his own and his son's signature, attested by that of a Secretary of State, this was surely enough to startle James, without its being necessary to seek for an explanation of his reluctance to give his assent in some imaginary overtures from Gondomar. way. and Mans feld. To his own disgrace Charles had his way. James had not strength of mind enough to break up the alliance on which he James gives had counted for the restoration of the Palatinate. Orders were sent to the ambassadors to accept the French proposals. What was James to gain in return? The The French verbal promise of support to Mansfeld, which was Government all that Louis offered, was plainly not worth having. "We think it not fit," wrote Carlisle and Holland, "to express by writing the sense we have of the proceedings of the French." Louis, in fact, had agreed to declarc his intention of continuing his contribution to Mansfeld for six months, and of allowing the money to be used for the recovery of the Palatinate. If, however, 'the affairs of the Palatinate were not settled within this time, his Majesty would continue, in every way which he might consider most fitting, to testify to his brother the King of Great Britain his desire that he might receive contentment in the matter of the Palatinate.' 2 Against this wording the ambassadors protested. Instead of declaring that he would aid 'in every way which he might consider most fitting,' Louis might at least say that he would aid in every way that was most fitting. They were told that this could not be. In that case, they replied, they would rather not listen at all to so illusory a promise. Acting, no doubt, in pursuance of orders from England, they said that they would be content with a simple promise to pay Mansfeld for six months. To this Louis cheerfully consented, and, in giving the promise, added a few words still vaguer than those to which objection had been taken. "As to the continuance of my assistance for the Palatinate," he said, "let my good brother the King of Great Britain confide in my affection, which I will show by my deeds and acting rather than by my words and promises." 3 Carlisle and Holland to Conway, Oct. 28, S. P. France. 2 Ville-aux-Clercs to Effiat, Carlisle and Holland to Conway, Oct. 28, Nov. 12; Hardwicke S. P. i. 523. S. P. France. 1624 SIGNATURE OF THE TREATY. 271 On these terms the marriage treaty was signed by the ambassadors on November 10. It needed only the ratification of the King of England and the grant of Nov. 10. The mar. riage treaty Something to be done for Mans. feld. signed. the Papal dispensation to be carried into effect. What was now to be done for Mansfeld? Was he, without any real understanding with France, to be launched into the heart of Germany? If a scheme so rash was to be persisted in, where was James to find the 20,000l. which he would be called upon to pay month by month. The Exchequer had not in it a farthing applicable to the pur pose. The Council of War had shown by its former answer that its members did not believe that the subsidies were intended to be expended in such a way, and without an order from the Council of War the Parliamentary Treasurers could give nothing. But for the turn which the marriage arrangements had taken, Parliament would by this time have been in full session, able either to grant the sum required or to give the King plainly to understand that no further subsidies would be forthcoming for the purpose. Where was found? In default of Parliament, application was again made to the Council of War. Payments for such an expedition as Mansfeld's were perhaps covered by the letter of the money to be Subsidy Act, as being intended to assist other his Majesty's friends and allies,' but they were certainly in contravention of its spirit. Besides, even if this had not been the case, there was no money really applicable to the purpose. It would tax all the powers of the Treasurers to meet the demands made upon them for the four points expressly named in the Act, and it was only by neglecting one or other of them that it would be possible to divert something for Mansfeld. By what arguments the Council of War was swayed we do not know. But on October 4 a warrant, followed up by another on November 24, was issued by that body to empower the Treasurers to advance 15,000l. for the expenses of levying troops for Mansfeld, and 40, cool. to pay his men for two months.1 Nov. 24. Payments out of the subsidies Abstract of the warrants of the Council of War, June 1625; S. P. Dom. Charles I., Addenda. Oct. 29. On October 29 orders had been given to levy 12,000 pressed men for this service.1 On November 4 Mansfeld landed at Margate on his return from Holland. On the 7th he received a commission empowering him to take command of the troops. He was to Mansfeld in use them for the recovery of the Palatinate, doing England. nothing against the King's friends and allies, especially doing nothing against the lands and dominions of which the King of Spain, our very dear brother, and the Infanta, have a just and legitimate possession.' 