ADMISSIONS BY HUME.

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seems to have had a perception of some of the absurd consequences to which it must lead, and therefore adds, "I beg the limitations here may be remarked when I say, that a miracle can never be proved so as to be the foundation of a system of religion. For I own that otherwise there may possibly be miracles, or violations of the usual course of nature, of such a kind as to admit of proof from human testimony." This single admission destroys at once the whole force of his argument. As an example, he says, "Suppose all authors, in all languages, agree that from the 1st of January, 1600, there was a total darkness over the whole earth for eight days; suppose that the tradition of this extraordinary event is still strong and lively among the people ; that all travelers who return from foreign countries bring us accounts of the same tradition, without the least variation or contradiction; it is evident that our present philosophers, instead of doubting the fact, ought to receive it as certain." "But," he adds, with reference, however, to another example, "should this miracle be ascribed to any new system of religion, men in all ages have been so imposed upon by ridiculous stories of that kind, that the very circumstance would be full proof of a cheat, and sufficient, with all men of sense, not only to make them reject the fact, but to reject it without further examination." On the consistency and candor of this passage I make no comment. As showing a tendency of our nature, the argument is just the reverse. Who, after reading this, can fail to feel that Hume was guilty of a heartless, if not a malignant trifling with the best interests of his fellow-men?

Summary. Thus, after mentioning the classes of persons whom I shall hope to benefit, I have endeavored to show, first, that you, my hearers, are responsible for the manner in which you use your understandings, and for the opinions you form on this great subject.

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And, secondly, that there is nothing in the nature or kind of evidence by which Christianity is sustained, nor in any conflict of the evidence of experience and of testimony, to prevent us from attaining that certainty upon which we may rest as upon the rock, and which shall constitute, if not "the assurance of faith," yet the assurance of understanding.

LECTURE II.

PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS.- REVELATION PROBABLE: FIRST, FROM THE NATURE OF THE CASE; SECONDLY, FROM FACTS.PROBABILITY OF MIRACLES. ASIDE FROM THEIR EFFECT IN SUSTAINING ANY PARTICULAR REVELATION. CONNECTION BETWEEN THE MIRACLE AND THE DOCTRINE. THE CHRISTIAN RELIGION, OR NONE.

THE Christian religion admits of certain proof; and to show this was one object of the last lecture. But, in searching for that proof, we may proceed in two different methods. We may either try the facts in question by the laws of evidence, precisely as we would any other facts; or we may judge beforehand of their probability or improbability. In the first case, we should allow nothing for what we might suppose previous probability or improbability, nothing for the nature of the facts as miraculous or common. We should hold our

selves in the position of an impartial jury, bound to decide solely according to the evidence. This course alone is in accordance with the spirit of the inductive philosophy, which decides nothing on the ground of previous hypothesis, but yields itself entirely to the guidance of facts properly authenticated, and refuses no conclusion which the existence of those facts necessarily involves. Let those who are to judge of Christianity approach it in this spirit, and we are content.

Need of the philosophic spirit. - And surely, if this spirit was demanded when the processes of nature only were in question, and the whole history of human

conjecture there is but the history of weakness and folly, so that science made no progress till facts established by proper evidence were received without reference to hypothesis, much more must this same spirit be demanded when the procedure of God in his moral government is concerned. On such a subject, nothing can be more contrary to that wise caution which adheres to facts, and balances evidence, and keeps the mind open to conviction, than to come to a decision under the influence of a prejudication of the case on the ground of any antecedent improbability.

Spirit of the age-tendency to reaction. But, unphilosophical as such a course plainly is, it springs directly from the spirit of the age. The human mind, in its constant oscillations between the extremes of credulity and skepticism, is now ranging somewhere on the side of skepticism. There was a time, both before and after the revival of letters, when a belief in frequent supernatural agency was common. But when many things, supposed to be owing to supernatural influence, were referred, by the light of science, to natural causes, and a large class of superstitions was thus expelled, then men passed to the other extreme, and it became weak and superstitious to believe even in the possibility of any other causes than those that were natural. It was the progress of this feeling toward the utmost limits of skepticism, that was called by many the progress of light in the world; and it was taken advantage of, and urged on, by skeptics, in every possible way. But a general tendency of the human mind is never altogether deceptive. It is the indication of some great truth. This is so with the tendency of man, admitted even by Hume, to believe in supernatural agency. And when the reaction is over, and men settle down in the light of a large experience, it will be readily conceded, I doubt not, that, while the gen

GROUND OF PROBABILITY.

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eral course of nature is uniform, so as to lay a foundation for experience, and give it value, there is also something in the system to meet our tendency to believe in that which is supernatural; that there are powers, higher than those of nature, connected with the natural and moral administration of the universe, that may interfere for the welfare of man.

Facts to rest on evidence. But, however this may be hereafter, it is not so now. The legitimate force of the evidence for Christianity is constantly neutralized by assertions, purely hypothetical, of the improbability of the facts. Now, we admit of no such improbability. We hold that no man has a right to construct a metaphysical balance in which he shall place an hypothesis of his own as a counterpoise for one particle of valid evidence. To do it, is to go back into the dark ages. It is to apply, in religion, maxims long since discarded in physics. It is, therefore, out of a regard to the exigencies of the time, and not because I think it essential to the Christian argument, that I proceed to adduce some considerations to show the antecedent probability of a revelation from God.

Probability-how judged of. To judge of the probability of any event, we must know something of its causes, or of the intentions of the agent who may produce it. If we know nothing of these, we have no right to say, of any event, that it is probable or improbable. If we know all the causes that are at work, or all the intentions of the agents employed, we can foretell with certainty what will take place. It is obvious, therefore, that an event which may seem highly probable to one man, or, perhaps, nearly certain, may seem to another altogether improbable. So sensible, however, are most persons of their ignorance of the causes, and agents, and purposes, that may exist in this complex and wonderful universe, that it requires but a