men, when all law and liberty were trampled under the feet of military banditti; when those great crimes were perpetrated on a high place and with a high hand against those who were the objects of public veneration, which, more than anything else, break their spirits and confound their moral sentiments, obliterate the distinctions between right and wrong in their understanding, and teach the multitude to feel no longer any reverence for that justice which they thus see triumphantly dragged at the chariot wheels of a tyrant; even then, when this unhappy country, triumphant indeed abroad, but enslaved at home, had no prospect but that of a long succession of tyrants wading through slaughter to a throne - even then, I say, when all seemed lost, the unconquerable spirit of English liberty survived in the hearts of English jurors. That spirit is, I trust in God, not extinct; and if any modern tyrant were, in the drunkenness of his insolence, to hope to overawe an English jury, I trust and I believe that they would tell him: "Our ancestors braved the bayonets of Cromwell; we bid defiance to yours. Contempsi Catalina gladios ·non pertimescam tuos!»

What could be such a tyrant's means of overawing a jury? As long as their country exists, they are girt round with impenetrable armor. Till the destruction of their country no danger can fall upon them for the performance of their duty, and I do trust that there is no Englishman so unworthy of life as to desire to outlive England. But if any of us are condemned to the cruel punishment of surviving our country-if, in the inscrutable counsels of Providence, this favored seat of justice and liberty, this noblest work of human wisdom and virtue, be destined to destruction,—which I shall not be charged with national prejudice for saying would be the most dangerous wound ever inflicted on civilization,- at least let us carry with us into our sad exile the consolation that we ourselves have not violated the rights of hospitality to exiles, that we have not torn from the altar the suppliant who claimed protection as the voluntary victim of loyalty and conscience!

Gentlemen, I now leave this unfortunate gentleman in your hands. His character and his situation might interest your humanity; but, on his behalf, I ask only justice from you. I ask only a favorable construction of what cannot be said to be more than ambiguous language, and this you will soon be told from the highest authority is a part of justice.

JAMES MADISON

(1751-1836)

N THE suggestion of James Madison, commissioners from Maryland and Virginia met at Mount Vernon, in March 1785, to

discuss means of exercising their joint jurisdiction over Chesapeake Bay and the Potomac. Maryland having proposed to invite other States, Madison saw the opportunity for a general movement, and on his initiative were held, first, the Annapolis meeting of 1786, and, next year, the Philadelphia Convention, which adopted the Federal Constitution. As Madison had been one of the framers of the "Virginia plan" presented to the convention, he is called "the Father of the Constitution." By his letters in the Federalist and by his advocacy of the Constitution against Patrick Henry in the Virginia Convention, he probably did more than even Washington or Hamilton to secure its adoption. He did not remain a Federalist, however. He had advocated a Federal Government based on the power of the people of the whole Union, as well as of the States, but he intended that the States should remain free and indestructible, and when issues were joined against the Alien and Sedition Laws he wrote the celebrated Virginia Resolutions, asserting that: "The Constitution of the United States was a compact, to which the States were parties, granting limited powers of government; that in the case of deliberate, palpable, and dangerous exercise of other powers not granted by the compact, the States had the right, and were in duty bound to interpose for arresting the progress of the evils." When the Virginia Resolutions were afterwards quoted in support of the South Carolina theory of Nullification, Madison denied that they would bear such a construction and declared himself opposed to Nullification as a mode of the "interposition» he had advised.

As President of the United States, Madison ranks above Jefferson —and, indeed, above any other President, except Washington, in personal dignity and in the dignity of his administration. Unassuming and unselfish, he showed himself in public as in private life the best type of the educated American gentleman.

STATE SOVEREIGNTY AND FEDERAL SUPREMACY

(From the Speech Delivered in the Virginia Convention, June 1788, on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution)

Mr. Chairman:

