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A tax upon the gross receipts of an express company engaged in carrying articles between States is valid. Southern Express Co. v. Hood, 15 Rich. 66.

A stamp tax on foreign bills of exchange drawn in the State, is not an impost or tax on exports. Ex parte James P. Martin, 7 Nev. 140.

A tax upon the gross sales of a party who purchases articles in their original packages from the importer, is not a tax on imports. Waring v. Mayor, 8 Wall. 110; S. C. 4 Ala. 139.

A tax upon a broker's sales of imported merchandise, which has not become incorporated with the property of the State, is void. People v. Moring, 3 Abb. App. 539; S. C. 47 Barb. 642.

A State law requiring a license from non-resident traders to vend foreign merchandise, is not a tax on imports or exports. Sears v. Commissioners, 36 Ind. 267.

A State may impose a higher tax on articles bought from non-residents than on those bought from manufacturers who reside in the State. Davis v. Dashiel, Phillips, 114.

A tax on sales is a tax on the proceeds, and not a tax on the imports. State v. Pinckney, 18 Rich. 474.

The removal or destruction of infectious or unsound articles is an exercise of the power of inspection, and forms an express exception to the prohibition. Brown v. State, 12 Wheat. 419.

A State has a right to lay a tax upon imports, the object of which is to pay for services performed in inspecting the articles, if the law is passed in good faith, and is not resorted to as a means of indirectly raising revenue. Green v. State, R. M. Charlt. 368.

The power to pass inspection laws involves the power to enforce such laws by adequate provisions for the remuneration of the officers charged with the duty of inspection. Such fees are not imposts. Addison v. Saulnier, 19 Cal. 82.

Inspection laws may apply to imported articles as well as to those intended for exportation. Neilson v. Garza, 2 Woods, 287.

Whether the fee allowed by a State law is excessive or not is a question that can only be determined by Congress. Neilson v. Garza, 2 Woods, 287.

The object of this prohibition is to protect both the vessel and cargo from State taxation while in transitu, and this prohibition can not be evaded and the same result effected by calling it a tax on the passengers or the master. Passenger Cases, 7 How. 283 ; S. C. 45 Mass. 282; People v. Downer, 7 Cal. 169; contra, In re Crandall, i Nev, 294.

Tonnage. (6) A duty of tonnage signifies a tax, custom or toll. Sheffield v. Parsons, 3 Stew. & Port. 302.

A duty of tonnage, in the most obvious sense of the term, imports a tax or duty proportioned to the tonnage or size of the vessel. Johnson v. Drummond, 20 Gratt. 419; Inman Steamship Co. v. Tinker, 94 U. S. 238.

It is not only a pro rata tax which is prohibited, but any duty on the ship, whether a fixed sum upon its whole tonnage, or a sum to be ascertained by comparing the amount of tonnage with the rate of duty. Steamship Co. v. Port Wardens, 6 Wall. 31.

A duty or tax, or burden, imposed under the authority of the State, which is by the law imposing it to be measured by the capacity of the vessel, and is in its essence a contribution claimed for the privilege of arriving and departing from a port of the United States, is within the prohibition. Tobin v. Vicksburg, 4 Cent. L. J. 280; Cannon v. New Orleans, 20 Wall. 577 ; S. C. 27 La. Ann. 16.

Taxes levied by a State upon ships and vessels as instruments of commerce are within the prohibition, and it makes no difference whether the ships or vessels taxed belong to the citizens of the State which levies the tax, or the citizens of another State. State Tonnage Tax Cases, 12 Wall. 204 ; S. C. 3 Grant, 128.

The privilege extends to all vessels entitled to the privileges of vessels employed in the coasting trade, whether employed in commercial intercourse between ports in different States or between different ports in the same State. State Tonnage Tax Cases, 12 Wall. 204 ; S. C. 3 Grant, 128.

A tonnage tax is a means prohibited to the States, and can not be employed as a means of enforcing some law which is within their constitutional authority. Johnson v. Drummond, 20 Gratt. 419.

The mere fact that a tax does not go into the public coffers does not prevent its being a duty of tonnage. What is done with the money can not affect the question. Alexander v. Railroad Co. 3 Strobh. 594; Sheffield v. Parsons, 3 Stew. & Port. 302.

