protect him from loss, and he has no right to ask more at the hands of the court than that this shall be done. He acquires no right by a contract to hold any particular person liable, provided the court will substitute another who can equally protect him from loss. Craighead v. Bank, I' Meigs, 199.

The right of a purchaser at a tax sale to a deed, can not be taken away by a repeal of a statute authorizing the execution of a deed. Bruce v. Schuyler, 4 Gilman, 221.

Any law passed after the execution of a contract, which denies, obstructs or impairs the right to sell the property of the debtor under an execution at a fair public sale to the highest bidder, by superadding a condition that there shall be no sale for any sum less than the value of the property levied on, to be ascertained by appraisement or any other mode of valuation than a public sale, affects the obligation of the contract, and is repugnant to the Constitution. Hunt v. Gregg, 8 Blackf. 105; Shaffer

v. Bolander, 4 G. Greene, 201; Burton v. Emerson, 4 G. Greene, 393; McCracken v. Hayward, 2 How. 608; Gantly v. Ewing, 3 How. 707; Smoot v. Lafferty, 2 Gilman, 383; Rosier v. Hale, 10 Iowa, 470; U. S. v. Conway, Hemp. 313; Bronson v. Kinzie, 1 How. 34; Baily v. Gentry, 1 Mo. 164; Rawley v. Hooker, 21 Ind. 144; contra, Waldo v. Williams, 4 Ill. 264; Catlin v. Munger, 1 Tex. 598.

Where a State has authorized a municipal corporation to contract and to exercise the power of local taxation to the extent necessary to meet its engagements, the power thus given can not be withdrawn until the contract is satisfied. The State and the corporation are equally bound. Von Hoffman v. Quincy, 4 Wall. 535; Lansing v. County, I Dill. 522; S. C. 2 Abb. C. C. 53.

A statute which prohibits a municipal corporation from levying taxes to pay a judgment, is void if it deprives the creditor of every efficient means for collecting his debt. Soutter v. Madison, 15 Wis. 30.

A statute which deprives a creditor of his remedy upon a judgment against a municipal corporation forever, unless the legislature shall in its discretion, at some future time, by a new law, provide for its payment, is void. Hadfield v. New York, 6 Robt. 501.

A statute making one municipal corporation liable on a contract, instead of another is valid, if all the rights of enforcing the judgment are preserved. Rader v. S. R. District, 36 N. J. 273.

A statute giving the grantee of a rent charge the right of re-entry for non-payment of the rent, is valid, for it merely affects the remedy. Van Rensselaer v. Ball, 19 N. Y. 100.

A statute authorizing the grantee of a rent charge to sue at law in his own name, is valid, for it operates on the remedy. Independently of the

statute he could sue in the name of the grantor. Van Rensselaer v. Hays, 19 N. Y. 68.

An act taking away the priority of a claim for rent in case of the levy of an execution upon the goods of a tenant, is valid. Stocking v. Hunt, 3 Denio, 274.

A statute giving an action of covenant against the assignee of a leasehold estate, pertains to the remedy and is valid. Taggart v. McGinn, 14 Penn. 155.

A statute abolishing distress for rent is valid, and may apply to leases in which such a power is reserved. Conkey v. Hart, 14 N. Y. 22; Van Rensselaer v. Snyder, 13 N. Y. 299; Guild v. Rogers, 8 Barb. 502.

A statute providing that a mortgagor shall not be liable for rent after the date of the sale under the mortgage, if he remains in possession and redeems within the time limited by law, is void so far as it applies to prior contracts. Greenfield v. Dorris, 1 Sneed, 548.

A law which releases the sureties on a jail bond after condition broken, and assignment of the bond by the sheriff to the creditor, is unconstitutional. Starr v. Robinson, 1 Chip. 257; Lewis v. Brackenridge, 1 Blackf.

220.

A State statute authorizing the sale of property free from a mortgage, and transferring the lien thereof to the proceeds, is valid. Potts v. New Jersey Arms and Ordnance Co. 17 N. J. Eq. 395.

A statute allowing the proceeds of property sold free from incumbrances, without the consent of the mortgagee, to be applied first to pay indefinite costs other than those of the sale, is void. Martin v. Somerville Co. 3 Wall. Jr. 206.

A statute permitting a receiver to sell property free from incumbrances, without the consent of the mortgagee, whether it brings sufficient to pay the incumbrance or not, impairs the obligation of the mortgage. Martin v. Somerville Co. 3 Wall. Jr. 206.

