language, if imperative as to one part, is imperative as to all. Martin v. Hunter, Wheat. 304.

There are two classes of cases enumerated in the Constitution, between which a distinction seems to be drawn. The first class includes cases arising under the Constitution, laws and treaties of the United States; cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls; and cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction. In this class the expression is that the judicial power shall extend to all cases, but in the subsequent part of the clause, which embraces all other cases of national cognizance, the word "all" is dropped, seemingly ex industria. In respect to the first class, it may well have been the intention of the framers of the Constitution imperatively to extend the judicial power either in an original or appellate form, to all cases, and in the latter class to leave it to Congress to qualify the jurisdiction, original or appellate, in such manner as public policy might dictate. Martin v. Hunter, 1 Wheat. 304; The Moses Taylor, 4 Wall.

411.

The Constitution imposes no limitation upon the class of cases involving controversies between citizens of different States to which the judicial power of the United States may be extended, and Congress may therefore lawfully provide for bringing, at the option of either of the parties, all such controversies within the jurisdiction of the Federal judiciary. Gaines v. Fuentes, 92 U. S. 10.

Congress may give the Federal courts original jurisdiction in any case to which the appellate jurisdiction extends. Osborn v. Bank, 9 Wheat. 738.

The mere question whether a collector of the customs is indebted to the United States, may be one of judicial cognizance. It is competent for the United States to sue any of its debtors in a court of law. It is equally clear that the United States may consent to be sued, and may yield this consent upon such terms and under such restrictions as it may think just. Murray v. Hoboken Co. 18 How. 272.

The judicial power may extend to all the cases enumerated in the Constitution. As the mode is not limited, it may extend to all such cases in any form in which judicial power may be exercised. It may, therefore, extend to them in the shape of original or appellate jurisdiction, or both, for there is nothing in the nature of the cases which binds to the exercise of the one in preference to the other. Martin v. Hunter, 1 Wheat. 304.

Laws.

The legislative, executive and judicial powers of every well constructed government are co-extensive with each other; that is, are potentially co-extensive. The executive department may constitutionally execute every law

which the legislature may constitutionally make, and the judicial power may receive from the legislature the power to construe every such law. Bank of U. S. v. Roberts, 4 Conn. 323; Osborn v. Bank, 9 Wheat. 738.

The power is given in general terms. No limitation is imposed. The broadest language is used. “All cases so arising are embraced. None are excluded. How jurisdiction shall be acquired by the inferior courts, whether it shall be original or appellate, or original in part and appellate in part, and the manner of procedure in its exercise after it has been acquired, are not prescribed. The Constitution is silent on those subjects. They are remitted without check or limitation to the wisdom of the legislature. Mayor 7. Cooper, 6 Wall. 247.

This clause enables the judicial department to receive jurisdiction to the full extent of the Constitution, laws and treaties of the United States when any question respecting them shall assume such a form that the judicial power is capable of acting on it. That power is capable of acting only when the subject is submitted to it by a party who asserts his rights in the form prescribed by law. It then becomes a case, and the Constitution declares that the judicial power shall extend to all cases arising under the Constitution, laws and treaties of the United States. Osborn v. Bank, 9 Wheat. 738.

The judicial power covers every legislative act of Congress, whether it be made within the limits of its delegated powers, or be an assumption of power beyond the grants in the Constitution. Ableman v. Booth, 21 How. 506; s. c. 3 Wis. 1; Mayor v. Cooper, 6 Wall 247.

When a question to which the judicial power of the Federal Government is extended by the Constitution forms an ingredient of the original cause, it is in the power of Congress to give the Federal courts jurisdiction of that cause, although other questions of fact or law may be involved in it. The other questions may be decided as incidental to that which gives the jurisdiction. Osborn v. Bank, 9 Wheat. 738; Mayor v. Cooper, 6 Wall.

247.