IN

N CONSIDERING this great subject, I trust we shall find that part which gives the General Government the power of laying and collecting taxes indispensable and essential to the existence of any efficient or well-organized system of government. If we consult reason, and be ruled by its dictates, we shall find its justification there; if we review the experience we have had, or contemplate the history of nations, here we find ample reason to prove its expediency. There is little reason to depend for necessary supplies on a body which is fully possessed of the power of withholding them. If a government depend on other governments for its revenues. - if it must depend on the voluntary contributions of its members-its existence must be precarious. A government which relies on thirteen independent sovereignties for the means of its existence is a solecism in theory and a mere nullity in practice. Is it consistent with reason that such a government can promote the happiness of any people? It is subversive of every principle of sound policy to trust the safety of a community with a government totally destitute of the means of protecting itself or its members. Can Congress, after the repeated unequivocal proofs it has experienced of the utter inutility and inefficacy of requisitions, reasonably expect that they would be hereafter effectual or productive? Will not the same local interests and other causes militate against a compliance? Whoever hopes the contrary must ever be disappointed. The effect, sir, cannot be changed without a removal of the cause. Let each county in this Commonwealth be supposed free and independent; let your revenues depend on requisitions of proportionate quotas from them; let application be made to them repeatedly: is it to be presumed that they would comply, or that an adequate collection could be made from partial compliances ? It is now difficult to collect the taxes from them. How much would that difficulty be enhanced, were you to depend solely on their generosity! I appeal to the reason of every gentleman here, whether he is not persuaded that the present Confederation is as feeble as the government of Virginia would be in that

case; to the same reason I appeal, whether it be compatible with prudence to continue a government of such manifest and palpable debility.

If we recur to history, and review the annals of mankind, I undertake to say that no instance can be produced, by the most learned man, of any confederate government that will justify a continuance of the present system, or that will not demonstrate the necessity of this change, and of substituting for the present pernicious and fatal plan the system now under consideration, or one equally energetic. The uniform conclusion drawn from a review of ancient and modern confederacies is that, instead of promoting the public happiness, or securing public tranquillity, they have, in every instance, been productive of anarchy and confusion, ineffectual for the preservation of harmony, and a prey to their own dissensions and foreign invasions.

The Amphictyonic league resembled our Confederation in its nominal powers; it was possessed of rather more power. The component States retained their sovereignty, and enjoyed an equality of suffrage in the federal council. But though its powers were more considerable in many respects than those of our present system, yet it had the same radical defect.

Its powers were exercised over its individual members in their political capacities. To this capital defect it owed its disorders and final destruction. It was compelled to recur to the sanguinary coercion of war to enforce its decrees. The struggles consequent on a refusal to obey a decree, and an attempt to enforce it, produced the necessity of applying to foreign assistance. By complying with such an application, together with his intrigues, Philip of Macedon acquired sufficient influence to become a member of the league. This artful and insidious prince soon after became master of their liberties.

The Achæsan league, though better constructed than the Amphictyonic, in material respects, was continually agitated with domestic dissensions and driven to the necessity of calling in foreign aid; this, also, eventuated in the demolition of their confederacy. Had they been more closely united, their people would have been happier; and their united wisdom and strength would not only have rendered unnecessary all foreign interpositions in their affairs, but would have enabled them to repel the attack of an enemy. If we descend to more modern examples, we shall find the same evils resulting from the same sources.

The Germanic system is neither adequate to the external defense nor internal felicity of the people. The doctrine of quotas and requisitions flourishes here. Without energy, without stability, the empire is a nerveless body. The most furious conflicts and the most implacable animosities between its members strikingly distinguish its history. Concert and co-operation are incompatible with such an injudiciously constructed system.

The republic of the Swiss is sometimes instanced for its stability; but even there, dissensions and wars of a bloody nature have been frequently seen among the cantons. A peculiar coincidence of circumstances contributes to the continuance of their political connection. Their feeble association owes its existence to their singular situation. There is a schism, this moment, in their confederacy, which, without the necessity of uniting for their external defense, would immediately produce its dissolution.

The confederate government of Holland is a further confirmation of the characteristic imbecility of such governments. From the history of this government we might derive lessons of the most important utility.

We may derive much benefit from the experience of that unhappy country. Governments destitute of energy will ever produce anarchy. These facts are worthy the most serious consideration of every gentleman here. Does not the history of these confederacies coincide with the lesson drawn from our own experience? I must certainly pray that America may have sufficient wisdom to avail herself of the instructive information she may derive from a contemplation of the sources of their misfortunes, and that she may escape a similar fate by avoiding the causes from which their infelicity sprang. If the General Government is to depend on the voluntary contribution of the States for its support, dismemberment of the United States may be the consequence. In cases of imminent danger, only the States more immediately exposed to it would exert themselves; those remote from it would be too supine to interest themselves warmly in the fate of those whose distresses they did not immediately perceive. The General Government ought, therefore, to be empow

ered to defend the whole Union.

Must we not suppose that those parts of America which are most exposed will first be the scenes of war? Those nations whose interest is incompatible with an extension of our power, and who are jealous of our resources to become powerful and