPPEL-ONE DEEDING TO CORPORA-option, and refusal by B. to surrender it, especially TION MAY NOT DENY CORPORATE EXISTENCE.—(1) A deed with a description otherwise uncertain should be construed with reference to the actual rightful state of the property at the time of the execution; and extrinsic evidence of that state is admissible to aid in the construction. Messer v. Oestreich, 10 N. W. Rep. 6. Where the grantee in such a deed goes into possession of land under it, and fences the same, and makes valuable improvements thereon, with the knowledge and acquiescence of the grantor, this is a practical construction of the deed, binding on the parties and those claiming under them. (2) Where one takes a mortgage including by its terms a parcel of land fenced off from the remainder of the mortgaged premises, and upon which a third party has erected and is maintain ing and occupying a valuable building, neither he nor a purchaser on foreclosure of his mortgage acquires any greater rights against such third party than the mortgagor has. Holcomb v. Holcomb, 2 Barb. 23; Tall. man v. Ely, 6 Wis. 244. (3) One who executes a deed (in this case a lease) to a body claiming to be a corporation, is estopped from denying its corporate character to defeat the instrument. In Franklin v. Twogood, 18 Iowa, 516, it was held that the execution of a mortgage to a corporation is an admission of its corporate existence, and estops the mortgagor from denying the same." To the same effect are Nat. Bank of Fairhaven v. Phoenix W. Co., 6 Huu, 71; Parish v. Wheeler, 22 N. Y. 494; Palmer v. Lawrence, 3 Sand. 162; Dutchess C. M. v. Davis, 14 Johns, 238. In Dew v. Van Houton, 10 N. J. L. 270, it was held that "in an action of ejectment brought by the assignee of a mortgagee against a mortgagor, upon a mortgage given to a corporation, it is not necessary to produce the charter of incorporation. The admission by the defendant himself, in the deed of mortgage, is sufficient proof, when uncontradicted, of the existence of the incorporation." In Congregational Society v. Perry, 6 N. H. 164, it was held he who gives a note to a corporation is not to be permitted to deny that there is such a corporation." To the same effect are Topping v. Bickford, 4 Allen, 120; Merchants' Nat. Bank v. Glendon Co., 120 Mass. 97; Huffaker v. Nat. Bank, 12 Bush, 287; Vater v. Lewis, 36 Ind. 288; John v. F. & M. Bank, 2 Blackf. 367; Montgomery R. Co. v. Hurst, 9 Ala. 513; Jones v. Bank, 8 B. Monr. 123; Rector, Church Wardens, etc. v. Lovett, 1 Hall. 191. In the last case cited it was * Appearing in 53 Wisconsin Reports. SALE OF PERSONAL PROPERTY — PRIVILEGE TO RETURN REASONABLE TIME.- A "reaper and selfbinder" was delivered to a conditional purchaser in July, and used in the harvest of that season, and found defective. In January or February following, the vendor's agent called on the purchaser in relation to payment for the machine, and the purchaser said he would give nothing for it; but he still kept it and did not offer to return it until the following April. Held, that there was no error in setting aside a finding by the jury that the machine was returned in a reasonable time, and rendering judgment for its value. What is a resonable time, unreasonable delay, laches, negligence, or diligence, in any given case, is strictly a mixed question of law and fact, which ought to be submitted to the jury. But to this general rule there are two exceptions, namely: When there are fixed and certain rules for its determination by the court; and where the uncontroverted evidence so clearly proves the issue that there is really no question in respect to it to be submitted to the jury. In such cases the question may be treated as one of law, and passed upon by the court without any encroachment upon the province of the jury. 1 Greenl. Ev., § 49, and notes; Williams v. Porter, 41 Wis. 423; Hutchinson v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 41 id. 542; Berg v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 50 id. 419. See also, Lemke v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 39 Wis. 450; Boothby v. Scales, 27 id. 626; 2 Sedg. Damages, 173: Vaughn v. Howe, 20 Wis. 497. Gammon v. Abrams. Opinion by Orton, J. - IMPUTING THE ALBANY LAW JOURNAL. UNCHASTITY REFUSAL TO SLANDER RETRACT.-(1) Words accusing a married woman of being a prostitute are actionable per se. Ranger v. Goodrich, 17 Wis. 78; Benaway v. Conyne, 5 Pin. 196; Gibson v. Gibson, 43 Wis. 23; Mayer v. Schleichter, 29 id. 646. (2) In slander, evidence of a subsequent refusal to retract the slanderous words is admissible to The refusal to admit the falsity show actual malice. of the charge, and insisting upon the truth when the defendant failed to prove the truth of the charge, was always considered an aggravation of the injury under the old rules of pleadings; and the admission of the falsity of the charge and apologizing for the wrong done was considered meritorious on the part of the defendant, and was received in mitigation of the damages. In England the effect which the apology shall have upon the damages is regulated by statute. 