man with an unmarried woman, or by an unmarried man with a married woman, is adultery in the man without regard to the guilt of the woman. And it is no less adultery that it is also rape. The offenses are different in the nature of the wrong done and in the facts which constitute them. Neither includes the other, and a defendant may be convicted of either without allegation or proof of some facts essential to the other. Carnal knowledge of a woman is the fact common to both. If it is with force and against her will, the crime is rape, and the fact that she is married is immaterial; if she is a married woman, the crime is adultery, and the fact that it is by force is immaterial. That a man cannot commit rape upon a married woman without also committing adultery, only shows that he commits both crimes by one act which includes all the elements of both. Morey v. Commonwealth, 108 Mass. 433. Commonwealth of Massachusetts v. Bakeman. Opinion by Allen, J.

EVIDENCE-PAROL ADMISSIBLE TO SHOW WRITING WAS DELIVERED CONDITIONALLY.-Conversations both at the time of the delivery of a written instrument and also before such delivery, showing that the delivery was conditional, held, to be admissible. The manual delivery of an instrument may always be proved to have been on a condition which has not been fulfilled, in order to avoid its effect. This is not to show any modification or alteration of the written agreement, but that it never became operative and that its obligation never commenced. Whitaker v. Salisbury, 15 Pick, 534; Davis v. Jones, 17 C. B. 625. Whether the delivery of a paper is absolute or conditional is a question of fact. That a delivery should be conditional, it is not necessary that express words to that effect should be used at the time. That conclusion may be drawn from all the circumstances which properly form a part of the entire transaction, whether in point of time they precede or accompany the delivery. Murray v. Earl of Stair, 2 B. & C. 82. Wilson v. Powers. Opinion by Devens. J.

FIXTURES-WHAT PASSES FROM VENDOR TO VENDEE NAMING SOME NOT EXCLUSIVE OF OTHERS-REPLEVIN WILL LIE TO RECOVER ARTICLES SEVERED FROM REALTY.-S. executed a deed of land to L., containing buildings, "together with all the trees, shrubbery, fences, fountain basin and pipes connected therewith now upon said lot; also all steam heating apparatus and its connections; all chandeliers, all gas and water fixtures, all window shades and fixtures, and all window screens now contained in the house, with all appurtenances, possession of the premises to be thereafter given, a right being given S. to occupy until that time in the deed. S., before giving possession, removed some marble slabs and cast iron screens which were shown to be a part of the steam heating apparatus that would not be complete without them, and one iron front piece used for the grate and fire place, which latter was fixed in the wall by masonry. Held, that these articles removed passed to L. by the deed, and that he could maintain replevin against S. for them, even before the termination of the agreed period of occupancy if S. removed them from their places with the intent to sever them from the realty. Whatever the owners in fee of an estate annexes to it for the better enjoyment of it is presumed to be done for its improvement, and thus becomes a part of the realty. The object, the effect, and the mode of annexation are all to be considered in determining whether any specific articles are movable fixtures. McLaughlin v. Nash, 14 Allen, 136; Pierce v. George, 108 Mass. 78; McConnell v. Blood, 123 id. 47; Guthri v. Jones, 108 id. 191; Southbridge Savings Bank v. Exeter Works, 127 id. 542; Smith Paper Co. v. Servin, 130 id. 511. It need not appear that the freehold would be

