Turnpikes.

A statute authorizing commissioners to examine the condition of turnpike roads, and throw open the gates if they are out of repair, is void, for it impairs the right of the corporation to collect toll at its gates. Powell v. Sammons, 31 Ala. 552.

A charter authorizing the construction of a railroad does not impair the obligation imposed by a prior charter to a turnpike company, authorizing the construction of a turnpike between the same termini. Turnpike Co. v. Railroad Co. 10 G. & J. 392.

A statute appointing inspectors of turnpikes with power to direct proper repairs to be made, and to take down the toll gates for a refusal to make such repairs, does not impair the obligation imposed by the charters. State v. Bosworth, 13 Vt. 402.

If the charter of a turnpike company prescribes the form of the sign or board with the rates of tolls, it will prevail over a general statute subsequently passed. Nichols v. Bertram, 20 Mass. 342,

Railroads.

Where the charter provides that the directors may regulate the business of a railroad corporation, a statute requiring that the first train arriving at a crossing shall wait until the train upon the other road shall arrive, is void. State v. Noyes, 47 Me. 189.

If the State, in conferring a right or franchise lying solely in grant, stipulates, for a valuable consideration, that the grantee shall have and enjoy it undisturbed and unmolested by any act or permission on the part of the State, the grant has the same effect as if it were the grant of an exclu-sive right in terms. It is equivalent to a covenant for quiet enjoyment against the acts of the State and those claiming under it. If the charter of a railroad corporation contains a provision that no other road shall be built within a certain distance, the corporation can not be disturbed in the enjoyment of the franchise by any subsequent charter. The stipulations may be both an executory covenant and an executed contract. So far as it confers a present right it is executed; so far as it amounts to a stipulation that the covenantor will not disturb the enjoyment of the right granted, it may be deemed executory. Boston & L. R. R. Co. v. Salem & L. R. R. Co. 68 Mass. I.

A law changing the tariff of freights which a railroad corporation is allowed by its charter to charge, is void. Hamilton v. Keith, 5 Bush, 458.

A State can not regulate the tolls of a corporation whose charter authorizes it to take such tolls as it may deem reasonable. Att. Gen. v. Railroad Companies, 35 Wis. 425.

Where the charter confers upon a railroad corporation the power to fix

its tariff of charges, a statute regulating the rates is void. Sloan v. Mo. Pacific R. R. Co. 2 Cent. L. J. 781; Phila. W. & B. R. R. Co. v. Bowers, 4 Houst. 506; contra, Moore v. Ill. Cent. R. R. Co. 4 C. L. N. 123.

A State legislature has the power to regulate the rates to be charged by a railroad corporation for the transportation of freight or passengers. Chicago B. & Q. R. R. Co. v. Iowa, 94 U. S. 155; Winona & St. Peter R. R. Co. 94 U. S. 180.

Taxes.

A State may by contract based on consideration exempt the property of an individual or corporation from taxation either for a specified period or \permanently, and it does not thereby relinquish its sovereign power. The taxing power may select its objects of taxation, and this is generally regulated by the amount necessary to answer the purposes of the State. The exemption of property from taxation is a question of policy and not of power. The act of making the contract, so far from parting with any portion of the sovereignty, is an exercise of it. State Bank v. Knoop, 16 How. 369; Ohio Trust Co. v. Debolt, 16 How. 416; S. C. I Ohio St. 563; State v. Georgia R. & B. Co. 54 Geo. 423; State v. County Court, 19 Ark. 360; Antoni v. Wright, 23 Gratt. 833; State v. Bank, 2 Houst. 99; Humphrey v. Pegues, 16 Wall. 244; Home of the Friendless v. Rouse, 8 Wall. 430; Wilmington Railroad Co. v. Reid, 13 Wall. 264; Tomlinson v. Branch Bank, 15 Wall. 460; People v. Auditor, 7 Mich. 84; Ill. Cent. R. R. Co. v. County, 17 Ill. 291; State Bank v. People, 5 Hl. 303; Camden & Amboy R. R. Co. v. Commissioners, 18 N. J. 71; Oliver v. Memphis & L. R. R. Co. 30 Ark. 128; Daughdrell v. Life Ins. Co. 31 Ala. 91; Bank v. New Albany, 11 Ind. 139; State v. Berry, 17 N. J. 81; Gardner v. State, 21 N. J. 557; Bank v. Edwards, 5 Ired. 516; Bank v. Deming, 7 Ired. 55; Municipality v. State Bank, 5 La. Ann. 394; Johnson v. Comm. 7 Dana, 338; contra, Mott v. Penn. R. R. Co. 30 Penn. 9; Norwalk Co. v. Husted, 3 Ohio St. 586; Toledo Bank v. Bond, 1 Ohio St. 622; Exchange Bank v. Hines, 3 Ohio St. 1; Milan & R. Plank Road Co. v. Husted, 3 Ohio St. 578; Sandusky Bank v. Wilbor, 7 Ohio, 481.

