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FEBRUARY, 1814.]

The Loan Bill.

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excited any alarm, it naturally lessened the public apprehensions on the subject of impressments; because, although it commanded British naval officers to seize and take, as usual, British natural born subjects from on board foreign merchant vessels, they were strictly enjoined

of restrictive measures; in form levelled equally against France and Great Britain, but really intended to injure Britain only, while they aided the cause of France. This brings me to the consideration of a subject, old and stale, indeed, but of essential importance to be well understood; and which therefore I will re-ex-"to permit no man to go on board such ships amine-I mean the embargo of December, 1807, the fruitful and immediate source of all the evils which have since afflicted our country; producing non-intercourse and non-importation, and terminating, as to the United States, in the greatest of all evils-war.

It will be recollected, that, just before this embargo was laid, the United States vessel Revenge arrived from France, with despatches from our Minister, General Armstrong. They arrived at Washington on the 14th of December, 1807. By the Revenge, news was brought that the French Emperor had said there should be no neutrals. This, indeed, was not long after gravely denied; but at length it came out in General Armstrong's own despatches, that the Emperor had said, the United States shall take the positive character of allies or enemies. But the people of the United States were not then prepared for a war against Great Britain. A gradual training for some years was requisite to bring them to that point. Nor were they prepared to adopt, knowingly, Bonaparte's continental system; it could be introduced only under the disguise of an embargo; a name universally understood to mean a very temporary suspension of the sailing of vessels for some special occasional purpose.

Four days only after the arrival of the despatches from France, President Jefferson sent to Congress the following Message:

To the Senate and House of

Representatives of the United States: The communications now made, showing the great and increasing dangers with which our vessels, our seamen, and merchandise, are threatened on the high seas, and elsewhere, from the belligerent powers of Europe; and it being of the greatest importance to keep in safety these essential resources, I deem it my duty to recommend the subject to the consideration of Congress, who will doubtless perceive all the advantage which may be expected from an inhibition of the departure of our vessels from the ports of the United States.

Their wisdom will also see the necessity of making every preparation for whatever events may grow out of the present crisis.

I ask a return of the letters of Messrs Armstrong and Champagny, which it would be improper to make public.

DECEMBER 18, 1807.

TH. JEFFERSON.

and vessels belonging to States at amity with Great Britain, for the purposes of so seizing upon, taking, and bringing away such persons aforesaid, for whose discreet and orderly demeanor the said captains could not answer; and that they should take especial care that no unnecessary violence be done or offered to the vessel, or to the remainder of the crew, from out of which such persons should be taken." The second paper was a letter (bearing date September 18, 1807) from the French Grand Judge, Regnier, to the Imperial Procureur (or Attorney) General of the Emperor's Council of Prizes, containing the Emperor's declaration concerning his Berlin decree. To the question, "1. Can armed vessels, under that decree, seize, in neutral vessels, either English property, or merchandise proceeding from the manufactures of the English territories? His Majesty notifies me, that since he had not thought proper to express any exception in his decree, there is no ground to make any in the execution with respect to any thing whatsoever." "2. His Majesty has not decided the question, whether French armed vessels may possess themselves of neutral vessels going to or from England, although they have no English merchandise on board." Why this decision was delayed, does not appear. Probably, it was for the purpose of watching for some favorable conjuncture, when the few French cruisers that could venture to sea might make a more extensive sweep of neutral vessels, thrown off their guard by a temporary forbearance.

for a plain reason that both had been published Of these two papers no secret was made; and in the newspapers: the British proclamation at full length, and the essential part of the letter of the French Grand Judge.

The third paper was General Armstrong's letter to the French Minister, Champagny, simply asking whether the Emperor, by his Berlin decree, intended to violate his treaty with the United States. And the fourth paper was Champagny's answer, announcing, with the usual assurance of a French Minister, that it was easy to reconcile the measures adopted under the Berlin decree with the observance of treaties. I will read these two letters.

General Armstrong's letter to M. Champagny.

PARIS, September 24, 1807. SIR: I have this moment learned that a new and

The communications consisted of four papers. The first a proclamation by the King of Great extended construction, highly injurious to the comBritain, dated the 16th of October, 1807, "for merce of the United States, was about to be given to recalling and prohibiting British seamen from the Imperial decree of the 21st of November last. It serving foreign Princes and States." This pro- is, therefore, incumbent on me to ask your Excelclamation had been published in our newspa- lency an explanation of his Majesty's views in relapers. It was a newspaper copy Mr. Jefferson tion to this subject, and particularly whether it be communicated to Congress. Far from having his Majesty's intention, in any degree, to infract the

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The Loan Bill.