injured by the removal if the article was fitted to the place or where it rendered that with which it was connected more ornamental. The enumeration of certain articles in the deed did not exclude other articles which as between the grantor and the grantee might be treated as part of the realty. A charge that if S. severed from the real estate the articles mentioned, and removed them from their places with a view to appropriate them to herself and to deprive L. of his property therein, an action of replevin could be properly brought before the expiration of her term of occupation under the deed, held, correct. Replevin can only be maintained by one who has a right to the immediate possession of the goods replevied. Richardson v. Reed, 4 Gray, 441; Wade v. Mason, 12 Gray, 335, The question is thus presented whether such a severance as stated gives a right of immediate possession to the owner of the realty from which they have been severed. It is a question similar to that which has been several times presented between the remainderman and the tenant for life who has committed waste by felling timber for purposes other than those of the estate, where it has been held that such wood at once becomes the property of the remainderman, who may immediately enter and take it. Clark v. Holden, 7 Gray, 8; Phillips v. Allen, 7 Allen, 115. Where one violates the terms of a bailment of personal property by removing it from the place where alone he was entitled to use it, or by selling it, the rule is similar. His wrongful act terminates his possession, and the bailor has a right to it immediately. Billings v. Tucker, 6 Gray, 368. S. was the tenant of L. Articles which were a part of the realty were let to her for use on the premises during the term. If by her wrongful act she separated them they become at once the personal property of the landlord, and all right of the wrong-doer ceased therein. Leonard v. Stickney. Opinion by Devens, J.

NEW JERSEY SUPREME COURT ABSTRACT. NOVEMBER TERM, 1881.*

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW RIGHT OF TRIAL BY JURY IN CIVIL ACTIONS — MODE OF PROCEDURE NOT VESTED RIGHT.-There is in this State no constitutional right to trial by jury on appeal from the courts for trial of small causes in cases where no jury was demanded below. If a party goes to trial before a justice, without demanding a jury, under statutes which provide that on appeal from the decision of the justice the cause shall be heard and determined by Appellate Court without a jury, he thereby waives any right to jury trial on appeal. No person has a vested right in any particular mode of procedure in actions at law; and except where the constitution expressly guarantees some certain mode, the procedure may be modified by the legislature at will. Parties may waive their merely private rights, whether constitutional or otherwise, at their pleasure. Sedg. ou Stat. and Const. Law, 111. And of this class is the right of trial by jury in civil causes. Lee v. Tillotson, 24 Wend. 337; Ten Eyck v. Farlee, I Harr. 348. It does not at all concern public interests, and if the legislature provides that by proceeding to trial before a justice without a jury suitors shall be considered as surrendering all right to jury trial for the settlement of the pending controversy, parties so proceeding are bound by the waiver. Wunser v. Atkinson. Opinion by Dixon, J.

FALSE IMPRISONMENT - PHYSICIANS' CERTIFICATE OF INSANITY - PLEADING.-The declaration alleges that the defendants, who are practicing physicians. did falsely and maliciously certify in writing, under * Appearing in 14 Vroom's (43 N. J. Law) Reports.

oath, that they had examined into the state of health and mental condition of Hannah L. Force, and that in their opinion she was insane and a fit subject to be sent to the State asylum for the insane, by means of which false certificate the defendants wrongfully and without reasonable cause, caused and procured the said Hannah to be arrested by her body and imprisoned in said asylum. This declaration shows no legal cause of action. It fails to aver that the defendants actually caused or procured the arrest, and discloses no facts from which it appears that the false certificate could have been the means of procuring the arrest. There is no logical connection between the wrongful act imputed to the defendant, to wit, the making of the false certificate, and the consequence attributed to it. Force v. Probasco. Opinion by Van Syckel, J.

LIBEL-ACTION

FOR, AGAINST CORPORATION PRIVILEGE STATEMENT TO JUSTICE ISSUING WARRANT EVIDENCE SEPARATE PUBLICATIONS.