If a mortgage contains a power in case of default, to sell according to law, a statute prescribing a shorter time for advertising before sale than existed at the time of the execution of the mortgage, is not repugnant to the Constitution. The remedy, instead of being impaired, is rendered more speedy and advantageous. James v. Stull, 9 Barb. 482.

The judicial mortgage resulting from the inscription of a judgment is no part of the contract on which the judgment is based, and may be taken away by statute. New Orleans v. Holmes, 13 La. Ann. 502.

The right to institute an action of ejectment upon the forfeiture of a mortgage is a part of the contract, and a statute which prohibits the institution of such a suit until after a foreclosure and sale of the property, is void. Mundy v. Monroe, I Mich. 68.

A statute extending the time from twenty days to six months before a default can be taken for want of an answer, is valid. Von Baumbach v. Bade, 9 Wis. 559; Holloway v. Sherman, 12 Iowa, 282.

A statute requiring six months advertisement prior to a sale under a mortgage, instead of six weeks, is valid. Von Baumbach v. Bade, 9 Wis. 559; Starkweather v. Hawes, 10 Wis. 125.

A statute diminishing the period required for the publication of a notice of foreclosure, is valid. Wehb v. Moore, 25 Ind. 4; Hopkins v. Jones, 22 Ind. 310.

When the mortgagee does not resort to the power to sell, contained in the mortgage, but applies to the court for the enforcement of his mortgage, he must take the remedy as he finds it, and can not object that it is less beneficial than that afforded at the time the mortgage was executed. Heyward v. Judd, 4 Minn. 483.

A law which provides that property shall not be sold under an execution or a decree of foreclosure, unless it brings two-thirds of its appraised value, imposes conditions which will frequently render a sale impossible, and impairs the obligation of contracts. Bronson v. Kinzie, 1 How. 311; Grantly v. Ewing, 3 How. 707; contra, Waldo v. Williams, 4 Ill. 264.

Where the mortgage contains a power to sell, the legislature can not interfere with its exercise so as to change the estate which the trustee is authorized to sell, and extend the time for redemption. Heyward v. Judd, 4 Minn. 483; Goenen v. Schroeder, 8 Minn. 387; Carroll v. Rossiter, 10 Minn. 174.

A law which gives the mortgagor a certain period in which to redeem the property after a sale under the mortgage, confers upon him an equitable estate to which he was not entitled under the contract, and unquestionably impairs its obligation. Bronson v. Kinzie, 1 How. 311; Grantly v. Ewing, 3 How. 707; contra, Stone v. Bassett, 4 Minn. 298; Heyward v. Judd, 4 Minn. 483; Freeborn v. Pettibone, 5 Minn 277; Waldo v. Williams, 4 Ill. 264.

A statute allowing a creditor to redeem at any time within two years after the sale under a mortgage made prior to the passing of the statute, is void. Howard v. Bugbee, 24 How. 461; S. C. 32 Ala. 713; Malony v. Fortune, 14 Iowa, 417; Seale v. Mitchell, 5 Cal. 401; Thorn v. San Francisco, 4 Cal. 127; contra, Iverson v. Shorter, 9 Ala. 713.

A statute giving the mortgagor the right to remain in possession during the time of redemption, upon paying the interest and the taxes, is valid. Heyward v. Judd, 4 Minn. 483; Berthold . Holman, 12 Minn. 335; Berthold v. Fox, 13 Minn. 501.

A statute requiring that the interest shall be paid in advance in order to enable the mortgagor to remain in possession after a sale, is valid. Stone v. Bassett, 4 Minn. 298.

The right to redeem is no part of the contract of indebtedness. It is a privilege given by statute. As the provision is only a matter out of which rights may grow, it may be repealed at any time before a party avails himself of it. Tuolumne Redemption Co. v. Sedgwick, 15 Cal. 515; contra, Cargill v. Power, 1 Mich. 369.

Although the law at the time of the execution of the mortgage provided that the property should not be sold for less than two-thirds of the appraised value, unless the mortgagor elected to have it sold subject to the right to redeem, a statute may take away the right of appraisement and redemption. Holland v. Dickerson, 41 Iowa, 367.