6 and 7 Vict., c. 96; Folkard's Starkie on Slander and Libel, $$ 499, 500, 501, 708, 709, 710. Klewin v. Bauman. Opinion by Taylor, J. FINANCIAL LAW. NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENT-DRAFT-ACCEPTANCE. A promise in writing to pay a draft to be drawn for a sum named is an authority to draw for that sum If the draft be drawn for more, the and no more. promisor will not be bound to pay any part of it. The rule is otherwise in the case of a draft in existence at In such case the the time the promise is made. promise will be treated as a partial acceptance, and the promisor will be bound to that extent. Molson's Bank v. Howard, 40 N. Y Sup. 15; Central Savings Bank v. Richards, 109 Mass. 414; 14 Am. Law Reg. (N. S.) 401; Weggerstoffe v. Keene, 1 Strange, 214; Edwards on Bills, 419; Byles on Bills, 194; Daniel on Neg. Inst., § 561; Bissell v. Lewis, 4 Mich. 450; Nelson v. First National Bank, 48 Ill. 59. Missouri Sup. Ct., Oct., 1881. Brinkman v. Hunter. Opinion by Hough, J. (73 Mo.) JOINT MAKERS-STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS.-In an action on a joint and several promissory note against one of two makers, to which he pleaded payment and limitations, it was held, that evidence was admissible of payment of items of interest and of part of the principal by the co-maker, who was dead when the suit was brought, indorsed on the note in his handwriting, and of admissions by the maker sued, to take the note out of the operation of the statute of limitations, and show that it was the latter's debt. The effect of part payment by one of two or more joint and several makers of a note, to prevent the bar of the statute, was considered in Ellicott v. Nichols, 7 Gill, 86, and again in Schindel v. Gates, 46 Md. 604. In these cases it was held as the settled law of this State that such payment, if made before the statute has attached, is sufficient to take the note out of the operation of the statute as to all the makers; on the principle that the Opinion payment by one is payment for all. Maryland Ct. of Appeals, Jan. 27, 1881. Burgoon v. Bixler. by Bartol, C. J. (55 Md. 384.) BONA FIDE HOLDER-PURCHASE AT A DISCOUNT. -Plaintiff purchased, a short time before maturity, for $30, five promissory notes of $20 each. These notes were secured by a mortgage. Held, that a finding of the trial court, in an action on the notes, that plaintiff was not a bona fide purchaser, would not be disturbed. The rights of a holder of negotiable paper, purchased before due, are to be determined by the simple test of honesty and good faith on his part in making the purIn determining whether the purchaser has chase. acted in good faith or not, the amount of the consideration may become a material inquiry. In Dewitt v. Perkins, 22 Wis. 474, it was held that purchasing a note of $300 for $50, against a solvent maker, was very strong, if not conclusive, evidence of bad faith. Aud 410; Hall v. Wilson, 16 id. 548. In Miller v. Race, 1 NEW YORK STATE BAR ASSOCIATION. OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF THE GENERAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE, The following is a statement of a resolution of this committee adopted by correspondence: "Resolved, That the Chairman of the General Executive Committee be, and is authorized and directed to appoint a committee of five to make arrangements for the annual meeting of the New York State Bar Association in 1882; and such committee of arrangements shall have power to add to its own number, and will report from time to time to the Executive Committee. "Approved, and transmitted to the Secretary for mailing to the members of the Executive Committee, pursuant to regulation five. 44 "BRADLEY B. BURT, "Chairman General Executive Committee. 'Dated, OSWEGO, January 2, 1882." A copy of said resolution and the approval thereof Messrs. Gerry, of this committee January 28, 1882. No vote against the by the Chairman, were sent by mail to every member the adoption of said resolution. same has been received by the Secretary. Shepard, Ivins, Low, Diven and Buchanan, voted for CHARLES J. BUCHANAN, Secretary General Executive Committee. NEW BOOKS AND NEW EDITIONS. NEW YORK CITATIONS. New York Citations. Cases affirmed, reversed, modified, and cited in all the Reports of the State of New York, from 1791 to the present time. By Theodore Connoly, of the New York Bar. Albany: W. C. Little & Co., 1882. Pp. viii, 986. THIS THIS work seems to be on the plan of Wait's Table of Cases. It is of course more convenient than that work, which