The taxing power is of vital importance and essential to the existence of government. The relinquishment of such a power is never to be assumed. The whole community is interested in retaining it undiminished, and has a right to insist that its abandonment ought not to be presumed in a case in which the deliberate purpose of the State to abandon it does not appear. Providence Bank v. Billings, 4 Pet. 514; Judson v. State, Minor, 150; Brewster v. Hough, 10 N. H. 138; Del. Railroad Tax, 18 Wall. 206; City v. Boatman's Ins. & Trust Co. 47 Mo. 150; State v. Dulle, 48 Mo. 282; Easton Bank v. Comm. 10 Penn. 442; Gordon v. Baltimore, 5 Gill, 231; Phila. & W. R. R. Co. v. State, 10 How. 376; Bank of Penn. v. Comm. 19 Penn. 144; State v. Minton, 23 N. J. 529.

The imposition of a tax upon a corporation does not impair the obliga

tion of its charter, unless there is an express clause therein exempting the X corporation from taxation. Providence Bank v. Billings, 4 Pet. 514; Portland Bank v. Apthorpe, 12 Mass. 252; Judson v. State, Minor, 150; North Mo. Railroad v. Maguire, 20 Wall. 46; S. C. 49 Mo. 490; Erie Railway Company v. Pennsylvania, 21 Wall. 492.

The mere reservation in a charter of a sum to be paid annually into the treasury does not contain an implied contract that no further tax shall be imposed. State v. Petway, 2 Jones Eq. 396; Minot v. P. W. & B. R. R. Co. 2 Abb. C. C. 323; Erie R. R. Co. v. Comm. 3 Brews. 368; Del. Railroad Tax, 18 Wall, 206; s. c. 7 Phila. 555; Louisville C. & L. R. R. Co. v. Comm. 10 Bush, 43; Evansville, H. & N. R. R. Co. v. Comm. 9 Bush, 438; State v. Parker, 32 N. J. 426.

A provision in the charter of an eleemosynary corporation, or of a uni-X versity for learning, that its property shall be exempt from taxation, is a contract whose obligation can not be impaired. Home of the Friendless v. Rouse, 8 Wall. 430; Washington University v. Rouse, 8 Wall. 439; S. C. 42 Mo. 308.

If the charter stipulates that the corporation shall pay certain taxes annually in lieu of all taxes to which it would otherwise be subject, the amount of taxes can not be subsequently increased. State v. Auditor, 5 Ohio St. 444; Ross County Bank v. Lewis, 5 Ohio St. 447; Le Roy v. East. S. C. Railway, 18 Mich. 233; Farmers' Bank v. Comm. 6 Bush, 126; State Bank v. Knoop, 16 How. 369; Mechanics' Bank v. Debolt, 18 How. 380; s. C. I Ohio St. 591; State v. Commissioners, 37 N. J. 240; Franklin Bank v. State, 1 Black, 474; State v. Commercial Bank, 7 Ohio, 125; Wright v. Sill, 2 Black, 544; Jefferson Bank v. Skelly, 1 Black, 436; S. C. 9 Ohio St. 606; Matheny v. Golden, 5 Ohio St. 361; Dodge v. Woolsey, 18 How. 331; Mechanics' Bank v. Thomas, 18 How. 384; contra, Norwalk Co. v. Husted, 3 Ohio St. 586; Toledo Bank v. Bond, 1 Ohio St. 622; Exchange Bank v. Hines, 3 Ohio St. I; Milan & R. Plank Road Co. v. Husted, 3 Ohio St. 578; Sandusky Bank v. Wilbor, 7 Ohio, 481.

If the charter stipulates that the property of the corporation shall be exempt from taxation, no tax can be levied or assessed thereon. Hardy v. Waltham, 24 Mass. 108.

If the charter exempts property used for the actual and necessary purposes of the corporation, a tax may be levied upon land leased to others, and not used for the purposes of the corporation. State v. Love, 37 N. J. 60.

If the charter exempts property used for the actual and necessary purposes of the corporation, no tax can be levied upon property used in the business of the corporation, although it may be used also by others. State v. Betts, 24 N. J. 555.

If a round sum or an annual charge is paid, or contracted to be paid, as the consideration for the grant of a franchise, the contract is a limitation ' upon the taxing power to impose any further tax on the franchise. The price is paid for the use of the privilege while it lasts, and any tax upon it would substantially be an addition to the price. Gordon v. Appeal Tax Court, 3 How. 133; S. C. 5 Gill, 231; Att. Gen. v. Bank of Charlotte, 4 Jones Eq. 287; vide Minot v. P. W. & B. R. R. Co. 2 Abb. C. C. 323; S. C. 18 Wall. 206; 7 Phila. 555; Mayor v. Balt. & O. R. R. Co. 6 Gill, 288.

