Congress can not confer any part of the judicial power upon an executive officer. Beatty v. U. S. 1 Dev. 231.

The condition of peace or war, public or civil, in a legal sense, must be determined by the political department of the Government, not the judicial U. S. v. 129 Packages, 11 A. L. Reg. 419.

This clause does not apply to the abnormal condition of conquered territory in the occupancy of a conquering army, nor prohibit the establishment of military courts in an insurrectionary State. Mechanics' Bank v. Union Bank, 22 Wall. 276; The Grapeshot, 9 Wall. 179.

Limited Jurisdiction.

The judicial power of the United States is to be exercised by courts organized for the purpose and brought into existence by an effort of the legislative power of the Union. Of all the courts which the United States may under their general powers constitute, one only, the Supreme Court, possesses jurisdiction derived immediately from the Constitution, of which the legislative power can not deprive it. All other courts created by the General Government possess no jurisdiction but what is given them by the power that creates them, and can be vested with none but what the power ceded to the General Government will authorize it to confer. Sheldon v. Sill, 8 How. 441; M'Intire v. Wood, 7 Cranch, 504; Kendall v. U. S. 12 Pet. 524; S. C. 5 Cranch C. C. 163; Cary v. Curtis, 3 How. 236; Bank v. Northumberland, 4 Conn. 333; S. C. 4 Wash. 108; U. S. v. Railroad Bridge Co. 6 McLean, 517; Bank of U. S. v. Roberts, 4 Conn. 323; U. S. v. Bedford Bridge, 1 W. & M. 401; Shute v. Davis, Pet. C. C. 431; U. S. v. Ta-wan-ga-ca, Hemp. 304; Hubbard v. Northern R. R. Co. 3 Blatch. 84; Ex parte Joseph De Cabrera, 1 Wash. 232; Mayor v. Cooper, 6 Wall. 247; Turner v. Bank, 4 Dall. 8; Smith v. Allyn, 1 Paine, 453; Moffat v. Soley, 2 Paine, 103; contra, Dundas v. Bowler, 3 McLean, 204; Brainard v. Williams, 4 McLean, 122.

The Constitution declares that the judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court created by the Constitution, and in such inferior courts as Congress shall, from time to time, ordain and establish. The Constitution defines the portions of the judicial power vested in the Supreme Court, and leaves the residue to be distributed among the inferior courts, which may be established by law, and to be vested or not vested in them, respect- . ively, from time to time, according to the discretion of Congress. The powers, therefore, not bestowed upon the Federal courts by legislative provisions remain dormant until some law shall call them into action by designating the particular tribunal which shall be authorized to exercise them. Bank of U. S. v. Roberts, 4 Conn. 323; Bank of U. S. v. Northumberland Bank, 4 Conn. 333.

The Federal courts can not exercise a common-law jurisdiction in criminal cases. U. S. v. Hudson, 7 Cranch, 32; U. S. v. Coolidge, 1 Wheat. 415; S. C. I Gallis. 488; contra, U. S. v. Ravara, 2 Dall. 297; U. S. v. Worrall, 2 Dall. 384.

The Federal courts can not proceed by information in criminal cases, unless the power is granted by Congress. U. S. v. Joe, 4 C. L. N. 105. Congress may transfer a suit from one inferior tribunal to another. Stuart v. Laird, I Cranch, 299.

Territorial Courts.

Territorial courts are legislative courts created in virtue of the general right of sovereignty which exists in the Government, or in virtue of that clause which enables Congress to make all needful rules and regulations respecting the territory belonging to the United States. The jurisdiction with which they are invested is not a part of that judicial power which is defined in this article, but is conferred by Congress in the execution of those general powers which that body possesses over the territories of the United States. Am. Ins. Co. v. Canter, 1 Pet. 511; Stacy v. Abbott, 1 A. L.

T. 84.

Congress may either define directly by its own act the jurisdiction of the Territorial courts created by it, or delegate the authority requisite for that purpose to the Territorial government. Leitensdorfer v. Webb, 20 How. 176.

If Congress, on admitting a Territory into the Union as a State, fails to provide for cases pending in the Supreme Court, it may do so by a subsequent act.. Freeborn v. Smith, 2 Wall. 160.

State Courts.

Congress can not vest any portion of the judicial power of the United States, except in courts ordained and established by itself. Martin v. Hunter, I Wheat. 304; Ely v. Peck, 7 Conn. 239; Davison v. Champlin, 7 Conn. 244; U. S. v. Lathrop, 17 Johns. 4; Jackson v. Rose, 2 Va. Cas. 34; Houston v. Moore, 5 Wheat. 1; S. C. 3 S. & R. 169; Ex parte Frank Knowles, 5 Cal. 300; State v. McBride, Rice, 400.

Congress can not compel a State court to entertain jurisdiction in any case, for they are not inferior courts in the sense of the Constitution. They are not ordained by Congress. State courts are left to consult their own duty from their own State authority and organization. Stearns v. U.S. 2 Paine, 300; Ex parte Alexander Stephens, 70 Mass. 559; Miss. River Tel. Co. v. First Nat. Bank, 7 C. L. N. 158.

A court is a creature of the Constitution and laws under which it exists. To exercise any power not derived from such Constitution and laws would be a usurpation. It is not, therefore, lawful for a State court to exercise jurisdiction conferred upon it by an act of Congress. Ex parte Frank

Knowles, 5 Cal 300.

Congress can not give jurisdiction to or require services of any officer of a State government as such. Ex parte Wm. Pool, 2 Va. Cas. 276; Prigg V. Comm. 16 Pet. 539.