is in two volumes, and it might easily be more accurate, than that work which has made some inexcusable omissions. The present also cites cases, from this journal and the Weekly Digest, not otherwise upon its accuracy. Assuming it to be accurate it must reported. It is out of the question for us to pronounce prove indispensable. With all its faults, we found Wait's Table a most useful auxiliary. This volume is rather cheaply gotten up. HINE AND NICHOLS' INSURANCE DECISIONS. Hine and Nichols' new Digest of Insurance Decisions, fire and marine, together with an abstract of the law on each important point in fire and marine insurance. The whole being intended as a complete hand book of the law, as established by the most recent adjudications in the courts of this country and Great Britain. By C. C. Hine and Walter S. Nichols, editors Insurance Law Journal. New York: The Insurance Monitor, 1882. Pp. 803. This book purports to be a digest of cases not as yet cited in any text book on insurance. The abstracts are very full, and the cases cited in the opinions are given. The abstracts of the law under each heading are succinctly and clearly stated, with citations of the cases from which the principles are derived. Assuming that the matter here given is not embodied in any complete digest of insurance law, or referred to in the standard text books, this volume will have its place. But on a trial at hazard of a dozen cases, we find every one of them cited in May on Insurance, just published, and to which we recently called attention. The two works are exactly contemporaneous, so that the statement of the editors may well have been made in perfect good faith. The present volume of course cannot supply the place of a good text book equally fresh, but it may be useful as a supplement. It is well printed. 18TH BLATCHFORD'S CIRCUIT COURT REPORTS. Appeal dismissed with costs- In re Attorney-General v. The Atlantic Mutual Life Insurance Co. (two appeals); Fitch v. Best; Gray v. The New York Elevator Co.; Young v. Cuddy; The People ex rel. Joseph F. Belton v. The Board of Commissioners of Public Parks. -Judgmeut affirmed with costs- Pound v. The JefThe Order affirmed with costsferson Iron Co.Knickerbocker Life Insurance Co. v. Nelson; Wallace v. Feely. Orders of General and Special Terms reversed and matter remitted to Special Term, to the end that it may exercise its discretion upon the application made to it. Costs to the appellants in this court to be paid by the receiver out of the funds- In re Attorney-General v. The Continental Life Insurance Co. (two cases). IN COURT OF APPEALS, Feb. 10, 1882. Ordered: The court will take a recess on Friday, the 10th day of February, 1882, until Monday, the 27th day of February, 1882, at 10 o'clock A. M., at the old Capitol in the city of Albauy, then to proceed with the call of the present calendar. E. O. PERRIN, Clerk. NOTES. THE Southern Law Review for February-March contains the following leading articles: History, Jurisdiction and Practice of the Court of Claims of the United States, by William A. Richardson; Liability of real estate for debts of deceased persons, by J. G. Woerner; Exemplary damages for injuries to property, fraud, etc., by Samuel Maxwell; Relief for the Federal Courts, by James O. Pierce. - In the Kentucky Law Journal for February are the following short articles: A Bankrupt Law, by John H. Ward; Chancery Jurisdiction in Kentucky in cases of fraudu H. W. Rives; Aliens and their rights, by D. M. Rodman; Divorce Laws, by Buford Twyman; Ministerial Officers, by J. E. Fogle. This volume is the latest contribution to a series of which we have often found occasion to speak well. The very first case in it, Lavin v. Emigrant Industrial Savings Bank, is one of the greatest interest, on the subject of administration on the estate of a living person, decided by Judge Choate. The case of Campbell v. James, p. 92, was once of great interest, being an action against the late postmaster of New York city for infringement of a patent for cancelling adhesive postal stamps. The plaintiff succeeded below, but the Supreme Court have just now reversed the decision. The case of Campbell v. Crampton, p. 150, Judge Wal-lent conveyance, by H. Burnett; Insane Homicides, by lace giving the opinion, holds that an action will not lie in this State for breach of promise of marriage made in Alabama, by nephew to aunt, such marriages being void in Alabama. Miller v. Mayor, p. 212, holds that the Brooklyn bridge is a lawful structure. Ehret v. Pierce, p. 302, holds that an advertising card is not subject of copyright. Kershaw v. Town of Hancock, p. 383, holds that unsealed coupons, originally attached to sealed bonds, and sold after being detached, are subject to the provisions of the statute of limitations applicable to sealed instruments. National Ex. Bank v. Wells, p. 478, holds that an assessment, under the New York act of April 23, 1866, against a shareholder in a National bank, on the value of his shares, is void. Among the patent cases are those involving a canopy top for a baby-carriage, a cuspidor, a cheese hoop, a rubber over-shoe, and a rivet for securing pantaloons pockets. The volume is well printed, and published by Baker, Voorhis & Co., New York city. While the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania decided 761 cases last year, the Supreme Court of West Virginia in eight years and a half has decided only 548 cases, and is overwhelmed with arrears. This comes of writing long opinions.