[FEBRUARY, 1814.

obligations of the treaty subsisting between the Unit- | laid these same letters openly before Congress? ed States and the French Empire ?

I pray your Excellency, &c.

JOHN ARMSTRONG.

The answer of M. Champagny to General Armstrong, dated October 7, 1807.

SIR: You did me the honor, on the 24th of September, to request me to send you some explanations as to the execution of the decree of blockade of the British Islands, as to vessels of the United States.

The provisions of all the regulations and treaties relative to a state of blockade have appeared applicable to the existing circumstance; and it results, from the explanations which have been addressed to me by the Imperial Procureur General of the Council of Prizes, that His Majesty has considered every neutral vessel going from English ports, with cargoes of English merchandise, or of English origin, as lawfully seizeable by French armed vessels.

The decree of blockade has been now issued eleven months. The principal powers of Europe, far from protesting against its provisions, have adopted them. They have perceived that its execution must be complete, to render it more effectual; and it has seemed easy to reconcile these measures with the observance of treaties, especially at a time when the infractions, by England, of the rights of all maritime powers, render their interest common, and tend to unite them in the support of the same cause. Accept, &c.

CHAMPAGNY.

But how? Mingled with a mass of other documents, making now a printed volume of upwards of five hundred pages! And strangers would not suspect, nor members of Congress know, (unless they had good memories,) that the two letters had any relation to the embargo. I have called the two letters harmless; and so they were, as to any indications of increased danger to our seamen, ships, and merchandise; but in Champagny's, may be seen the latent cause of the embargo. I have before remarked, that the essence and main operation of the Berlin decree, declaring the British islands in a state of blockade, was the shutting up of the ports of the European continent (thence called the continental system) against all British ships, and against all the manufactures and produc tions of the British dominons, in neutral ships, for the purpose of reducing and destroying the commerce of Great Britain, and with that her naval power. And the French Minister tells General Armstrong, that the principal powers of Europe, far from protesting against the provisions of the Berlin decree of blockade, had adopted them; and that they had perceived "that its execution must be complete, to render it more effectual." And what was wanting to render it complete? Nothing but to shut up, in like manner, all the ports of the United States, between which and the British dominions commercial intercourse was of vast extent, and alike advantageous to both countries. And this adoption and completion of the French Emperor's continental system was effected under the deceitful name of embargo.

manifested in the four papers communicated with Mr. Jefferson's Message. Now, I will show, from his own documents, that both he and Mr. Madison (then Secretary of State) knew, and soon after acknowledged, that no such dangers existed.

Here we see that Armstrong's and Champagny's letters exhibit no new source of danger to our seamen, ships, and merchandise; but, on the contrary, refer directly to the Emperor's decision in Regnier's letter, already published in substance, and not attempted by Mr. Jefferson to be concealed. Why, then, did he say that Armstrong's and Champagny's letters ought not I pray gentlemen to remember, that this emto be made public, and, with over-abundant bargo was recommended solely and absolutely caution, desire the return of them to himself? on the great and increasing dangers to our seaThe answer is easy. Had the letters been pub-men, ships, and merehandise, pretended to be lished, the bold imposture would have been detected. Although the majorities in the two Houses of Congress, reposing a blind confidence in Mr. Jefferson, did not discern the imposition, citizens abroad would at the first glance, have discovered and denounced the cheat; and the nation, shocked at the contemplated mischief, would not have acquiesced in the measure. But a mystery was thrown over the transaction, by the solemn withdrawing of those two harmless letters; which, it was natural for the people to suppose, contained the evidences of the mighty dangers against which the entire shutting up of our ports was a necessary precaution. The project succeeded; and the people, for near fifteen months, endured all the evils and losses of a suspended commerce and navigation, which had given employment and subsistence to some hundreds of thousands of citizens on the seaboard, and general prosperity to the country. But what ought to be the surprise of gentlemen, after all this mysterious secrecy about the two letters of Armstrong and Champagny, to be informed that, precisely three months after passing the Embargo law, to wit, on the 22d of March, 1808, Mr. Jefferson, of his own accord,

Mr. Madison, in his letter of March 25, 1808, (only three months subsequent to the Embargo law,) to the British Minister here, Mr. Erskine, referring to the Berlin decree, represents it as a mere declaration of the French Emperor, either without the intention or without the means to carry it into effect against the United States; and therefore not authorizing the retaliatory measure of the British Orders in Council.

