benevolence, and a sense of public utility, the main prop will certainly be taken from the argument which I have here pursued. But in the mean time it is not presumptuous to conclude, that the situation best calculated to improve by exercise the faculties of man, is civil society, consisting, as it does, of unequal fortunes, ranks, and conditions.* * This must not be understood as favouring the accumulation of wealth into few hands. The more gradual the steps by which you ascend from the lowest to the highest fortune, the more advantageous is the state of the community. Much inconvenience results, in many countries, from the colossal fortunes of a few individuals, contrasted with general poverty. The civilization is always least advanced, where any of the intermediate steps are wanting. 85 CHAPTER IV. Whether Equality or Inequality of Ranks and Fortunes, is the Condition best suited to the Exercise of Virtue. If the advantages arising to mankind from their union in civil society could be pursued no farther, it would be a sufficient evidence of the Creator's wisdom, that he had provided for bringing the human race into a situation so favourable for the developement of their faculties. But intelligence, though the distinguishing ornament of our species, is still to be held inferior and subservient to virtue. And since the great object of our existence on earth is believed to be moral discipline, it might be difficult to reconcile the inequality of conditions with that main purpose of human life, unless a state consisting of such unequal conditions had a farther advantage, even beyond its first effect of bringing the mental faculties to their highest perfection. The truth is, how ever, that the inequality of conditions, which is the foundation of civil society, affords not only the best improvement of the human faculties, but the best trial of the human virtues; it is the nursery most suited to their formation, and the theatre most fitted for their exercise. The advocates of equality are not contented with denying this; they assert the very contrary. "Reduce all conditions to equality," it has been said, "and the great occasions of crime will be cut off for ever." This bold declaration must not be admitted even in passing: for it is impossible to suppose any condition of things so equal, that no man shall desire what belongs to another. A change of this sort, if effected at all, must originate in the inward habits, and not in the outward situation of man. But the truer proposition is, that the great occasions of virtue would be cut off for ever, without any corresponding deduction on the score of vice.* A complete community of * Pol. Justice, i. 462. The observations of Aristotle on this subject deserve attention, because he had an opportu goods, if it could possibly exist on a large scale, might diminish the temptations to fraud and robbery; but these constitute only a small part of the moral guilt of mankind; while, on the other hand, all those virtuous habits which nity of seeing that of which we have no instance, the actual operation of a certain degree of equality with some share of comparative civilization. "The bare necessaries of life, food and fuel, clothes to cover our nakedness, and a home to shelter us from the storm, comforts, which it is pretended, the equalization of property would enable all men to enjoy, are not the only incentives to injustice. The greatest crimes are committed for none of these things. It is not to avoid cold or hunger that tyrants cover themselves with blood; and states decree the most illustrious rewards, not to him who catches a thief, but to him who kills an usurper. Phaleas's plan of equalizing property is useful, therefore, against the least and most inconsiderable only of the evils which infest society, evils against which there is an appropriate remedy in industry and moderation. "The equalization of fortunes may have some slight tendency to stifle animosity and prevent dissension. But its effect is always inconsiderable, and often doubtful; since those who think themselves entitled to superiority will not patiently brook equality. The wickedness of man is boundless; and is an evil that cannot be remedied by equalizing property, whether lands or moveables." Lib. 2. de Polit. chap. vii.; or v. of Dr. Gillies's translation, from which I here quote, as being sufficiently accurate for the purpose. derive both their origin and their perfections from the varieties of the human condition, all the dispositions of mind to which the different circumstances of civilized life give play and action, would lose the occasions under which they are now formed, and the opportunities in which they are displayed. The Platonic view of moral virtue, which places it in the contemplation of ideal excellence, may be consistent with a state of perfection, but is incompatible with a state of probation. Virtue is an active and energetic habit, arising from the various relations of human life, and exercised in the practice of real duties; so that, as you increase the number and variety of those relations, you enlarge its sphere of action; and in proportion as you contract them, in proportion as you bring down the conditions of mankind towards an uniform level, you lower the standard, and reduce the degree of moral excellence. It may possibly be argued, that this description of virtue originates not in the nature of virtue itself, but in the situation of man; and |