-The American Law Register for February contains the following cases in full: Raynor v. Preston (Eng. Ct. App.), on right of vendee to insurance money before completion of contract of sale, with note by Hugh Weightman; Mahoney Mining Co. v. Anglo-Californian Bank (U. S. Sup. Ct.), on liability of corporation for overdraft by its officers, with note by Adelbert Hamilton; Hackley v. Headley (Mich.), on duress of goods, with note by M. D. Ewell; Uhl v. Harvey (Ind.), on notice by retiring partner, with note by W. W. Thornton. The article on Maritime Liens, by Theodore M. Etting, is continued. "The Hour," a New York city weekly, has a very good full-page cartoon of Judge Arnoux, in its issue of February 4th, accompanied by a biographical sketch, which will interest our readers, inasmuch as it makes extracts from and references to this Journal in reference to Judge Arnoux's cases of Lange v. Benedict, the Rollwagen will, and the Brooklyn bridge. See 20 Alb. Law Jour. 44; 10 id. 3; 9 id. 102, 150, 154.-The American Law Review for February contains the following leading articles: The responsibility of Guiteau, by Charles F. Folsom, M. D.; Liability of subscribers as affected by amendments to charters of corporations, by W. H. Whittaker; Issues involving the fact of insanity-the burden of proof, by Arthur G. Sedgwick; 7TH STEWART'S EQUITY REPORTS (34 N. J. Eq.). Of former volumes of this unique and invaluable series we have so often spoken that it is unnecessary to say more of this than that it is equal to its predecessors. Judge Stewart's notes continue excellent, and are more numerous than ever, but we wish the printer would put them at the end of the cases, instead of at the bottom of the pages. The cases are generally important. We note especially, Hannon v. Williams, p. 255, holding that a depositor in an insolvent savings bank, who is also indebted to the bank, cannot set off his deposit against his indebtedness; and Haydock v. Haydock, p. 570, an interesting case of constructive fraud. The volume can be obtained from F. D. Linn & Co., Jersey City. We wish the reporter would index | Can damages for causing death be recovered independhis notes.* ent of any statute? by Richard C. McMurtrie. REPORTER will be sent to all our subscribers and exchanges, as a prospectus. This is the project to which we referred, 24 Alb. Law Jour. 521. It is under the charge of an experienced and thoroughly capable editor, Mr. R. R. Newell, of Boston, and judging from the first number, which we have examined in manuscript, we think it cannot fail to be a very valuable assistant to the profession. The first number is necessarily in some sense experimental as to make-up and dimensions of matter, and the intention is to make the succeeding numbers fuller and rather more of the "digest" than of the "index." It is intended to give in this way, from month to month, a reference, more or less full, to absolutely every case decided in England and America during the next preceding month, and reported in any medium whatever, so that the practitioner may be sure of possessing a knowledge of every thing decided on any point at the moment when he goes into court. It is not expected to supersede the reports or digests or law journals, but only to afford a temporary but trustworthy and comprehensive glance at the whole field of adjudication for the month. Our English mails bring us an account of a very singular occasion for discharging a jury pending a criminal trial. At the Hertford Assizes, before Mr. Justice Grove, a man indicted for night-poaching was brought to trial. Two witnesses had testified for the prosecution, and a third was about to be sworn, when a juror arose in the box and said, "my lord, we don't wish to hear any more of this case," and another presently said they did not believe anything of what had been testified, and had made up their minds not to convict on such evidence. His lordship thereupon discharged the jury, and dismissed the prisoner upon his own recognizance. After the discharge, five of the jurors signed a letter to the judge, disavowing the action of the two who had spoken, and declaring that they had been ready to hear the whole case. So far as we know, this is entirely novel. Of course the question of once in jeopardy will arise on an attempt to try the prisoner again. The London Law Journal remarks: "Nothing would be more prejudicial to public confidence in the law than that the judges should be supposed to exercise their power of discharging the jury when they think the verdict is going against the Crown. In the case in question it appeared proba- | ble that if the existing jury tried it a verdict of acquittal would have been returned without reference to the evidence, and for this misconduct of the jury the judge would seem to have been justiVOL. 