ical jurisdiction and sovereignty of the States. Virginia v. West Virginia, 11 Wall. 39; Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 12 Pet. 657.

A question of boundary between States is within the original jurisdic tion of the Supreme Court. Florida v. Georgia, 17 How. 478.

The Supreme Court has no jurisdiction over questions of a political and not judicial character. State v. Stanton, 6 Wall. 50; Cherokee Nation v. State, 5 Pet. I.

Although Congress has the right to prescribe the process and mode of proceeding in cases where the Supreme Court has original jurisdiction as fully as in any other court, yet the omission to legislate on the subject does not deprive the court of the jurisdiction conferred. In the absence of any legislation by Congress, the court itself may prescribe the mode and form of proceedings so as to attain the ends for which jurisdiction was given. Florida v. Georgia, 17 How. 478.

The original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court is special and limited, and its action must be confined to the particular cases, controversies and parties over which the Constitution has authorized it to act. Any action without the limits prescribed is coram non judice, and its action a nullity. Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 12 Pet. 657.

A motion to dismiss for want of jurisdiction may be made, even after a plea to the merits. Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 12 Pet. 657.

Where a State is a party plaintiff or defendant, the governor represents the State, and the suit may be in form a suit by him as governor in behalf of the State where the State is plaintiff, and he must be summoned or notified as the officer representing the State where the State is defendant. Comm v. Dennison, 24 How. 66.

Where a question of boundary is in dispute between two States, the United States may intervene if it has any interest in the controversy, and produce proof. Florida v. Georgia, 17 How. 478.

An indictment against a private person for an assault upon an ambassador or public minister, is not a case affecting such ambassador or minister. U. S. v. Ortega, 11 Wheat. 467.

A State court is deprived of jurisdiction over an offense committed by a consul against the laws of the State. Comm. v. Kosloff, 5 S & R. 546; contra, State v. De La Foret, 2 N. & M. 217.

The Supreme Court has no original jurisdiction of a proceeding by a private individual who is an alien, to obtain redress for a wrong done him by another private individual who is a citizen. Ex parte Barry, 2 How. 65.

Although the Constitution vests in the Supreme Court original jurisdiction in suits affecting ambassadors, ministers and consuls, it does not pre

clude Congress from exercising the power of vesting a concurrent jurisdiction in such inferior courts as may by law be established. St. Luke's Hospital v. Barclay, 3 Blatch. 259; Graham v. Stucken, 4 Blatch. 50; U. S. v. Ravara, 2 Dall. 297; Gittings v. Crawford, Tan. 1.

A State may be authorized to sue in the inferior courts. State v. Atkins 35 Geo. 315; contra, State v. Trustees, 5 B. R. 466; s. c. 1 Hughes, 133

Appellate Jurisdiction.

Appellate jurisdiction is given by the Constitution to the Supreme Court in all cases where it has not original jurisdiction, subject, however, to such exceptions and regulations as Congress may prescribe. It is therefore capable of embracing every case enumerated in the Constitution which is not exclusively to be decided by way of original jurisdiction. Martin v. Hunter, I Wheat. 304.

In every case to which judicial power extends and in which original jurisdiction is not expressly given to the Supreme Court, its judicial power must be exercised in the appellate and only in the appellate form. The V original jurisdiction can not be enlarged, but its appellate jurisdiction may be exercised in every case cognizable under this article in the Federal courts in which original jurisdiction can not be exercised. Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 264.

The appellate powers of the Supreme Court are limited and regulated by the acts of Congress, and must be exercised subject to the exceptions and regulations made by Congress. Ex parte Clement L. Vallandigham, 1 Wall. 243; Durousseau v. U. S. 6 Cranch, 307; Barry v. Mercein, 5 How. 103; U. S. v. Moore, 7 Cranch, 159: Ex parte McCardle, 7 Wall. 506; Murdock v. Memphis, 20 Wall. 590; Martin v. Hunter, 1 Wheat. 304. The Supreme Court can not exercise appellate jurisdiction over the Court of Claims. Gordon v. U. S. 2 Wall. 561.

In prize cases the Supreme Court can exercise appellate jurisdiction only. A case can not be docketed unless there is an order, decree or judgment in some inferior court, for appellate jurisdiction necessarily implies some judicial determination, some judgment, decree or order of an inferior tribunal from which an appeal is taken. The Alivia, 7 Wall. 571.

The Supreme Court may be vested with the power to issue a writ of habeas corpus to release a person committed by an inferior court, for the writ is appellate in its nature. Ex parte Bollman, 4 Cranch, 73; Ex parte Burford, 3 Cranch, 448; U. S. v. Hamilton, 3 Dall. 17; Ex parte Kearney, 7 Wheat. 38.

The appellate power of the Supreme Court is not limited by the terms of this article to any particular courts. The words are "in all other cases

before mentioned the Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction." It is the case, then, and not the court, that gives jurisdiction. The Constitution not only contemplated, but meant to provide for cases within the scope of the judicial power of the United States which might yet depend before State tribunals. It was foreseen that in the exercise of their ordinary jurisdiction State courts would incidentally take cognizance of cases arising under the Constitution, the laws, and treaties of the United States. Yet to all these cases the judicial power, by the very terms of the Constition, is to extend. The appellate power of the United States must, therefore, in such cases, extend to State tribunals; and if in such cases, there is no reason why it should not equally attach upon all others within the purview of the Constitution. Martin v. Hunter, 1 Wheat. 304; Piqua Bank v. Knoup, 6 Ohio St. 342; Dodge v. Woolsey, 18 How. 331; Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 264; Ableman v. Booth, 21 How. 506; s. c. 3 Wis. 1 ; Ferris v. Coover, 11 Cal. 175; contra, Hunter v. Martin, 4 Munf. 1; Johnson v. Gordon, 4. Cal. 368.