It is not necessary that a bonus shall be paid in order to render the contract for exemption binding. The obligation is as strong on the State for the privileges granted and accepted as if a bonus were paid. State Bank v. Knoop, 16 How. 369.

A provision fixing the mode in which the taxes shall be assessed does not preclude the legislature from adopting another mode. Bailey v. Maguire, 22 Wall. 215; State v. Han. & St. Jo. R. R. Co. 60 Mo. 143.

Where the charter exempts the property and franchise of the corporation from taxation for a certain period, and after that time provides that the State may tax the capital stock not exceeding a certain amount, the State, after the expiration of the time, can not tax the property and the franchise, for the limitation to a particular mode includes a negative of every other mode. Raleigh & G. R. R. Co. v. Reid, 64 N. C. 155; S. C. 13 Wall. 269.

Where the charter provides that a tax to be levied on the happening of some future contingency, shall be in lieu of all other taxes, no tax can be levied prior to that time. McGavisk v. State, 34 N. J. 509.

A grant of all the rights, powers and privileges conferred by the charter of another corporation, includes an exemption from taxation conferred by an amendment of its charter then in force. Humphrey v. Pegues, 16 Wall. 244.

A statute merely exempting property from taxation, without any consideration, does not savor of a contract, and may be repealed. Hospital v. Philadelphia, 24 Penn. 229; Sandusky Bank v. Wilbor, 7 Ohio St. 481; St. Louis I. M. & S. R. Co. v. Loftin, 30 Ark. 693; People v. Commissioners, 47 N. Y 501; S. C. 53 Barb. 70; State v. County Treasurer, 4 Rich. N. S. 520; Holly Springs S. & I. Co. v. Marshall, 52 Miss. 281.

If property is given to an ecclesiastical society, for certain purposes, during the existence of a statute enacting that property so given shall be exempt from taxation, it can not be taxed as long as it is applied to those purposes, for the statute was a contract with the donors under which the property was given, and no subsequent legislature can divest the right thus vested in the society. Atwater v. Woodbridge, 6 Conn. 223; Osborne

v. Humphrey, 7 Conn. 335; Landon v. Litchfield, 11 Conn. 251; Seymour v. Hartford, 21 Conn. 481; Parker v. Redfield, 10 Conn. 490; Herrick v. Randolph, 13 Vt. 525; contra, Brainerd v. Colchester, 31 Conn. 407; Lord v. Litchfield, 36 Conn. 116.

The mere existence of a statute exempting lands sequestered to public, pious and charitable uses, from taxation at the time of the making of a grant by the State to a municipal corporation of land for the maintenance of the ministry, does not make it a condition of the grant, so as to exempt the land from subsequent taxation. Herrick v. Randolph, 13 Vt. 525.

A statute which provides that lands granted to public, pious or charitable uses, shall be forever exempt from taxation, has no effect upon prior grants, except while it remains in force, and may be repealed. Herrick v. Randolph, 13 Vt. 525.

If a statute exempts lands granted to a public or charitable use from taxation, a subsequent statute may render such land liable to taxation where it is conveyed without the reservation of an annual rent. New Haven v. Sheffield, 30 Conn. 160; Brainerd v. Colchester, 31 Conn. 407; Lord v. Litchfield, 36 Conn. 116.

If the exemption is spontaneous, and no service or duty or other remunerative condition is imposed on the corporation, it is a mere privilege, and may be withdrawn at any time. Rector v. Philadelphia, 24 How. 300; S. C. 24 Penn. 229; Brainerd v. Colchester, 31 Conn. 407; Lord v. Litchfield, 36 Conn. 116; Tucker v. Ferguson, 22 Wall. 527.

An exemption of the capital of a corporation from taxation extends to additional capital permitted under subsequent acts. State v. N. & W. R. R. Co. 30 Conn. 290.

The State can not authorize a municipal corporation to impose a tax which the State itself has no right to levy. O'Donnell v. Bailey, 24 Miss. 386; Camden & Amboy R. R. Co. v. Hillegas, 18 N. J. 11; Camden & Amboy R. R. Co. v. Commissioners, 18 N. J. 71.

A provision in a charter that a certain rate of taxes shall be paid in lieu of all taxes to the State does not exempt the corporation from liability for municipal taxes. Lexington v. Aull, 30 M0. 480; Paris v. Farmers' Bank, 30 Mo. 575.

A provision exempting a corporation from taxation applies not merely to the State, but to every public corporation created by it. City of Richmond v. R. & D. R. R. Co. 21 Gratt. 604; Mayor v. Balt. & Ohio R. R. Co. 6 Gill, 288; Bank of Cape Fear v. Edwards, 5 Ired. 516; State Bank v. Charleston, 3 Rich. 342.