25—No. 8. fied in discharging them." In Com. v. McCormick, 130 Mass. 61, the jury was discharged, pending the trial, upon discovery that one of them was a surety upon a recognizance in the cause entered into by one of the defendants. The recent verdicts of the coroner's juries in the matters of the Spuyten Duyvil railroad "accident" and the burning of the Potter building in New York city, forcibly remind us of some old thoughts of ours on "dead-letter laws." There are plenty of these laws, such as those against selling intoxicating liquors without license, betting, profane swearing, travelling on Sunday, those in reference to fire limits and the safety of tenement-houses and other buildings, those holding persons criminally responsible for negligence producing death, and the like. Such laws have never been enforced and never can be so long as the public are so apathetic on these subjects. If Mr. Potter could be sent to prison he and others would become more careful about setting death-traps in buildings. If the brakeman, Melius, could be sent to prison, the next brakeman would go back with his lantern and warn off the approaching train, although it might tire him and muddy his boots. Punch used to prescribe the tying a director on the front of the engine to prevent collisions. We would recommend tying another to the rear platform. We shall hope to see somebody punished in the city of New York for these murders. And we hope the prosecution will have more foresight or better luck than they had in Com. v. Hartwell, 128 Mass. 415; S. C., 35 Am. Rep. 391, the case of the Old Colony railroad conductor, indicted for negligently producing a collision and killing a passenger, and where the indictment having alleged that he knew of the approach of the other train, the prosecution failed or omitted to prove it, and he got a new trial. Since then we have not heard of the case. It always cheers us to hear of the conviction of those sportive fellows who point pistols at others to frighten them, and thus kill the subjects of their jest. State v. Hardie, 47 Iowa, 647; S. C., 29 Am. Rep. 496. Our community ought to be ashamed of their dead-letter laws, and every citizen who interests himself in endeavoring to procure their enforcement, is a public benefactor. Let the officers of justice stick to Mr. Potter and the railroad murderers, and see if they cannot enforce these laws for once, just by way of variety. And let some one see if the brutal New York city shop-keepers are obeying the recent law requiring them to furnish seats for saleswomen. We have no idea that one shop-keeper in ten obeys this law. But nothing can be done for a community that does not care to have its laws enforced. It is much easier to have a spasm of virtue once in a while, shed a few tears, subscribe a few dollars, call a few hard names, and find a few sweeping coroners' verdicts. A few years ago the city attorney of Troy faithfully tried to punish citizens who infringed the fire-limits ordinance, and met with no great success. In the same city an earnest attempt to enforce ex cise penalties was rather frowned upon by the public, and the attorney who engaged in it was regarded as a mean fellow. As a general rule the enforcement of the laws is as thorough as the community deserve or are willing to stand by. Senator Edmunds makes a careful review of the conduct of the Guiteau trial, in the March number of the North American Review. He comes substantially to the same conclusions that we have drawn in this journal. His approval of Judge Cox's course in general will soothe whatever of annoyance that discreet judge may have suffered from the ignorant rant of newspaper writers. Senator Edmunds takes the same views that we have advanced respecting the practical inability of the judge to restrain a disorderly prisoner whose counsel plead insanity. At the same time he recommends some enactment enabling courts to punish disorderly prisoners for contempt and to suspend their trial meantime. As we have said before, we doubt the expediency or necessity of this. Such occasions are very rare, and as the Senator himself seems conscious, such resorts might lose more in public delay, expense