assumes its proper place, and throws into the shade all the motives and the interests of time. Its language is, "What shall it profit a man, if he shall gain the whole world, and lose his own soul; or what shall a man give in exchange for his soul?" It makes the will of God our rule; it places us under his omniscient eye; it points us forward to the tribunal of an omnipotent Judge, to a sentence of unmixed justice, and a reward of matchless grace. Nothing can be more alluring, on the one hand, or more terrific, on the other, than its descriptions of the consequences of human conduct. It speaks of "eternal life;" of being the "sons and heirs of God;" of a "crown of life;" of "an inheritance incorruptible, and undefiled, and that fadeth not away." It speaks, also, of "the blackness of darkness forever;" of "the worm that dieth not, and the fire that is not quenched." Laying aside, then, the affections, and looking solely at the direct motives of duty and of interest which it presents, surely no other system can be so adapted to move the will as this, when it is really believed.

Teachings not abstract. I observe, finally, that Christianity is adapted to the will, and to the whole emotive nature of man, because its teachings respecting the character of God and human duty are not by general and abstract propositions, but by facts, and by manifestations in action. At this point Christianity is strongly contrasted with natural religion, and with every thing that tends towards pantheism. "It is indeed," says Erskine, "a striking, and yet an undoubted fact, that we are comparatively little affected with abstract truths in morality." "A single definite and intelligible action gives a vividness and a power to the idea of that moral character which it exhibits, beyond what could be conveyed by a multitude of abstract descriptions. Thus the abstract ideas of patriotism and integrity make but an uninteresting appearance

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when contrasted with the high spectacle of heroic worth which was exhibited in the conduct of Regulus, when, in the senate of his country, he raised his solitary voice against those humbling propositions of Carthage, which, if acquiesced in, would have restored him to liberty, and which for that single reason had almost gained an acquiescence; and then, unsubdued alike by the frantic entreaties of his family, the weeping solicitations of the admiring citizens, and the appalling terrors of his threatened fate, he returned to Africa, rather than violate his duty to Rome and the sacredness of truth." "In the same way, the abstract views of the divine character, drawn from the observation of nature, are, in general, rather visions of the intellect than efficient moral principles in the heart and conduct; and, however true they may be, are uninteresting and unexciting when compared with the vivid exhibition of them in a history or definite and intelligible action. To assist our weakness, therefore, and to accommodate his instructions to the principles of our nature, God has been pleased to present us a most interesting series of actions, in which his moral character, as far as we are concerned, is fully and perspicuously embodied."

So great is this difference, as ideas are presented in different modes, that an idea or a principle may be apparently received, and approved, in its abstract form, which shall not be recognized as the same when it takes the form of action. "A corrupt politician, for instance, can speculate on and applaud the abstract idea of integrity; but when this abstract idea takes the form of a man and a course of action, it ceases to be that harmless and welcome visitor it used to be, and draws on itself the decided enmity of its former apparent friend." "In the same way, many men will admit the abstract idea of a God of infinite holiness and good

ness, and will even take delight in exercising their reason or their taste in speculating on the subject of his being and attributes; yet these same persons will shrink with dislike and alarm from the living energy which this abstract idea assumes in the Bible." * The great object of Erskine is to show, first, that there is this difference between ideas thus presented; and, secondly, that God has made in action such manifestations of himself as must, if they are believed, bring the character into conformity with his. Whatever we may think of the second proposition, there can be no doubt of the principle involved in the first; nor of the fact that the emotive nature of man is addressed, in accordance with it, both in the Old Testament and in the New. All that series of mighty acts which God performed in behalf of the Israelites the deliverance. from Egypt, the giving of the law, the passage through the wilderness and through Jordan-could not but affect their hearts and wills infinitely more than they could have been by any description of God, or by any mere precepts. Probably it was better adapted than any thing else could have been to give that people correct ideas of God, and to lead them to a full and joyful obedience of his commandments. And so the great fact of the New Testament, that "God so loved the world, that he gave his only-begotten Son," and the example of our Saviour," who loved us and gave himself for us," have ever been among its most powerful and constraining motives. They have, in fact, been those without which no others would have been of any avail.

Whether, then, we consider its offers of pardon and of aid; its connection with the affections; the power of its direct motives; or its mode of appeal by facts and manifestations in action, we see that Christianity is perfectly adapted to the will of man.

* Internal Evidence.

LECTURE VI

ARGUMENT FIFTH, CONTINUED. DIVISION SECOND: CHRISTIANITY AS A RESTRAINING POWER. - ARGUMENT SIXTH: THE EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE OF CHRISTIANITY. - ARGUMENT SEVENTH ITS FITNESS AND TENDENCY TO BECOME UNIVERSAL. ARGUMENT EIGHTH: IT HAS ALWAYS BEEN IN THE WORLD.

MAN is a complex being. He has been called the microcosm, or little world, because, while he has a distinctive nature of his own, he is a partaker and representative of every thing in the inferior creation. In him are united the material and the spiritual, the animal and the rational. He has instincts, propensities, desires, passions, by which he is allied to the animals; he has also reason, conscience, free-will, by which he is allied to higher intelligences and to God. Hence the ends he is capable of choosing, and the principles by which he may be actuated, are very various. Body and soul, reason and passion, conscience and desire, often seem to be, and are, opposing forces, and man is left

"In doubt to act or rest,

In doubt to deem himself a god or beast,
In doubt his soul or body to prefer."

"The intestine war of reason against the passions,' says Pascal," has given rise, among those who wish for peace, to the formation of two different sects. The

one wished to renounce the passions, and be as gods; the other to renounce reason, and become beasts."

Excitement, guidance, restraint — difficulty of.With this wide range of faculties, and consequent variety of impulses and motives, in the individual, and especially when we consider the variety of his social relations, we may well say that, if any problem was beyond human skill, it was the choice of ends, and the arrangement of means and motives, the contrivance of a system of excitement, and guidance, and restraint, which should harmonize these jarring elements, and cause every wheel in the vast machinery of human society to move freely and without interference. Accordingly, whether we look at the faculties excited, or at the ends to which they have been directed, or at the restraints imposed, we find in all human systems a great want of adaptation to the nature of man. Excitement, guidance, restraint, - these are what man needs; and a system which should so combine them as to lead him, in its legitimate influence, to his true perfection and end, would be adapted to his whole nature. I have already spoken of the power of Christianity to excite and to guide some of the principal faculties. I now proceed to make some observations upon it as a restraining power.

No natural principle to be eradicated. There is no natural principle of action which requires to be eradicated, but there are many which require to be directed, subordinated, and restrained. There are principles of our nature, which conduce only to our well-being when acting within prescribed limits, which become the source of vice and wretchedness when those limits are overstepped. But to put the check upon each particular wheel, precisely at the point at which its motion would become too rapid for the movement of the whole, requires a skill beyond that of man.