1624 July. Refusal of the Council of War to supply Mansfeld. BUCKINGHAM'S DESIGNS. 265 dangerous to the enemy than to their own commanders. Yet what else was to be done? An attempt had been made in vain to divert some of the subsidy money to the support of Mansfeld. The Council of War had replied by asking whether the King would give them a written declaration that he needed the money for one of those four ends mentioned in the statute.' Weston, who had been sent to ask for the money, could not say that the King intended to give any such declaration, but he knew 'that it was both his Majesty's and the Prince's pleasure' that they should enable Mansfeld to pay his troops. He was told distinctly that without 'some particular warrant in writing nothing could be done.'1 Mansfeld's Even if Buckingham had been able to raise the money which he needed, it was unlikely that Mansfeld's armament would Questions gain for him the good-will of the House of Comarising out of mons? If the force which it had been proposed to employment. levy had been directed towards the Palatinate, such an employment would have been entirely outside the circle of ideas within which the Lower House had been moving, and Buckingham had already reason to question whether France was disposed to give even this amount of satisfaction to the wishes of the King of England. A little later Louis's The League intentions were made still clearer. On August 26 a covery of the league had been signed between France, Venice, and Valtelline. Savoy for the recovery of the Valtelline; and, in order to prevent the Spanish Government from bringing up fresh troops to resist the attack, it had been arranged that the Duke of Savoy, with the aid of a French force, should make an attack upon Genoa, and that Mansfeld should throw himself upon Alsace and the Austrian possessions in Swabia.2 Aug. 26. for the re Whilst James and Buckingham, therefore, were fondly Richelieu hoping to make use of Richelieu for the reconquest and Ger- of the Palatinate, Richelieu was planning how to make use of James and Buckingham for the reconquest of the Valtelline. The result of Marescot's embassy to many. 'Weston to Conway, July 31, S. P. Dom. clxx. 82. Siri, Mem. Rec. v. 639, 680. Germany had been discouraging. Richelieu had consequently assured the Elector of Bavaria that he need have no fear of an attack from France for at least a year, and had instructed Effiat to lay before James a plan for the pacification of Germany which bore a very close resemblance to those unsatisfactory overtures which had been made by Francesco della Rota in the preceding winter.1 Richelieu was probably right in judging that this was as much as he could persuade his master to do for some time to come; perhaps also in judging that it would be unwise for France to embark in open war till it was clear that she could find allies who could be trusted; but when Buckingham passed his neck under the yoke of the imperious Cardinal, he had certainly expected more than this. again in England. 2 Towards the end of September Mansfeld was once more in England, pressing for men and money. He announced S-ptember. that his English troops, if he could persuade James Mansfeld to entrust him with any, would be allowed to land between Calais and Gravelines, close to the Flemish frontier, and that Louis was ready to allow him to levy 13,000 men, and would, in conjunction with his allies, supply money 'for their pay. Yet the French ministers, who had so pertinaciously demanded the strictest acknowledgment of the rights of the English Catholics, refused to bind themselves to any definite course in their military operations by a single line in writing. In the meanwhile, Louis wrote to Effiat informing him that what was given to Mansfeld was given 'for the affairs of our league,' that is to say, for the support of his operations in the Valtelline. If the men could also be useful to the King of England and his son-in-law, he should be glad. After the marriage had been agreed upon, he would be able to deliberate further.4 'Richelieu, Mém. ii. 405; Louis XIII. to Effiat, Sept. Harl MSS. 4595, fol. 307. See p. 181. 2 Louis XIII. to Effiat, Sept. 24, ibid. fol. 369. Effiat to Louis XIII., Louis XIII. to Effiat, Oct. 4 ibid. fol. 17 b. Sept. 30 ibid. fol. 33. 1624 LOUIS WILL NOT BIND HIMSELF. 267 Such was the position of affairs when the English Parliament was a second time prorogued. Buckingham, it would seem, October. A written engagement demanded had sold his master's honour for nought. To his thinking, indeed, the only course left to him was to push blindly on. If he had had his way, 20,000l. from France. would have been placed at once in Mansfeld's hands. The adventurer had an interview with James, who listened, well pleased, to his talk, and amused him by a recommendation to ask leave of the Infanta to pass through the Spanish Netherlands on his way to the Palatinate.' There was, however, still some prudence left in the English Court. The Council recommended a short delay till Louis had given a written promise to allow Mansfeld's troops to enter France, and to permit their employment for the recovery of the Palatinate. In the meanwhile Mansfeld was to go to Holland, to muster some Germans who were to take part in the expedition.2 The French refuse to give one. In a few days James learned that he had reckoned without the French in respect both of the marriage and of Mansfeld's army. Carlisle and