It is immaterial what form of expression is used in describing the tax or the object or subject, if, upon looking at its real character and effect, it is found to come within the meaning of a duty of tonnage. Thus the tax, instead of being called a tax on the vessel, may be called a tax upon the master or, cargo; it may purport to be a tax upon some privilege to be enjoyed by the vessel, as the privilege of coming into a certain port or of riding at a particular anchorage, or of being served as she may have occasion by the wardens of a port, or the privilege of engaging in a particular trade, as the trade in wood, or corn, or oysters; yet, if really and substantially it is a duty of tonnage, it is equally within the prohibition as if the tax had been called by its right name. Johnson v. Drummond, 20 Gratt. 419.

A State law imposing half pilotage fees on vessels refusing to receive a pilot is not a duty, impost or excise. Cooley v. Philadelphia, 12 How. 299.

A charge for services rendered, or conveniences provided, is in no sense a tax or duty. It is not a hindrance or impediment to free navigation. The prohibition is designed to guard against local hindrances to trade and carriage by vessels, not to relieve them from liability to claims for assistance rendered and facilities furnished for trade and commerce. It is a tax or duty that is prohibited, something imposed by virtue of sovereignty, not claimed in the right of proprietorship. K. N. P. Co. v. Keokuk, 10 C. L. N. 91 ; S. C. 5 Cent. L. J. 504.

A charge for wharfage is not a tax or duty It is an assertion, not of sovereignty, but of a right of property. K. N. P. Co. v. Keokuk, 10 C. L. N. 91 ; S. C. 5 Cent. L. J. 504; Cannon v. New Orleans, 20 Wall. 577; S. C. 27 La. Ann. 16.

The character of the service is the same whether the wharf is built and offered for use by a State, a municipal corporation, or a private individual. K. N. P. Co. v. Keokuk, 10 C. L. N. 91 ; S. C. 5 Cent. L. J. 504 ; Cannon v. New Orleans, 20 Wall. 577 ; s. C. 27 La. Ann. 16.

The State may regulate the compensation for wharfage, so as to prevent extortion. Cannon v. New Orleans, 20 Wall. 577; S. C. 27 La. Ann. 16.

A statute regulating dues for wharfage is not a statute imposing tonnage duties. The owners of the shores of navigable waters may, at considerable expense, make them convenient and useful for the masters of vessels, and the right to compensation results from the use of those conveniences. Sterrett v. Houston, 14 Tex. 153; Municipality v. Pease, 2 La, Ann. 538 ; The Ann Ryan, 7 Ben. 20.

A tax which is by its terms due from all vessels arriving and stopping in a port, without regard to the place where they may stop, whether it be in the channel of the stream or out in the bay, or landed at a natural river bank, can not be treated as compensation for the use of a wharf. Cannon v. New Orleans, 20 Wall. 577 ; S. C. 27 La. Ann. 16.


When a city or other municipality is the owner of wharves or piers built by its own money, to assist vessels landing within its limits, in the pursuit of their business, it may exact and receive a reasonable compensation for the use thereof, the same as individuals. Cannon v. New Orleans, 20 Wall. 577; S. C. 27 La. Ann. 16; Worsley v. Municipality, 9 Rob. 324.

Neither a State nor a municipal corporation can be permitted to impose a tax on tonnage under cover of laws ostensibly passed to collect wharfage. K. N. P. Co. v. Keokuk, 10 C. L. N. 91.

The prohibition was intended to protect the freedom of commerce, and nothing more, and should be so construed as to carry out that intent. K. N. P. Co. v. Keokuk, 10 C. L. N. 91.

If a municipal corporation improves a wharf on part of the water front, it may impose a reasonable wharfage for the use thereof, although it is graduated according to the tonnage of the vessel. N. W. Union Packet Co. v. St. Louis, 4 Cent. L. J. 58; Keokuk v. Packet Co. 4 Cent. L. J. 276; S. C. 10 C. L. N. 91; 5 Cent. L. J. 504.

An ordinance regulating the charges for wharfage, may be enforced, unless the defendant pleads and proves that they are beyond the limits of just compensation. Keokuk v. Packet Co. 4 Cent. L. J. 276.