- (1) An action for libel will lie against a corporation. There was an early impression that inasmuch as malice was an element in every libel, and as it was thought that a corporation was an entity without mind, so no bad mind or malice could be attributed to a corporate body. This was the view taken by Baron Alderson in Stevens v. Midland Counties R. Co., 10 Exch. 352, a case decided as late as 1854. It was an action for malicious prosecution. The same view was taken by some courts tn this country. In Childs v. Bank of Missouri, 17 Mo. 213, decided in 1852, it was held that an action for malicious prosecution would not lie against a corporation, because it was incapable of malice. In Owsley v. Moutgomery and West Point R. Co., 37 Ala. 560, decided in 1861, it was held that while an action for false imprisonment would, au action for malicious prosecution would not, lie against a corporation. The distinction was drawn between acts creating liability without regard to motive, and conduct, which, without motive, creates no liability. There is no reason why there should exist any immunity for corporations for malicious torts. For all torts not malicious it is held by a uniform line of cases, I think, without a single exception, that a corporation is responsible. Addison on Torts, 1117; Cooley on Torts, 119. See, also, Brokaw v. New Jersey R. Co., 3 Vroom, 328; Whitfield v. South East R. Co., E. B. & E. 115; Green v.London G.O. Co.,7 C. B. (N.S.) 290. (2) The publication of a statement made by a justice of what had been said by persons applying to him for a warrant, which statements do not appear in any affidavit, nor were made as part of a hearing, are not privileged. See upon the subject of privilege as to judicial proceedings, Curry v. Walter, 1 Bos. & Pul. 525; Wason v. Walter, 38 L. J. (Q. B.) 34; Lewis v. Levy, E. B. & E. 37. (3) Separate publications made concerning the plaintiff which are not themselves actionable are admissible in an action for libel. There is a rule enunciated by many courts that proof of distinct slanders and libels cannot be shown, because it is impossible to prevent a jury from assessing damages, not only for the one in suit, but for all proven. Frazier v. McCloskey, 60 N. Y. 337; Bodwell v. Swan, 3 Pick. 376; Leonard v. Pope, 27 Mich. 145. The rule as stated has not received the uuiform approval of the courts of this country. State v. Riggs, 39 Conn. 498; Stearns v. Cox, 17 Ohio, 590. In England there was for a time a tendency toward the exclusion of all separate libels in all cases. Defries v. Davis, 7 C. & P. 112. But whenever the presence of express malice is involved in the cause, the rule is now stated to be that separate libels are provable as showing the malicious motive of the defendant. Pearson v. Lemaitre, 5 M. & G. 700; Barrett v. Long, 3 H. L. Cas. 395. If such publications are actionable, it seem that they are still admissible whenever the question of malice in fact is to be left to the

jury. McDermott v. Evening Journal Association. Opinion by Reed, J.

TAXATION EQUALITY OF TAXATION OF BANKS WHEN OTHER CORPORATIONS EXEMPT-NATIONAL BANK SHARES - DEDUCTIONS.- The provision of the Constitution that property must be assessed for taxation by uniform rules and according to its true value, does not require that all property should be taxed, and is not infringed by the taxation of bank shares, when shares in all other classes of corporations are exempt. Nor is it violated by the fact that shares in the same bank are rated differently in different townships if such inequality of valuation arises from accident or mistake, or even willful default of the assessor in the individual case, and not from any system of valuation designed to produce it. This constitutional provision requires and is satisfied by such regulations as should impose the same percentage of its actual value upon all taxable property in the township for township purposes, in the county for county purposes, and in the State for State purposes. See Exchange Bank v Hines, 3 Ohio St. 1. State v. Runyon, 12 Vroom, 98; Cummings v. National Bank, 101 U. S. Bank 153; National Bank v. Kimball, 103 id. 732. shares may be rated at more than would be produced by a division of the capital and surplus among all the shares, the bank's business and franchises being likewise entitled to consideration in fixing their real worth. Under the act of Congress, section 5219 of the Revised Statutes, shares in National banks are to be assessed at their actual value, without any deduction on account of the bank's capital or surplus being invested in United States securities. This section is not infringed by State laws which provide that all personal property, including money and all debts owing by solvent debtors, and shares in National and State banks and other corporations, shall be assessed at their true value and taxed at an equal rate, even if these laws also provide that certain classes of property, including shares in certain classes of corporations, shall be exempt from taxation. See Newark City Bank v. Assessor, 1 Vroom, 13; Bank of Commerce v. New York, 2 Black. 620; People v. Commissioners, 4 Wall. 244; People v. Weaver, 100 U. S. 529; Pelton v. National Bank, 101 id. 529; First National Bank v. Waters, 23 Alb. L. J. 413; Van Allen v. Assessors, 3 Wall. 573; National Bk. v. Commonwealth, 9 id. 353; Hepburn v. School Directors, 23 id. 480; People v. Commissioners of Taxes, 94 U. S. 415. Stratton v. Collins. Opinion by Dixon, J.