Holland were plainly told that their master's letter, even if countersigned by the Prince and a Secretary of State, would not suffice, and were informed at the same time that there could be no offensive league for the present. "To capitulate in writing," said the French ministers, "would but cast rubs in the way of their dispensation, and make it altogether impossible; since it must needs highly offend the Pope to hear they should enter into an offensive league with heretics against Catholics, and was like so far to scandalize the Catholic princes of Germany, as this king should lose all credit with them, whom yet he hoped to win to their better party." In vain the ambassadors remonstrated. Not a line in writing could be drawn from the French ministers. They could not,' they said, 'condescend to anything in writing; but it the King's faith and promise would serve the turn, that should be renewed to us here, and 1 Rusdorf to Frederick, Oct. 2, Mém. i. 377. 15, 16, 2 Rusdorf to Frederick Oct. 5, Mém. i. 379, 381; Conway to Carlisle and Holland, Hardwicke S. P. i. 532. to his Majesty likewise by their ambassador in England, in as full and ample manner as we could desire it.' A long altercation followed, and the English ambassadors broke off the interview in high dudgeon, saying that they knew not whether, when the King their master should hear of this their proceeding, he might not open his ear to new counsels, and embrace such offers as might come to him from other parts, and leave them perhaps to seek place for repentance when it would be too late.'1 In a private letter to the Prince, Carlisle expressed his opinion strongly. "It may therefore please your Highness," he wrote, to give your humble servant leave, out of his Aug. 13. Carlisle's zeal and devotion to your Highness' service, to reopinion. present unto your Highness that our endeavours here will be fruitless unless you speak unto the French ambassador in a higher strain, and that my Lord of Buckingham also hold the same language unto him. It is true that they do offer the King's word for their assistance, and that their ambassador shall give his Majesty the like assurance; but what assurance can be given to the verbal promise of this people, who are so apt to retract or give new interpretations to their former words, your Highness, out of your excellent wisdom, will easily discern." 2 The French plan supported by Buckingham. With respect to the marriage treaty, so much had been yielded already that a point or two further hardly mattered much. Buckingham had before him the vision of an angry Parliament, incensed with him, as he told Effiat, because he 'had so far departed from the promises that had been made.'3 Startling news, too, reached him from Spain. Inojosa, as might have been expected, had, after a mock investigation, been fully acquitted of the charge of conspiring against Buckingham; but the party 1 Carlisle and Holland to Conway, [Oct. 9], Hardwicke S. P. i. 536; date from copy in S. P. France. 2 Carlisle to Charles, Oct. 7, ibid. i. 535. 66 Sept. 26 "A cause qu'ils disent que le Duc s'est fort éloigné des promesses qui leur avoient été faites."-Effiat to Ville-aux-Clercs, Oct. 6 4596, fol. 25. Harl. MSS. 1624 JAMES GIVES WAY. 269 opposed to Olivares had sufficient weight in the Council to make one more effort to avoid a breach, and a resolution was taken to send Gondomar once more to England in Coloma's room. Gondomar The prospect of seeing the clever Spaniard again whispering his words of command in James's ear to return to was very terrible to Buckingham; and who could foresee the result if Gondomar should find new and unexpected allies in the House of Commons? England. Oct. 19. Charles supports Buckingham. If it was to be a question whether the King should give way to Spain or to France, Charles was sure to place himself on Buckingham's side, and he joined in urging his father to make the required concession. "Your despatch," he wrote to Carlisle, "gave us enough ado to keep all things from an unrecoverable breach. For my father at first startled very much at it, and would scarce hear reason, which made us fear that his averseness was built upon some hope of good overtures from Gondomar, who, they say, is to be shortly here, though I believe it not; which made me deal plainly with the King, telling him I would never match with Spain, and so entreated him to find a fit match for me. Though he was a little angry at first, yet afterwards he allowed our opinions to be reason, which before he rejected." 1 It was like Charles to suppose that his father could not be really influenced by the motives he professed, and to fancy that it was impossible for anyone to differ from himself with any semblance of reason. Yet if the concession which he was now recommending had been laid before him six months before, he would doubtless have started back with amazement and horror. He had directly engaged that his marriage should bring 'no advantage to the recusants.' 2 As for James, a loophole was still left to him. He had promised that 'no such condition' should be 'foisted in upon any other treaty whatsoever. He was not asked to do precisely this. He was to keep his word in the letter, whilst breaking it in the spirit. The article, separate from the treaty, was to be called a private engagement. As, however, it was to be made as binding as possible by The Prince to Carlisle, Oct. 19, S. P. France. 2 Page 222. • Page 226. 3 |