The right to redeem property sold under an execution pertains solely to the remedy, and exists solely by statute, and the legislature may repeal the . statute at any time before it has been availed of by the parties entitled. Tuolumne Redemption Co. v. Sedgwick, 15 Cal. 515.

A State law allowing a redemption at any time within a certain period after a sale under an execution, when there was no redemption at the time of the making of the contract, is void. Oliver v. McClure, 28 Ark. 555; Scobey v. Gibson, 17 Ind. 572; Inglehart v. Wolfin, 20 Ind. 32; contra, Moore v. Martin, 38 Cal. 428; Turner v. Watkins, 31 Ark. 429.

Appeal.

A statute granting a writ of error or an appeal to a party after the expiration of the time for suing out the writ or taking the appeal, does not impair the obligation of a contract. Converse v. Burrows, 2 Minn. 229; Davis v. Ballard, 1 J. J. Marsh. 563; Braddee v. Brownfield, 2 W. & S. 271.

A statute permitting one of several parties against whom a judgment has been rendered, to sue out a writ of error without joining his codefendants, does not impair the obligation of a contract. Wilder v. Lumpkin, 4 Geo. 208.

A statute allowing an appeal to be taken without giving security for costs does not impair the obligation of any contract. Todd v. Neal, 49 Ala. 266.

A statute taking away the right of appeal is not unconstitutional. Grover v. Coon, 1 N. Y. 536.

New Trial.

A statute allowing a new trial or a proceeding in the nature of an appeal after litigation actually commenced, or even after judgment, does not impair the obligation of a contract, although there was no provision for a new trial or appeal previously. Calder v. Bull, 3 Dall. 386; s. c. 2 Root, 350 Balt. & S. R. R. Co. v. Nesbit, 10 How. 395; League v. De Young, II How. 185; Colby v. Dennis, 36 Me. 9; vide Young v. State Bank, 4 Ind. 301.

A statute declaring a judgment void and granting a new trial impairs the obligation of contracts, and is void. Weaver v. Lapsley, 43 Ala. 224.

Exemptions.

Such property as is subject to execution at the time the debt is contracted must remain subject to execution until the debt is paid. A statute which creates an additional exemption is therefore void so far as it affects prior contracts. Lessley v. Phipps, 49 Miss. 790; Alexander v. Kilpatrick, 14 Fla. 450; Jones v. Brandon, 48 Geo. 593; Quackenbush v. Danks, I Denio, 128; S. C. 3 Denio, 594; 1 N. Y. 129; Matthewson v. Weller, 3 Denio, 52; Homestead Cases, 23 Gratt. 266; Russell v. Randolph, 26 Gratt. 795; Cockran v. Darcy, 5 Rich. N. S. 125; Ex parte Hewett, 5 Rich. N. S. 409; De la Howe v. Harper, 5 Rich. N. S. 470; contra, Pol v. Hardie, 65 N. C. 447; Allen v. Shield, 72 N. C. 504; Robert v. Coco, 25 La. Ann. 199; Stephenson v. Osborne, 41 Miss. 119; Wilson v. Sparks, 72 N. C. 208; Garrett v. Cheshire, 69 N. C. 396; Bronson v. Kenzie, 1 How. 311; Rockwell v. Hubbell, 2 Doug. 197; Velder v. Alkenbrack, 6 Barb. 327; Helfenstein v. Cave, 3 Iowa, 287; In re Sarah Kennedy, 2 Rich. N. S. 116; Howze v. Howze, 2 Rich. N. S. 229; Sneider v. Heidelberger, 45 Ala. 126; Doughty v. Sheriff, 27 La. Ann. 355.

The contracting of a debt does not in any legal sense create a lien upon the debtor's property. The right which a creditor by becoming such acquires, is to have the use and benefit of the laws for the collection of debts. If a subsequent act increases the exemption, the question always is whether the law which prevailed when the contract was made has been so far changed that there does not remain a substantial and reasonable mode of enforcing it in the ordinary and regular course of justice. If it has not, the act is valid Stephenson v. Osborne, 41 Miss. 119; Morse v. Gould, 11 N. Y. 281; Grimes v. Bryne, 2 Minn. 89.

If a new Constitution deprives the courts of jurisdiction to sell exempted property, there is no remedy to enforce the contract. Hardeman v. Downer, 93 Geo. 425.

No exemption can be allowed as against a mortgagee claiming under a mortgage made prior to the law allowing the exemption. Shelor v. Mason, 2 Rich. N. S. 233.