GEORGIA SUPREME COURT ABSTRACT.

EVIDENCE- -ADMISSIONS OF ONE ALLEGED PARTNER DO NOT PROVE PARTNERSHIP.-The sayings and admissions of one of an alleged partnership, not in the presence of the others, nor brought to their knowledge and assented to or ratified by them, are inadmissible to bind the other party or establish the existence of a partnership. Flournoy v. Williams. Opinion by Speer, J.

[Decided March 7, 1882.]

MUNICIPAL CORPORATION-NOT LIABLE FOR REASONABLE TEMPORARY OBSTRUCTION OF STREETS.- A temporary and reasonable obstruction of its streets by a city, intended for the public safety and convenience, will not render it liable for damages because of injury therefrom, where it appears that the obstruction was not negligently made or carelessly guarded. Stretching ropes across a street while a firemen's parade and exhibition are progressing is such a temporary and reasonable obstruction. Simon v. City of Atlanta. Opinion by Speer, J.

[Decided Jan. 24, 1882.]

LEASE WHEN LESSOR HAS ALTERNATIVE REMEDY FOR BREACH.-The plaintiffs had demised certain

[Decided April 20, 1882.]

SLANDER -CHARGE OF FRAUDULENT CONVERSION.To charge another with fraudulently converting money to his own use. is actionable per se, as being calculated to exclude him from society. This is true, whether the words used charge a crime punishable by law or not. Elsas v. Browne. Opinion by Crawford, J. [Decided Jan. 31, 1882.]

TELEGRAPH -LIABILITY OF COMPANY FOR ERROR IN MESSAGE - CONDITIONS AS TO REPETITION.-B. delivered to a telegraph company at Columbus, Ga., a telegraphic message to be sent to New York, in these words: "Cover two hundred September and one hundred August; " the message as delivered by the company in New York was: "Cover two hundred September, two hundred August." By reason of the error B. suffered loss. In an action by B. against the company for such loss, held, that it being shown that the message sent was changed in its transmission, the burthen was on the company to show that it had exercised proper diligence about the business of such transmission. In this case the agent of the company shows by his evidence that the error was his own, and the result of the operation of unconscious mental action." Against such "unconsciousness" the law gives redress when loss results therefrom. Any rule or regulation of the telegraph company which seeks to relieve it from performing its duty, belonging to the employment, with integrity, skill and diligence, contravenes public policy as well as the law, and under it the party at fault cannot seek refuge. If it became necessary for the company in transmitting messages with integrity, skill and diligence, to secure accuracy by having said messages repeated, " then the law devolves upon it the duty of repeating them. To say the company shall only be liable for the amount of tolls paid out is practically to excuse them altogether. Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Blanchard. Opinion by Speer, J.

[Decided March 7, 1882.]

action of ejectment to recover possession of them; and alleged in their statement of claim that breaches of covenant entailing forfeiture had been committed by the lessees. The defendants contended in their statement of defense that the lease sued upon by the plaintiffs contained in its reddendum clause a provision that on doing the acts complained of (the alleged breaches) the lessees were liable only to pay an extra or penal rent. The plaintiff demurred to the defendants' statement of defense. Held, on demurrer, that the remedy of the plaintiffs was alternative, and that the right of the plaintiffs to re-enter for breaches of covenant contemplated by the lease was not inconsistent with the proviso for the payment of such extra rent by the defendants, and that the demurrer must be allowed. Q. B. D.. Feb. 28, 1882. Weston v. Metropolitan Asylums Board. Opinion by Mathew and Cave, JJ. (46 L. T. Rep. [N. S.] 166).

