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Taxes,

(a) The power to lay and collect taxes is expressly given to Congress, in connection with a recital of the objects to which the taxes when collected may be legitimately applied. The recital is not a positive and distinct grant of indefinite power. Comm. v. Morrison, 2 A. K. Marsh. 75; Passenger Cases, 7 How. 283; S. C. 45 Mass. 282; Griswold v. Hepburn, 2 Duvall, 20; Thayer v. Hedges, 22 Ind. 282; vide Maynard v. Newman, i Nev. 271.

The grant is general without limitation as to place. It consequently extends to all places over which the government extends. If this could be doubted, the doubt is removed by the subsequent words which modify the grant. These words are: “but all duties, imposts and excises shall be uniform throughout the United States.” It will not be contended that the modification of the power extends to places to which the power itself does not extend. The power then to lay and collect duties, imports and excises, may be exercised and must be exercised throughout the United States. This term designates the great Republic which is composed of States and Territories. The District of Columbia is not less within the United States than any State. Since then the power to lay and collect taxes, which includes direct taxes, is obviously coextensive with the power to lay and collect duties, imposts and excises, it follows that the power to impose direct taxes also extends throughout the United States. Loughborough v. Blake, 5 Wheat. 317.

The power to lay and collect taxes, duties and imposts, gives to Congress a plenary power over all persons and things for taxation, except exports. Such is the received meaning of the word taxes in its most extended sense, and always so when it is not used in contradistinction to terms of taxation having a limited meaning as to the objects to which by usage the terms apply. It is in the Constitution used in both senses; in its extended sense, when it is said that Congress may lay and collect taxes, and in a more confined sense in contradistinction to duties, imposts and excises. Congress may tax persons who come into the United States. Passenger Cases, 7 How. 283; S. C. 45 Mass. 282. The

purpose of the Constitution was to give the power of taxation to Congress in its fullest extent as to everything except exports. This purpose is apparent from the terms in which the taxing power is granted. More comprehensive words could not have been used. Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 8 Wall. 533.

The taxing power is given in the most comprehensive terms. The only limitations imposed are, that direct taxes, including the capitation tax, shall be apportioned; that duties, imposts and excises shall be uniform ; and that no duties shall be imposed upon articles exported from any State. With these exceptions, the exercise of the power is in all respects unsettered. Pacific Life Ins. Co. v. Soule, 7 Wall. 433.

Congress can not tax exports, and it must impose direct taxes by the rule of apportionment, and indirect taxes by the rule of uniformity. Thus limited and thus only, it reaches every subject, and may be exercised at discretion. But it reaches only existing subjects. License Tax Cases, 5 Wall. 462.

Congress has no power to lay taxes to pay the debts of a State, or to provide by taxation for its general welfare. Congress may tax for the treasury of the Union, and here its power ends. Passenger Cases, 7 How. 283; S. C. 45 Mass. 282.

A tax can not be pronounced unconstitutional, merely because it is oppressive, for Congress is responsible, not to the court, but to the people by whom its members are elected. Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 8 Wall. 533.

Duties are things due and recoverable by law. In its widest signification the term is hardly less comprehensive than “ taxes." It is applied in its most restricted meaning to customs, and in that sense is nearly the synonym of “imposts.” Pacific Life Ins. Co. v. Soule, 7 Wall. 433.

Excise is an inland imposition, sometimes upon the consumption of the commodity and sometimes upon the retail sale ; sometimes upon the manufacturer and sometimes upon the vendor. Pacific Life Insurance Co. v. Soule, 7 Wall. 433.

Impost is a duty on imported goods and merchandise. Pacific Life Ins. Co. v. Soule, 7 Wall. 433.

An internal revenue law which is uniform is valid, although its enforcement is suspended by rebellion in some States, and it recognizes such suspension. U. S. v. Riley, 5 Blatch. 204.

A tax upon distillers is in the nature of an excise tax, and is uniform in its operation if it is assessed equally upon all manufacturers of spirits, wherever they are. U. S. v. Singer, 15 Wall. 112.

Congress may impose a tax on a business which is prohibited by the laws of a State. License Tax Cases, 5 Wall. 462; U. S. v. Riley, 5 Blatch. 204.