The right of the plaintiff to sue can not depend on the defense which the defendant may choose to set up. His right to sue is anterior to that defense, and must depend on the state of things when the action is brought. The questions which the case involves must therefore determine its character, whether those questions be made in the cause or not. Osborn v. Bank, 9 Wheat. 738.

Whether the case arises in the State or Federal tribunals, it is within the reach of this power. Mayor v. Cooper, 6 Wall. 247.

Cases may arise under the laws of the United States by implication, so that they come under the judicial power of the Federal Government. It is

not unusual for a legislative act to involve consequences not expressed. An officer, for example, is ordered to arrest an individual. It is not necessary, nor is it usual, to say that he shall not be punished for obeying the order. His security is implied in the order itself. The judicial power is the instrument employed by the Government in administering the security. Hodgson v. Millward, 3 Grant, 412.

To bring a case within the judicial power of the United States it need not be of an unmixed character. If the principal right, the right of property in the subject in controversy, is given or created by an act of Congress made in pursuance of the Constitution, it is sufficient. Bank of U. S. v. Roberts, 4 Conn. 323.

The construction of an act of Congress, when a claim or a defense arises out of it, is within the province of the Federal judiciary. Hodgson v. Millward, 3 Grant, 412.

When a defendant seeks protection under a law of the United States, it is a case arising under that law. Hodgson v. Millward, 3 Grant, 412; Kulp v. Ricketts, 3 Grant, 420.

Congress has no constitutional power to settle the rights under treaties, except in cases purely political. The construction of them is the peculiar province of the judiciary when a case shall arise between individuals. Wilson v. Wall, 6 Wall. 83.

The article does not extend the judicial power to every violation of the Constitution which may possibly take place, but to "a case in law or in equity," in which a right under such law is asserted in a court of justice. If the question can not be brought into a court, then there is no case in law or equity, and no jurisdiction is given by the words of the article. Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 264.

The General Government has full authority to appoint and commission all courts, magistrates, and officers to carry the laws of Congress into effect without necessary reliance on those of the States. Ex parte Alexander Stephens, 70 Mass. 559.

Congress may provide that a national bank may sue and be sued in the Federal courts. Magill v. Parsons, 4 Conn. 317; Bank of U. S. v Roberts, 4 Conn. 323: Bank of U. S. v. Northumberland Bank, 4 Conn. 333; S. C. 4 Wash. 108; Bank v. Osborn, 9 Wheat. 738.

Admiralty.

The Constitution not only confers admiralty jurisdiction, but the word "maritime" is superadded, seemingly ex industria, to remove every latent doubt. "Cases of maritime jurisdiction " must include all maritime contracts, torts, and injuries which are in the understanding of the common

law, as well as of the admiralty, "causæ civiles et maritima." In this view there is a peculiar propriety in the incorporation of the term maritime into the Constitution. The disputes and discussions respecting what the admiralty jurisdiction was could not but be well known to the framers of that instrument. One party sought to limit it by locality, another by the subject-matter. It was wise, therefore, to dissipate all question by giving cognizance of all "cases of maritime jurisdiction," or what is precisely equivalent, of all maritime cases. Upon any other construction the word "maritime" would be mere tautology; but in this sense it has a peculiar and appropriate force. De Lovio v. Boit, 2 Gallis. 398; The Huntress, 2 Ware, 89; Kynoch v. Ives, Newb. 205; Davis v. The Seneca, 6 Penn. L. J. 213; S. C. Gilp. 10; vide U. S. v. Bedford Bridge, 1 W. & M. 401.

The terms admiralty and maritime belong to the law of nations as well as to our own domestic and municipal law. This is peculiarly true of the former - admiralty. A court of admiralty is a court of the law of nations, and in one branch of its jurisdiction, that of prize, both the law and the jurisdiction are derived solely from the law of nations. The Huntress, 2 Ware, 89.

The maritime law is a part of the common law. Thompson v. The Catharina, 1 Pet. Ad. 104.