MORTGAGE

RIGHTS OF ASSIGNEE OR MORTGAGEE OF EQUITY OF REDEMPTION AS TO EQUITIES.- An assignee or mortgagee of an equity of redemption takes subject to all the equities in which the assignor or mortgagor was subject at the date of assignment, but free from any equities which would have arisen against the assignor or mortgagor of the equity of redemption at a subsequent date if he had 'not assigned or mortgaged it. If, therefore, the owner in fee simple of Whiteacre and Blackacre mortgages those properties to two different persons, and subsequently assigns or mortgages the equity of redemption of Blackacre to A., and after such assignment or mortgage the prior mortgages of the two properties become vested in B., B. is not entitled, as against A., to consolidate the mortgage of Whiteacre with his prior mortgage of Blackacre. White v. Hillacre, 3 Y. & C. Ex. 597, approved and followed. Reevor v. Luck, L. Rep., 4 Eq, 537, not followed. Other cases referred to: Cummins v. Fletcher, L. R. 14 Ch. D. 712; Jennings v. Jordan, L. R., 6 App. Cas. 701; Watson v. Mid-Wales R. Co., L. R., 2 C. P. 593; Vint v. Padgett, 31 L. T. Rep. 21; Mills v. Jennings, 45 L. T. Rep. (N. S.) 593; Jones v. Smith, 2 Ves. 372; Ch. Div., Feb. 18, 1882. Harter v. Colman. Opinion by Fry, J. (46 L. T. Rep. [N. S.] 154).

RECENT ENGLISH DECISIONS.

INSURANCE- MARINE

POLICY WHEN RISK ON

FREIGHT COMMENCES.- The plaintiffs, shipowners, by a policy of insurance, underwritten by the defendants, caused "themselves to be insured, lost or not lost, at and from Liban to Bordeaux, upon freight (valued at interest), of and in the vessel Hawthorn, beginning the adventure upon the said goods or freight from the loading thereof on board the said ship at Liban, and to continue and endure during the said vessel's abode there, and until the said vessel shall have arrived at Bordeaux, and the said goods shall be safely delivered from the said ship." The plaintiff's said vessel commenced loading at Liban a cargo of oats for Bordeaux, and a portion of the cargo was in lighters alongside, and was about to be transferred to the said vessel, when, by reason of the perils of the sea, the said lighters and portion of cargo were wholly lost, and the plaintiffs were prevented from earning the freight insured. Held, upon demurrer, that the plaintiffs could not recover. Q. B. D., Feb. 22, 1882. Hopper v. Wear Marine Insurance Co. Opinion by Mathew, J. (46 L. T. Rep. [N. S.] 107).

INSURANCE LAW.

FIRE POLICY-CONDITION AVOIDING-REPRESENTATIONS AS TO INTEREST.—Where the terms of a policy of fire insurance provide that "if the interest of the assured in the property be any other than the entire, unconditional, and sole ownership of the property for the uses and benefit of the assured, or if the building stands on leased ground, it must be so represented to these companies, and so expressed in the written part of this policy; otherwise the policy will be void," it is the duty of the party applying for insurance to disclose the nature of his interest in the property to be insured, and from the mere fact that the company's agent made no inquiry concerning the extent of applicant's interest, a waiver of the provision on the part of the company cannot be presumed. Such provisions must be upheld and enforced, not simply on the ground that it is a warranty to be enforced independently of their materiality, but upon the ground that it calls for the disclosure of material facts. See Insurance Co. v. Lawrence, 10 Pet. 507; Jenkins v. Insurance Co. 7 Gray, 370; Rohrback v. Insurance Co. 62 N. Y. 47; Hall v. Insurance Co., 6 Gray.. 186; Liberty Hall Assoc. v. Insurance Co., 7 id. 265; Commonwealth

v. Insurance Co., 112 Mass. 136; Findley v. Insurance Co., 30 Penn. St. 311; Tarten v. Insurance Co., 9 Cush., 490; Allen v. Insurance Co., 12 id. 366; U. S. Circ. Ct. N. D. Iowa, April, 1881. Waller v. Northern Assurance Co. Opinion by McCrary, C. J. (10 Fd. Rep. 232.)