But still earlier, on the 8th of February, 1808, only seven weeks after the embargo was imposed, Mr. Madison, writing to General Armstrong, and pronouncing the Berlin decree, as construed and enforced by the Emperor, to be as well a violation of our treaty with France, as of the incontestable principles of public law, declares— "The conduct of the French Government, in giving this extended operation to its decree, and, indeed, in issuing one with such an apparent or doubtful import against the rights of

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the sea, is the more extraordinary, inasmuch as the inability to enforce it on that element exhibited the measure in the light of an empty menace."

And now, sir, who can think with patience on the extensive mischiefs brought on the people of the United States by this embargo, when the Berlin decree, in which the alleged increased danger lay, was known, and so soon after was acknowledged, to be an empty menace, though solemnly declared by Mr. Jefferson "to show great and increasing dangers to our vessels, seamen, and merchandise?"

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those orders, which have not certainly been acquiesced in, were not even known in America, at the date of the decree." Now, the decree of Milan was issued in Italy by the French Emperor, on the 17th of December, 1807; and it was on the morning of the next day, in this city, that Mr. Jefferson recommended to Congress the laying of the embargo. It was grounded, as I have shown, solely on the papers communicated with this Message; three of which, and the only ones which presented even the semblance of danger, had recently arrived from France. I may mention another fact corroboI am aware, Mr. Chairman, that it may be, rating the evidence that the embargo was laid as it has been said, that the British Orders in in concert with the French Government, or in Council were a principal cause of the embargo; conformity with its views. Letters were rebut, sir, well-known facts and the public docu- ceived in America, from merchants in Holland, ments demonstrate the assertion to be unfounded. stating that General Armstrong had said that a The President, as I have said, rested his re-general embargo would take place in the Unitcommedation of an embargo solely on the pa- ed States immediately on the arrival of the Repers he communicated; and in the Senate, (of venge. And the fact was, (as I have before which I was then a member,) while the embar-stated,) that in four days after the despatches go bill was before it, not one word was said of British Orders in Council. Further, Mr. Madison in his letter, dated December 23, 1807, (the day after the Embargo law was passed,) to Mr. Pinkney, (our Minister in London,) says: “I avail myself of the opportunity to enclose you a copy of a Message from the President to Congress, and their act in pursuance of it, laying an immediate embargo on our vessels and exports. The policy and the causes of the measure are explained in the Message itself." It is true, that about two months afterwards, when the British Orders in Council had become known, Mr. Madison made some change in his language. It was then convenient to do so. In his letter of February 19, 1808, to Mr. Pinkney, he says: "My last, which was committed to the British packet, enclosed a copy of the act of Embargo, and explained the policy of the measure;" artfully omitting "causes," and adding, "among the considerations which enforced it, was the probability of such decrees as were issued by the British Government on the 11th of November; the language of the British Gazettes, with other indications, having left little doubt that such were meditated." But, sir, this was an afterthought, eagerly laid hold on by the advocates of the Administration to appease the growing discontents of the people, suffering under a total interdict of their commerce, without any known cause. To put this miserable pretence at rest, I will recur, in confirmation of the evidence I have already given, to the report of the Committee of Foreign Relations, made to the House of Representatives on the 22d of November, 1808, of which Mr. George W. Campbell (now Secretary of the Treasury) was the chairman. In that report the committee, endeavoring to repel the charge of acquiescence in the unlawful aggressions of either France or England, say: "The Milan decree of December, 1807, can still less rest for its defence on the supposed acquiescence of the United States in the British orders of the preceding month, since

by the Revenge had reached Washington, the embargo was recommended. Still further, we know that the French Emperor "applauded the embargo," and that he issued his Bayonne decree April 17, 1808, directing all American vessels which should thereafter come into any of the ports of France to be seized; because no vessel of the United States could then navigate the seas without violating the embargo law. And thus while he, so well pleased with the embargo, as it came in aid of, and rendered complete, his continental system, issued a decree to assist in carrying it into perfect execution, our Administration,† directing General Armstrong to "remonstrate against the injustice and illegality of the French decree" (that of Berlin, for the Milan decree had not then reached America) suggested, that the embargo would be continued until the Berlin decree should be repealed! This farce might amuse, but for the serious and extensive mischiefs which flowed from it.

But it has been said that, prior to the embargo, there were rumors and newspaper reports of orders contemplated by the British Government, like those issued in November, 1807. And did ever an intelligent legislator think of taking rumors and newspaper reports for the foundation of a law; especially of a law which shut up the ports and interdicted the commerce of the whole nation-a commerce the second only in the world for its extent? The pretence is as shameful as it is ridiculous.

One more remark: The embargo law was unlimited in the terms of its duration, and doubtless was intended, by its projector, to be commensurate in length of time with the French Emperor's continental system; that is, with the continuance of the European war; by the termination of which, had the people suffered the

* Letter of August 5, 1810, from the French Minister, the Duke of Cadore to General Armstrong.