Congress has the power to raise revenue by a stamp act. Hunter v. Cobb, i Bush, 239.

Congress has no power to forfeit land absolutely to the United States as a penalty for the non-payment of taxes. Martin v. Snowden, 18 Gratt.

100.

Congress has no power to provide that the whole land shall be sold for non-payment of direct taxes in every case, whatever may be the value of the land, and whatever the amount of the tax, for such a course is not necessary and proper to carry the power to tax into execution. Martin v. Snowden, 18 Gratt. 100.

Congress can not authorize a trade or business within a State in order to tax it. License Tax Cases, 5 Wall. 462.

The Federal Government is limited in its right to lay and collect taxes to the citizens and their transactions as such, or as acting in the Federal Government officially or otherwise, and cannot lay them on or collect them from individuals on their proceedings when acting, not as citizens transacting business with each other as such, but officially or in the pursuit of rights and duties in and rough State official agencies and institutions. Warren v. Paul, 22 Ind. 276.

Congress has no power to tax the means and instrumentalities employed by the States for carrying on the operations of their governments, preserving their existence and fulfilling the high and responsible duties assigned to them by the Constitution. Collector v. Day, 11 Wall. 113.

Congress can not impose a tax upon the salary of a judicial officer of a State. Collector v. Day, 11 Wall. 113.

Congress can not impose an income tax on the compensation allowed by a State to a State's attorney. U. S. v. Ritchie, 4 C. L. N. 139.

A stamp tax on writs issued by State courts, is unconstitutional and void. Warren v. Paul, 22 Ind. 276; Jones v. Keep, 19 Wis. 369; Fifield v. Close, 15 Mich. 505; Smith v. Short, 40 Ala. 385; Union Bank v. Hill, 3 Cold. 325; Edelward's Appeal, 66 Penn. 89; Tucker v. Potter, 35 Conn. 43; Lewis v. Randall, i Abb. Pr. N. S. 135; S. C. 30 How. Pr. 378; Walton v. Bryenth, 24 How. Pr. 357; Ford v. Clinton, 25 Iowa, 157; contra, German Liederkranz v. Schieman, 25 How. Pr. 388; Hoyt v. Benner, 22 La. Ann. 353.

Congress has no power to control contracts or impair the legal obligation of contracts made in a State according to her laws, by making them void for want of a stamp. Hunter. v. Cobb, i Bush, 239; Latham v. Smith, 45 Ill. 29; Forcheimer v. Holly, 14 Fla. 239.

Congress has no power to declare by law what shall or shall not be evidence in a State court. Latham v. Smith, 45 Ill. 29; Forcheimer v. Holly, 14 Fla. 239; Clemens v. Conrad, 19 Mich. 170; Sporer v. Eifler, i Heisk. 633; Haight v. Grist, 64 N. C. 739; Hunter v. Cobb, i Bush, 239; Hanford v. Obrecht, 49 III. 146 ; Craig v. Dimock, 47 Ill. 308; Bunker v. Green, 48 III. 243; U. S. Express Co. v. Haines, 48 Ill. 248; Wilson v. Kenna, 52 Ml. 43 ; contra, Woodson v. Randolph, 1 Va. Cas. 128; Howe v. Carpenter, 53 Barb. 382.

Congress can not tax the salary of a judge of a State court, although his salary is fixed by a body acting under the authority of the Legislature, for the agency which the State may choose to employ for that purpose, can not affect the relation which the two governments bear to each other. Freedman v. Sigel, io Blatch. 327.

Congress has no power to tax the official bonds given to a State by its officers, for the faithful performance of their duties. State v. Garton, 32 Ind. 1; contra, City v. Stevenson, 30 Iowa, 526.

There is no distinction between levying a tax upon the exercise of a power reserved to the States, and levying it on all those who seek to enforce their rights or redress their grievances through the instrumentality of the power or upon the means employed to that end. Union Bank v. Hill, 3 Cold. 325.

Congress can not impose a tax upon a tax certificate issued by State authority at a tax sale. Barden v. Supervisors, 33 Wis. 445.