In

FIRE POLICY - PROVISIONS AS TO ARBITRATION.this case a fire insurance policy provides that "if differences shall arise touching any loss or damage, after proof thereof has been received in due form, the matter shall, at the written request of either party, be submitted to impartial arbitrators, whose award in writing shall be binding on the parties as to the amount of such damage, but shall not decide the liability of the company under the policy. It is furthermore mutually agreed that no action against this company for the reeovery of any claim by virtue of this policy shall be sustainable in any court until an award shall have been obtained fixing the amount of such claim in the manner above provided. Held, that this provided for an award only in case of a difference as to the amount of a loss; that as an arbitration might have been and was not demanded by the insurer, the assured may maintain an action on the policy without alleging an arbitration. Such agreement as to arbitration, being collateral to the agreement to pay the loss, does not oust the courts of jurisdiction to enforce the latter agreement. See upon this subject, Avery v. Scott, 8 Exch. 487; Mentz v. Armenia Fire Ins. Co., 79 Penn. St. 478: Lasher v. Northwestern Nat. Ins. Co., 25 N. Y. 98; Hurst v. Litchfield, 39 N. Y. 377. Wisconsin Sup. Ct. Nov. 3, 1881. Phoenix Insurance Co. v. Badger. Opinion by Orton, J., (53 Wis.)

CORRESPONDENCE.

DOCTORS DISAGREE.

Editor of the Albany Law Journal:

The proposition to which Judge Finen gave utterance in his recent address before the Albany Law School, and of which you approved in your last issue, is in direct conflict with the conclusions of science. So firmly is it established by modern research that "the mental essence is not originally alike in all," that it is most surprising a man of Judge Finch's attainments should deliver a lecture based on the opposite proposition, and a lecture, too, which advocates the pursuit of general culture, in science and literature, by the legal student. The speaker must himself have failed to keep in the line of recent investigations and can hardly have read a mental philosophy later than Locke's. Any raiser of thoroughbred stock could give him testimony as to the value of inherited physical tendencies, while Francis Galton's book on Hereditary Genius, to mention no other, would prove to him the existence of the same tendencies in the realm of mind. Belief that "all men are equal" has been the cause of much wasted energy, for it leads men to think themselves capable of coping with their natural superiors, and to believe they can attain and fill positions for which they are not fitted, and to which their mental powers can never carry them. 'Tis a doctrine now generally confined to school committees' addresses to their fledglings and is a dangerous one to instill into the minds of ambitious young law students.

Respectfully,

JOHN COTTON DANA. [See Current Topics. ED. ALB. LAW JOUR.]

NEW BOOKS AND NEW EDITIONS.

ROBINSON'S HISTORY OF THE HIGH COURT OF CHANCERY.

History of the High Court of Chancery and other Institutions of England, from the time of Caius Julius Caesar until the accession of William and Mary. By Conway Robinson. (Vol. 1 to the death of Henry VIII.) Richmond: J. W. Randolph & English, 1882." Advance Sheets.

THIS

HIS ponderous tome of 1215 pages is certainly a literary monstrosity. At this day of "books without end so big a book as this, in order to have warranted its publication, should have possessed some superior quality. We confess that we cannot invent a single excuse for the publication of this particular big book. It possesses no meritorious quality whatever, excepting perhaps the printing, which is fairly up to the standard.