2 Nov. 4. He is not to touch Spanish territory. The troops, in short, were to be used for the purposes for which they were intended, and for nothing else. If a war with Spain must come, let it come after due deliberation, and not as the result of one of those raids which Mansfeld knew so well how to plan and to execute. cess. Assuredly reasons were not wanting to justify James in the policy of carrying the war into Germany rather than attacking Spain. On the other hand there is nothing to be said Little pros. pect of suc- for the means which he adopted to secure his end. Mansfeld himself was a man upon whom no dependence could be placed. Even in the little Court which gathered round the exiles at the Hague, he was no longer regarded with favour. Camerarius, one of the ablest of Frederick's counsellors, predicted that no good would come of his employment. "From this," he wrote, "the restoration of the Palatinate is not to be expected. Indeed I see many other objections; and if Mansfeld has with him foreign soldiers, instead of an army for the most part composed of Germans, the whole Empire will be leagued against him. I fear, too, that Duke Christian may combine with him, and he is alike hateful to God and man. The time requires not such defenders." Broken and divided as Germany was, there was still some national feeling left. To fling a couple of adventurers with an army of foreigners into the heart of the country was not the 'Signet Office Docquets, Oct. 29. Rusdorf to Frederick, Nov. 5; the King to Mansfeld, Nov. 7; Rusdorf's Mem. i. 390, 392. 1624 CONSEQUENCES OF THE TREATY. 273 way to conciliate this feeling. As yet no arrangement had been come to with the German Princes. It was not upon any understanding with them that Mansfeld's projects were based. Nor, even if the chances of an invasion of Germany had been greater than they were, was this invasion one which could be regarded hopefully. For, of the two Governments by which it was to be supported, one was anxious to employ the troops against Spain in Italy, whilst the other was anxious to employ them against the Emperor in Germany. There were, in fact, two policies, each of which was not without its merits. A close alliance with France to attack Spain would probably not have been without its fruits in lightening the weight which pressed upon the German Protestants. On the other hand a close alliance with Sweden, Denmark, the Dutch Republic, and the Princes of North Germany would probably have been more directly effectual for the recovery of the Palatinate. In the first case, the co-operation of the Northern Protestants; in the second case, the co-operation of France, would have to be regarded as of secondary impor tance. The course which was actually taken was the result of the several faults of James and Buckingham. It satisfied the King's caution by the appearance of strength which he saw in an alliance reaching from Stockholm to Paris. It accorded with Buckingham's impetuosity, that England should stand. alone, and should prepare to throw her only army into the midst of Europe without any trustworthy or ascertained alliance on any side. James's notion that it was possible to treat the question of the Palatinate apart, without given offence to Spain, was one which could hardly bear the test of conversion into practical action. He had thought to mingle in a strife in which the passions of men were deeply engaged, without taking account of anything but their reason, and he had fancied that he could • The impossibility of Spain remaining neutral if the Palatinate were attacked, is clearly put in a letter from the Infanta Isabella to Philip IV., April 2, Brussels MSS. measure their reason by his own. He had expected his son-inlaw to forget his injuries, and to consent to take his place again at Heidelberg as a peaceable subject of the Empire. He had expected the King of Spain, in spite of the deep distrust which he entertained of Frederick, to help him back into his old Frankenthal position. He now expected the Infanta Isabella demanded to surrender Frankenthal to an English garrison fanta. according to the treaty made in the spring of the preceding year. The Infanta replied that she was quite ready to give up the town to an English garrison if James would send one to the gates; but she declined to assure that garrison against the probable danger of an attack from the Imperialist forces in the neighbourhood. Clearly the Spaniards were not about to assist in the recovery of the Palatinate. from the In 1 Would France be more likely to help than Spain had been? For a moment James and Buckingham were able to flatter France gives themselves that it would be so. On November 18 hopes of aid. it was known in London 2 that, when the marriage treaty was signed, Louis had promised with his own royal mouth that Mansfeld should have liberty to land at Boulogne or Calais; that the letters of exchange for the French share of the expenses had actually been seen by the ambassadors; and that Richelieu had assured Carlisle and Holland that 'they had not so much linked together two persons as two crowns, and that the interest of the Palatinate was as dear to them as to the English.' 3 Nov. 21. in London. At the news that the treaty had been signed the bells of the London churches rung out their merriest peals, and Rejoicings healths were drunk to the future Queen of England around bonfires in the streets.4 Yet at the very time the French Court had already made up its mind to draw back from the engagement into which Louis had entered a few days before to allow Mansfeld to pass through France. The preparations for the attack upon the Valtelline were now complete; 1 See p. 74. Nov. 26 Dec. 6 |