The Constitution directs that all the regular and permanent duties which properly belong to a court in the ordinary and popular signification of that term shall be performed by the courts described therein. There is, therefore, nothing in the Constitution which prevents a ministerial officer or other person by law directed to do and perform any act which may be necessary to bring an accused party before a court possessing the judicial power of determining his guilt or innocence. Ex parte Wm. Pool, 2 Va. Cas. 276; Prigg v. Comm. 16 Pet. 539; Ex parte Gist, 26 Ala. 156; Ex parte Martin, 2 Paine, 348; Ableman v. Booth, 21 How. 506; s. c. 3 Wis. 1, 145, 157.

Congress may authorize any citizen of the United States to perform any act which the Constitution does not require to be performed in a different manner. Ex parte Wm. Pool, 2 Va. Cas. 276; Ex parte Gist, 26

Ala. 156.

State Laws.

The jurisdiction of the Federal courts is derived alone from the Constitution and laws of the United States, and can not be enlarged, diminished, or affected by State laws. U. S. v. Drennen, Hemp. 320; Livingston v. Jefferson, I Brock. 203.

A State legislature can not confer jurisdiction upon Federal courts, or prescribe the means or mode of its exercise. That subject belongs exclusively to the Federal Government, and must be regulated solely by the Constitution and the laws of Congress. Greely v. Townsend, 25 Cal. 604.

No State can take away the privilege conferred upon citizens of other States to sue in the Federal courts by providing a special remedy in its own courts. Mason v. Boom Company, 3 Wall. Jr. 252.

Removal from State Courts.

The power to remove suits from State courts to Federal courts is not to be found in express terms in any part of the Constitution. It is only given

by implication, as a power necessary and proper to carry into effect some express power. The removal of a cause is an indirect mode by which the Federal courts acquire original jurisdiction. Railway Company v. Whitton, 13 Wall. 270; Martin v. Hunter, 1 Wheat. 304.

Congress may provide for the removal of cases over which the Federal courts may take jurisdiction, from the State courts into the Federal courts. Railway Company v. Whitton, 13 Wall. 270; Fisk v Union Pacific R. R. Co. 6 Blatch. 362; Murray v. Patrie, 5 Blatch. 343; Mayor v Cooper, 6 Wall. 247; Tod v. Fairfield, 15 Ohio St. 377; Clark v. Dick, 1 Dill. 8; McCormick v. Humphrey, 27 Ind. 144: Johnson v. Monell, 1 Wool. 390; Martin v. Hunter, 1 Wheat. 304; Hodgson v. Millward, 3 Grant, 412; Kulp v. Ricketts, 3 Grant, 420; contra, Johnson v. Gordon, 4 Cal. 368.

Where the judicial power of the United States can be applied only because the case involves a controversy between citizens of different States, it rests entirely with Congress to determine at what time the power may be invoked, and upon what conditions; whether originally in the Federal court, or after suit brought in the State court; and in the latter case at what stage of the proceedings, whether before issue or trial by removal to a Federal court, or after judgment on appeal or writ of error. Gaines v. Fuentes, 92 U. S. 10.

A case may be removed from a State court to a Federal court where it arises under the Constitution or laws of the United States, as well as where it arises between citizens of different States. Kulp v. Ricketts, 3 Grant, 420.

A statute requiring a foreign corporation to file an agreement not to remove cases against it into the Federal courts, as a condition to the permission to transact business in the State, is void. Morse v. Ins. Co. 20 Wall. 445; S. C. 30 Wis. 496; Railway Co. v. Pierce, 27 Ohio St. 155; contra, N. Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Best, 23 Ohio St. 105; Continental Ins. Co. v. Kasey, 13 A. L. J. 311.

If the license to transact business in the State is made dependent upon the condition that the corporation shall not remove any case from a State to a Federal court, the State may revoke the license if such removal is made. State v. Doyle. 40 Wis. 175; Doyle v. Continental Ins. Co. 15 A. L. J. 267; contra, Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Doyle, 6 Biss. 461.

Compensation.

Congress can not create or limit any other tenure of the judicial office, or refuse to pay the stipulated salary of the judges at stated times, or diminish it during their continuance in office. Martin v. Hunter, 1 Wheat.

Although Congress may establish courts of appellate jurisdiction, yet such courts must consist of judges appointed in the manner the Constitution requires, and holding their offices by no other tenure than that of good behavior. Hayburn's Case, 2 Dall. 409; U. S. v. Ferreira, 13

How. 40.

The fees allowed to a justice of the peace, appointed in the District of Columbia, can not be diminished during his continuance in office. U. S. v. More, 3 Cranch, 160, note.

SECTION II.

1. The judicial power shall extend to all cases in law and equity, arising under this Constitution, the laws of the United States, and treaties made, or which shall be made, under their authority; to all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls; to all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction; to controversies to which the United States shall be a party; to controversies between two or more States; between a State and citizens of another State; between citizens of different States; between citizens of the same State claiming lands under grants of different States; and between a State, or the citizens thereof, and foreign States, citizens or subjects.

Construction.

The words "shall extend" are used in an imperative sense. They import an absolute grant of judicial power. They can not have a relative signification applicable to powers already granted, for the people had not made any previous grant. The Constitution was for a new Government organized with new substantive powers, and not a mere supplementary charter to a Government already existing. Martin v. Hunter, 1 Wheat. 304.

The language of the article throughout is manifestly designed to be mandatory upon the legislature. Its obligatory force is so imperative that Congress could not, without a violation of its duty, have refused to carry it into operation. It is a duty also to vest the whole judicial power. The