Professing to be a history, Mr. Robinson's work is, in a literary sense, no history at all, for it nearly fails to mention the Court of Chancery and the institutions usually deemed kindred to the subject of equity jurisdiction. What particular institutions this book is concerned with, we confess not to be able to discern. The late Dr. Lieber of Columbia College gave a notable definition of the term "Institutions, ' (Lieber's Civil Liberty and Self Government, p. 300, et. seq.), a definition of extended significance; but Mr. Robinson seems to regard trite historical incidents, murders, deaths, burials, fortifications, antiquarian lore and scraps of biography at second hand, as legitimate institutions of England; for these things occupy nine-tenths of his book. He has given us no account of any one particular institution, its beginning, its growth and expansion, or its legitimate sphere. Nor has he added one single comment of value to the literature of particular institutions. Our author, in his extraordinary preface, indicates that he had intended to write a good history of the Court of Chancery, so as to fill a recognized hiatus in literature; but in the course of this laudible undertaking, as he intimates, he felt "that the history should embrace other institutions of England" and "be illustrated by surrounding circumstances. In pursuit of the "surrounding circumstances" Mr. Robinson has evidently concluded that he could with entire safety leave the history of the High Court of Chancery and the other institutions of England until the second volume of his work. This resolution was perhaps not unwise, as it has given our author the first volume in which to transcribe most of Stubb's Constitutional History of England, a very valuable work, as Mr. Robinson flatteringly concedes in his preface. This preface, by the way, devotes the place of emphasis to the ancestry of George Washington, a fact which led us, at the outset, to anticipate the somewhat desultory treatment which follows; for George Washington's ancestry, interesting as it always is to Americans, can hardly be regarded as a precisely cognate subject to the "High Court of Chancery."

The first Title of volume one (why this historical work is divided into Titles we do not know), relates to the "Institutions of Britain from its Invasion by the Romans until the Norman Conquest." This is a considerable period, and as our author begins at the very beginning of his subject we had anticipated a reference to original and authentic sources of information, as well as to the latest investigations of an ethnological and philological character, and especially to the works of the comparative and historical jurists, all which tend to throw much light on the law-germs of primitive peoples. We had hoped to find some theory of the origin of the English folc-law, its precise debt to the imported tribes, or at least some intelligent account of the subject. But this book contains nothing of the

sort, and not even the author's patriotic allusion to Washington, at the outset, induces him to refer to the very creditable American essayists who have considered Anglo-Saxon Law (Bigelow's History of Procedure in England; Essays in Anglo-Saxon Law, Boston, 1876). In this same period our author pursuing the chronological order with a vengeance, and introducing the subject precisely at the right year, but amidst his reminiscences of the formative period of English history, makes an allusion to the Corpus Juris Civilis. Here, certainly, an extended digression would not have been inappropriate for the precise relation of the Civil law to equity jurisprudence as formulated by the English Chancellors, is fascinating to every English and American lawyer. But Mr. Robinson, with a quotation not so extended as that relating to the physical appearance of Edward I.. passes on to fields and quotations new.

The second Title of this book, relates to the "InstituHere, tions of England during the Norman period. " we certainly expected a summary of the learning on tenures and the feudalism of the Normans, and some allusion to "Placita Anglo Normanica, as well as to the excellent original materials of this period of English history, much of which relates to jurisprudence and to juridical science. But our author goes reaping away with his indefatigable scissors, telling us nothing new and quoting from second-hand sources. To have produced such common-place as this book, it was useless to begin with the time of Caesar.