A statute authorizing the collection of wharsage from vessels landing articles other than the production of the State, at any public wharf, is unconstitutional. Wharf Case, 3 Bland, 361,

A statute allowing fees to a harbor master for assigning a vessel to a berth at a wharf, is not a tonnage duty, although the fees are ascertained by the burden or tonnage. State v. Charleston, 4 Rich. 286; Benedict v. Vanderbilt, i Robt. 194; Port Wardens v. The Martha J. Ward, 14 La. Ann 289; Master v. Prats, 10 Rob. 459.

A State law requiring every vessel to pay a certain fee to the port warden or harbor master, whether he renders any services or not, is a duty on tonnage. Steamship Co. v. Port Wardens, 6 Wall. 31; Sheffield v. Parsons, 3 Stew. & Port. 302 ; Hackley v. Geraghty, 34 N. J. 332 ; Alex

3 ander v. Railroad Co. 3 StroBh. 594 ; Inman Steamship Co. v. Tinker, 94 U. S. 238; contra, Port Wardens v. The Charles Morgan, 14 La. Ann. 595; Port Wardens v. The Martha J. Ward, 14 La. Ann. 289; City v. The Nautilus, 8 I. R. R. 91.

A toll or duty on all tonnage carried on a railroad, at a certain rate per mile, is not a duty of tonnage. Penn. Railroad Co. v. Comm. 3 Grant, 128.

A municipal ordinance which imposes a charge on a vessel, to be regulated according to the tonnage, for arriving at and departing from a port, and not merely for the use of the wharf, is void. Northwestern U. P. Co. v. St. Paul, 3 Dillon, 454; S. C. 7 C. L. N. 331.

A toll to be applied to pay for improvements made upon a navigable river, is not in the nature of a tonnage duty or any duty at all, upon the vessel, within the meaning of the Constitution, any more than a toll at a turnpike gate is a duty upon the carriage. It is a compensation exacted for a privilege conferred, and in proportion to it. It is no more a tonnage duty than laws regulating wharfage or port charges. Thames Bank v. Lovell, 18 Conn. 500.

A State can not lay a tonnage duty on vessels employed as lighters for other vessels engaged in foreign commerce, although they ply exclusively within the waters of the State. Lott v. Morgan, 41 Ala. 246.

A statute requiring vessels carrying oysters taken in the State, to take out a license and pay therefor a tax of a certain amount for every ton that the vessel may measure, imposes a duty of tonnage, and is void. Johnson v. Drummond, 20 Gratt. 419.

A State law requiring a vessel to pay a fee to a pilot for inspection, is valid. Baker v. Wise, 16 Gratt. 139.

A State can not impose a duty of tonnage for the purpose of raising a revenue in order to defray the expenses of its quarantine regulations. Peete v. Morgan, 19 Wall. 581.

A State may tax a vessel owned by a citizen of the State, and engaged wholly and entirely in plying on waters exclusively within the State, although it is registered and enrolled by the United States. Lott v. Mobile Trade Co. 42 Ala. 578;. Lott v. Cox, 43 Ala. 697.

A tax upon a vessel according to her valuation as property, and as part of the taxable property of the place where she is owned and registered, is not a duty of tonnage. The North Cape, 6 Biss. 505; State Tonnage Tax Cases, 12 Wall. 204; S. C. 3 Grant, 128; Perry v. Torrance, 8 Ohio, 521 ; State v. Charleston, 4 Rich. 286; Battle v. Corporation, 9 Ala. 234.

A tax levied on a vessel wholly irrespective of its value as property, and solely and exclusively on the basis of its tonnage, is a duty of tonnage. State Tonnage Tax Cases, 12 Wall. 204; S. C. 3 Grant, 128.


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(c) The words “ agreement” and “compact can not be construed as synonymous with one another, and still less can either of them be held to mean the same thing with the word “ treaty " in the preceding clause, into which the States are positively and unconditionally forbidden to enter, and which even the consent of Congress can not authorize. The words “agreement” and “compact" evidently mean something more than the word “ treaty,” and were designed to make the prohibition more comprehensive. The word “ agreement” does not necessarily import any direct and express stipulation, nor is it necessary that it should be in writing. If there is a verbal understanding to which both parties have assented, and upon which both are acting, it is an agreement." The use of all these terms, “ treaty," “ agreement,” compact,” show that it was the intention of the framers of the Constitution, to use the broadest and most comprehensive terms, and that they anxiously desired to cut off all connection or communication between a State and a foreign power. The word “agreement


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