Congress can not tax the salary of a judge of a State court, although it is paid by a municipal corporation, for the right to tax does not depend upon the mode which the State may choose to raise the revenue applied to the support of the office, or the sources from which it may choose to draw that revenue. Freedman v. Sigel, 10 Blatch. 327.

Congress can not require a revenue stamp to be placed upon a tax deed given by a State upon a sale of land for taxes, for it has no power to tax the means or instruments devised by the States for the

purpose

of collecting their own revenues. Sayles v. Davis, 22 Wis. 225; Delorme v. Ferk, 24. Wis. 201,

A municipal corporation is a portion of the governmental power of the State, and its revenues are not subject to taxation. U. S. v. Railroad Co. 17 Wall. 322.

Congress can not tax the interest due to a municipal corporation, on money advanced by it to a railroad corporation, to aid in building a railroad. U. S. v. Railroad Co. 17 Wall. 322.

· In order to entitle the revenue of a municipal corporation to exemption from taxation, it must be municipal in its nature. U. S. v. Railroad Co. 17 Wall. 322.

Congress may impose a tax upon the notes of State banks issued for v circulation. Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 8 Wall. 533.

A tax upon the interest due on railroad bonds, which is levied upon all railroads indebted by bond, and in the same amount, and is to be collected in the same manner, is valid although the bonds are held by non-residents. The tax must be uniform throughout the United States, not beyond them. Michigan Central R. R. Co. v. Slack, 22 I. R. R. 337.

Borrowing Money. (6) The power to "borrow money," includes or implies the power to issue the requisite securities or evidences of debt for the money borrowed. Hague v. Powers, 39 Barb. 427; Metropolitan Bank v. Van Dyck, 27 N. Y. 400; Thayer v. Hedges, 22 Ind. 282; George v. Concord, 45 N. H. 434; Van Husan v. Kanouse, 13 Mich. 303.

It is not necessary that these obligations shall be issued only in return for money received, and not for capital or commodities of which money is the representative. As the government requires articles of various descriptions, or the services of men for its exigencies in war and in peace, it may give its own obligations or evidences of indebtedness, and these are valid and properly issued under the power to borrow money. Metropolitan Bank v. Van Dyck, 27 N. Y. 400.

It is not essential to the exercise of this power that the contract between the government and the lender or the obligations issued shall provide for the repayment of the money borrowed at any specific future day, or with interest. Metropolitan Bank v. Van Dyck, 27 N. Y. 400.

The issue of treasury notes is an exchange of credit for money or property. All political economists recognize the fact that in issuing paper promises to circulate as currency, their makers are in effect borrowing on the credit of these promises whatever of value they receive in exchange for them. Metropolitan Bank v. Van Dyck, 27 N. Y. 400.

Borrowing money means neither more nor less than raising supplies on the credit of the government. The issuing and paying out of treasury notes may be a forced loan to the government. Metropolitan Bank v. Van Dyck, 27 N. Y. 400.

Congress may constitutionally authorize the emission of bills of credit, make them receivable in payment of debts due to the United States, fit ther for use by those who see fit to use them in all the transactions of commerce, provide for their redemption, and make them a currency uniform in value and description, and convenient and useful for circulation. Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 8 Wall. 533.

In order to borrow, the government must have credit, and if, in the judgment of Congress, it is either necessary or proper, in order to enhance the credit of the government promises, to make them a legal tender in the payment of private as well as public debts, it has the right to do so. Riddlesbarger v. McDaniel, 38 Mo. 138; Hague v. Powers, 39 Barb. 427 ; Metropolitan Bank v. Van Dyck, 27 N. Y. 400; Thayer v. Hedges, 23 Ind. 141; Breitenbach v. Turner, 18 Wis. 140; Reynolds v. Bank, 18 Ind. 467; Maynard v. Newman, 1 Nev. 271; Carpenter v. Northfield Bank, 39 Vt. 46; Shollenberger v. Brinton. 52 Penn. 9; Verges v. Giboney, 38 Mo.458; contra, Thayer v. Hedges, 22 Ind. 282; Griswold v. Hepburn, 2 Duvall, 20.

Congress, by suitable enactments, may restrain the circulation, as money, of any notes not issued by itself. Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 8 Wall. 533.

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