The subsequent titles of this work manifest no visible improvement. "Lord Campbell's Lives" contains in one hundred pages a fuller and more accurate history of the Court of Chancery than this whole volume. Our author's method of compiling history is very much calculated to obscure the merits of his literary style; it is that usually observed in the lawbriefs of the period-extensive quotations connected by a running commentary of italics, division and demonstration. The result is that our author's style suffers from the juxtaposition of too many excellent standards. The style of Lord Campbell's Lives is, even when most pompous and acrid, picturesque and scholar-like. Lord Campbell's reader is at least in legal society, and Lord Campbell is the Cicerone of the occasion. But Mr. Robinson's reader is in no society at all, and everybody by turns, except Mr. Robinson, is the Cicerone of the occasion. And just here we may observe, without detracting from recognized merits, that the Penny Magazine,''Green's Short History of the English People,' and Miss Strickland's Queens of England, are hardly proper guides to a serious history of the High Court of Chancery of England. But as Mr. Robinson writes at his villa near Washington, the musty archives of the English Chancery were perhaps too far distant to be of service to him. We should have thought a perusal of the report of the English Record Commissioners would have deterred him from this historical essay; it certainly must have convinced him that he could as easily dam the Chesapeake by himself, as write a history of the High Court of Chancery out of London, and compiled from handy-volume series.

The first volume contains some almost insignificant errors of proof-reading, perhaps not worth noticing. The quotation-marks in several places are omitted at the end of the quotation. But this may be due to the character of the compilation which forbids precision on this point. We should hardly have expected, though, to have found the accent omitted in "Diversité des Courtes," (pp. 465, 466), atfer reading in the preface, (p. 7), such idiomatic French as "Monsieur Domat." We observe other trifling inaccuracies, but it is only necessary to allude to one more: the title of ch. 30, p. 920, should be Henry VIII., and not Henry VII., otherwise the unwary reader may conclude that

THE

HE following decisions were handed down, Tuesday, June 13, 1882. Judgment affirmed with costs - Fitzpatrick v. Slocum; Wilson v. Simpson; Ten v. Ryder; The Nassau -Judgment Gas Light Company v. City of Brooklyn.reversed, new trial granted, costs to abide eventNichols v. N. Y. C. & H. R. R. Co; Levy v. Loeb; Sanders v. Townsend. Appeal dismissed with costs Berrien v. Chatwood.- -Order affirmed and judgment absolute ordered for the respondent on the stipulation with costs - Kuin v. Smith.- -Order affirmed with costs Market National Bank of New York v. Pacific National Bank of Boston.-Order of General Term reversed, that of Surrogate affirmed with costs- In re administration of Curser.-Order of General Term reversed, judgment of referee affirmed with costsThe Phoenix Bank v. Stafford.-Appeal dismissed and case remanded to General Term for a rehearingPalmer v. Dearing.-Judgment affirmed - Curtin v. The People.-Judgment modified by ordering a new trial, costs to abide the event- Gawthrop v. Leary.Judgment modified in respect to allowance of interest which should be at six per cent for the whole period, according to principle settled in Walter v. Utica Railroad Co., 86 N. Y. 401, and as so modified affirmed without costs in this court-First National Bank of Meadville, Pa., v. Fourth National Bank of City of New York.

The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania are about as tender of "juniors" as Mr. Norris, on whose plea in their behalf we commented last week. In a recent case they felt compelled to beat a certair party, "notwithstanding the earnest and able argument of the ingenious young gentleman who was of counsel for " him. Not many of us old heads get such a free advertisement as that.- - In Gilbert & Sullivan's new opera the principal character is the Lord Chancellor, who is in love with one of his own wards, and is obliged therefore to obtain his own consent to the union, and satisfy himself that he is all that can be desired. He finally overcomes all scruples. Lucas Hurst of Philadelphia has bequeathed $200,000 for founding a free law library for the benefit of students and poor members of the legal profession. When can there be a trial without any issue? When there is a "miscarriage of justice." The American Law Review for June contains the following leading articles: What shall be done with the Reports? by Jas. L. High; Extortionate Traffic Rates, by Edelbert Hamilton; Preferred Stock. We would answer the titlequery of Mr. High's excellent article by saying, Codify. We regret to see Mr. Hamilton using "traffic" for carriage or transportation. "Traffic " means commerce, trade, or barter, and its use in the other sense, although common among carriers, is a corruption.