The principle on which the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court over the State courts is allowed is, that no government can be efficient or just without the means of self-protection. And hence, that those who act under it, or claim rights beneath the shield of its laws should, within its own territory, be able to appeal to its own tribunals for relief. Scott v. Jones, 5 How. 343.

The provisions of the Constitution do not imply that the States will be willfully disregardful of the obligations solemnly placed upon them by the people, but that there may be interferences from their legislation, either with the Constitution or between their enactments and those of Congress. This suggested the necessity, or rather made it obvious, that the National Union would be incomplete and altogether insufficient for the great ends contemplated, unless a constitutional arbiter was provided to give certainty and uniformity in all of the States to the interpretation of the Constitution and the legislation of Congress, with powers to declare judicially what acts of the legislatures of the States might be in conflict with either. Had this not been done, there would have been no mutuality of constitutional obligation between the States, either in respect to the Constitution or the laws of Congress, and each of them would have determined for itself the operation of both, either by legislation or judicial action; in either way exempting itself and its citizens from engagements which it had not made by itself, but in common with other States of the Union equally sovereign, by which they bound their sovereignties to each other, that neither of them should assume to settle a principle or interest for itself in a matter which was the common interest of all of them. Such is certainly the common-sense view of the people when any number of them enter into a contract for their mutual benefit in the same proportions of interest. In such a case neither should assume the right to bind his compeers by his judgment as to the stipulations of their contract. Dodge v. Woolsey, 18 How. 331; Ableman v. Booth, 21 How. 506; s. C 3 Wis. 1.

The exercise of appellate jurisdiction is far from being limited by the terms of the Constitution to the Supreme Court. There can be no doubt that Congress may create a succession of inferior tribunals, in each of which it may vest appellate as well as original jurisdiction. The judicial power is delegated by the Constitution in the most general terms, and may therefore be exercised by Congress under every variety of form of appellate or original jurisdiction. As there is nothing in the Constitution which restrains or limits this power, it must therefore in all other cases subsist in the utmost latitude of which in its own nature it is susceptible. Martin v. Hunter, I Wheat. 304; S. C. 4 Munf. I.

None but the Supreme Court can entertain jurisdiction by way of appeal from the judgments of State courts in cases originally cognizable and commenced in those courts; and any act of Congress giving such jurisdiction to any inferior court of the United States would be unconstitutional and void. Wetherbee v. Johnson, 14 Mass. 412; Patrie v. Murray, 43 Barb. 323.

3. The trial of all crimes, except in cases of impeachment, shall be by jury; and such trial shall be held in the State where the said crime shall have been committed; but when not committed within any State, the trial shall be at such place or places as the Congress may, by law, have directed.

The provisions of this clause are applicable to proceedings in the Federal courts only. Murphy v. People, 2 Cow. 815.

A proceeding to annul the license of a pilot for neglect of duty is not a criminal proceeding. Low v. Commissioners, R. M. Charlt. 302.

A citizen in civil life, in no wise connected with the military service, can not be tried by a military commission in a place where the Federal authority is unopposed, and its courts open to hear criminal accusations and redress grievances. Ex parte Milligan, 4 Wall. 2.

A statute which provides that a party may be tried by the court on a charge of libel is void, although it gives him the right to appeal to another court where the charge must be tried by a jury. The accused is entitled not to be first convicted by a court, and then to be acquitted by a jury, but to be acquitted or convicted in the first instance by a jury. Ex parte Charles A. Dana, 7 Ben. I.

The form of asking a prisoner how he will be tried is wholly unnecessary. This provision is imperative upon the courts, and prisoners can be lawfully tried in no other manner. As soon, therefore, as it judicially ap

pears of record that the party has pleaded not guilty, there is an issue in a criminal case which the courts are bound to direct to be tried by a jury. U. S. v. Gilbert, 2 Sum. 19.

A statute to confiscate the property of persons engaged in rebellion, in any district in which it may be found, is void. Norris v. Doniphan, 4 Met. (Ky.) 385.

A crime committed against the laws of the United States out of the limits of a State is not local, but may be tried at such place as Congress shall designate by law. United States v. Dawson, 15 How. 467.

SECTION III.

1. Treason against the United States shall consist only in levying war against them, or in adhering to their enemies, giving them aid and comfort. No person shall be convicted of treason unless on the testimony of two witnesses to the same overt act, or on confession in open court.

It is consonant to the principles of the Constitution that the crime of treason shall not be extended by construction. Ex parte Bollman, 4 Cranch, 75.

However flagitious may be the crime of conspiring to subvert the Government by force, such conspiracy is not treason. To conspire to levy war, and actually to levy war, are distinct offenses. The first must be brought into open action by the assemblage of men for a purpose treasonable in itself, or the fact of levying war is not committed. Ex parte Bollman, 4 Cranch, 75; U. S. v. Mitchell, 2 Dall. 348.

There must be an actual assemblage of men for a treasonable purpose to constitute a levying of war. Ex parte Bollman, 4 Cranch, 75.

The assemblage of men for the purpose of carrying into operation the treasonable intent, which will amount to levying war, must be an assemblage in force. U. S. v. Burr, 2 Burr's Trial, 401; U. S. v. Hoxie, 1 Paine, 265.

To constitute a levying of war there must be an assemblage of persons in force to overthrow the Government or coerce its conduct. The words embrace not only those acts by which war is brought into existence, but also those acts by which war is prosecuted. They levy war who create or carry on war. U. S. v. Greathouse, 2 Abb. C. C. 364.

If a body of men is actually assembled for the purpose of effecting by