The etymology or received use of the words "admiralty" and "maritime jurisdiction," include jurisdiction of all things done upon and relating to the sea, or, in other words, all transactions and proceedings relative to commerce and navigation, and to damages or injuries upon the sea. De Lovio v. Boit, 2 Gallis. 398; Scott v. The Young America, Newb. 101.

The admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the Federal courts covers not merely the cognizance of the case, but the jurisprudence and principles. by which it is to be administered. It covers the whole maritime law applicable to the case in judgment, without the slightest dependence upon or connection with the local jurisprudence of the State on the same subject. The subject-matter of admiralty and maritime law is withdrawn from State legislation, and belongs exclusively to the national Government and its proper functionaries. The Chusan, 2 Story, 455.

Cases in admiralty are not identical with cases arising under the laws and Constitution of the United States. The Constitution clearly contemplates these as three distinct classes of cases. Am. Ins. Co. v. Canter, I Pet. 511.

The admiralty jurisdiction can not be made to depend upon the power of Congress to regulate commerce. They are entirely distinct things having no necessary connection with each other, and are conferred in the Constitution by separate and distinct grants. The Belfast, 7 Wall. 624; The Genesee Chief v. Fitzhugh, 12 How. 443; The Sarah Jane, 1 Lowell, 203.

A law defining the jurisdiction of certain courts of the United States is not a regulation of commerce. The jurisdiction to administer the laws relating to commerce is not a regulation within the meaning of the Constitution. The Genesee Chief v. Fitzhugh, 12 How. 443.

The power of regulating commerce with foreign nations and among the States, is granted by another article of the Constitution, to the legislative department. This covers the whole maritime commerce of the country. The grant to the judicial department, of the cognizance of all causes of maritime jurisdiction, makes the judicial co-extensive with the legislative power. The Huntress, 2 Ware, 89.

The grant of admiralty power to the Federal courts was not intended to be limited or to be interpreted by what were cases of admiralty jurisdiction in England when the Constitution was adopted. Waring v. Clarke, 5 How. 441; De Lovio v. Boit, 2 Gallis. 398; The Huntress, 2 Ware, 89; Kynoch v. Ives, Newb. 205; Steele v. Thacher, 1 Ware, 91; Davis v. The Seneca, 6 Penn. L. J. 213; S. c. Gilp. 10; The Gold Hunter, 1 Bl. & H. 300; The Volunteer, 1 Sum. 551; New Jersey Co. v. Merchants' Bank, 6 How. 344.

The admiralty has jurisdiction over maritime contracts, although the voyage contemplated begins and ends in the State, and is prosecuted only in waters within the State. The Belfast, 7 Wall. 624; The Elmira Shepherd, 8 Blatch. 341; Leonard v. The Volunteer, 15 I. R. R. 59; S. C. 1 C. L. N. 185; The Mary Washington, 1 Abb. C. C. 1; The Leonard, 3 Ben. 263; The Sarah Jane, 1 Lowell, 203; Carpenter v. The Emma Johnson, I Cliff. 633; S. C. 1 Sprague, 527; contra, Maguire v. Card, 21 How. 248; The Troy, 4 Blatch. 355: Allen v. Newberry, 21 How. 244; New Jersey Co. v. Merchants' Bank, 6 How. 344.

The admiralty jurisdiction extends to torts committed on navigable waters although they are committed within the body of a county. Roberts v. Skolfield, 8 A. L. Reg. 156.

In cases purely dependent on the locality of the act done, the admiralty jurisdiction is limited to the sea and to tide waters as far as the tide flows, and does not reach beyond high-water mark. U. S. v. Coombs, 12 Pet. 72.

The cession of all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction is not a cession of the waters on which those cases may arise. This article is not intended for the ċession of territory or of general jurisdiction. The general jurisdiction over the place subject to this grant of power adheres to the territory as a portion of the sovereignty of the States not yet given away. U. S. v. Bevans, 3 Wheat. 336; Smith v. State, 18 How. 71; Ware v. Hyer, 2 Paine, 131; S. C. 1 Bl. & H. 235.