and inconvenience, than they would gain in dignity and decorum. The possession of the power, unused, would soon bring it into contempt. We must get on with the trial of Guiteaus as best we can. But everybody will agree with the senator that spectators may be compelled to good behavior and punished for levity or disorder, and that this power should have been exercised on the late trial. Some members of Congress seem to find a constitutional difficulty in the way of punishing or suppressing polygamy. Polygamy, forsooth, is a religious creed and institution, and therefore we have no right to meddle with it! If the Thugs should come over from India, and set up their religious practice of assassination, on the same reasoning we could not punish them. Religious belief cannot justify crime, and polygamy is regarded by all civilized nations as a crime. It was part of Guiteau's religious convictions that he was divinely commissioned to "remove" the president, but we find no scruple in punishing him for practicing his creed. Really, it seems to us that a congressman who argues that polygamy is constitutionally entitled to immunity because those who practice it pretend to believe it a religious ordinance, is, not to put too fine a point on it, making an ass of himself. Such a defense might have been set up for slavery, although we do not remember that it ever was. Polygamy is the greatest political crime of our age and country. We compromised long with slavery, because it was entrenched behind State Constitutions. There is no such difficulty in the present case. Congress can reduce its territories to good behavior or disfranchise them, or disfranchise their citizens. There is no reason in law or morals why Senator Edmund's bill should not pass. If any congressman has a tenderness for concubinage, let him emigrate to Turkey. Mr. W. H. Bailey, of North Carolina, writes some interesting and original suggestions to the Central Law Journal on the subject of "digesting and indexing." He agrees with Mr. Austin Abbott that "it ought to be established as an inflexible rule to use the noun as the initial word and not the adjective. Thus, Actions, civil; Actions, criminal; not Civil Actions, or Criminal Actions." "Indictment" he would put under Pleading, criminal; "Declaration" or Complaint," under Pleading, civil. This is well enough, perhaps, but is not "criminal law" rather too broad a subject to be made a mere subdivision of "actions"? We believe however in putting all the subordinate heads of criminal law, such as homicide, larceny, etc., under Criminal Law. We agree with him, too, in dispensing with Husband and Wife, and making a generic head of Marriage, with subdivisions of Dower, Divorce, etc. It seems to us he refines too much upon the use of catch-words and cant-words. We hardly approve of "Daffa Down Dilly," for example, as a reference to the famous case of slander of an attorney. The man who could remember that could remember Defamation on Attorney. Mr. Bailey will find a cross-referencer to his mind in the editor of the North Carolina Statutes, who puts down, "Stud-horses, see Religious Societies." On turning to the latter we find that it is against the law to exhibit such animals within a specified distance of a meeting of any religious society - it being feared that the operations of nature will prove more attractive to Kentuckians than the services of the sanctuary. Bailey observes: "It is astonishing how little our indexers have availed themselves of a great many good old words, such as Fiduciary, Alibi, etc., and coined words such as Betterments, Contractee, Distributee, Cablegram, Licensee, and the like, and why they do not coin words as needed, such as Addressee (party written to), Wiree (party telegraphed), Homsteader, Usuree, etc." Now contractee" is “a vile phrase," for a "contractee" is also a contractor. It is different with Licensee and Distributee. There is no need of Usurer or Usuree; Usury steader; Telegraph will embrace Telegrapher and tells the whole story. Homestead will cover HomeWiree. We partly agree with Mr. Bailey when he says: "Let all such headings as Administrators, Adultery, Affidavit, Agreement, Alimony, Amendment, Answer, Assignment, Bills of Lading, Certiorari, Cities, Clerks, and many others, be used only as cross-references, reserving on the guiding principle already stated such apparent subdivisions as AdAttachment, Attorneys, Bankruptcy, Bastardy, vancement, Affray, Agency, Appeal, Arrest, Assault, Boundary, etc." But several of these have independence enough to stand alone, it seems to us. IN NOTES OF CASES. Mr. 'N Brown v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., Wisconsin Supreme Court, Jan. 10, 1882, 11 N. W. Rep. 356, the plaintiffs, husband and wife, were passengers on the defendant's railroad. Through the negli |