+ Mr. Madison's letter to General Armstrong, dated February 8, 1808.

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The Loan Bill.

[FEBRUARY, 1814.

embargo to remain, we should have had neither | rested on the information I had received-but seamen, ships, nor merchandise. And this, received from a gentleman on whose correctness probably, was the wished for consummation; I relied. And, sir, I still think the reliance was for, in Mr. Jefferson's Notes on Virginia, after just. I entertain no doubt that a verbal offer a plausible flourish on commerce, and a navy was made without instructions, and rejected. for its protection, he says: "Perhaps, to remove The gentleman's information, as I stated it, as much as possible the occasions of making came down to the 6th of March, 1813; to which war, it might be better for us to abandon the Mr. Daschkoff had received no instructions. ocean altogether, that being the element where- And within a few days I have learnt, very accion we shall be principally exposed to jostle with dentally, though from an authentic source, that other nations; to leave to others to bring what it was on the same 6th of March, and I underwe shall want, and to carry what we can spare. stand on the evening of that day, the despatches This would make us invulnerable to Europe, by containing Mr. Daschkoff's instructions, came to offering none of our property to their prize, his hands; and on the 8th of March he tendered and would turn all our citizens to the cultiva- the mediation in a letter to the Secretary of tion of the earth. It might be time enough to State. seek employment for them at sea when the land no longer offers it."

Here, sir, give me leave to notice the advantage attempted to be taken by different gentlemen, of one expression in Mr. Daschkoff's letter, to justify our Government in declaring war. Mr. Daschkoff says-"His Majesty, who takes pleasure in doing justice to the wisdom of the Government of the United States of America, is convinced that it has done all that it could do to prevent this rupture." If, sir, such a sentiment be expressed in Mr. Daschkoff's instructions from his Government, it must be viewed as one of those diplomatic compliments which mean nothing; and which, if taken seriously by any diplomatist of any experience, would render him ridiculous. And unquestionably an equal compliment, whatever it might be, was

I have gone back to the embargo, because, though it was not the first attempt to interrupt a friendly and useful intercourse with Great Britain; yet it was the first great measure levelled against her, and against our own commerce and prosperity. It was the first great link in that chain of ruinous measures with which we have been bound for the last six years, and the fruitful source of all the evils with which we have been afflicted; it produced non-intercourse, non-importation, and war. For the embargo having been imposed (as I have demonstrated) in concert with, or in subserviency to France, could not be abandoned without some substitute. And this was the non-paid to the British as to the American Governintercourse law. The people being unwilling to submit any longer to the continental system, which, having for fourteen months shut up all our ports, was driving them to beggary and ruin. The ports, therefore, were opened, and our vessels permitted to depart, and carry with them our productions and merchandise to all countries, except those of France and Great Britain, and their dependencies. The effect of this absurd measure (originating partly in the pride of the Administration, who had relied so much on the efficacy of their restrictive energies) was seriously injurious to ourselves, by compelling our merchants to send their cargoes to other countries than those where they were chiefly to be consumed.

Mr. Chairman, in the course of the debates on the Loan bill, some gentleman spoke of the Russian mediation, on which I had publicly written, stating that the Russian Minister, Mr. Daschkoff, had made an offer of it without orders from his Government; whereas it now appeared, from the documents lately communicated by the President, that Mr. Daschkoff was instructed to offer the mediation of his master, the Emperor Alexander, to effect a peace between the United States and Great Britain; and the gentleman expressed his expectation that my candor would induce me to acknowledge I had been in an error. Sir, I shall never | hesitate, on proper evidence, to confess an error; but in this case I have nothing to retract. I publicly announced, that my whole statement

ment. But certainly the Russian Government could not have expected that either would have been published to the world. And if we suppose the sentiment was expressed to the American Government, exclusively, we must also suppose that the Emperor Alexander was willing to charge the Government of his distinguished ally, Great Britain, with a conduct directly opposite to that of the American Government; that is, as persisting in claims unreasonable and unjust-a supposition not easily to be admitted, because the imputation is grossly affrontive to Great Britain. But, after all, (as drowning men will catch at straws,) of what value is the sentiment, if really expressed in Mr. Daschkoff's instructions? What does the Emperor Alexander know of the merits of the controversy, which, for so many years, has been kept up between our own and the British Government? Who can be weak enough to imagine, that, amidst the cares of his vast empire, he has spent any time in examining the many volumes of letters and other documents which have been written and published on this subject? The number even of American citizens who have read them, with the critical attention requisite to the forming of a correct opinion, is very small; nor is it credible that the Russian Minister of State, Count Romanzow, was sufficiently acquainted with the controversy to have pronounced such a definitive opinion. And, therefore, if he did entertain that opinion, it must have been formed on the information

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given him on one side of the question by Mr. Adams; a circumstance, if true, that will show how ill-qualified was the Russian Minister of State to act, in the name of the Emperor, the part of a mediator. The case was simply this: The Emperor knew that war had taken place between the United States and Great Britain, and was solicitous to effect a reconciliation, because he wished for the uninterrupted and undiminished aid of his great ally, in the common cause of Europe, against the dangerous power of France; and at the same time that his subjects, who had been long suffering under the French Emperor's continental system, might enjoy all the benefits of a free communication with the United States.

By the papers communicated about the Russian mediation, it appears that the British Minister at St. Petersburg offered to give a passport to an American vessel, to proceed to the United States with the despatches of Mr. Adams, and those of the Russian Government containing the offer of its mediation, provided the vessel should touch in England; a condition with which, Mr. Adams says, "he did not think it suitable to comply." Why it was not suitable is not intimated. Had the vessel been despatched, and touched in England, she might have brought with her the decision of the British Government, not to accept the mediation, and thus have prevented the useless mission to Russia, and the delay, for near a year, of measures for a direct negotiation to put an end to the war, if that was really desired. There are many other topics, Mr. Chairman, which have been introduced into this debate, and which I intended to notice; but, weary of the subject, I shall pass them by, and conclude with a few observations on the Army and Navy of the United States, as employed in the present

war.

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In the debate on the bill for filling the ranks of the Army, in order to continue the war, one reason assigned was, to redeem the military character of the country." Sir, I do not think it needs redemption; I mean, that I do not think our country disgraced. The like materials for an army exist as in the time of our Revolutionary war. But, soldiers are not formed in a day. New officers and new men require much and long instruction. Soldiers taken from the tranquil walks of civil life must pass through a course of strict discipline, and be gradually inured to dangers, to acquire the steadiness necessary to meet, on equal terms, the regular troops of an enemy. The uniform exercise of the musket is the easiest part that soldiers have to learn. To march, to wheel, to change their positions as the scenes of action change, and yet preserve their order, are the difficult parts of duty. If without such essential preparation our troops have been led into action, disasters were to have been expected.

Entirely different is our Naval war. There, both officers and men have already learnt to march on the mountain wave, and their minds

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are familiar with danger-with the perils of storms and tempests-that would appal the hearts of landsmen. They are also, as seamen, perfectly skilled in all the movements and inanœuvres rendered necessary by changes of the wind or the conduct of the enemy; and nearly all they want besides, at the breaking out of war, is to learn the exercise of cannon-a work of ten or fifteen days. Hence it was, that very early after the commencement of the war of our Revolution, our armed vessels met those of the enemy on equal terms, reckoning man for man and gun for gun. And, for myself, I wanted no new proofs of our ability to meet an equal enemy on the seas. That, in the encounters which have happened in the present war, a superiority has appeared on the side of the American armed vessels, is not surprising, when it is considered, that by the war, nearly all our seamen were thrown out of employment-the declaration of war having put an end to our fisheries, and almost annihilated our mercantile navigation-whence it happened that our naval officers had it in their power to man their vessels with a superior class of sailors. The enemy, on the other hand, manning thousands of merchant vessels, and many hundred vessels of war, had their choice of seamen lessened. For a long time, too, they had been almost without an enemy on the ocean; and their only enemy there, they had been accustomed almost uniformly to beat, and consequently to despise. Hence, they had grown over-confident and careless circumstances which, even when the forces should be equal, could hardly fail to produce defeat and disgrace.

THURSDAY, March 3.

The Loan.

The House resumed the consideration of the unfinished business, viz: the bill authorizing a Loan.

Mr. MACON, of North Carolina, said his anxiety for the question, and for an early adjournment of Congress, would have induced him to remain in his seat, but that it was now near four o'clock, and he did not expect that any vote would be taken to-day, except the one on the passage of the bill, and he would not delay that but for a short time; he would, therefore, express his opinion in as few words as he could on some of the topics which had been brought into the debate.

It has, Mr. Speaker, been more than onee hinted or insinuated that the Southern States are unfriendly to New England. These hints and insinuations are founded in error. No fact had been stated, nor in his opinion could one be stated, which would justify the remarks he had frequently heard made on this subject. Such remarks produce no effect in the Southern States, because the people there know there is no foundation for them, and it is possible they were not intended for that part of the nation;

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